Keith Lehrer – författare

This monograph is both an intellectual summation as well as a philosophical advancement of key themes of the work of Keith Lehrer on several key topics--including knowledge, self-trust, autonomy, and consciousness. He here attempts to integrate these themes and develop an intellectual system that can constructively solve philosophical problems. The system is indebted to the modern work of Sellars, Quine, and Chisholm, as well as historically to Hume and Reid. At the core of this system lies Lehrer's theory of knowledge, which he previously called a coherence theory of knowledge but now calls a defensibility theory. Lehrer argues that knowledge requires the capacity to justify or defend the target claim of knowledge in terms of a background system. Defensibility is an internal capacity supplied by that system to meet objections to the claim. This theory however leaves open the problem of "experience"--noted by other philosophers--i.e. how to explain the special role of experience in a background system even granted we are fallible in describing it. Lehrer offers a solution to the problem of experience, arguing that reflection on experience converts the experience itself into an exemplar, something like a sample that becomes a vehicle or term of representation. The exemplar represents itself and extends to represent the external world. It exhibits something about evidence and truth concerning experience that, as Wittgenstein noted, cannot be fully described but can only be shown. Exemplar representation is the missing link of a background system to truth about the world.

This monograph is both an intellectual summation as well as a philosophical advancement of key themes of the work of Keith Lehrer on several key topics--including knowledge, self-trust, autonomy, and consciousness. He here attempts to integrate these themes and develop an intellectual system that can constructively solve philosophical problems. The system is indebted to the modern work of Sellars, Quine, and Chisholm, as well as historically to Hume and Reid. At the core of this system lies Lehrer''s theory of knowledge, which he previously called a coherence theory of knowledge but now calls a defensibility theory.Lehrer argues that knowledge requires the capacity to justify or defend the target claim of knowledge in terms of a background system. Defensibility is an internal capacity supplied by that system to meet objections to the claim. This theory however leaves open the problem of "experience"--noted by other philosophers--i.e. how to explain the special role of experience in a background system even granted we are fallible in describing it. Lehrer offers a solution to the problem of experience, arguing that reflection on experience converts the experience itself into an exemplar, something like a sample that becomes a vehicle or term of representation.The exemplar represents itself and extends to represent the external world. It exhibits something about evidence and truth concerning experience that, as Wittgenstein noted, cannot be fully described but can only be shown. Exemplar representation is the missing link of a background system to truth about the world.

This monograph is both an intellectual summation as well as a philosophical advancement of key themes of the work of Keith Lehrer on several key topics--including knowledge, self-trust, autonomy, and consciousness. He here attempts to integrate these themes and develop an intellectual system that can constructively solve philosophical problems. The system is indebted to the modern work of Sellars, Quine, and Chisholm, as well as historically to Hume and Reid. At the core of this system lies Lehrer''s theory of knowledge, which he previously called a coherence theory of knowledge but now calls a defensibility theory.Lehrer argues that knowledge requires the capacity to justify or defend the target claim of knowledge in terms of a background system. Defensibility is an internal capacity supplied by that system to meet objections to the claim. This theory however leaves open the problem of "experience"--noted by other philosophers--i.e. how to explain the special role of experience in a background system even granted we are fallible in describing it. Lehrer offers a solution to the problem of experience, arguing that reflection on experience converts the experience itself into an exemplar, something like a sample that becomes a vehicle or term of representation.The exemplar represents itself and extends to represent the external world. It exhibits something about evidence and truth concerning experience that, as Wittgenstein noted, cannot be fully described but can only be shown. Exemplar representation is the missing link of a background system to truth about the world.

