Gifford Weary – författare

This wide-ranging anthology of current research bridges clinical and social psychology, concentrating on clinical judgment, the development of maladaptive behavior, and intervention strategies. The editors provide extensive commentary that integrates the individual chapters into a comprehensive theoretical formulation. "Advances valuable insights on the status of the integration process. ... [Readers] will encounter a wealth of empirical findings drawn from abroad range of topics." --Contemporary Psychology

Human beings are agents: They may exert influence over their own fate. They initiate their actions, experience a considerable degree of freedom and control in their mundane activities, and respond adversely to external constraints to their agency; they are able to monitor and modify their moti- vation, affective states, and behavior. Since the sixties, the notion of person-as-agent has become increas- ingly accepted in scientific psychology. Nowadays, personal control is a standard topic in research on personality, motivation, and social behavior. The most popular approach identifies personal control with a feeling or judgment: To have control means to perceive the self as a source of causa- tion. Within this perspective, such consciously accessible contents like perceived freedom and self-determination, feelings and expectations of control, or perceived self-efficacy and competence emerge as natural tar- gets of research (see e.g., Alloy, Clements, & Koenig, 1993; Bandura, 1977; OeCharms, 1968; Oeci & Ryan, 1985; Harvey, 1976; Rotter, 1966; Thomp- son, 1993; Wortman, 1975).

Human beings are agents: They may exert influence over their own fate. They initiate their actions, experience a considerable degree of freedom and control in their mundane activities, and respond adversely to external constraints to their agency; they are able to monitor and modify their moti- vation, affective states, and behavior. Since the sixties, the notion of person-as-agent has become increas- ingly accepted in scientific psychology. Nowadays, personal control is a standard topic in research on personality, motivation, and social behavior. The most popular approach identifies personal control with a feeling or judgment: To have control means to perceive the self as a source of causa- tion. Within this perspective, such consciously accessible contents like perceived freedom and self-determination, feelings and expectations of control, or perceived self-efficacy and competence emerge as natural tar- gets of research (see e.g., Alloy, Clements, & Koenig, 1993; Bandura, 1977; OeCharms, 1968; Oeci & Ryan, 1985; Harvey, 1976; Rotter, 1966; Thomp- son, 1993; Wortman, 1975).

This book initially was conceived in 1986 by Weary and Harvey as a revi­ sion and update of their 1981 Perspectives on Attributional Processes (pub­ lished by Wm. C. Brown," Dubuque, Iowa). However: toe extensive nature of recent work on attributional processes and the opportunity to collabo­ rate with Melinda Stanley as a coauthor led to a plan to develop a more comprehensive work than the 1981 book. It definitely is an amalgam of our interests in social and clinical psychology. It represents our commitment to basic theoretical and empirical inquiry blended with the applications of ideas and methods to understanding attribution in more naturalistic set­ tings, and as it unfolds in the lives of different kinds of people coping with diverse problems of living. The book represents a commitment also to the breadth of approach to attribution questions epitomized by Fritz Heider''s uniquely creative mind and work in pioneering the area. To us, the attribu­ tional approach is not a sacrosanct school of thought on the human condi­ tion. It is, rather, a body of ideas and findings that we find to be highly useful in our work as social (JH and GW) and clinical (GW and MS) psychology scholars. It is an inviting approach that, as we shall describe in the book, brings together ideas and work from different fields in psychology-all concerned with the pervasive and inestimab1e importance of interpretive activity in human experience and behavior.

This book initially was conceived in 1986 by Weary and Harvey as a revi­ sion and update of their 1981 Perspectives on Attributional Processes (pub­ lished by Wm. C. Brown," Dubuque, Iowa). However: toe extensive nature of recent work on attributional processes and the opportunity to collabo­ rate with Melinda Stanley as a coauthor led to a plan to develop a more comprehensive work than the 1981 book. It definitely is an amalgam of our interests in social and clinical psychology. It represents our commitment to basic theoretical and empirical inquiry blended with the applications of ideas and methods to understanding attribution in more naturalistic set­ tings, and as it unfolds in the lives of different kinds of people coping with diverse problems of living. The book represents a commitment also to the breadth of approach to attribution questions epitomized by Fritz Heider's uniquely creative mind and work in pioneering the area. To us, the attribu­ tional approach is not a sacrosanct school of thought on the human condi­ tion. It is, rather, a body of ideas and findings that we find to be highly useful in our work as social (JH and GW) and clinical (GW and MS) psychology scholars. It is an inviting approach that, as we shall describe in the book, brings together ideas and work from different fields in psychology-all concerned with the pervasive and inestimab1e importance of interpretive activity in human experience and behavior.

Over the past two decades theorists and researchers have given increasing attention to the effects, both beneficial and harmful, of various control­ related motivations and beliefs. People''s notions of how much personal control they have or desire to have over important events in their lives have been used to explain a host of performance and adaptational outcomes, including motivational and performance deficits associated with learned helplessness (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) and depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), adaptation to aging (Baltes & Baltes, 1986; Rodin, 1986), cardiovascular disease (Matthews, 1982), cancer (Sklar & Anisman, 1979), increased reports of physical symptoms (Pennebaker, 1982), enhanced learning (Savage, Perlmutter, & Monty, 1979), achievement-related behaviors (Dweck & Licht, 1980; Ryckman, 1979), and post abortion adjustment (Mueller & Major, 1989). The notion that control motivation plays a fundamental role in a variety of basic, social psychological processes also has a long historical tradition. A number of theorists (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967), for example, have suggested that causal inferences arise from a desire to render the social world predictable and controllable. Similarly, control has been implicated as an important mediator of cognitive dissonance (Wicklund & Brehm, 1976) and attitude phenomena (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969). Despite the apparent centrality of control motivation to a variety of social psychological phenomena, until recently there has been relatively little research explicitly concerned with the effects of control motivation on the cognitive processes underlying such phenomena (cf.

Over the past two decades theorists and researchers have given increasing attention to the effects, both beneficial and harmful, of various control­ related motivations and beliefs. People's notions of how much personal control they have or desire to have over important events in their lives have been used to explain a host of performance and adaptational outcomes, including motivational and performance deficits associated with learned helplessness (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) and depression (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), adaptation to aging (Baltes & Baltes, 1986; Rodin, 1986), cardiovascular disease (Matthews, 1982), cancer (Sklar & Anisman, 1979), increased reports of physical symptoms (Pennebaker, 1982), enhanced learning (Savage, Perlmutter, & Monty, 1979), achievement-related behaviors (Dweck & Licht, 1980; Ryckman, 1979), and post abortion adjustment (Mueller & Major, 1989). The notion that control motivation plays a fundamental role in a variety of basic, social psychological processes also has a long historical tradition. A number of theorists (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967), for example, have suggested that causal inferences arise from a desire to render the social world predictable and controllable. Similarly, control has been implicated as an important mediator of cognitive dissonance (Wicklund & Brehm, 1976) and attitude phenomena (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969). Despite the apparent centrality of control motivation to a variety of social psychological phenomena, until recently there has been relatively little research explicitly concerned with the effects of control motivation on the cognitive processes underlying such phenomena (cf.