Robert Jervis is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University. His books include System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life and How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics (both Princeton).

"The best statement of the psychological position in the literature on international politics. Highly readable, informative, and thought-provoking."--Library Journal "This exceptional book is a landmark in the study of cognitive processes in government foreign policy decision making. It integrates a thorough grasp of major psychological theory and research concerning individual cognitive processes with a detailed and perceptive reading of numerous historical accounts of international politics."--Contemporary Psychology "A valuable contribution to the theoretical literature on international relations."--Choice

• PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION xiii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xci INTRODUCTION 3 I The Setting 1 Perception and the Level of Analysis Problem 13 Do Perceptions Matter? 13 The International Environment 18 Compulsion in Extreme Circumstances? 19 Domestic Determinants 21 The Bureaucracy 24 Perceptions, Reality, and a Two-Step Model 28 2 External Stimuli, Internal Processes, and Intentions 32 Introduction 32 External versus Internal Sources of Behavior 35 Intentions 48 Inaccurate Predictions about One's Own Behavior 54 3 Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary 58 Two Views of International Relations and the Cold War 58 Deterrence 58 The Spiral Model 62 Psychological Dynamics 67 Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Problems with Incrementalism 76 Self-Defeating Power 78 Prescriptions 82 Universal Generalizations? 84 Evidence against the Spiral Model 84 Evidence against Deterrence 90 Deterrence and World War II; Spiral Model and World War I 94 When Will Force and Threats Work? The Decision-Maker's Choice 96 When Will Force and Threats Work? Hypotheses 100 Perceptions of Intention and Analyses of What ls at Stake 102 Other Explanations for the Differences between the Spiral and Deterrence Theories 107 Differences in Values 108 Claims for a Dominant Strategy 109 Dangers of Applying Gradualism to an Aggressive Adversary 110 Suggestions 111 II Processes of Perception 4 Cognitive Consistency and the Interaction between Theory and Data 117 Consistency: Rational and Irrational 117 Rational Consistency 119 Cognitive-Affective Balance 120 Source-Message Interaction 122 Implications 124 Irrational Consistency-Avoidance of Value Trade-Offs 128 Assimilation of Information to Pre-existing Beliefs 143 The Impact of Expectations on Perceptions 145 The Necessary Interdependence of Facts and Theories 154 The Interdependence between Facts and Theories in Science 156 The Impact of Categorization 162 Different Theories, Different Perceptions 163 The Emergence of New Theories and Images 165 Cognitive Distortion and Implications for Decision-Making 172 Failure to Recognize the Influence of Pre-Existing Beliefs 181 Excessive and Premature Cognitive Closure 187 Implications for Decision-Making 191 Confidence, Commitment, and Ambiguity 195 Implications for Decision-Making 201 5 The Impact of the Evoked Set 203 Evoked Set in the Absence of Communication 203 Communication and Estimating the Evoked Set of the Other 205 Misunderstandings within a Government: Differences in Information, Perspectives, and Time Lags 206 Uneven Distribution of Information within Governments 209 Differences in Evoked Set Caused by Differences in Concerns 211 Conclusions 215 6 How Decision-Makers Learn from History 217 Introduction 217 Lessons as Predispositions 222 Alternative Explanations 225 The Learning Process 227 Organizational Learning 238 Events from Which People Learn Most 239 Firsthand Experiences 239 Some Consequences 243 Alternative Explanations 246 Early Experiences and Generational Effects 249 Generational Effects 253 Alternative Explanations 257 Delayed Impact on Policy 260 Events Important to the Person's State or Organization 262 Revolutions 262 The Last War 266 Range of Available Alternative Analogies 270 What Lessons Do People Learn? 271 Impact of Constant Factors 271 Lessons about Specific Actors 274 Reactions to Failure 275 Nothing Fails like Success 278 Alternative Explanations 219 Summary 281 Appendix: The Impact of Domestic Politics and Training on Perceptual Predispositions 283 Learning from Domestic Politics 283 Training 287 7 Attitude Change 288 Introduction 288 Mechanisms of Attitude Preservation and Change 291 Centrality 297 The Rate at Which Discrepant Information Is Received 308 Beliefs Especially Resistant to Discrepant Information 310 III Common Misperceptions 8 Perceptions of Centralization 319 Unity and Planning 319 Plans, Not Accidents and Confusion 321 One Actor, Not Several 323 Special Cases 326 Variables Encouraging the Perception of Unity and Planning 327 Being Misinformed about One's Own Behavior 329 Misinformation about Physical Effects 331 Disobedience by Agents 332 Causes of Disobedience 332 Types of Disobedience 333 Consequences of Lack of Awareness of Agents' Behavior 334 Consequences of Perceptions of Unity and Planning 338 9 Overestimating One's Importance as Influence or Target 343 Introduction 343 Overestimating One's Effectiveness 344 Perceptions of Influence and Turning Points 348 Injury and Perceptions of the Other's Autonomy 349 Belief that the Other Understands that You Are Not a Threat 354 10 The Influence of Desires and Fears on Perceptions 356 Wishful Thinking 356 Experiments: Lack of Incentives for Accuracy 357 Desires or Expectations? 359 Direct Impact of Affect 361 Experimental Manipulation of Affect 361 Judgments of Desirability and Probability 362 Other Experiments 363 Wishful Thinking in International Relations 365 Perceptions of Danger: Vigilance or Defense? 372 Avoidance of Perceptions of Extreme Probabilities 378 Summary 380 11 Cognitive Dissonance and International Relations 382 Cognitive Dissonance Theory 382 Cognitive Dissonance and Inertia 387 The Magnitude of Dissonance 392 The Impact of Spending Resources 393 Incentives and Compulsion 399 Boomerang Effects 404 Summary 406 IV In Lieu of Conclusions 12 Minimizing Misperception 409 Making Assumptions and Predictions Explicit 410 Devil's Advocates 415 Conversions 418 Identities and Missions 418 Awareness of Common Misperceptions 423 BIBLIOGRAPHY 425 INDEX 433