Art can provide us with a sensory experience that provokes us to reconfigure how we think about our world and ourselves. Theories of art have often sought to find some feature of art that isolates it from the rest of experience. Keith Lehrer argues, in opposition, that art is connected, not isolated, from how we think and feel, represent and react. When art directs our attention to sensory exemplars in aesthetic experience of which we become conscious in a special way, it also shows us our autonomy as we represent ourselves and our world, ourselves in our world, and our world in ourselves. This form of representation, exemplar representation, uses the exemplar as a term of representation and exhibits the nature of the content it represents in terms of itself. It shows us both what our world is like and how we represent the world thereby revealing the nature of intentionality to us. Issues of general interest in philosophy such as knowledge, autonomy, rationality and self-trust enter the book along with more specifically aesthetic issues of formalism, expressionism, representation, artistic creativity and beauty. The author goes on to demonstrate how the connection between art and broader issues of feminism, globalization, collective wisdom, and death show us the connection between art, life, politics and the self. Drawing from Hume, Reid, Goodman, Danto, Brand, Ismael and Lopes, Lehrer argues here that the artwork is a mentalized physical object engaging us philosophically with the content of exemplar experience. The exemplar representation of experience provoked by art ties art and science, mind and body, self and world, together in a dynamic loop, reconfiguring them all as it reconfigures art itself.

Art can provide us with a sensory experience that provokes us to reconfigure how we think about our world and ourselves. Theories of art have often sought to find some feature of art that isolates it from the rest of experience. Keith Lehrer argues, in opposition, that art is connected, not isolated, from how we think and feel, represent and react. When art directs our attention to sensory exemplars in aesthetic experience of which we become conscious in a special way, it also shows us our autonomy as we represent ourselves and our world, ourselves in our world, and our world in ourselves. This form of representation, exemplar representation, uses the exemplar as a term of representation and exhibits the nature of the content it represents in terms of itself. It shows us both what our world is like and how we represent the world thereby revealing the nature of intentionality to us. Issues of general interest in philosophy such as knowledge, autonomy, rationality and self-trust enter the book along with more specifically aesthetic issues of formalism, expressionism, representation, artistic creativity and beauty. The author goes on to demonstrate how the connection between art and broader issues of feminism, globalization, collective wisdom, and death show us the connection between art, life, politics and the self. Drawing from Hume, Reid, Goodman, Danto, Brand, Ismael and Lopes, Lehrer argues here that the artwork is a mentalized physical object engaging us philosophically with the content of exemplar experience. The exemplar representation of experience provoked by art ties art and science, mind and body, self and world, together in a dynamic loop, reconfiguring them all as it reconfigures art itself.

Philosopher Keith Lehrer outlines a view of freedom of choice based on a Kahneman-derived distinction between what he calls a first order system that is intuitive and immediate, and a higher order system of response, which he calls a second system of scientific analysis. Lehrer argues that freedom of choice is an expression of attention to the higher order system, and that what is often called free will is often just doing what you desire, a response that neglects consideration of other options. Freedom of choice acknowledges those options, and preference among them forms in response to the acceptance of evidence. We might suppose that in responding to beliefs that one has attended to evidence, but that is a delusion, because our higher order acceptance of evidence can be overwhelmed by the fixation created by first level belief. What is the difference between just doing what you desire because it feels good and acting on what you prefer because of scientific acceptance? Lehrer points to a form of preference that he says is the ultimate explanation of choice -- what he calls a power preference. It is a preference that loops back on to itself, a fixed-point vector, and suffices to explain choice. Lehrer's theory of such a power preference includes scientific explanation and consistently accommodates determinism. It is itself a scientific and philosophical explanation, and an ultimate principle of explanation. Lehrer terms the freedom of choice expressing that preference “ultimate freedom”-- the source of our knowledge and agency both in theory, directing what we rationally accept, and in practice directing freedom of choice.

