Helge Blakkisrud – författare

Vladimir Putin has explicitly based his nation-building initiatives on the assumption that there exists a vast pool of common values in Russia that cut across ethnic and regional divides. Nation-Building and Common Values in Russia explores whether Putin is correct in his assumption, and to what degree a 'commonality of values' among the citizens of a country is a crucial element in the establishment of a common identity among them. The study raises two basic questions: Which values are actually common among various groups in Russia's population? And which nation-building strategies are the Russian authorities actually pursuing, centrally and locally? Sociological and political approaches to the study of nation-building and national cohesion in Russia are employed to answer these questions, and the findings contribute to a better understanding of nation-building processes in post-Communist Russia in general and of Putin's strategies in particular.

Vladimir Putin has explicitly based his nation-building initiatives on the assumption that there exists a vast pool of common values in Russia that cut across ethnic and regional divides. Nation-Building and Common Values in Russia explores whether Putin is correct in his assumption, and to what degree a 'commonality of values' among the citizens of a country is a crucial element in the establishment of a common identity among them. The study raises two basic questions: Which values are actually common among various groups in Russia's population? And which nation-building strategies are the Russian authorities actually pursuing, centrally and locally? Sociological and political approaches to the study of nation-building and national cohesion in Russia are employed to answer these questions, and the findings contribute to a better understanding of nation-building processes in post-Communist Russia in general and of Putin's strategies in particular.

The North is intrinsic to the way most outsiders imagine Russia: snow, long winters and the endless Siberian forests. Indeed, about 70 percent of the country's territory is defined as belonging to the North. These inhospitable tracts contain immense natural wealth, and large cities were constructed in Soviet times to supply the labor force for extraction industries. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian North has become both a burden and an asset. It is overdeveloped, with its now obsolete mono-industrial towns, and underdeveloped, with its still largely untapped natural resources. Today's Russian authorities face the challenge of developing a new Northern policy adapted to the realities of the 21st century. With its expert contributions from political science, economics, geography, and anthropology, this book represents the first comprehensive study in the Western literature of federal politics towards the Russian North. In addition to mapping the scope for federal governance, it covers such important issues such as infrastructure development, natural resource management, environmental affairs, and policies towards indigenous peoples.

This title was first published in 2001. This study of centre-periphery relations in Russia looks at general developments in law, politics and economy, as well as resource management and military presence. The book is the result of several years of co-operation between the Centre for Russian Studies and the Polar Programme.

This title was first published in 2001. This study of centre-periphery relations in Russia looks at general developments in law, politics and economy, as well as resource management and military presence. The book is the result of several years of co-operation between the Centre for Russian Studies and the Polar Programme.

Since Vladimir Putin's return to the Russian presidency in 2012, protection and promotion of so-called 'traditional values' has played a prominent role in the Kremlin's propaganda campaigns. From the large-scale demonstrations in 2011 2012 to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, conservative social values have been mobilised to justify the Kremlin's policy choices. In the case of the invasion, for example, Putin argued that the allegedly 'decadent' western world was using Ukraine as a springboard to export its 'pseudo-values' into Russia. Drawing on a series of case studies spanning elite-level political rhetoric, the work of various ideological 'values entrepreneurs' such as the Russian Orthodox Church, and, not least, of grassroots sentiments, Political Legitimacy and Traditional Values in Putin's Russia explores authoritarian regime legitimation in today's Russia.

Since Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012, protection and promotion of so-called ‘traditional values’ has played a prominent role in the Kremlin’s propaganda campaigns. From the large-scale demonstrations in 2011–2012 to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, conservative social values have been mobilised to justify the Kremlin’s policy choices. In the case of the invasion, for example, Putin argued that the allegedly ‘decadent’ western world was using Ukraine as a springboard to export its ‘pseudo-values’ into Russia. Drawing on a series of case studies spanning elite-level political rhetoric, the work of various ideological ‘values entrepreneurs’ such as the Russian Orthodox Church, and, not least, of grassroots sentiments, Political Legitimacy and Traditional Values in Putin's Russia explores authoritarian regime legitimation in today’s Russia.

