Jere R. Behrman – författare

Substantial progress in the fight against extreme poverty was made in the last two decades. But the slowdown in global economic growth and significant increases in income inequality in many developed and developing countries raise serious concerns about the continuation of this trend into the 21st century. The time has come to seriously think about how improvements in official global governance, coupled with and reinforced by rising activism of ''global citizens'' canlead to welfare-enhancing and more equitable results for global citizens through better national and international policies.This book examines the factors that are most likely to facilitate the process of beneficial economic growth in low-, middle-, and high-income countries. It examines past, present, and future economic growth; demographic changes; the hyperglobalization of trade; the effect of finance on growth; climate change and resource depletion; and the sense of global citizenship and the need for global governance in order to draw longer-term implications, identify policy options for improving the lives ofaverage citizens around the world, and make the case for the need to confront new challenges with truly global policy responses. The book documents how demographic changes, convergence, and competition are likely to bring about massive shifts in the sectoral and geographical composition of globaloutput and employment, as the center of gravity of the global economy moves toward Asia and emerging economies elsewhere. It shows that the legacies of the 2008-09 crisis-high unemployment levels, massive excess capacities, and high debt levels-are likely to reduce the standard of living of millions of people in many countries over a long period of adjustment and that fluctuations in international trade, financial markets, and commodity prices, as well as the tendency of institutions at boththe national and international level to favor the interests of the better-off and more powerful pose substantial risks for citizens of all countries. The chapters and their policy implications are intended to stimulate public interest and facilitate the exchange of ideas and policydialogue.

Substantial progress in the fight against extreme poverty was made in the last two decades. But the slowdown in global economic growth and significant increases in income inequality in many developed and developing countries raise serious concerns about the continuation of this trend into the 21st century. The time has come to seriously think about how improvements in official global governance, coupled with and reinforced by rising activism of ''global citizens'' canlead to welfare-enhancing and more equitable results for global citizens through better national and international policies.This book examines the factors that are most likely to facilitate the process of beneficial economic growth in low-, middle-, and high-income countries. It examines past, present, and future economic growth; demographic changes; the hyperglobalization of trade; the effect of finance on growth; climate change and resource depletion; and the sense of global citizenship and the need for global governance in order to draw longer-term implications, identify policy options for improving the lives ofaverage citizens around the world, and make the case for the need to confront new challenges with truly global policy responses. The book documents how demographic changes, convergence, and competition are likely to bring about massive shifts in the sectoral and geographical composition of globaloutput and employment, as the center of gravity of the global economy moves toward Asia and emerging economies elsewhere. It shows that the legacies of the 2008-09 crisis-high unemployment levels, massive excess capacities, and high debt levels-are likely to reduce the standard of living of millions of people in many countries over a long period of adjustment and that fluctuations in international trade, financial markets, and commodity prices, as well as the tendency of institutions at boththe national and international level to favor the interests of the better-off and more powerful pose substantial risks for citizens of all countries. The chapters and their policy implications are intended to stimulate public interest and facilitate the exchange of ideas and policydialogue.

Substantial progress in the fight against extreme poverty was made in the last two decades. But the slowdown in global economic growth and significant increases in income inequality in many developed and developing countries raise serious concerns about the continuation of this trend into the 21st century. The time has come to seriously think about how improvements in official global governance, coupled with and reinforced by rising activism of 'global citizens' can lead to welfare-enhancing and more equitable results for global citizens through better national and international policies. This book examines the factors that are most likely to facilitate the process of beneficial economic growth in low-, middle-, and high-income countries. It examines past, present, and future economic growth; demographic changes; the hyperglobalization of trade; the effect of finance on growth; climate change and resource depletion; and the sense of global citizenship and the need for global governance in order to draw longer-term implications, identify policy options for improving the lives of average citizens around the world, and make the case for the need to confront new challenges with truly global policy responses. The book documents how demographic changes, convergence, and competition are likely to bring about massive shifts in the sectoral and geographical composition of global output and employment, as the center of gravity of the global economy moves toward Asia and emerging economies elsewhere. It shows that the legacies of the 2008-09 crisis-high unemployment levels, massive excess capacities, and high debt levels-are likely to reduce the standard of living of millions of people in many countries over a long period of adjustment and that fluctuations in international trade, financial markets, and commodity prices, as well as the tendency of institutions at both the national and international level to favor the interests of the better-off and more powerful pose substantial risks for citizens of all countries. The chapters and their policy implications are intended to stimulate public interest and facilitate the exchange of ideas and policy dialogue.