Philosopher Keith Lehrer outlines a view of freedom of choice based on a Kahneman-derived distinction between what he calls a first order system that is intuitive and immediate, and a higher order system of response, which he calls a second system of scientific analysis. Lehrer argues that freedom of choice is an expression of attention to the higher order system, and that what is often called free will is often just doing what you desire, a response that neglects consideration of other options. Freedom of choice acknowledges those options, and preference among them forms in response to the acceptance of evidence. We might suppose that in responding to beliefs that one has attended to evidence, but that is a delusion, because our higher order acceptance of evidence can be overwhelmed by the fixation created by first level belief. What is the difference between just doing what you desire because it feels good and acting on what you prefer because of scientific acceptance? Lehrer points to a form of preference that he says is the ultimate explanation of choice -- what he calls a power preference. It is a preference that loops back on to itself, a fixed-point vector, and suffices to explain choice. Lehrer''s theory of such a power preference includes scientific explanation and consistently accommodates determinism. It is itself a scientific and philosophical explanation, and an ultimate principle of explanation. Lehrer terms the freedom of choice expressing that preference ?ultimate freedom?-- the source of our knowledge and agency both in theory, directing what we rationally accept, and in practice directing freedom of choice.

Philosopher Keith Lehrer outlines a view of freedom of choice based on a Kahneman-derived distinction between what he calls a first order system that is intuitive and immediate, and a higher order system of response, which he calls a second system of scientific analysis. Lehrer argues that freedom of choice is an expression of attention to the higher order system, and that what is often called free will is often just doing what you desire, a response that neglects consideration of other options. Freedom of choice acknowledges those options, and preference among them forms in response to the acceptance of evidence. We might suppose that in responding to beliefs that one has attended to evidence, but that is a delusion, because our higher order acceptance of evidence can be overwhelmed by the fixation created by first level belief. What is the difference between just doing what you desire because it feels good and acting on what you prefer because of scientific acceptance? Lehrer points to a form of preference that he says is the ultimate explanation of choice -- what he calls a power preference. It is a preference that loops back on to itself, a fixed-point vector, and suffices to explain choice. Lehrer''s theory of such a power preference includes scientific explanation and consistently accommodates determinism. It is itself a scientific and philosophical explanation, and an ultimate principle of explanation. Lehrer terms the freedom of choice expressing that preference ?ultimate freedom?-- the source of our knowledge and agency both in theory, directing what we rationally accept, and in practice directing freedom of choice.

Keith Lehrer offers an original philosophical view of principal aspects of the human condition, such as reason, knowledge, wisdom, autonomy, love, consensus, and consciousness. Three unifying ideas run through the book. The first is that what is uniquely human is the capacity for metamental ascent, the ability to consider and evaluate first-order mental states (such as beliefs and desires) that arise naturally within us. A primary function of this metamental ascent is the resolution of personal and interpersonal conflict, essential to such central human goods as wisdom, autonomy, and consensus. The second unifying idea is that we have a system for such reflective evaluation which yields acceptance (in relation to beliefs) or preference (in relation to the objects of desires). The third unifying idea is that there are `keystones' of evaluation in this system: loops of trustworthiness that are themselves supported by the structure that they hold together. Self-trust is the basis of our trustworthiness, on which reason, knowledge, and wisdom are grounded.

Keith Lehrer offers an original philosophical view of principal aspects of the human condition, such as reason, knowledge, wisdom, autonomy, love, consensus, and consciousness. Three unifying ideas run through the book. The first is that what is uniquely human is the capacity for metamental ascent, the ability to consider and evaluate first-order mental states (such as beliefs and desires) that arise naturally within us. A primary function of this metamental ascent is the resolution of personal and interpersonal conflict, essential to such central human goods as wisdom, autonomy, and consensus. The second unifying idea is that we have a system for such reflective evaluation which yields acceptance (in relation to beliefs) or preference (in relation to the objects of desires). The third unifying idea is that there are `keystones' of evaluation in this system: loops of trustworthiness that are themselves supported by the structure that they hold together. Self-trust is the basis of our trustworthiness, on which reason, knowledge, and wisdom are grounded.

The essays in this book, published here as a collection for the first time, are unified by the thesis that freedom, rationality, social consensus, and knowledge depend on thoughts about thoughts, that is, on metamental operations. These provide for our optionality, plasticity, and most of all for the evaluation and control of lower-level information. The collection argues that the human mind is essentially a metamind.

