R. Scott Smith – författare

The field of mythography has grown substantially in the past thirty years, an acknowledgment of the importance of how ancient writers "wrote down the myths" as they systematized, organized and interpreted the vast and contested mythical storyworld. With the understanding that mythography remains a contested category, that its borders are not always clear, and that it shifted with changes in the socio-cultural and political landscapes, The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Mythography offers a range of scholarly voices that attempt to establish how and to what extent ancient writers followed the "mythographical mindset" that prompted works ranging from Apollodorus' Library to the rationalizing and allegorical approaches of Cornutus and Palaephatus. Editors R. Scott Smith and Stephen M. Trzaskoma provide the first comprehensive survey of mythography from the earliest attempts to organize and comment on myths in the archaic period (in poetry and prose) to late antiquity. The essays also provide an overview of those writers we call mythographers and other major sources of mythographic material (e.g., papyri and scholia), followed by a series of essays that seek to explore the ways in which mythographical impulses were interconnected with other intellectual activities (e.g., geography and history, catasteristic writings, politics). In addition, another section of essays presents the first sustained analysis between mythography and the visual arts, while a final section takes mythography from late antiquity up into the Renaissance. While also taking stock of recent advances and providing bibliographical guidance, this Handbook offers new approaches to texts that were once seen only as derivative sources of mythical data and presents innovative ideas for further research. The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Mythography is an essential resource for teachers, scholars, and students alike.

The field of mythography has grown substantially in the past thirty years, an acknowledgment of the importance of how ancient writers "wrote down the myths" as they systematized, organized and interpreted the vast and contested mythical storyworld. With the understanding that mythography remains a contested category, that its borders are not always clear, and that it shifted with changes in the socio-cultural and political landscapes, The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Mythography offers a range of scholarly voices that attempt to establish how and to what extent ancient writers followed the "mythographical mindset" that prompted works ranging from Apollodorus'' Library to the rationalizing and allegorical approaches of Cornutus and Palaephatus. Editors R. Scott Smith and Stephen M. Trzaskoma provide the first comprehensive survey of mythography from the earliest attempts to organize and comment on myths in the archaic period (in poetry and prose) to late antiquity. The essays also provide an overview of those writers we call mythographers and other major sources of mythographic material (e.g., papyri and scholia), followed by a series of essays that seek to explore the ways in which mythographical impulses were interconnected with other intellectual activities (e.g., geography and history, catasteristic writings, politics). In addition, another section of essays presents the first sustained analysis between mythography and the visual arts, while a final section takes mythography from late antiquity up into the Renaissance. While also taking stock of recent advances and providing bibliographical guidance, this Handbook offers new approaches to texts that were once seen only as derivative sources of mythical data and presents innovative ideas for further research. The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Mythography is an essential resource for teachers, scholars, and students alike.

The field of mythography has grown substantially in the past thirty years, an acknowledgment of the importance of how ancient writers "wrote down the myths" as they systematized, organized and interpreted the vast and contested mythical storyworld. With the understanding that mythography remains a contested category, that its borders are not always clear, and that it shifted with changes in the socio-cultural and political landscapes, The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Mythography offers a range of scholarly voices that attempt to establish how and to what extent ancient writers followed the "mythographical mindset" that prompted works ranging from Apollodorus'' Library to the rationalizing and allegorical approaches of Cornutus and Palaephatus. Editors R. Scott Smith and Stephen M. Trzaskoma provide the first comprehensive survey of mythography from the earliest attempts to organize and comment on myths in the archaic period (in poetry and prose) to late antiquity. The essays also provide an overview of those writers we call mythographers and other major sources of mythographic material (e.g., papyri and scholia), followed by a series of essays that seek to explore the ways in which mythographical impulses were interconnected with other intellectual activities (e.g., geography and history, catasteristic writings, politics). In addition, another section of essays presents the first sustained analysis between mythography and the visual arts, while a final section takes mythography from late antiquity up into the Renaissance. While also taking stock of recent advances and providing bibliographical guidance, this Handbook offers new approaches to texts that were once seen only as derivative sources of mythical data and presents innovative ideas for further research. The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Mythography is an essential resource for teachers, scholars, and students alike.