Substantial progress in the fight against extreme poverty was made in the last two decades. But the slowdown in global economic growth and significant increases in income inequality in many developed and developing countries raise serious concerns about the continuation of this trend into the 21st century. The time has come to seriously think about how improvements in official global governance, coupled with and reinforced by rising activism of 'global citizens' can lead to welfare-enhancing and more equitable results for global citizens through better national and international policies. This book examines the factors that are most likely to facilitate the process of beneficial economic growth in low-, middle-, and high-income countries. It examines past, present, and future economic growth; demographic changes; the hyperglobalization of trade; the effect of finance on growth; climate change and resource depletion; and the sense of global citizenship and the need for global governance in order to draw longer-term implications, identify policy options for improving the lives of average citizens around the world, and make the case for the need to confront new challenges with truly global policy responses. The book documents how demographic changes, convergence, and competition are likely to bring about massive shifts in the sectoral and geographical composition of global output and employment, as the center of gravity of the global economy moves toward Asia and emerging economies elsewhere. It shows that the legacies of the 2008-09 crisis-high unemployment levels, massive excess capacities, and high debt levels-are likely to reduce the standard of living of millions of people in many countries over a long period of adjustment and that fluctuations in international trade, financial markets, and commodity prices, as well as the tendency of institutions at both the national and international level to favor the interests of the better-off and more powerful pose substantial risks for citizens of all countries. The chapters and their policy implications are intended to stimulate public interest and facilitate the exchange of ideas and policy dialogue.

Serving as a companion to Growing Up Global, this book from the National ResearchCouncil explores how the transition to adulthood is changing in developing countriesin light of globalization and what the implications of these changes might be forthose responsible for designing youth policies and programs. Presenting a detailedseries of studies, this volume both complements its precursor and makes for a usefulcontribution in its own right. It should be of significant interest to scholars, leaders ofcivil society, and those charged with designing youth policies and programs.

Serving as a companion to Growing Up Global, this book from the National ResearchCouncil explores how the transition to adulthood is changing in developing countriesin light of globalization and what the implications of these changes might be forthose responsible for designing youth policies and programs. Presenting a detailedseries of studies, this volume both complements its precursor and makes for a usefulcontribution in its own right. It should be of significant interest to scholars, leaders ofcivil society, and those charged with designing youth policies and programs.

For decades, the primary argument in justifying education has been based on its direct economic effects. Yet education also provides "social benefits" for individuals and society at large, including a better way of taking care of ourselves, and consequently creating a better society to live in. Though it is difficult to quantify these social benefits, a more systematic analysis would improve our understanding of the full effects of education and provide a basis for considering related policies. The Office of Research of the United States Department of Education commissioned a series of papers on measuring these effects of education. Those papers, revised and updated, are collected here. Kenneth J. Arrow provides perspective on education and preference formation, and Jere R. Behrman considers general conceptual and measurement issues in assessing the social benefits of education and policies related to education. These issues are taken up by experts in four fields--health, parenting, the environment, and crime. Themes addressed include measurement issues regarding what we mean by education and its benefits; basic analytical issues in assessing the impact of education on these social benefits using behavioral data; and whether the social benefits of education justify public policy interventions. Jere R. Behrman is William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. Nevzer G. Stacey is Senior Research Analyst, Office of Educational Research, U.S. Department of Education.