Robert Jervis is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University. His books include System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life and How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics (both Princeton).

"The best statement of the psychological position in the literature on international politics. Highly readable, informative, and thought-provoking."--Library Journal "This exceptional book is a landmark in the study of cognitive processes in government foreign policy decision making. It integrates a thorough grasp of major psychological theory and research concerning individual cognitive processes with a detailed and perceptive reading of numerous historical accounts of international politics."--Contemporary Psychology "A valuable contribution to the theoretical literature on international relations."--Choice

• PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION xiii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xci INTRODUCTION 3 I The Setting 1 Perception and the Level of Analysis Problem 13 Do Perceptions Matter? 13 The International Environment 18 Compulsion in Extreme Circumstances? 19 Domestic Determinants 21 The Bureaucracy 24 Perceptions, Reality, and a Two-Step Model 28 2 External Stimuli, Internal Processes, and Intentions 32 Introduction 32 External versus Internal Sources of Behavior 35 Intentions 48 Inaccurate Predictions about One's Own Behavior 54 3 Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary 58 Two Views of International Relations and the Cold War 58 Deterrence 58 The Spiral Model 62 Psychological Dynamics 67 Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Problems with Incrementalism 76 Self-Defeating Power 78 Prescriptions 82 Universal Generalizations? 84 Evidence against the Spiral Model 84 Evidence against Deterrence 90 Deterrence and World War II; Spiral Model and World War I 94 When Will Force and Threats Work? The Decision-Maker's Choice 96 When Will Force and Threats Work? Hypotheses 100 Perceptions of Intention and Analyses of What ls at Stake 102 Other Explanations for the Differences between the Spiral and Deterrence Theories 107 Differences in Values 108 Claims for a Dominant Strategy 109 Dangers of Applying Gradualism to an Aggressive Adversary 110 Suggestions 111 II Processes of Perception 4 Cognitive Consistency and the Interaction between Theory and Data 117 Consistency: Rational and Irrational 117 Rational Consistency 119 Cognitive-Affective Balance 120 Source-Message Interaction 122 Implications 124 Irrational Consistency-Avoidance of Value Trade-Offs 128 Assimilation of Information to Pre-existing Beliefs 143 The Impact of Expectations on Perceptions 145 The Necessary Interdependence of Facts and Theories 154 The Interdependence between Facts and Theories in Science 156 The Impact of Categorization 162 Different Theories, Different Perceptions 163 The Emergence of New Theories and Images 165 Cognitive Distortion and Implications for Decision-Making 172 Failure to Recognize the Influence of Pre-Existing Beliefs 181 Excessive and Premature Cognitive Closure 187 Implications for Decision-Making 191 Confidence, Commitment, and Ambiguity 195 Implications for Decision-Making 201 5 The Impact of the Evoked Set 203 Evoked Set in the Absence of Communication 203 Communication and Estimating the Evoked Set of the Other 205 Misunderstandings within a Government: Differences in Information, Perspectives, and Time Lags 206 Uneven Distribution of Information within Governments 209 Differences in Evoked Set Caused by Differences in Concerns 211 Conclusions 215 6 How Decision-Makers Learn from History 217 Introduction 217 Lessons as Predispositions 222 Alternative Explanations 225 The Learning Process 227 Organizational Learning 238 Events from Which People Learn Most 239 Firsthand Experiences 239 Some Consequences 243 Alternative Explanations 246 Early Experiences and Generational Effects 249 Generational Effects 253 Alternative Explanations 257 Delayed Impact on Policy 260 Events Important to the Person's State or Organization 262 Revolutions 262 The Last War 266 Range of Available Alternative Analogies 270 What Lessons Do People Learn? 