Since Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012, protection and promotion of so-called ‘traditional values’ has played a prominent role in the Kremlin’s propaganda campaigns. From the large-scale demonstrations in 2011–2012 to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, conservative social values have been mobilised to justify the Kremlin’s policy choices. In the case of the invasion, for example, Putin argued that the allegedly ‘decadent’ western world was using Ukraine as a springboard to export its ‘pseudo-values’ into Russia. Drawing on a series of case studies spanning elite-level political rhetoric, the work of various ideological ‘values entrepreneurs’ such as the Russian Orthodox Church, and, not least, of grassroots sentiments, Political Legitimacy and Traditional Values in Putin''s Russia explores authoritarian regime legitimation in today’s Russia.

Since Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012, protection and promotion of so-called ‘traditional values’ has played a prominent role in the Kremlin’s propaganda campaigns. From the large-scale demonstrations in 2011–2012 to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, conservative social values have been mobilised to justify the Kremlin’s policy choices. In the case of the invasion, for example, Putin argued that the allegedly ‘decadent’ western world was using Ukraine as a springboard to export its ‘pseudo-values’ into Russia. Drawing on a series of case studies spanning elite-level political rhetoric, the work of various ideological ‘values entrepreneurs’ such as the Russian Orthodox Church, and, not least, of grassroots sentiments, Political Legitimacy and Traditional Values in Putin''s Russia explores authoritarian regime legitimation in today’s Russia.

This book surveys Russian nationalism as a political, social and intellectual phenomenon by leading Western and Russian experts. Includes case studies on the relationship between nationalism and migrantophobia; religion; the media; national identity in economic policy; the strategy of the Putin regime and public opinion.

Explores the momentous changes that have taken place in the Russian nationalism since Putin's return to the presidencyRussia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a watershed in post-Cold War European history and brought East West relations to a low. At the same time, by selling this fateful action in starkly nationalist language, the Putin regime achieved record-high popularity. This book shows how, after the large-scale 2011 13 anti-Putin demonstrations in major Russian cities and the parallel rise in xenophobia related to the Kremlin's perceived inability to deal with the influx of Central Asian labour migrants, the annexation of Crimea generated strong 'rallying around the nation' and 'rallying around the leader' effects. The contributors to this collection go beyond the news headlines to focus on overlooked aspects of Russian society such as intellectual racism and growing xenophobia. These developments are contextualised with an overview of Russian nationalism: state-led, grassroots and the tensions between the two.ContributorsHelge Blakkisrud, Senior Researcher and Head of the Research Group on Russia, Eurasia and the Arctic, at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway. J. Paul Goode, Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) of Russian Politics at the University of Bath, UK. Robert Horvath, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Philosophy at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. Eleanor Knott, Fellow in Qualitative Methodology, and from September 2017 an Assistant Professor in the Department of Methodology at the London School of Economics, UK. Pal Kolsto, Professor of Russian Studies at the University of Oslo. Michael Komin, Senior Expert at the Centre for Strategic Research in Moscow, and holds an MA degree in Political Science from the National Research University Higher School of Economics in St Petersburg, Russia. Alexandra Kuznetsova, PhD candidate at the Arthur V. Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada, and an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political and Social Studies, Kazan National Research Technological University, Russia. Andrey Makarychev, Guest Professor at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Science, University of Tartu, Estonia. Emil Pain, Director General of the Centre for Ethno-Political and Regional Studies, Moscow, and Professor of Political Science, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow. Eduard Ponarin, Director of the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research and Professor of Sociology at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Caress Schenk, an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan.Sergey Sergeev, Professor and Head of the Department of Social and Political Conflict Studies at Kazan National Research Technological University and Professor at the Political Science Department, Kazan Federal University, Russia.Yuri Teper, Israel Science Foundation (ISF) postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Sofia Tipaldou, Marie Curie Research Fellow at the University of Manchester, UK. Alexander Verkhovsky, Director of SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, Moscow. Alexandra Yatsyk, Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, Austria, and Visiting Researcher at the Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a watershed in post-Cold War European history and brought East–West relations to a low. At the same time, by selling this fateful action in starkly nationalist language, the Putin regime achieved record-high popularity. This book shows how, after the large-scale 2011–2013 anti-Putin demonstrations in major Russian cities and the parallel rise in xenophobia related to the Kremlin’s perceived inability to deal with the influx of Central Asian labour migrants, the annexation of Crimea generated strong ‘rallying around the nation’ and ‘rallying around the leader’ effects. The contributors to this collection go beyond the news headlines to focus on overlooked aspects of Russian society such as intellectual racism and growing xenophobia. These developments are contextualised with an overview of Russian nationalism: state-led, grassroots and the tensions between the two.