Howard Robinson – författare

Berkeley''s idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx.There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley''s Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and his response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.This edition of Berkeley''s two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes and an index.ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World''s Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford''s commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more.

Berkeley''s idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx.There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley''s Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and his response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.This edition of Berkeley''s two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes and an index.ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World''s Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford''s commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more.

Perception and Idealism takes up two long-standing philosophical problems: how perception makes objects manifest to us, and what the world must be like for objects to be manifest in that way. Part I addresses the nature of perception. A detailed discussion of contemporary versions of naïve realist and of intentionalist theories is provided, and refutations offered of both. Robinson argues that sense-datum theory is not subject to any of the vices normally attributed to it, but in fact allows one to say that we directly perceive objects as being the way that they naturally manifest themselves to creatures like us. The sense-datum theory can be reconciled with a form of direct realism, once one understands properly the cognitive and the phenomenal components in perception, a relationship which intentionalist theories confuse. As perception makes us aware of objects as they manifest themselves to us, this leaves open the question of what they are like in themselves. This is the topic of Part II. A variety of realist conceptions of the material world are considered and found to be either empty or less plausible than idealism: the ''powers'' conception of matter, Lewis''s quiddities, Esfeld''s ''matter points'', and quantum theory. The problem of giving a realist account of space is also developed. Turning to mentalist options, simple phenomenalism and panpsychism are discussed and rejected. Robinson concludes that Berkeley''s theistic phenomenalism, or idealism, is the most plausible account.

Perception and Idealism takes up two long-standing philosophical problems: how perception makes objects manifest to us, and what the world must be like for objects to be manifest in that way. Part I addresses the nature of perception. A detailed discussion of contemporary versions of naïve realist and of intentionalist theories is provided, and refutations offered of both. Robinson argues that sense-datum theory is not subject to any of the vices normally attributed to it, but in fact allows one to say that we directly perceive objects as being the way that they naturally manifest themselves to creatures like us. The sense-datum theory can be reconciled with a form of direct realism, once one understands properly the cognitive and the phenomenal components in perception, a relationship which intentionalist theories confuse. As perception makes us aware of objects as they manifest themselves to us, this leaves open the question of what they are like in themselves. This is the topic of Part II. A variety of realist conceptions of the material world are considered and found to be either empty or less plausible than idealism: the ''powers'' conception of matter, Lewis''s quiddities, Esfeld''s ''matter points'', and quantum theory. The problem of giving a realist account of space is also developed. Turning to mentalist options, simple phenomenalism and panpsychism are discussed and rejected. Robinson concludes that Berkeley''s theistic phenomenalism, or idealism, is the most plausible account.

Perception and Idealism takes up two long-standing philosophical problems: how perception makes objects manifest to us, and what the world must be like for objects to be manifest in that way. Part I addresses the nature of perception. A detailed discussion of contemporary versions of naïve realist and of intentionalist theories is provided, and refutations offered of both. Robinson argues that sense-datum theory is not subject to any of the vices normally attributed to it, but in fact allows one to say that we directly perceive objects as being the way that they naturally manifest themselves to creatures like us. The sense-datum theory can be reconciled with a form of direct realism, once one understands properly the cognitive and the phenomenal components in perception, a relationship which intentionalist theories confuse. As perception makes us aware of objects as they manifest themselves to us, this leaves open the question of what they are like in themselves. This is the topic of Part II. A variety of realist conceptions of the material world are considered and found to be either empty or less plausible than idealism: the 'powers' conception of matter, Lewis's quiddities, Esfeld's 'matter points', and quantum theory. The problem of giving a realist account of space is also developed. Turning to mentalist options, simple phenomenalism and panpsychism are discussed and rejected. Robinson concludes that Berkeley's theistic phenomenalism, or idealism, is the most plausible account.

