Robert Jervis – författare

The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community’s (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to policy or partisan preferences.

In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued an NIE entitled Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that contained a surprising finding. Analysts concluded that Iran had probably suspended its clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapon. This assessment created a political firestorm, despite the fact that analysts went to great lengths to assess the accuracy of their sources and to offer nuanced judgments about the complex issues surrounding Iran’s civilian and military nuclear programs. In this edited volume, former intelligence professionals and leading intelligence scholars describe and assess the factors that shaped this NIE and the course of events that sparked an international controversy. These chapters make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the state of the art when it comes to intelligence analysis and the challenges that emerge when intelligence estimates address significant foreign and defence policy issues and on-going political debates.

One of the chapters in this volume was originally published in the book titled, Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand. Other chapters were originally published in the journals Intelligence and National Security and Comparative Strategy.

The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community’s (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to policy or partisan preferences.

In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued an NIE entitled Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that contained a surprising finding. Analysts concluded that Iran had probably suspended its clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapon. This assessment created a political firestorm, despite the fact that analysts went to great lengths to assess the accuracy of their sources and to offer nuanced judgments about the complex issues surrounding Iran’s civilian and military nuclear programs. In this edited volume, former intelligence professionals and leading intelligence scholars describe and assess the factors that shaped this NIE and the course of events that sparked an international controversy. These chapters make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the state of the art when it comes to intelligence analysis and the challenges that emerge when intelligence estimates address significant foreign and defence policy issues and on-going political debates.

One of the chapters in this volume was originally published in the book titled, Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand. Other chapters were originally published in the journals Intelligence and National Security and Comparative Strategy.

To say that the world changed drastically on 9/11 has become a truism and even a cliché. But the incontestable fact is that a new era for both the world and US foreign policy began on that infamous day and the ramifications for international politics have been monumental.In this book, one of the leading thinkers in international relations, Robert Jervis, provides us with several snapshots of world politics over the past few years. Jervis brings his acute analysis of international politics to bear on several recent developments that have transformed international politics and American foreign policy including the War on Terrorism; the Bush Doctrine and its policies of preventive war and unilateral action; and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East (including the Iraq War) and around the world. Taken together, Jervis argues, these policies constitute a blueprint for American hegemony, if not American empire. All of these events and policies have taken place against a backdrop equally important, but less frequently discussed: the fact that most developed nations, states that have been bitter rivals, now constitute a "security community" within which war is unthinkable.American Foreign Policy in a New Era is a must read for anyone interested in understanding the policies and events that have shaped and are shaping US foreign policy in a rapidly changing and still very dangerous world.

To say that the world changed drastically on 9/11 has become a truism and even a cliché. But the incontestable fact is that a new era for both the world and US foreign policy began on that infamous day and the ramifications for international politics have been monumental.In this book, one of the leading thinkers in international relations, Robert Jervis, provides us with several snapshots of world politics over the past few years. Jervis brings his acute analysis of international politics to bear on several recent developments that have transformed international politics and American foreign policy including the War on Terrorism; the Bush Doctrine and its policies of preventive war and unilateral action; and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East (including the Iraq War) and around the world. Taken together, Jervis argues, these policies constitute a blueprint for American hegemony, if not American empire. All of these events and policies have taken place against a backdrop equally important, but less frequently discussed: the fact that most developed nations, states that have been bitter rivals, now constitute a "security community" within which war is unthinkable.American Foreign Policy in a New Era is a must read for anyone interested in understanding the policies and events that have shaped and are shaping US foreign policy in a rapidly changing and still very dangerous world.

Based on more than three decades of observation, Robert Jervis concludes in this provocative book that the very foundations of many social science theories--especially those in political science--are faulty. Taking insights from complexity theory as his point of departure, the author observes that we live in a world where things are interconnected, where unintended consequences of our actions are unavoidable and unpredictable, and where the total effect of behavior is not equal to the sum of individual actions. Jervis draws on a wide range of human endeavors to illustrate the nature of these system effects. He shows how increasing airport security might actually cost lives, not save them, and how removing dead trees (ostensibly to give living trees more room) may damage the health of an entire forest. Similarly, he highlights the interconnectedness of the political world as he describes how the Cold War played out and as he narrates the series of events--with their unintended consequences--that escalated into World War I. The ramifications of developing a rigorous understanding of politics are immense, as Jervis demonstrates in his critique of current systemic theories of international politics--especially the influential work done by Kenneth Waltz. Jervis goes on to examine various types of negative and positive feedback, bargaining in different types of relationships, and the polarizing effects of alignments to begin building a foundation for a more realistic, more nuanced, theory of international politics. System Effects concludes by examining what it means to act in a system. It shows how political actors might modify their behavior in anticipation of system effects, and it explores how systemic theories of political behavior might account for the role of anticipation and strategy in political action. This work introduces powerful new concepts that will reward not only international relations theorists, but also all social scientists with interests in comparative politics and political theory.

Since its original publication in 1976, Perception and Misperception in International Politics has become a landmark book in its field, hailed by the New York Times as "the seminal statement of principles underlying political psychology." This new edition includes an extensive preface by the author reflecting on the book''s lasting impact and legacy, particularly in the application of cognitive psychology to political decision making, and brings that analysis up to date by discussing the relevant psychological research over the past forty years. Jervis describes the process of perception (for example, how decision makers learn from history) and then explores common forms of misperception (such as overestimating one''s influence). He then tests his ideas through a number of important events in international relations from nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history. Perception and Misperception in International Politics is essential for understanding international relations today.

Robert Jervis has been a pioneering leader in the study of the psychology of international politics for more than four decades. How Statesmen Think presents his most important ideas on the subject from across his career. This collection of revised and updated essays applies, elaborates, and modifies his pathbreaking work. The result is an indispensable book for students and scholars of international relations.How Statesmen Think demonstrates that expectations and political and psychological needs are the major drivers of perceptions in international politics, as well as in other arenas. Drawing on the increasing attention psychology is paying to emotions, the book discusses how emotional needs help structure beliefs. It also shows how decision-makers use multiple shortcuts to seek and process information when making foreign policy and national security judgments. For example, the desire to conserve cognitive resources can cause decision-makers to look at misleading indicators of military strength, and psychological pressures can lead them to run particularly high risks. The book also looks at how deterrent threats and counterpart promises often fail because they are misperceived.How Statesmen Think examines how these processes play out in many situations that arise in foreign and security policy, including the threat of inadvertent war, the development of domino beliefs, the formation and role of national identities, and conflicts between intelligence organizations and policymakers.