N. Laor - Böcker

1. GENERAL The term "diagnostics" refers to the general theory of diagnosis, not to the study of specific diagnoses but to their general framework. It borrows from different sciences and from different philosophies. Traditionally, the general framework of diagnostics was not distinguished from the framework of medicine. It was not taught in special courses in any systematic way; it was not accorded special attention: students absorbed it intuitively. There is almost no comprehensive study of diagnostics. The instruction in diagnosis provided in medical schools is exclusively specific. Clinical instruction includes (in addition to vital background information, such as anatomy and physiology) specific instruction in nosology, the theory and classification of diseases, and this includes information on diagnoses and prognoses of diverse diseases. What is the cause of the neglect of diagnostics, and of its integrated teaching? The main cause may be the prevalence of the view of diagnostics as part-and­ parcel of nosology. In this book nosology is taken as a given, autonomous field of study, which invites almost no comments; we shall freely borrow from it a few important general theses and a few examples. We attempt to integrate here three studies: ll of the way nosology is used in the diagnostic process; of the diagnostic process as a branch of applied ethics; ~ of the diagnostic process as a branch of social science and social technology.

The contributors to this book focus particularly on the broad philosophical framework known as critical rationalism, testing its limitations and discovering surprising connections. The essays well illustrate the fecundity and range of Professor Agassi's interests, and the broad range of persons he has influenced. Of particular concern in the volume are the broad frameworks of rationality and of religion. The religion of science, which is something Agassi has always opposed, is debated here. The volume contains one of the last papers by the late Paul K. Feyerabend.

A feature of this book is the broad range of the contributors, drawn from Europe, the Middle East and North America, testifying both to the range of Professor Agassi's interests and the geographical spread of his influence. Most contributors use Agassi's ideas as a springboard to engage in debate on issues, or offer a contribution in an area that interests him. In this volume contributors consider such questions as: Agassi's philosophy of education, in practice as well as in theory; the impact of psychology on philosophy; the origins of critical rationalism in the Bible; and the debates in economics stimulated by the work of Popper and Agassi. Besides the special topics, the reader should gain some sense of the fruitfulness of critical rationalism in the hands of Agassi's friends and colleagues.

In Volume I the contributors focus particularly on the broad philosophical framework known as critical rationalism, testing its limitations and discovering surprising connections. The essays well illustrate the fecundity and range of Professor Agassi's interests, and the broad range of persons he has influenced. Of particular concern in the volume are the broad frameworks of rationality and of religion. The religion of science, which is something Agassi has always opposed, is debated here. Among other distinguished contributors, the volume contains one of the last papers by the late Paul K. Feyerabend. A feature of Volume II is the broad range of the contributors, drawn from Europe, the Middle East and North America, testifying both to the range of Professor Agassi's interests and the geographical spread of his influence. Most contributors use Agassi's ideas as a springboard to engage in debate on issues, or offer a contribution in an area that interests him.In this volume contributors consider such questions as: Agassi's philosophy of education, in practice as well as in theory; the impact of psychology on philosophy; the origins of critical rationalism in the Bible; and the debates in economics stimulated by the work of Popper and Agassi. Besides the special topics, the reader should gain some sense of the fruitfulness of critical rationalism in the hands of Agassi's friends and colleagues.

An outstanding feature of this book is the broad range of the contributors, drawn from Europe, the Middle East and North America, testifying both to the range of Professor Agassi's interests and the geographical spread of his influence. Most contributors use Agassi's ideas as a springboard to engage in debate on issues, or offer a contribution in an area that interests him. In this volume contributors consider such questions as Agassi's philosophy of education, in practice as well as in theory; the impact of psychologism in philosophy; the origins of critical rationalism in the Bible; the debates in economics stimulated by the work of Popper and Agassi, and many other topics. Besides the special topics, the reader gains some sense of the fruitfulness of critical rationalism in the hands of Agassi's friends and colleagues.

I suppose Joseph Agassi's best and dearest self-description, his cher­ ished wish, is to practice what his 1988 book promises: The Gentle Art of Philosophical Polemics. But for me, and for so many who know him, our Agassi is tough-minded, not tender, not so gentle. True to his beloved critical thinking, he is ever the falsificationist, testing himself of course as much as everyone else. How, he asks himself, can he engage others in their own self-critical exploration? Irritate? Question their logic, their facts, their presuppositions, their rationales? Subvert their reasoning, uncover their motives? Help them to lose their balance, but always help them, make them do it to, and for, themselves. Out of their own mouths, and minds, and imagination. A unique teacher, in classroom and out; not for everyone. Agassi is not quite a tight textual Talmudist disputant, not quite the competitor in the marketplace of ideas offered for persuasive sale, not quite the clever cross-examining lawyer advocate, not quite a philosopher-scientist, not a sceptic more than necessary, not quite embat­ tled in the bloody world but not ever above the battle either . . . but a good deal of all of these, and steeped in intelligence and good will.