Michael Hand – författare

Education, Ethics and Experience is a collection of original philosophical essays celebrating the work of one of the most influential philosophers of education of the last 40 years. Richard Pring’s substantial body of work has addressed topics ranging from curriculum integration to the comprehensive ideal, vocational education to faith schools, professional development to the privatisation of education, moral seriousness to the nature of educational research. The twelve essays collected here explore and build on Pring’s treatment of topics that are central to the field of philosophy of education and high on the agenda of education policy-makers. The essays are by no means uncritical: some authors disagree sharply with Pring; others see his arguments as useful but incomplete, in need of addition or amendment. But all acknowledge their intellectual debt to him and recognise him as a giant on whose shoulders they stand. This book will be a welcome and lively read for educational academics, researchers and students of Educational Studies and Philosophy.

This fascinating monograph tackles a well-established problem in the philosophy of education. The problem is the threat posed to the logical possibility of non-confessional religious education by the claim that religion constitutes an autonomous language-game or form of knowledge. Defenders of this claim argue that religion cannot be understood from the outside: it is impossible to impart religious understanding unless one is also prepared to impart religious belief. Michael Hand argues for two central points: first, that non-confessional religious education would indeed be impossible if it were true that religion constitutes a distinct form of knowledge; and, second, that religion does not in fact constitute a distinct form of knowledge.

Education, Ethics and Experience is a collection of original philosophical essays celebrating the work of one of the most influential philosophers of education of the last 40 years. Richard Pring’s substantial body of work has addressed topics ranging from curriculum integration to the comprehensive ideal, vocational education to faith schools, professional development to the privatisation of education, moral seriousness to the nature of educational research. The twelve essays collected here explore and build on Pring’s treatment of topics that are central to the field of philosophy of education and high on the agenda of education policy-makers. The essays are by no means uncritical: some authors disagree sharply with Pring; others see his arguments as useful but incomplete, in need of addition or amendment. But all acknowledge their intellectual debt to him and recognise him as a giant on whose shoulders they stand. This book will be a welcome and lively read for educational academics, researchers and students of Educational Studies and Philosophy.

Children must be taught morality. They must be taught to recognise the authority of moral standards and to understand what makes them authoritative. But there’s a problem: the content and justification of morality are matters of reasonable disagreement among reasonable people. This makes it hard to see how educators can secure children’s commitment to moral standards without indoctrinating them.In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand tackles this problem head on. He sets out to show that moral education can and should be fully rational. It is true that many moral standards and justificatory theories are controversial, and educators have an obligation to teach these nondirectively, with the aim of enabling children to form their own considered views. But reasonable moral disagreement does not go all the way down: some basic moral standards are robustly justified, and these should be taught directively, with the aim of bringing children to recognise and understand their authority.This is an original and important contribution to the philosophy of moral education, which lays a new theoretical foundation for the urgent practical task of teaching right from wrong.

Children must be taught morality. They must be taught to recognise the authority of moral standards and to understand what makes them authoritative. But there’s a problem: the content and justification of morality are matters of reasonable disagreement among reasonable people. This makes it hard to see how educators can secure children’s commitment to moral standards without indoctrinating them.In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand tackles this problem head on. He sets out to show that moral education can and should be fully rational. It is true that many moral standards and justificatory theories are controversial, and educators have an obligation to teach these nondirectively, with the aim of enabling children to form their own considered views. But reasonable moral disagreement does not go all the way down: some basic moral standards are robustly justified, and these should be taught directively, with the aim of bringing children to recognise and understand their authority.This is an original and important contribution to the philosophy of moral education, which lays a new theoretical foundation for the urgent practical task of teaching right from wrong.

Is Religious Education Possible?: A Philosophical Investigation tackles a well-established problem in the philosophy of education. The problem is the threat posed to the logical possibility of non-confessional religious education by the claim that religion constitutes an autonomous language-game or form of knowledge. Defenders of this claim argue that religion cannot be understood from the outside: it is impossible to impart religious understanding unless one is also prepared to impart religious belief.Michael Hand argues for two central points: first, that non-confessional religious education would indeed be impossible if it were true that religion constitutes a distinct form of knowledge; and, second, that religion does not in fact constitute a distinct form of knowledge.

In Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence, John Tillson develops a theory concerning which kinds of formative influence are morally permissible, impermissible or obligatory. Applying this theory to the case of religion, he argues that religious initiation in childhood is morally impermissible whether conducted by parents, teachers or others. Tillson addresses questions such as: how we come to have the ethical responsibilities we do, how we understand religion, how ethical and religious commitments can be justified, and what makes children ethically special.

Many people, whether educators or not, will agree that an education that does not inspire wonder is barren. Wonder is commonly perceived as akin to curiosity, as stimulating inquiry, and as something that enhances pleasure in learning, but there are many experiences of wonder that do not have an obvious place in education. In Wonder and Education, Anders Schinkel theorises a kind of wonder with less obvious yet fundamental educational importance which he calls 'contemplative wonder'. Contemplative wonder disrupts frameworks of understanding that are taken for granted and perceived as natural and draws our attention to the world behind our constructions, sparking our interest in the world as something worth attending to for its own sake rather than for our purposes. It opens up space for the consideration of (radical) alternatives wherever it occurs, and in many cases is linked with deep experiences of value; therefore, it is not just important for education in general, but also, more specifically, for moral and political education.

Philosophical Reflections on Neuroscience and Education explores conceptual and normative questions about the recent programme which aims to underpin education with neuroscientific principles. By invoking philosophical ideas such as Bennett and Hacker’s mereological fallacy, Wittgenstein’s the first-person/third-person asymmetry principle and the notion of irreducible/constitutive uncertainty, William H. Kitchen offers a critique of the whole-sale adoption of neuroscience to education. He explores and reviews the role that neuroscience has started to play in educational policy and practice, and whether or not such a role is founded in coherent conceptual reasoning. Kitchen critically analyses the role which neuroscience can possibly play within educational discussions, and offers paradigmatic examples of how neuroscientific approaches have already found their way into educational practice and policy documents. By invoking the philosophical work primarily of Wittgenstein, he argues against the surge of neuroscientism within educational discourse and offers to clarify and elucidate core concepts in this area which are often misunderstood.

A Critique of Pure Teaching Methods and the Case of Synthetic Phonics examines how research into the effectiveness of teaching methods can and should relate to what takes place in the classroom. The discussion brings to light some important features of the way we classify teaching activities. The classifications are unlike those we use in natural science – for instance, how we classify drug dosages. This point has very important implications for what should be considered the appropriate relationships between educational research and classroom practice.Andrew Davis applies the results of this discussion to the teaching of early reading, focussing in particular on the approach known as synthetic phonics. He provides a philosophical investigation into the nature of reading, and into the concepts that feature in approaches to teaching it, such as the idea of building words from letter sounds, the nature of words themselves and reading for meaning. He concludes with a discussion of why this matters so much, reflecting on how stories and books can be part of a child’s emerging identity within the family. He explores how values of family life should be weighed against the importance of achievements in school, and argues for the claim that school reading policies of certain kinds may have a destructive impact if they are felt to trump the private interests of children and their families.

The Necessity of Aesthetic Education is a manifesto. That which is experienced through engagement with art, through the many various and diverse art forms and media, is uniquely and essentially valuable to the lives of human beings. In order to fully appreciate and gain the most out of the arts, which offer a variety of aesthetic experience, there are concepts, skills and techniques integral to such understanding. In this book, Laura D’Olimpio argues that aesthetic education ought to be a compulsory part of education for all school-aged students, from pre-primary to high school, on the basis of its distinctive value. Such an argument is timely, given the so-called crisis in the arts and humanities, with declining student numbers in subjects that do not have a direct vocational correlative, and increased focus on science, engineering, technology and mathematics (STEM) subjects. As funding cuts increasingly slash the support for the arts, there is a need to argue for why the arts and arts education is valuable, for their own sake, as well as for the positive contributions they can and do make to society. Through critical engagement with a range of thinkers including Maxine Greene, John Dewey and Elliot Eisner, D’Olimpio offers a unique and important contribution to aesthetic education, and to research within philosophy of education.

What is a good human life? A life of duty? Virtue? Happiness? This book weaves a path through traditional answers. We live well, suggests the author, not primarily by pursuing goods for ourselves, but by cherishing other people and guiding them towards lives of cherishing. We cherish objects too – the planet, my grandfather’s watch – and practices like music-making to which we are personally drawn. In this work of ‘populated philosophy’ (copiously illustrated by literary and ‘real life’ examples), a cherishing life is presented as hard and irreducibly individual. The idea of cherishing, says the author, points towards intimate, unreasonable layers of the ethical life, as well as the deepening of wisdom and connection. It also points towards incomparable satisfactions, reminding us who we are and who we want to be.

In Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence, John Tillson develops a theory concerning which kinds of formative influence are morally permissible, impermissible or obligatory. Applying this theory to the case of religion, he argues that religious initiation in childhood is morally impermissible whether conducted by parents, teachers or others. Tillson addresses questions such as: how we come to have the ethical responsibilities we do, how we understand religion, how ethical and religious commitments can be justified, and what makes children ethically special.

Many people, whether educators or not, will agree that an education that does not inspire wonder is barren. Wonder is commonly perceived as akin to curiosity, as stimulating inquiry, and as something that enhances pleasure in learning, but there are many experiences of wonder that do not have an obvious place in education. In Wonder and Education, Anders Schinkel theorises a kind of wonder with less obvious yet fundamental educational importance which he calls 'contemplative wonder'. Contemplative wonder disrupts frameworks of understanding that are taken for granted and perceived as natural and draws our attention to the world behind our constructions, sparking our interest in the world as something worth attending to for its own sake rather than for our purposes. It opens up space for the consideration of (radical) alternatives wherever it occurs, and in many cases is linked with deep experiences of value; therefore, it is not just important for education in general, but also, more specifically, for moral and political education.

The Necessity of Aesthetic Education is a manifesto. That which is experienced through engagement with art, through the many various and diverse art forms and media, is uniquely and essentially valuable to the lives of human beings. In order to fully appreciate and gain the most out of the arts, which offer a variety of aesthetic experience, there are concepts, skills and techniques integral to such understanding. In this book, Laura D’Olimpio argues that aesthetic education ought to be a compulsory part of education for all school-aged students, from pre-primary to high school, on the basis of its distinctive value. Such an argument is timely, given the so-called crisis in the arts and humanities, with declining student numbers in subjects that do not have a direct vocational correlative, and increased focus on science, engineering, technology and mathematics (STEM) subjects. As funding cuts increasingly slash the support for the arts, there is a need to argue for why the arts and arts education is valuable, for their own sake, as well as for the positive contributions they can and do make to society. Through critical engagement with a range of thinkers including Maxine Greene, John Dewey and Elliot Eisner, D’Olimpio offers a unique and important contribution to aesthetic education, and to research within philosophy of education.

Should schools promote values to children? Most people are happy with schools teaching the value of kindness and that bullying is wrong. But since 2014, schools in England have also been required to teach “British values”, including “democracy”, “liberty” and “mutual respect and tolerance”. To the dismay of some parents and conservative religious groups, some schools are also teaching more controversial values: that it’s okay to be gay, for example, or that we must appreciate religious traditions that we regard as making mistakes about how to live. Is this value-shaping justifiable in the liberal state? If so, what values may students be directed towards, and how may teachers in schools go about this? This book answers these questions by first defending a distinctive theoretical approach, ‘thin comprehensive liberalism’. This approach shows respect for persons by seeking minimally controversial justifications for policy and curricula, whilst also considering other important normative commitments such as protecting children from harm and securing their future equal political status. This ultimately justifies a substantive and controversial values education. The book also discusses the approach that should be taken to teaching values in schools. Using the British values policy as a platform for discussion, it recommends that values education should become a compulsory, high-status subject, with dedicated curriculum time and taught by experts at managing discussions of controversial issues. This change would help secure the welfare of children and a society where the free and equal status of all individuals is respected.

This book presents a case for teaching philosophy in schools. It develops two original arguments for teaching philosophy to all students at some point over the course of their education. Gatley argues that teaching philosophy is the best way to help students to think clearly using ordinary, or non-specialist concepts such as ‘good’, ‘truth’, or ‘happiness’. She goes on to argue that teaching philosophy is the best way to help students to make sense of the different conceptual schemes used by different school subjects. Combining these two arguments, Gatley suggests that these two roles for philosophy are central to the task of educating people, and so philosophy ought to be included on school curricula. Building on the work of philosophers of education including Richard Stanley Peters, Harry Brighouse, Matthew Lipman, Mary Midgley and Martha Nussbaum, the book covers a range of topics including Philosophy for Children (P4C), the aims education, religious education, curriculum design and education policy.