All humans eventually die, but life expectancies differ over time and among different demographic groups. Teasing out the various causes and correlates of death is a challenge, and it is one we take on in this book. A look at the data on mortality is both interesting and suggestive of some possible relationships. In 1900 life expectancies at birth were 46. 3 and 48. 3 years for men and women respectively, a gender differential of a bit less than 5 percent. Life expectancies for whites then were about 0. 3 years longer than that of the whole population, but life expectancies for blacks were only about 33 years for men and women. At age 65, the remaining life expectancies were about 12 and 11 years for whites and blacks respectively. Fifty years later, life expectancies at birth had grown to 66 and 71 years for males and females respectively. The percentage differential between the sexes was now almost up to 10 percent. The life expectancies of whites were about one year longer than that for the entire population. The big change was for blacks, whose life expectancy had grown to over 60 years with black females living about 5 percent longer than their male counterparts. At age 65 the remaining expected life had increased about two years with much larger percentage gains for blacks.

This Element reviews what we know about parental investments and children's human capital in low-to-middle-income countries (LMICs). First, it presents definitions and a simple analytical framework; then discusses determinants of children's human capital in the form of cognitive skills, socioemotional skills and physical and mental health; then reviews estimates of impacts of these forms of human capital; next considers the implications of such estimates for inequality and poverty; and concludes with a summary suggesting some positive impacts of parental investments on children's human capital in LMICs and a discussion of gaps in the literature pertaining to both data and methodology. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element reviews what we know about parental investments and children''s human capital in low-to-middle-income countries (LMICs). First, it presents definitions and a simple analytical framework; then discusses determinants of children''s human capital in the form of cognitive skills, socioemotional skills and physical and mental health; then reviews estimates of impacts of these forms of human capital; next considers the implications of such estimates for inequality and poverty; and concludes with a summary suggesting some positive impacts of parental investments on children''s human capital in LMICs and a discussion of gaps in the literature pertaining to both data and methodology. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element reviews what we know about parental investments and children''s human capital in low-to-middle-income countries (LMICs). First, it presents definitions and a simple analytical framework; then discusses determinants of children''s human capital in the form of cognitive skills, socioemotional skills and physical and mental health; then reviews estimates of impacts of these forms of human capital; next considers the implications of such estimates for inequality and poverty; and concludes with a summary suggesting some positive impacts of parental investments on children''s human capital in LMICs and a discussion of gaps in the literature pertaining to both data and methodology. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

During the 1990s, the United States encountered an unprecedented economic upsurge. The duration and scope of this boom led many policymakers in D.C., to believe they had finally found a magic formula for sustained economic growth and seamless national development. Labeled the Washington Consensus, this free-market approach was a shift away from regulation and government intervention toward allowing the markets work themselves out on a global level. Was it magic?

After all, this was an era where the markets for goods, services, capital, and labor burst forth from North America, Western Europe, and Japan to stretch across the globe. The Soviet Union had collapsed and East and Southeast Asian economies were flourishing. Globalization and A New World Order became the slogans of the day.

In what some scholars and policymakers view as a massive social experiment, the U.S. Treasury and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began leaning on Latin American countries to dismantle their economic regime of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Without a firm understanding of the complexities involved, international lenders pressed for implementation of the Washington Consensus – advocating governments to step out of the way and let the markets do their work.

Yet every nation has a different history when it comes to the process of market creation. The attempt to apply a blanket formula on countries with divergent political, social, and cultural legacies flopped miserably. Supporters of the Washington Consensus discovered their magic formula was merely a myth.

Although Chile, which already had strong institutional foundations, came closest to succeeding in the implementation of the Washington Consensus, places like Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina met with political and economical turmoil that shook their countries to the core.

Pulling from a wellspring of knowledge, expertise, and experience from representatives of sociology, economics, demography, anthropology, and urban studies, this special issue of The ANNALS provides a coherent chain of evidence that reveals how the idea for structural adjustment in Latin America arose, how it was applied, the negative consequences it had, and the lessons learned.

Sprung from a request by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation on "Urban Studies and Demography," this collection of thought-provoking articles is the result of a two-year pilot research project conducted by faculty and students affiliated with the Population Studies Center and the Urban Studies program at the University of Pennsylvania.