This volume contains papers by a group of leading experts on Aristotle and the later Aristotelian tradition of Neoplatonism. The discussion ranges from Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides, the most important pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, to Neoplatonic and medieval use of Aristotle, for which Aristotle himself set guidelines in his discussions of his predecessors. Traces of these guidelines can be seen in the work of Plotinus, and that of the later Greek commentators on Aristotle. The study of these commentators, and the recognition of the philosophical interest and importance of the ideas which they expressed in their commentaries, is an exciting new development in ancient philosophy to which this book makes a unique and distinguished contribution.

Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx.There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and his response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.This edition of Berkeley's two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes and an index. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more.

Questions about perception remain some of the most difficult and insoluble in both epistemology and in the philosophy of mind. This controversial but highly accessible introduction to the area explores the philosophical importance of those questions by re-examining what had until recent times been the most popular theory of perception - the sense-datum theory. Howard Robinson surveys the history of the arguments for and against the theory from Descartes to Husserl. He then shows that the objections to the theory, particularly Wittgenstein's attack on privacy and those of the physicalists, have been unsuccessful. He argues that we should return to the theory sense-data in order to understand perception. In doing so he seeks to overturn a consensus that has dominated the philosophy of perception for nearly half a century.

Questions about perception remain some of the most difficult and insoluble in both epistemology and in the philosophy of mind. This controversial but highly accessible introduction to the area explores the philosophical importance of those questions by re-examining what had until recent times been the most popular theory of perception - the sense-datum theory. Howard Robinson surveys the history of the arguments for and against the theory from Descartes to Husserl. He then shows that the objections to the theory, particularly Wittgenstein's attack on privacy and those of the physicalists, have been unsuccessful. He argues that we should return to the theory sense-data in order to understand perception. In doing so he seeks to overturn a consensus that has dominated the philosophy of perception for nearly half a century.

Ontological materialism, in its various forms, has become the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of mind. This book provides a variety of defenses of mind-body dualism, and shows (explicitly or implicitly) that a thoroughgoing ontological materialism cannot be sustained. The contributions are intended to show that, at the very least, ontological dualism (as contrasted with a dualism that is merely linguistic or epistemic) constitutes a philosophically respectable alternative to the monistic views that currently dominate thought about the mind-body (or, perhaps more appropriately, person-body) relation.

The assumption of materialism (in its many forms) Howard Robinson believes is false. In his book he presents a very forceful critique of the modern forms that materialism has taken. In telling discussions of the theory of supervenience put forward by Davidson and Peacocke, the central state materialism attributable to Smart, Armstrong and others, Putnam's functionalism, and Rorty's disappearance theory, he shows that, whatever their local inconsistencies, these forms of materialism all overlook or quite inadequately explain elementary and unimpeachable intuitions about our own mental experiences. Robinson concludes with a consideration of the alternative views of the matter of which the mind is held to consist. These arguments will either serve to crystallise for the most part inchoate opposition to materialism among a number of philosophers, and will challenge its proponents to find a more secure defence for the basis of their view.

This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle, and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem.

This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle, and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem.

Questions about perception remain some of the most difficult and insoluble in both epistemology and in the philosophy of mind. This controversial but highly accessible introduction to the area explores the philosophical importance of those questions by re-examining what had until recent times been the most popular theory of perception - the sense-datum theory. Howard Robinson surveys the history of the arguments for and against the theory from Descartes to Husserl. He then shows that the objections to the theory, particularly Wittgenstein''s attack on privacy and those of the physicalists, have been unsuccessful. He argues that we should return to the theory sense-data in order to understand perception. In doing so he seeks to overturn a consensus that has dominated the philosophy of perception for nearly half a century.

Questions about perception remain some of the most difficult and insoluble in both epistemology and in the philosophy of mind. This controversial but highly accessible introduction to the area explores the philosophical importance of those questions by re-examining what had until recent times been the most popular theory of perception - the sense-datum theory. Howard Robinson surveys the history of the arguments for and against the theory from Descartes to Husserl. He then shows that the objections to the theory, particularly Wittgenstein''s attack on privacy and those of the physicalists, have been unsuccessful. He argues that we should return to the theory sense-data in order to understand perception. In doing so he seeks to overturn a consensus that has dominated the philosophy of perception for nearly half a century.

