John Earman – författare

This book is the first serious, book-length study of the philosophical implications of relativity. It explains the relevant technical issues of general relativity theory and discusses how these issues bear upon philosophical problems about the nature of space and time, causality and laws of nature. Features include an analysis of time travel, The Big Bang and the Horizon Problem, Eternal Recurrence and Cyclic Time amongst other much debated issues today which have been brought to light in the the face of a series of theorems, due largely to Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose. Written by a leading philosopher, this book provides an overview of the technical literature as well as analytical commentary on its philosophical significance.

By situating Hume's famous work "Of Miracles" (which notoriously argues against the possiblity of miracles) in the context of the 18th century debate on miracles, Earman shows that Hume's argument is largely unoriginal, and largely without merit where it is original. On the positive side, he shows how progress can be made on the issues, so provocatively posed in Hume's essay, about the ability of eyewitness testimony to establish the credibility of marvelous and miraculous events. Earman's work is simultaneously a contribution to the history of ideas, the philosophy of religion, and to probability and induction.

By situating Hume's famous work Of Miracles (which notoriously argues against the possiblity of miracles) in the context of the 18th-century debate on miracles, Earman shows that Hume's argument is largely unoriginal, and largely without merit where it is original. On the positive side, he shows how progress can be made on the issues, so provocatively posed in Hume's essay, about the ability of eyewitness testimony to establish the credibility of marvelous and miraculous events. Earman's work is simultaneously a contribution to the history of ideas, the philosophy of religion, and to probability and induction.

Almost from its inception, Einstein''s general theory of relativity was known to sanction spacetime models harboring singularities. Until the 1960s, however, spacetime singularities were thought to be artifacts of the idealizations of the models. This attitude evaporated in the face of a series of theorems, due largely to Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose, which showed that Einstein''s general theory implies that singularities can be expected to occur in a wide variety of conditions in both gravitational collapse and in cosmology. In the light of these results some physicists adopted the attitude that, since spacetime singularities are intolerable, general relativity contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Others hoped that peaceful coexistence with singularities could be achieved by proving a form of Roger Penrose''s cosmic censorship hypothesis, which would place singularities safely inside black holes. Whatever the attitude one adopts toward spacetime singularities, it is evident that they raise a number of foundational problems for physics and have profound implications for the philosophy of space and time. However, philosophers of science have been slow to awaken to the significance of these developments. Indeed, this is the first serious book-length study of the subject by a philosopher of science. It features an overview of the literature on singularities, as well as an analytic commentary on their significance to a number of scientific and philosophical issues.

This vital study offers a new interpretation of Hume''s famous "Of Miracles," which notoriously argues against the possibility of miracles. By situating Hume''s popular argument in the context of the eighteenth-century debate on miracles, Earman shows Hume''s argument to be largely unoriginal and chiefly without merit where it is original. Yet Earman constructively conceives how progress can be made on the issues that Hume''s essay so provocatively posed about the ability of eyewitness testimony to establish the credibility of marvelous and miraculous events.

This vital study offers a new interpretation of Hume''s famous "Of Miracles," which notoriously argues against the possibility of miracles. By situating Hume''s popular argument in the context of the eighteenth-century debate on miracles, Earman shows Hume''s argument to be largely unoriginal and chiefly without merit where it is original. Yet Earman constructively conceives how progress can be made on the issues that Hume''s essay so provocatively posed about the ability of eyewitness testimony to establish the credibility of marvelous and miraculous events.

These provocative essays by leading philosophers of science exemplify and illuminate the contemporary uncertainty and excitement in the field. The papers are rich in new perspectives, and their far-reaching criticisms challenge arguments long prevalent in classic philosophical problems of induction, empiricism, and realism. By turns empirical or analytic, historical or programmatic, confessional or argumentative, the authors' arguments both describe and demonstrate the fact that philosophy of science is in a ferment more intense than at any time since the heyday of logical positivism early in the twentieth century.  Contents:  “Thoroughly Modern Meno,” Clark Glymour and Kevin Kelly“The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative Approach to Inquiry,” Jaakko Hintikka“Aristotelian Natures and Modern Experimental Method,” Nancy Cartwright“Genetic Inference: A Reconsideration of “David Hume's Empiricism,” Barbara D. Massey and Gerald J. Massey“Philosophy and the Exact Sciences: Logical Positivism as a Case Study,” Michael Friedman“Language and Interpretation: Philosophical Reflections and Empirical Inquiry,” Noam Chomsky“Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method,” Richard Boyd“Do We Need a Hierarchical Model of Science?” Diderik Batens“Theories of Theories: A View from Cognitive Science,” Richard E. Grandy“Procedural Syntax for Theory Elements,” Joseph D. Sneed“Why Functionalism Didn't Work,” Hilary Putnam“Physicalism,” Hartry FieldThis title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1992.