We live in a time of moral confusion: many believe there are no overarching moral norms, and we have lost an accepted body of moral knowledge. Alasdair MacIntyre addresses this problem in his much-heralded restatement of Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue ethics; Stanley Hauerwas does so through his highly influential work in Christian ethics. Both recast virtue ethics in light of their interpretations of the later Wittgenstein's views of language. This book systematically assesses the underlying presuppositions of MacIntyre and Hauerwas, finding that their attempts to secure moral knowledge and restate virtue ethics, both philosophical and theological, fail. Scott Smith proposes alternative indications as to how we can secure moral knowledge, and how we should proceed in virtue ethics.

For most of the church''s history, people have seen Christian ethics as normative and universally applicable. Recently, however, this view has been lost, thanks to naturalism and relativism. R. Scott Smith argues that Christians need to overcome Kant''s fact-value dichotomy and recover the possibility of genuine moral and theological knowledge.

Philosophical naturalism is taken to be the preferred and reigning epistemology and metaphysics that underwrites many ideas and knowledge claims. But what if we cannot know reality on that basis? What if the institution of science is threatened by its reliance on naturalism? R. Scott Smith argues in a fresh way that we cannot know reality on the basis of naturalism. Moreover, the "fact-value" split has failed to serve our interests of wanting to know reality. The author provocatively argues that since we can know reality, it must be due to a non-naturalistic ontology, best explained by the fact that human knowers are made and designed by God. The book offers fresh implications for the testing of religious truth-claims, science, ethics, education, and public policy. Consequently, naturalism and the fact-value split are shown to be false, and Christian theism is shown to be true.

We live in a time of moral confusion: many believe there are no overarching moral norms, and we have lost an accepted body of moral knowledge. Alasdair MacIntyre addresses this problem in his much-heralded restatement of Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue ethics; Stanley Hauerwas does so through his highly influential work in Christian ethics. Both recast virtue ethics in light of their interpretations of the later Wittgenstein's views of language. This book systematically assesses the underlying presuppositions of MacIntyre and Hauerwas, finding that their attempts to secure moral knowledge and restate virtue ethics, both philosophical and theological, fail. Scott Smith proposes alternative indications as to how we can secure moral knowledge, and how we should proceed in virtue ethics.

Philosophical naturalism is taken to be the preferred and reigning epistemology and metaphysics that underwrites many ideas and knowledge claims. But what if we cannot know reality on that basis? What if the institution of science is threatened by its reliance on naturalism? R. Scott Smith argues in a fresh way that we cannot know reality on the basis of naturalism. Moreover, the "fact-value" split has failed to serve our interests of wanting to know reality. The author provocatively argues that since we can know reality, it must be due to a non-naturalistic ontology, best explained by the fact that human knowers are made and designed by God. The book offers fresh implications for the testing of religious truth-claims, science, ethics, education, and public policy. Consequently, naturalism and the fact-value split are shown to be false, and Christian theism is shown to be true.

Philosophical naturalism is taken to be the preferred and reigning epistemology and metaphysics that underwrites many ideas and knowledge claims. But what if we cannot know reality on that basis? What if the institution of science is threatened by its reliance on naturalism? R. Scott Smith argues in a fresh way that we cannot know reality on the basis of naturalism. Moreover, the "fact-value" split has failed to serve our interests of wanting to know reality. The author provocatively argues that since we can know reality, it must be due to a non-naturalistic ontology, best explained by the fact that human knowers are made and designed by God. The book offers fresh implications for the testing of religious truth-claims, science, ethics, education, and public policy. Consequently, naturalism and the fact-value split are shown to be false, and Christian theism is shown to be true.

We live in a time of moral confusion: many believe there are no overarching moral norms, and we have lost an accepted body of moral knowledge. Alasdair MacIntyre addresses this problem in his much-heralded restatement of Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue ethics; Stanley Hauerwas does so through his highly influential work in Christian ethics. Both recast virtue ethics in light of their interpretations of the later Wittgenstein''s views of language. This book systematically assesses the underlying presuppositions of MacIntyre and Hauerwas, finding that their attempts to secure moral knowledge and restate virtue ethics, both philosophical and theological, fail. Scott Smith proposes alternative indications as to how we can secure moral knowledge, and how we should proceed in virtue ethics.