This book argues that a special value of art is the way in which it uses conscious experience -- the exemplars of aesthetic experience -- to autonomously reconfigure how we conceive of our world and ourselves, ourselves in our world and our world in ourselves. Exemplar representation ties are and science, mind and body, self and world together in a dynamic loop reconfiguring them all as it reconfigures itself.

In this impressive second edition of Theory of Knowledge, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief, and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection. The purpose of this series is to provide a contemporary assessment and history of the entire course of philosophical thought. Each book constitutes a detailed, critical introduction to the work of a philosopher of major influence and significance. The author's reason for writing this book is that the philosophy of Thomas Reid is widely unread, while the combination of soundness and creativity of his work is unexcelled.

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection. The purpose of this series is to provide a contemporary assessment and history of the entire course of philosophical thought. Each book constitutes a detailed, critical introduction to the work of a philosopher of major influence and significance. The author's reason for writing this book is that the philosophy of Thomas Reid is widely unread, while the combination of soundness and creativity of his work is unexcelled.

In this impressive second edition of Theory of Knowledge, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief, and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge,the work of Platinga, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories, contextualism, and recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must be matched by appropriate internal factors to yield knowledge. This match of internal and external factors follows from Lehrer''s new coherence theory of undefeated justification. In addition to doing justice to the living epistemological traditions, the text smoothly integrates several new lines that will interest scholars. Also, a feature of special interest is Lehrer''s concept of a justification game.This second edition of Theory of Knowledge is a thoroughly revised and updated version that contains several completely new chapters. Written by a well-known scholar and contributor to modern epistemology, this text is distinguished by clarity of structure, accessible writing, and an elegant mix of traditional material, contemporary ideas, and well-motivated innovation.

In this impressive second edition of Theory of Knowledge, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief, and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge,the work of Platinga, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories, contextualism, and recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must be matched by appropriate internal factors to yield knowledge. This match of internal and external factors follows from Lehrer''s new coherence theory of undefeated justification. In addition to doing justice to the living epistemological traditions, the text smoothly integrates several new lines that will interest scholars. Also, a feature of special interest is Lehrer''s concept of a justification game.This second edition of Theory of Knowledge is a thoroughly revised and updated version that contains several completely new chapters. Written by a well-known scholar and contributor to modern epistemology, this text is distinguished by clarity of structure, accessible writing, and an elegant mix of traditional material, contemporary ideas, and well-motivated innovation.

This book derives from a 1993 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Knowledge, Teaching, and Wisdom. The Institute took place at the University of California, Berkeley, and was co-directed by Keith Lehrer and Nicholas D. Smith. The aims of the Institute were several: we sought to reintroduce wisdom as a topic of discussion among contemporary philosophers, to undertake an historical investigation of how and when and why it was that wisdom faded from philosophical view, and to ask how contemporary epistemological theories might apply to the obviously related subjects of teaching and wisdom. In recruiting participants, Lehrer and Smith put the greatest emphasis on those with professional interests in epistemology and the history of philosophy, of the ancient Greeks especially ancient Greek philosophy (because in the writings all three subjects of the Institute were explicitly related and discussed). But in addition to these two groups, some effort was made also to include others, with academic specializations in a variety of fields other than epistemology and the history of philosophy, to ensure that a broad perspective could be achieved in our discussions. To an obvious extent, the papers in this book reflect the recruitment emphases and variety. They also testify to the extent that the Institute managed to bring life to our subjects, and to raise very old questions in a contemporary context.

This book is about Austrian philosophy leading up to the philosophy of Rudolf Haller. It emerged from a philosophy conference held at the University of Arizona by Keith Lehrer with the support of the University of Arizona and Austrian Cultural Institute. We are grateful to the University of Arizona and the Austrian Cultural Institute for their support, to Linda Radzik for her editorial assistance, to Rudolf Haller for his advice and illuminating autobiographical essay and to Ann Hickman for preparing the camera-ready typescript. The papers herein are ones preseJ,lted at the conference. The idea that motivated holding the conference was to clarify the conception of Austrian Philosophy and the role of Rudolf Haller therein. Prof Rudolf Haller of Karl-Franzens University of Graz has had a profound influence on modern philosophy, which, modest man that he is, probably amazes him. He has made fine contributions to many areas of philosophy, to aesthetics, to philosophy of language and the theOl)' of knowledge. His seven books and more than two hundred articles testify to his accomplishments. But there is something else which he did which was the reason for the conference on Austrian Philosophy in his honor. He presented us, as Barry Smith explains, with a unified conception of Austrian Philosophy.