This book presents a case for teaching philosophy in schools. It develops two original arguments for teaching philosophy to all students at some point over the course of their education. Gatley argues that teaching philosophy is the best way to help students to think clearly using ordinary, or non-specialist concepts such as ‘good’, ‘truth’, or ‘happiness’. She goes on to argue that teaching philosophy is the best way to help students to make sense of the different conceptual schemes used by different school subjects. Combining these two arguments, Gatley suggests that these two roles for philosophy are central to the task of educating people, and so philosophy ought to be included on school curricula. Building on the work of philosophers of education including Richard Stanley Peters, Harry Brighouse, Matthew Lipman, Mary Midgley and Martha Nussbaum, the book covers a range of topics including Philosophy for Children (P4C), the aims education, religious education, curriculum design and education policy.

This book examines the rationale of incorporating the arts in the school curriculum from a philosophical, rather than pedagogical, perspective. Educational resources are frequently under scrutiny, and education policy makers wish to maximize the use of public funds and children’s time at school, leaving the arts as a lower priority. To understand the logic behind this, Barchana-Lorand revisits milestones in the history of the philosophy of art to address core questions in art education, namely, what are the challenges of teaching the arts? And why teach the arts at all? Barchana-Lorand draws on the work of a broad range of philosophers including Dewey, Eisner, Greene, Hume, Plato, Kant, Langer, Read and Schiller. The book aims to show how attempts to justify art as a tool for societal and individual improvement fail in advocating art education. Ultimately she claims that the arts should be taught because children have the right to receive art education. That right stems from the unique nature of art.

Philosophy in Schools is a collection of original philosophical essays that together make a robust case for the teaching of philosophy in schools. Leading philosophers of education explode the myth that philosophy is somehow too difficult or abstract for children and set out a series of compelling arguments for its inclusion in the school curriculum.Key themes addressed include:- the role of philosophy in teaching controversial issues- the epistemological basis of critical thinking- the practice of conceptual analysis- philosophical thinking in moral and religious education- the idea of philosophical intelligence- philosophical themes in children's literature- philosophy and the adolescent's search for meaning- the connection between philosophy and wisdom

A Critique of Pure Teaching Methods and the Case of Synthetic Phonics examines how research into the effectiveness of teaching methods can and should relate to what takes place in the classroom. The discussion brings to light some important features of the way we classify teaching activities. The classifications are unlike those we use in natural science – for instance, how we classify drug dosages. This point has very important implications for what should be considered the appropriate relationships between educational research and classroom practice.Andrew Davis applies the results of this discussion to the teaching of early reading, focussing in particular on the approach known as synthetic phonics. He provides a philosophical investigation into the nature of reading, and into the concepts that feature in approaches to teaching it, such as the idea of building words from letter sounds, the nature of words themselves and reading for meaning. He concludes with a discussion of why this matters so much, reflecting on how stories and books can be part of a child’s emerging identity within the family. He explores how values of family life should be weighed against the importance of achievements in school, and argues for the claim that school reading policies of certain kinds may have a destructive impact if they are felt to trump the private interests of children and their families.

What is a good human life? A life of duty? Virtue? Happiness? This book weaves a path through traditional answers. We live well, suggests the author, not primarily by pursuing goods for ourselves, but by cherishing other people and guiding them towards lives of cherishing. We cherish objects too – the planet, my grandfather’s watch – and practices like music-making to which we are personally drawn. In this work of ‘populated philosophy’ (copiously illustrated by literary and ‘real life’ examples), a cherishing life is presented as hard and irreducibly individual. The idea of cherishing, says the author, points towards intimate, unreasonable layers of the ethical life, as well as the deepening of wisdom and connection. It also points towards incomparable satisfactions, reminding us who we are and who we want to be.

Philosophical Reflections on Neuroscience and Education explores conceptual and normative questions about the recent programme which aims to underpin education with neuroscientific principles. By invoking philosophical ideas such as Bennett and Hacker’s mereological fallacy, Wittgenstein’s the first-person/third-person asymmetry principle and the notion of irreducible/constitutive uncertainty, William H. Kitchen offers a critique of the whole-sale adoption of neuroscience to education. He explores and reviews the role that neuroscience has started to play in educational policy and practice, and whether or not such a role is founded in coherent conceptual reasoning. Kitchen critically analyses the role which neuroscience can possibly play within educational discussions, and offers paradigmatic examples of how neuroscientific approaches have already found their way into educational practice and policy documents. By invoking the philosophical work primarily of Wittgenstein, he argues against the surge of neuroscientism within educational discourse and offers to clarify and elucidate core concepts in this area which are often misunderstood.