Ontological materialism, in its various forms, has become the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of mind. This book provides a variety of defenses of mind-body dualism, and shows (explicitly or implicitly) that a thoroughgoing ontological materialism cannot be sustained. The contributions are intended to show that, at the very least, ontological dualism (as contrasted with a dualism that is merely linguistic or epistemic) constitutes a philosophically respectable alternative to the monistic views that currently dominate thought about the mind-body (or, perhaps more appropriately, person-body) relation.

Surveying the history, latest developments and potential future directions of contemporary analytic philosophy, this is an essential one-volume reference guide for all those working in the field. The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy brings together a team of internationally renowned scholars to explore all the major areas of inquiry, key concepts and most important thinkers in the analytic tradition.Topics covered include: • The history of analytic philosophy, from Frege, Moore and Russell to Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and beyond• Philosophy of mind and language from early developments to the most recent advances• Perspectives in moral and political philosophy• Contemporary metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science and mathematics• The latest thinking on perception, free will and personal identityThe Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy also includes a historical chronology and a full guide to further reading and available resources, making this an invaluable library or desktop reference guide for anyone working in the discipline today.

Surveying the history, latest developments and potential future directions of contemporary analytic philosophy, this is an essential one-volume reference guide for all those working in the field. The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy brings together a team of internationally renowned scholars to explore all the major areas of inquiry, key concepts and most important thinkers in the analytic tradition.Topics covered include: • The history of analytic philosophy, from Frege, Moore and Russell to Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and beyond• Philosophy of mind and language from early developments to the most recent advances• Perspectives in moral and political philosophy• Contemporary metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science and mathematics• The latest thinking on perception, free will and personal identityThe Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy also includes a historical chronology and a full guide to further reading and available resources, making this an invaluable library or desktop reference guide for anyone working in the discipline today.

Surveying the history, latest developments and potential future directions of contemporary analytic philosophy, this is an essential one-volume reference guide for all those working in the field. The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy brings together a team of internationally renowned scholars to explore all the major areas of inquiry, key concepts and most important thinkers in the analytic tradition.Topics covered include: • The history of analytic philosophy, from Frege, Moore and Russell to Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and beyond• Philosophy of mind and language from early developments to the most recent advances• Perspectives in moral and political philosophy• Contemporary metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science and mathematics• The latest thinking on perception, free will and personal identityThe Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy also includes a historical chronology and a full guide to further reading and available resources, making this an invaluable library or desktop reference guide for anyone working in the discipline today.

Featuring chapters on the latest developments in fifteen core subjects in analytic philosophy, The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy is an essential guide for all those working in the field today. Introducing its history and looking ahead to new research directions, this companion brings together a team of internationally renowned philosophers to explore the major concepts, thinkers and areas of inquiry in the analytic traditionWith an extensive glossary, an annotated bibliography, a timeline of major events and publications, and a guide to further resources, this comprehensive companion is ideal for use on courses. Broken down into three parts, it covers: The history of analytic philosophy, from Frege, Moore and Russell to Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and beyond the more recent work of four influential American philosophers: Quine, Davidson, Putnam and Kripke Current analytic philosophy in action in subjects such as philosophy of mind and language, moral and political philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science, mathematics, perception, free will and personal identity Recent trends and developments such as the rise of specialisation and science, self-consciousness and analytic metaphysicsBroaching the controversial question of what analytical philosophy is, explaining how it differs from Continental Philosophy and exploring the extent to which it in a state of crisis, The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy presents an authoritative introduction to the origins and future of Anglo-America''s dominant philosophical tradition. Now available in paperback, this edition includes updated references and a chapter on Ethics and the problem of overdemandingnes.