271 Impact of Constant Factors 271 Lessons about Specific Actors 274 Reactions to Failure 275 Nothing Fails like Success 278 Alternative Explanations 219 Summary 281 Appendix: The Impact of Domestic Politics and Training on Perceptual Predispositions 283 Learning from Domestic Politics 283 Training 287 7 Attitude Change 288 Introduction 288 Mechanisms of Attitude Preservation and Change 291 Centrality 297 The Rate at Which Discrepant Information Is Received 308 Beliefs Especially Resistant to Discrepant Information 310 III Common Misperceptions 8 Perceptions of Centralization 319 Unity and Planning 319 Plans, Not Accidents and Confusion 321 One Actor, Not Several 323 Special Cases 326 Variables Encouraging the Perception of Unity and Planning 327 Being Misinformed about One's Own Behavior 329 Misinformation about Physical Effects 331 Disobedience by Agents 332 Causes of Disobedience 332 Types of Disobedience 333 Consequences of Lack of Awareness of Agents' Behavior 334 Consequences of Perceptions of Unity and Planning 338 9 Overestimating One's Importance as Influence or Target 343 Introduction 343 Overestimating One's Effectiveness 344 Perceptions of Influence and Turning Points 348 Injury and Perceptions of the Other's Autonomy 349 Belief that the Other Understands that You Are Not a Threat 354 10 The Influence of Desires and Fears on Perceptions 356 Wishful Thinking 356 Experiments: Lack of Incentives for Accuracy 357 Desires or Expectations? 359 Direct Impact of Affect 361 Experimental Manipulation of Affect 361 Judgments of Desirability and Probability 362 Other Experiments 363 Wishful Thinking in International Relations 365 Perceptions of Danger: Vigilance or Defense? 372 Avoidance of Perceptions of Extreme Probabilities 378 Summary 380 11 Cognitive Dissonance and International Relations 382 Cognitive Dissonance Theory 382 Cognitive Dissonance and Inertia 387 The Magnitude of Dissonance 392 The Impact of Spending Resources 393 Incentives and Compulsion 399 Boomerang Effects 404 Summary 406 IV In Lieu of Conclusions 12 Minimizing Misperception 409 Making Assumptions and Predictions Explicit 410 Devil's Advocates 415 Conversions 418 Identities and Missions 418 Awareness of Common Misperceptions 423 BIBLIOGRAPHY 425 INDEX 433

Robert Jervis is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University. His books include System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life and How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics (both Princeton).

"The best statement of the psychological position in the literature on international politics. Highly readable, informative, and thought-provoking."--Library Journal "This exceptional book is a landmark in the study of cognitive processes in government foreign policy decision making. It integrates a thorough grasp of major psychological theory and research concerning individual cognitive processes with a detailed and perceptive reading of numerous historical accounts of international politics."--Contemporary Psychology "A valuable contribution to the theoretical literature on international relations."--Choice

• PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION xiii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xci INTRODUCTION 3 I The Setting 1 Perception and the Level of Analysis Problem 13 Do Perceptions Matter? 13 The International Environment 18 Compulsion in Extreme Circumstances? 19 Domestic Determinants 21 The Bureaucracy 24 Perceptions, Reality, and a Two-Step Model 28 2 External Stimuli, Internal Processes, and Intentions 32 Introduction 32 External versus Internal Sources of Behavior 35 Intentions 48 Inaccurate Predictions about One's Own Behavior 54 3 Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary 58 Two Views of International Relations and the Cold War 58 Deterrence 58 The Spiral Model 62 Psychological Dynamics 67 Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Problems with Incrementalism 76 Self-Defeating Power 78 Prescriptions 82 Universal Generalizations? 84 Evidence against the Spiral Model 84 Evidence against Deterrence 90 Deterrence and World War II; Spiral Model and World War I 94 When Will Force and Threats Work? The Decision-Maker's Choice 96 When Will Force and Threats Work? Hypotheses 100 Perceptions of Intention and Analyses of What ls at Stake 102 Other Explanations for the Differences between the Spiral and Deterrence Theories 107 Differences in Values 108 Claims for a Dominant Strategy 109 Dangers of Applying Gradualism to an Aggressive Adversary 110 Suggestions 111 II Processes of Perception 4 Cognitive Consistency and the Interaction between Theory and Data 117 Consistency: Rational and Irrational 117 Rational Consistency 119 Cognitive-Affective Balance 120 Source-Message Interaction 122 Implications 124 Irrational Consistency-Avoidance of Value Trade-Offs 128 Assimilation of Information to Pre-existing Beliefs 143 The Impact of Expectations on Perceptions 145 The Necessary Interdependence of Facts and Theories 154 The Interdependence between Facts and Theories in Science 156 The Impact of Categorization 162 Different Theories, Different Perceptions 163 The Emergence of New Theories and Images 165 Cognitive Distortion and Implications for Decision-Making 172 Failure to Recognize the Influence of Pre-Existing Beliefs 181 Excessive and Premature Cognitive Closure 187 Implications for Decision-Making 191 Confidence, Commitment, and Ambiguity 195 Implications for Decision-Making 201 5 The Impact of the Evoked Set 203 Evoked Set in the Absence of Communication 203 Communication and Estimating the Evoked Set of the Other 205 Misunderstandings within a Government: Differences in Information, Perspectives, and Time Lags 206 Uneven Distribution of Information within Governments 209 Differences in Evoked Set Caused by Differences in Concerns 211 Conclusions 215 6 How Decision-Makers Learn from History 217 Introduction 217 Lessons as Predispositions 222 Alternative Explanations 225 The Learning Process 227 Organizational Learning 238 Events from Which People Learn Most 239 Firsthand Experiences 239 Some Consequences 243 Alternative Explanations 246 Early Experiences and Generational Effects 249 Generational Effects 253 Alternative Explanations 257 Delayed Impact on Policy 260 Events Important to the Person's State or Organization 262 Revolutions 262 The Last War 266 Range of Available Alternative Analogies 270 What Lessons Do People Learn? 271 Impact of Constant Factors 271 Lessons about Specific Actors 274 Reactions to Failure 275 Nothing Fails like Success 278 Alternative Explanations 219 Summary 281 Appendix: The Impact of Domestic Politics and Training on Perceptual Predispositions 283 Learning from Domestic Politics 283 Training 287 7 Attitude Change 288 Introduction 288 Mechanisms of Attitude Preservation and Change 291 Centrality 297 The Rate at Which Discrepant Information Is Received 308 Beliefs Especially Resistant to Discrepant Information 310 III Common Misperceptions 8 Perceptions of Centralization 319 Unity and Planning 319 Plans, Not Accidents and Confusion 321 One Actor, Not Several 323 Special Cases 326 Variables Encouraging the Perception of Unity and Planning 327 Being Misinformed about One's Own Behavior 329 Misinformation about Physical Effects 331 Disobedience by Agents 332 Causes of Disobedience 332 Types of Disobedience 333 Consequences of Lack of Awareness of Agents' Behavior 334 Consequences of Perceptions of Unity and Planning 338 9 Overestimating One's Importance as Influence or Target 343 Introduction 343 Overestimating One's Effectiveness 344 Perceptions of Influence and Turning Points 348 Injury and Perceptions of the Other's Autonomy 349 Belief that the Other Understands that You Are Not a Threat 354 10 The Influence of Desires and Fears on Perceptions 356 Wishful Thinking 356 Experiments: Lack of Incentives for Accuracy 357 Desires or Expectations? 359 Direct Impact of Affect 361 Experimental Manipulation of Affect 361 Judgments of Desirability and Probability 362 Other Experiments 363 Wishful Thinking in International Relations 365 Perceptions of Danger: Vigilance or Defense? 372 Avoidance of Perceptions of Extreme Probabilities 378 Summary 380 11 Cognitive Dissonance and International Relations 382 Cognitive Dissonance Theory 382 Cognitive Dissonance and Inertia 387 The Magnitude of Dissonance 392 The Impact of Spending Resources 393 Incentives and Compulsion 399 Boomerang Effects 404 Summary 406 IV In Lieu of Conclusions 12 Minimizing Misperception 409 Making Assumptions and Predictions Explicit 410 Devil's Advocates 415 Conversions 418 Identities and Missions 418 Awareness of Common Misperceptions 423 BIBLIOGRAPHY 425 INDEX 433