Richard J. Harknett – författare

A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace.Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.

A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace.Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.

A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace.Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.

A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace.Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.

The core argument of Cyber Persistence and Campaigning is straightforward: to avoid being drawn into unwanted crisis or armed conflict (or prevail in both if they emerge), policymakers must apply cyber resources through coherent continuous cyber campaigns that set and structure conditions and circumstances to their advantage. The optimal way for policymakers to do this is to conduct concurrent campaigns for cyber contingency and advantage in competition. Cyber resources are not optimized as substitutes for conventional or nuclear weapons in war, or for coercion in crisis settings. They are, rather, the anticipatory stage-setters for those contingencies. As such, they are critical to ensuring the military forces that deter and fight are always ready and able to do so, and they play a parallel, simultaneous role in advancing state interests short of those contingencies. This means that states seeking and sustaining cyber initiative will have the advantage across the competition-conflict spectrum over those that do not. Cyber persistence through campaigning combines a single logic with a 21st century artform. Those states that master this combination will thrive in the digital age.