Sami Pihlstrom – författare

In our troubled times of global conflict, philosophical reflection on war and peace has never been more urgent. This distinctive contribution to the ethics of war combines pragmatism with Kantian-inspired transcendental philosophy to offer fresh insights into age-old questions of when, if ever, war can be ethically acceptable.

Sami Pihlström argues that both traditional just war theory and pacifism function as forms of "secular theodicy", which justify innocent suffering for supposed greater goods. Moving beyond these approaches, he develops a meliorist framework that refuses both naive optimism and fatalistic pessimism about human conflict. The book examines three critical areas: the problem of sacrificing innocents in war, the ethics of nuclear deterrence in our post-World War II world, and the philosophy of history that shapes how we understand ourselves as a political community. Central to this analysis is the concept of defending the "transcendental ''us''"—not merely a contingent nation-state, but the very conditions that make ethical and political community possible. Drawing on thinkers from William James to Raimond Gaita, this work offers a philosophically rigorous yet accessible exploration of what it means to defend civilization itself against existential threats, ensuring that those who die in such defense "shall not have died in vain."

War, Pacifism, and Deterrence will appeal to researchers and graduate students interested in the philosophy of war and peace, pragmatism, and transcendental philosophy.

In our troubled times of global conflict, philosophical reflection on war and peace has never been more urgent. This distinctive contribution to the ethics of war combines pragmatism with Kantian-inspired transcendental philosophy to offer fresh insights into age-old questions of when, if ever, war can be ethically acceptable.

Sami Pihlström argues that both traditional just war theory and pacifism function as forms of "secular theodicy", which justify innocent suffering for supposed greater goods. Moving beyond these approaches, he develops a meliorist framework that refuses both naive optimism and fatalistic pessimism about human conflict. The book examines three critical areas: the problem of sacrificing innocents in war, the ethics of nuclear deterrence in our post-World War II world, and the philosophy of history that shapes how we understand ourselves as a political community. Central to this analysis is the concept of defending the "transcendental ''us''"—not merely a contingent nation-state, but the very conditions that make ethical and political community possible. Drawing on thinkers from William James to Raimond Gaita, this work offers a philosophically rigorous yet accessible exploration of what it means to defend civilization itself against existential threats, ensuring that those who die in such defense "shall not have died in vain."

War, Pacifism, and Deterrence will appeal to researchers and graduate students interested in the philosophy of war and peace, pragmatism, and transcendental philosophy.

Pragmatism and Objectivity illuminates the nature of contemporary pragmatism against the background of Rescher’s work, resulting in a stronger grasp of the prospects and promises of this philosophical movement. The central insight of pragmatism is that we must start from where we find ourselves and deflate metaphysical theories of truth in favor of an account that reflects our actual practices of the concept. Pragmatism links truth and rationality to experience, success, and action. While crude versions of pragmatism state that truth is whatever works for a person or a community, Nicholas Rescher has been at the forefront of arguing for a more sophisticated pragmatist position. According to his position, we can illuminate a robust concept of truth by considering its links with inquiry, assertion, belief, and action. His brand of pragmatism is objective and organized around truth and inquiry, rather than other forms of pragmatism that are more subjective and lenient. The contingency and fallibility of knowledge and belief formation does not mean that our beliefs are simply what our community decides, or that truth and objectivity are spurious notions. Rescher offers the best chance of understanding how it is that beliefs can be the products of human inquiry yet aim at the truth nonetheless. The essays in this volume, written by established and up-and-coming scholars of pragmatism, touch on themes related to epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and ethics.

The essays collected in this volume and authored by Sami Pihlström emphasize that our relation to the world we live in and seek to represent and get to know better through our practices of conceptualization and inquiry is irreducibly valuational. There is no way of even approaching, let alone resolving, the philosophical issue of realism without drawing due attention to the ways in which human values are inextricably entangled with even the most purely “factual” projects of inquiry we engage in.

This entanglement of the factual and the normative is, as explicitly argued in Chapter 7 but implicitly suggested in all the other chapters as well, both pragmatic (practice-embedded and practice-involving) and transcendental (operating at the level of the necessary conditions for the possibility of our representing and cognizing the world in general). The author claims we need to carefully examine the complex relations of realism, value, and transcendental arguments at the intersection of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. This book does so by offering case-studies of various important neopragmatists and philosophers close to the pragmatist tradition, including Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Rescher, Joseph Margolis, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It appeals to scholars and advanced graduate students focusing on pragmatism and analytic philosophy.

This book argues that no ethically appropriate relation to other human beings is possible unless we treat them as genuinely other. The authors provide reasons to be critical of various attempts, many of them popular in our contemporary (Western) culture, to encourage deeper attachment to and immersion into others’ lives and experiences. They defend the significance of the distance between human beings, criticizing exaggerated uses of, e.g., the concept of empathy and related concepts in academic as well as more popular ethical contexts, across a range of issues from the nature of ethical duty to the philosophy of love.

This book defends antitheodicism, arguing that theodicies, seeking to excuse God for evil and suffering in the world, fail to ethically acknowledge the victims of suffering. The authors argue for this view using literary and philosophical resources, commencing with Immanuel Kant’s 1791 “Theodicy Essay” and its reading of the Book of Job. Three important twentieth century antitheodicist positions are explored, including “Jewish” post-Holocaust ethical antitheodicism, Wittgensteinian antitheodicism exemplified by D.Z. Phillips and pragmatist antitheodicism defended by William James. The authors argue that these approaches to evil and suffering are fundamentally Kantian. Literary works such as Franz Kafka’s The Trial, Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, and George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, are examined in order to crucially advance the philosophical case for antitheodicism.