These provocative essays by leading philosophers of science exemplify and illuminate the contemporary uncertainty and excitement in the field. The papers are rich in new perspectives, and their far-reaching criticisms challenge arguments long prevalent in classic philosophical problems of induction, empiricism, and realism. By turns empirical or analytic, historical or programmatic, confessional or argumentative, the authors' arguments both describe and demonstrate the fact that philosophy of science is in a ferment more intense than at any time since the heyday of logical positivism early in the twentieth century.  Contents:  “Thoroughly Modern Meno,” Clark Glymour and Kevin Kelly“The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative Approach to Inquiry,” Jaakko Hintikka“Aristotelian Natures and Modern Experimental Method,” Nancy Cartwright“Genetic Inference: A Reconsideration of “David Hume's Empiricism,” Barbara D. Massey and Gerald J. Massey“Philosophy and the Exact Sciences: Logical Positivism as a Case Study,” Michael Friedman“Language and Interpretation: Philosophical Reflections and Empirical Inquiry,” Noam Chomsky“Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method,” Richard Boyd“Do We Need a Hierarchical Model of Science?” Diderik Batens“Theories of Theories: A View from Cognitive Science,” Richard E. Grandy“Procedural Syntax for Theory Elements,” Joseph D. Sneed“Why Functionalism Didn't Work,” Hilary Putnam“Physicalism,” Hartry FieldThis title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1992.

Testing Scientific Theories was first published in 1984. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.Since much of a scientist's work consists of constructing arguments to show how experiments and observation bear on a particular theory, the methodologies of theory testing and their philosophical underpinnings are of vital concern to philosophers of science. Confirmation of scientific theories is the topic of Clark Glymour's important book Theory and Evidence,published in 1980. His negative thesis is that the two most widely discussed accounts of the methodology of theory testing - hypothetico-deductivism and Bayesianism - are flawed. The issues Glymour raises and his alternative "bootstrapping" method provided the focus for a conference sponsored by the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science and for this book. As editor John Earman says in his preface, the papers presented in Testing Scientific Theories germinate so many new ideas that philosophers of science will reap the harvest for years to come.Topics covered include a discussion of Glymour's bootstrapping theory of confirmation, the Bayesian perspective and the problems of old evidence, evidence and explanation, historical case studies, alternative views on testing theories, and testing particular theories, including psychoanalytic hypotheses and hypotheses about the completeness of the fossil record.

Foundations of Space-Time Theories was first published in 1977. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.The essays in this volume are based on the papers given at a conference on the philosophical aspects of the space-time theory held under the auspices of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science.

Devoted to the history of general relativity, this text provides reviews from scholars all over the world. Many of the papers originated at the Third International Conference on the History of General Relativity, held at the University of Pittsburgh in the summer of 1991. Topics covered include: disputes with Einstein; the empirical basis of general relativity; variational principles in general relativity; the reception and development of general relativity; and cosmology and general relativity.

A reprint of the Prentice-Hall edition of 1992.Prepared by nine distinguished philosophers and historians of science, this thoughtful reader represents a cooperative effort to provide an introduction to the philosophy of science focused on cultivating an understanding of both the workings of science and its historical and social context. Selections range from discussions of topics in general methodology to a sampling of foundational problems in various physical, biological, behavioral, and social sciences. Each chapter contains a list of suggested readings and study questions.

Natural and social sciences seem very often, though usually only implicitly, to hedge their laws by ceteris paribus clauses - a practice which is philosophically very hard to understand because such clauses seem to render the laws trivial and unfalsifiable. After early worries the issue is vigorously discussed in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind since ca. 15 years. This volume collects the most prominent philosophers of science in the field and presents a lively, controversial, but well-integrated, highly original and up-to-date discussion of the issue. It will be the reference book in the coming years concerning ceteris paribus laws.

The title of this work is to be taken seriously: it is a small book for teaching students to read the language of determinism. Some prior knowledge of college-level mathematics and physics is presupposed, but otherwise the book is suitable for use in an advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate course in the philosophy of science. While writing I had in mind primarily a philosophical audience, but I hope that students and colleagues from the sciences will also find the treatment of scientific issues of interest. Though modest in not trying to reach beyond an introductory level of analysis, the work is decidedly immodest in trying to change a number of misimpressions that pervade the philosophical literature. For example, when told that classical physics is not the place to look for clean and unproblematic examples of determinism, most philosophers react with a mixture of disbelief and incomprehension. The misconcep­ tions on which that reaction is based can and must be changed.

Natural and social sciences seem very often, though usually only implicitly, to hedge their laws by ceteris paribus clauses - a practice which is philosophically very hard to understand because such clauses seem to render the laws trivial and unfalsifiable. After early worries the issue is vigorously discussed in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind since ca. 15 years. This volume collects the most prominent philosophers of science in the field and presents a lively, controversial, but well-integrated, highly original and up-to-date discussion of the issue. It will be the reference book in the coming years concerning ceteris paribus laws.