Students, researchers, and policymakers in public affairs, economics, anthropology, international affairs, sociology, urban studies, population studies, and others will gain clarity and insight into this complex phase of world economic history.

During the 1990s, the United States encountered an unprecedented economic upsurge. The duration and scope of this boom led many policymakers in D.C., to believe they had finally found a magic formula for sustained economic growth and seamless national development. Labeled the Washington Consensus, this free-market approach was a shift away from regulation and government intervention toward allowing the markets work themselves out on a global level. Was it magic?

After all, this was an era where the markets for goods, services, capital, and labor burst forth from North America, Western Europe, and Japan to stretch across the globe. The Soviet Union had collapsed and East and Southeast Asian economies were flourishing. Globalization and A New World Order became the slogans of the day.

In what some scholars and policymakers view as a massive social experiment, the U.S. Treasury and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began leaning on Latin American countries to dismantle their economic regime of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Without a firm understanding of the complexities involved, international lenders pressed for implementation of the Washington Consensus – advocating governments to step out of the way and let the markets do their work.

Yet every nation has a different history when it comes to the process of market creation. The attempt to apply a blanket formula on countries with divergent political, social, and cultural legacies flopped miserably. Supporters of the Washington Consensus discovered their magic formula was merely a myth.

Although Chile, which already had strong institutional foundations, came closest to succeeding in the implementation of the Washington Consensus, places like Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina met with political and economical turmoil that shook their countries to the core.

Pulling from a wellspring of knowledge, expertise, and experience from representatives of sociology, economics, demography, anthropology, and urban studies, this special issue of The ANNALS provides a coherent chain of evidence that reveals how the idea for structural adjustment in Latin America arose, how it was applied, the negative consequences it had, and the lessons learned.

Sprung from a request by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation on "Urban Studies and Demography," this collection of thought-provoking articles is the result of a two-year pilot research project conducted by faculty and students affiliated with the Population Studies Center and the Urban Studies program at the University of Pennsylvania.

Students, researchers, and policymakers in public affairs, economics, anthropology, international affairs, sociology, urban studies, population studies, and others will gain clarity and insight into this complex phase of world economic history.

All humans eventually die, but life expectancies differ over time and among different demographic groups. Teasing out the various causes and correlates of death is a challenge, and it is one we take on in this book. A look at the data on mortality is both interesting and suggestive of some possible relationships. In 1900 life expectancies at birth were 46. 3 and 48. 3 years for men and women respectively, a gender differential of a bit less than 5 percent. Life expectancies for whites then were about 0. 3 years longer than that of the whole population, but life expectancies for blacks were only about 33 years for men and women. At age 65, the remaining life expectancies were about 12 and 11 years for whites and blacks respectively. Fifty years later, life expectancies at birth had grown to 66 and 71 years for males and females respectively. The percentage differential between the sexes was now almost up to 10 percent. The life expectancies of whites were about one year longer than that for the entire population. The big change was for blacks, whose life expectancy had grown to over 60 years with black females living about 5 percent longer than their male counterparts. At age 65 the remaining expected life had increased about two years with much larger percentage gains for blacks.

All humans eventually die, but life expectancies differ over time and among different demographic groups. Teasing out the various causes and correlates of death is a challenge, and it is one we take on in this book. A look at the data on mortality is both interesting and suggestive of some possible relationships. In 1900 life expectancies at birth were 46. 3 and 48. 3 years for men and women respectively, a gender differential of a bit less than 5 percent. Life expectancies for whites then were about 0. 3 years longer than that of the whole population, but life expectancies for blacks were only about 33 years for men and women. At age 65, the remaining life expectancies were about 12 and 11 years for whites and blacks respectively. Fifty years later, life expectancies at birth had grown to 66 and 71 years for males and females respectively. The percentage differential between the sexes was now almost up to 10 percent. The life expectancies of whites were about one year longer than that for the entire population. The big change was for blacks, whose life expectancy had grown to over 60 years with black females living about 5 percent longer than their male counterparts. At age 65 the remaining expected life had increased about two years with much larger percentage gains for blacks.