Joseph Agassi – författare

Professor Joseph Agassi has published his Towards an Historiography of Science in 1963. It received many reviews by notable academics, including Maurice Finocchiaro, Charles Gillispie, Thomas S. Kuhn, Geroge Mora, Nicholas Rescher, and L. Pearce Williams. It is still in use in many courses in the philosophy and history of science. Here it appears in a revised and updated version with responses to these reviews and with many additional chapters, some already classic, others new. They are all paradigms of the author’s innovative way of writing fresh and engaging chapters in the history of the natural sciences.

This book collects 13 papers that explore Wittgenstein''s philosophy throughout the different stages of his career. The author writes from the viewpoint of critical rationalism. The tone of his analysis is friendly and appreciative yet critical.

Of these papers, seven are on the background to the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Five papers examine different aspects of it: one on the philosophy of young Wittgenstein, one on his transitional period, and the final three on the philosophy of mature Wittgenstein, chiefly his Philosophical Investigations. The last of these papers, which serves as the concluding chapter, concerns the analytical school of philosophy that grew chiefly under its influence.

This book contributes to the theoretical discussions of equilibria that rest on error―in which we include mistaken choices of games to play. Extant game theory recommends diverse strategies (plans of actions) for various given games, particularly those in Nash equilibria, in which no player benefits from one-sided strategy alteration. The literature also refers to the design of games that fit given goals. This is the mechanism design theory; its function is to serve social planners ignorant of the preferences of the people intended to play them.

Our study of games avoidance adds to game theory the meta-game of choosing what game to play and what game to avoid playing, and that both players and planners can generate. This comprises a shift from the maximalist position that aims to maximize possible profit to the minimalist one that aims at minimizing possible loss. This shift depends on the question, considering the public interest, what set of games is it advisable to encourage? Obviously, it is advisable to encourage playing some groups of games such as trade, as well as to discourage playing other groups of games such as wars. This shift makes the theory much more applicable to social science: usually, choosing what game to play is less practical than choosing what game not to play. This invites legislation and similar incentives; their study should aim at the improvement of their usefulness.

Discussing the possibility of changing both game and strategy renders game theory part-and-parcel of social science. For this mathematical models will not do: it requires a clear distinction between describing options and explaining situations. Explanations may enhance efforts at improvement.

This volume examines Popper’s philosophy by analyzing the criticism of his most popular critics: Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos. They all followed his rejection of the traditional view of science as inductive. Starting from the assumption that Hume’s criticism of induction is valid, the book explores the central criticism and objections that these three critics have raised. Their objections have met with great success, are significant and deserve paraphrase. One also may consider them reasonable protests against Popper’s high standards rather than fundamental criticisms of his philosophy. The book starts out with a preliminary discussion of some central background material and essentials of Popper’s philosophy. It ends with nutshell representations of the philosophies of Popper. Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos. The middle section of the book presents the connection between these philosophers and explains what their central ideas consists of, what the critical arguments are, how they presented them, and how valid they are. In the process, the author claims that Popper''s popular critics used against him arguments that he had invented (and answered) without saying so. They differ from him mainly in that they demanded of all criticism that it should be constructive: do not stop believing a refuted theory unless there is a better alternative to it. Popper hardly ever discussed belief, delegating its study to psychology proper; he usually discussed only objective knowledge, knowledge that is public and thus open to public scrutiny.

This book aims to familiarize readers in a very simple and easy mannerthe rules and proper procedures of rational debate. It will help reducethe frustration that many experience when engaging in debates. The properconduct of debate is both fun and mentally stimulating, and we trust that implementing the rules ofdebate outlined in this book will help you and your friends increase yourability to learn, improve and engage in rational and intellectual debates.