Malcolm Dando – författare

The fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations was commemorated in 1995 with a number of conferences and publications which assessed the history and contemporary role of this paramount international organization. This book is the result of a meeting of scholars and specialists who wished to further understanding of the challenges faced by the United Nations in its efforts to intervene in post cold war conflict. Its particular focii are the UN experiences in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, where peacekeepers seemed powerless to act in the face of genocide and gross violations of human rights.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention entirely prohibits biological warfare, but it has no effective verification mechanism to ensure that the 140 plus States Parties are living up to their obligations. From 1995-2001, the States Parties attempted to negotiate a Protocol to the Convention to remedy this deficiency. On 25 July 2001 the United States entirely rejected the final text which would probably have been acceptable to most other states. The book investigates how this disaster came about, and the potential consequences of the failure of American leadership.

The threat of biological weapons has never attracted as much public attention as in the past five years. Current concerns largely relate to the threat of weapons acquisition and use by rogue states or by terrorists. But the threat has deeper roots—it has been evident for fifty years that biological agents could be used to cause mass casualties and large-scale economic damage. Yet there has been little historical analysis of such weapons over the past half-century.Deadly Cultures sets out to fill this gap by analyzing the historical developments since 1945 and addressing three central issues: Why have states continued or begun programs for acquiring biological weapons? Why have states terminated biological weapons programs? How have states demonstrated that they have truly terminated their biological weapons programs?We now live in a world in which the basic knowledge needed to develop biological weapons is more widely available than ever before. Deadly Cultures provides the lessons from history that we urgently need in order to strengthen the long-standing prohibition of biological weapons.

Preventing a Biochemical Arms Race responds to a growing concern that changes in the life sciences and the nature of warfare could lead to a resurgent interest in chemical and biological weapons (CBW) capabilities. By bringing together a wide range of historical material and current literature in the field of CBW arms control, the book reveals how these two disparate fields might be integrated to precipitate a biochemical arms race among major powers, rogue states, or even non-state actors.It seeks to raise awareness among policy practitioners, the academic community, and the media that such an arms race may be looming if developments are left unattended, and to provide policy options on how it—and it's devastating consequences—could be avoided. After identifying weaknesses in the international regime structures revolving around the Biological Weapons and Chemical Weapons Conventions, it provides policy proposals to deal with gaps and shortcomings in each prohibition regime individually, and then addresses the widening gap between them.

During the last century, advances in the life sciences were used in the development of biological and chemical weapons in large-scale state offensive programmes, many of which targeted the nervous system. This study questions whether the development of novel biological and chemical neuroweapons can be prevented as neuroscience progresses.

The fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations was commemorated in 1995 with a number of conferences and publications which assessed the history and contemporary role of this paramount international organisation.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention entirely prohibits biological warfare, but it has no effective verification mechanism to ensure that the 140-plus States Parties are living up to their obligations. On 25 July 2001 the United States entirely rejected the final text which would probably have been acceptable to most other states.

Essentials of Biological Security A guide to minimizing the threat of misusing benignly intended and dual-use biological research In Essentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective, a team of distinguished researchers delivers a fundamental resource designed to raise awareness and understanding of biological security as it pertains to the malign manipulation of benignly intended scientific research. Written by experts who have spent decades involved in biological security issues, the book is systematically organized to make it accessible to a wide range of life scientists likely to encounter dangerous opportunities for the deliberate misuse of their research. Readers will also find: A thorough introduction to biological security and the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) threat spectrum Comprehensive explorations of the history of biological weapons from antiquity to modern day Practical discussions of dual-use technologies and how to minimize their risk Expert analyses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other relevant international agreements and organizations Perfect for professionals working in life sciences, medicine, global health, biosafety, and biosecurity, Essentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective will also benefit anyone with an interest in and being responsible for biological security.

The life and chemical sciences are in the midst of a period of rapid and revolutionary transformation that will undoubtedly bring societal benefits but also have potentially malign applications, notably in the development of chemical weapons. Such concerns are exacerbated by the unstable international security environment and the changing nature of armed conflict, which could fuel a desire by certain States to retain and use existing chemical weapons, as well as increase State interest in creating new weapons; whilst a broader range of actors may seek to employ diverse toxic chemicals as improvised weapons. Stark indications of the multi-faceted dangers we face can be seen in the chemical weapons attacks against civilians and combatants in Iraq and Syria, and also in more targeted chemical assassination operations in Malaysia and the UK. Using a multi-disciplinary approach, and drawing upon an international group of experts, this book analyses current and likely near-future advances in relevant science and technology, assessing the risks of their misuse. The book examines the current capabilities, limitations and failures of the existing international arms control and disarmament architecture – notably the Chemical Weapons Convention – in preventing the development and use of chemical weapons. Through the employment of a novel Holistic Arms Control methodology, the authors also look beyond the bounds of such treaties, to explore the full range of international law, international agreements and regulatory mechanisms potentially applicable to weapons employing toxic chemical agents, in order to develop recommendations for more effective routes to combat their proliferation and misuse. A particular emphasis is given to the roles that chemical and life scientists, health professionals and wider informed activist civil society can play in protecting the prohibition against poison and chemical weapons; and in working with States to build effective and responsive measures to ensure that the rapid scientific and technological advances are safeguarded from hostile use and are instead employed for the benefit of us all.

Recent advances in neuroscience – the study of the mechanisms within the brain that underlie our behaviours and what happens when these go wrong – have been profound. However, benignly intended neurological research that seeks to understand dysfunction in the central nervous system (CNS) could be misused, for example in the development of novel CNS-acting chemical agent weapons for use in armed conflict and also in repression of civilian populations.This book follows a 3-step Holistic Arms Control approach: examining the (bio)chemical agents and relevant physiological systems they affect, as well as associated dual-use technologies that need to be regulated; analysing a range of potentially applicable international law, international arms control, disarmament and other instruments, and attendant control regimes constraining misuse; and finally providing a strategy to strengthen existing regulatory mechanisms as well as suggest new measures to prevent the misuse of the neurosciences and associated dual-use technologies without limiting the widespread health and other societal benefits that flow from their benign application.Suitable for biochemists and researchers in the areas of neuroscience, neurochemistry, and neuropharmacology, this book will also be of interest for those working in arms control, disarmament and related legal fields, as well as forensic medicine and toxicology.

This book offers an analysis of how the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) regime has responded in the immediate aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.