In this impressive second edition of Theory of Knowledge, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief, and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge,the work of Platinga, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories, contextualism, and recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must be matched by appropriate internal factors to yield knowledge. This match of internal and external factors follows from Lehrer's new coherence theory of undefeated justification. In addition to doing justice to the living epistemological traditions, the text smoothly integrates several new lines that will interest scholars. Also, a feature of special interest is Lehrer's concept of a justification game.This second edition of Theory of Knowledge is a thoroughly revised and updated version that contains several completely new chapters. Written by a well-known scholar and contributor to modern epistemology, this text is distinguished by clarity of structure, accessible writing, and an elegant mix of traditional material, contemporary ideas, and well-motivated innovation.

Reid’s previously published writings are substantial, both in quantity and quality. This edition attempts to make these writings more readily available in a single volume. Based upon Hamilton’s definitive two volume 6th edition, this edition is suitable for both students and scholars.Beanblossom and Lehrer have included a wide range of topics addressed by Reid. These topics include Reid’s views on the role of common sense, scepticism, the theory of ideas, perception, memory and identity, as well as his views on moral liberty, duties, and principles. Historical as well as topical considerations guided the selection process. Thus, Reid’s responses to Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are included. Through the resulting selections Reid’s influence and impact upon subsequent philosophers is manifested.

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection. The purpose of this series is to provide a contemporary assessment and history of the entire course of philosophical thought. Each book constitutes a detailed, critical introduction to the work of a philosopher of major influence and significance. The author''s reason for writing this book is that the philosophy of Thomas Reid is widely unread, while the combination of soundness and creativity of his work is unexcelled.

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection. The purpose of this series is to provide a contemporary assessment and history of the entire course of philosophical thought. Each book constitutes a detailed, critical introduction to the work of a philosopher of major influence and significance. The author''s reason for writing this book is that the philosophy of Thomas Reid is widely unread, while the combination of soundness and creativity of his work is unexcelled.

AND BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH This collection of essays in honor of Roderick M. Chisholm is the work of his former students. The book was conceived and the original con­ tributors invited by Richard Taylor. We restricted the contributors to former students of Chisholm as a special tribute to his acknowledged as a teacher of philosophy. The profundity of his contributions to genius epistemology and metaphysics are acknowledged throughout the phil­ osophical world. Those who have been present at his lectures and semi­ nars, who have been incited to philosophical cerebration by the clarity and precision of his exposition, know that his impact on contemporary philosophy far exceeds the influence of the written word. It is, we think, appropriate that his students should reserve for themselves the privilege of honoring Chisholm in this way as his 60th birthday draws near. The tribute paid to Chisholm in Taylor's essay conveys a personal impression. I shall, consequently, refrain from personal reminiscence here, and instead, mention some of the highlights of an illustrious life. Chisholm was born on November 27, 1916 in North Attleboro, Massachu­ setts. He married Eleanor F. Parker in 1943 and raised three children with her. He received an A. B. from Brown in 1938, a Ph. D. from Harvard in 1942, and served in the U. S. Army from 1942 to 1946.