We live in a time of moral confusion: many believe there are no overarching moral norms, and we have lost an accepted body of moral knowledge. Alasdair MacIntyre addresses this problem in his much-heralded restatement of Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue ethics; Stanley Hauerwas does so through his highly influential work in Christian ethics. Both recast virtue ethics in light of their interpretations of the later Wittgenstein''s views of language. This book systematically assesses the underlying presuppositions of MacIntyre and Hauerwas, finding that their attempts to secure moral knowledge and restate virtue ethics, both philosophical and theological, fail. Scott Smith proposes alternative indications as to how we can secure moral knowledge, and how we should proceed in virtue ethics.

Philosophical naturalism is taken to be the preferred and reigning epistemology and metaphysics that underwrites many ideas and knowledge claims. But what if we cannot know reality on that basis? What if the institution of science is threatened by its reliance on naturalism? R. Scott Smith argues in a fresh way that we cannot know reality on the basis of naturalism. Moreover, the "fact-value" split has failed to serve our interests of wanting to know reality. The author provocatively argues that since we can know reality, it must be due to a non-naturalistic ontology, best explained by the fact that human knowers are made and designed by God. The book offers fresh implications for the testing of religious truth-claims, science, ethics, education, and public policy. Consequently, naturalism and the fact-value split are shown to be false, and Christian theism is shown to be true.

Are Brian McLaren, Tony Jones, Doug Pagitt, and Rob Bell "yesterday''s news," as many evangelicals seem to think? Truth and the New Kind of Christian (2005) tried to provide a balanced assessment of McLaren''s and Jones''s views. But, they seem to be right about much more that is affecting evangelicals than was realized then. Also, that book misunderstood one of their core claims: everything is interpretation. Moreover, their views have developed over the years, e.g., ethically about colonialism, its influences, and how we should live now. They also have advanced several further claims about the gospel and traditional doctrines.To what extent should Christians embrace their views? Are these the ways to go forward toward a more authentic Christianity, one that is morally better, and a better fit, for our times?Like Truth, this book gives careful attention to their thought. It also offers its own portrait of major shaping influences on Western, Americanized Christianity. But, there remains a root issue that keeps the Western church, whether progressive emergents or evangelicals, in its "Babylonian captivity." It is liberation from that root that will lead to an authentically emergent Christianity.

"Terrific . . . exactly the sort of collection we have long needed: one offering a wide range of texts, both literary and documentary, and that--with the inclusion of Sulpicia and Perpetua--allows students to hear the voices of actual women from the ancient world. The translations themselves are fluid; the inclusion of long extracts allows students to sink their teeth into material in ways not possible with traditional source books. The anonymous texts, inscriptions, and other non-literary material topically arranged in the 'Documentary' section will enable students to see how the documentary evidence supplements or undermines the views advanced in the literary texts. This is a book that should be of great use to anyone teaching a survey of the history of Ancient Rome or a Roman Civilization course. I look forward to teaching with this book which is, I think, the best source book I have seen for the way we teach these days." --David Potter, University of Michigan

This new edition of Anthology of Classical Myth offers selections from key Near Eastern texts—the Babylonian Epic of Gilgamesh, Epic of Creation (Enuma Elish), and Atrahasis; the Hittite Song of Emergence; and the flood story from the book of Genesis—thereby enabling students to explore the many similarities between ancient Greek and Mesopotamian mythology and enhancing its reputation as the best and most complete collection of its kind.

Constructivism dominates over other theories of knowledge in much of western academia, especially the humanities and social sciences. In Exposing the Roots of Constructivism: Nominalism and the Ontology of Knowledge, R. Scott Smith argues that constructivism is linked to the embrace of nominalism, the theory that everything is particular and located in space and time. Indeed, nominalism is sufficient for a view to be constructivist.However, the natural sciences still enjoy great prestige from the “fact-value split.” They are often perceived as giving us knowledge of the facts of reality, and not merely our constructs. In contrast, ethics and religion, which also have been greatly influenced by nominalism, usually are perceived as giving us just our constructs and opinions. Yet, even the natural sciences have embraced nominalism, and Smith shows that this will undermine knowledge in those disciplines as well. Indeed, the author demonstrates that, at best, nominalism leaves us with only interpretations, but at worst, it undermines all knowledge whatsoever. However, there are many clear examples of knowledge we do have in the many different disciplines, and therefore those must be due to a different ontology of properties. Thus, nominalism should be rejected. In its place, the author defends a kind of Platonic realism about properties.