TItis book is the joint project of a philosopher, Lehrer, and a mathematician, Wagner. The book is, therefore, divided into a first part written by Lehrer, which is primarily philosophical, and a second part written by Wagner that is primarily formal. The authors were, however, influenced by each other throughout. Our book articulates a theory of rational consensus in science and society. The theory is applied to politics, ethics, science, and language. We begin our exposition with an elementary mathematical model of consensus developed by Lehrer in a series of articles [1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1978]. Chapter 3 contains material from [1978]. Lehrer formulated the elementary model when he was a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Be­ havioral Sciences, Stanford, in 1973 with the invaluable mathematical assist­ of Kit Fine, Gerald Kramer and Lionel McKenzie. In the summer of ance 1977, Lehrer and Wagner met at the Center in a Summer Seminar on Freedom and Causality supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Wagner read the manuscript of Lehrer [1978] and subsequently solved some mathematical problems of the elementary model. After discussions of philosophical prob­ lems associated with that model, Wagner developed the foundations for the extended model. These results were reported in Wagner [1978, 1981a].

TItis book is the joint project of a philosopher, Lehrer, and a mathematician, Wagner. The book is, therefore, divided into a first part written by Lehrer, which is primarily philosophical, and a second part written by Wagner that is primarily formal. The authors were, however, influenced by each other throughout. Our book articulates a theory of rational consensus in science and society. The theory is applied to politics, ethics, science, and language. We begin our exposition with an elementary mathematical model of consensus developed by Lehrer in a series of articles [1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1978]. Chapter 3 contains material from [1978]. Lehrer formulated the elementary model when he was a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Be­ havioral Sciences, Stanford, in 1973 with the invaluable mathematical assist­ of Kit Fine, Gerald Kramer and Lionel McKenzie. In the summer of ance 1977, Lehrer and Wagner met at the Center in a Summer Seminar on Freedom and Causality supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Wagner read the manuscript of Lehrer [1978] and subsequently solved some mathematical problems of the elementary model. After discussions of philosophical prob­ lems associated with that model, Wagner developed the foundations for the extended model. These results were reported in Wagner [1978, 1981a].

This book derives from a 1993 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Knowledge, Teaching, and Wisdom. The Institute took place at the University of California, Berkeley, and was co-directed by Keith Lehrer and Nicholas D. Smith. The aims of the Institute were several: we sought to reintroduce wisdom as a topic of discussion among contemporary philosophers, to undertake an historical investigation of how and when and why it was that wisdom faded from philosophical view, and to ask how contemporary epistemological theories might apply to the obviously related subjects of teaching and wisdom. In recruiting participants, Lehrer and Smith put the greatest emphasis on those with professional interests in epistemology and the history of philosophy, of the ancient Greeks especially ancient Greek philosophy (because in the writings all three subjects of the Institute were explicitly related and discussed). But in addition to these two groups, some effort was made also to include others, with academic specializations in a variety of fields other than epistemology and the history of philosophy, to ensure that a broad perspective could be achieved in our discussions. To an obvious extent, the papers in this book reflect the recruitment emphases and variety. They also testify to the extent that the Institute managed to bring life to our subjects, and to raise very old questions in a contemporary context.

The book contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology. As the focus of the volume is truly innovative we expect the book to sell well to both philosophers and scholars from neighboring fields such as social and cognitive science. The predominant view in analytic philosophy is that an ability for self-evaluation is constitutive for agency and intentionality. Until now, the debate is limited in two (possibly mutually related) ways: Firstly, self-evaluation is usually discussed in individual terms, and, as such, not sufficiently related to its social dimensions; secondly, self-evaluation is viewed as a matter of belief and desire, neglecting its affective and emotional aspects. The aim of the book is to fill these research lacunas and to investigate the question of how these two shortcomings of the received views are related.

The book contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology. As the focus of the volume is truly innovative we expect the book to sell well to both philosophers and scholars from neighboring fields such as social and cognitive science. The predominant view in analytic philosophy is that an ability for self-evaluation is constitutive for agency and intentionality. Until now, the debate is limited in two (possibly mutually related) ways: Firstly, self-evaluation is usually discussed in individual terms, and, as such, not sufficiently related to its social dimensions; secondly, self-evaluation is viewed as a matter of belief and desire, neglecting its affective and emotional aspects. The aim of the book is to fill these research lacunas and to investigate the question of how these two shortcomings of the received views are related.