Continuum Studies in American Philosophy – serie

Relativism about knowledge or truth has always provoked the ire of philosophers. Ever since Protagoras declared in antiquity that "man is the measure of all things", relativism has been repeatedly attacked. Recently, however, Alasdair MacIntyre has observed that "relativism . is one of those doctrines that have by now been refuted a number of times too often." Along with MacIntyre, Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty have also argued that while relativism may be problematic, there are valuable insights in it that philosophers need to take notice of. This book sorts out exactly what those relativistic insights are, and where they are to be found within the works of these three leading late-twentieth-century American philosophers. Timothy Mosteller begins with a review of the major traditional definitions of relativism and the classical arguments against it. He then examines twentieth-century accounts and defenses of relativism and points out that each account faces problems similar to those of the traditional versions.The book continues with substantial treatments of the views of MacIntyre, Putnam and Rorty on relativism, with each thinker robustly engaging the opinions of the others.Mosteller concludes the book by developing an alternative approach to relativism about knowledge, which recognizes that while there may be no single 'global' criterion for all knowledge claims, there can be 'local' standards for settling particular disputes in such a way as to avoid the traditional hazards of relativism.

For much of the twentieth century, many Anglo-American philosophers supported three theses - one about reality, one about truth, and one about human knowledge - that, taken together, underwrote debates in epistemology. The first was realism: the commonsensical-sounding view that the world of physical objects exists independently of human thought or language. The second was the correspondence theory of truth, according to which true statements or beliefs are those which accurately represent the way the world is. The third was foundationalism: the view that our knowledge of the world, like an edifice, must rest on firm foundations (i.e. on beliefs whose justification does not depend on any other beliefs). In the last two decades, however, a radical anti-epistemology movement led by the influential American philosopher Richard Rorty has put partisans of all three theses on the defensive. Moreover, Rorty has repeatedly claimed that his opposition to the shibboleths of traditional epistemology draws inspiration from the grand tradition of Pragmatism (especially from William James and John Dewey.  In this important new book, Douglas McDermid argues persuasively for two key claims: first, that the so-called "Neo-Pragmatist" critique of traditional epistemology is thoroughly unconvincing; second, that Rorty is guilty of taking the name of Pragmatism in vain, since there are crucial and far-reaching differences between Neo-Pragmatism and the Classical Pragmatism of James and Dewey. The Varieties of Pragmatism will take its place in the forefront of the literature on this most vital part of the American philosophical legacy.

The influence of Thomas Kuhn (1922 -1996) on the history and philosophy of science has been truly enormous. In 1962, Kuhn's famous work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, helped to inaugurate a revolution - the historiographic revolution - in the latter half of the twentieth century, providing a new understanding of science in which 'paradigm shifts' (scientific revolutions) are punctuated with periods of stasis (normal science). Kuhn's revolution not only had a huge impact on the history and philosophy of science but on other disciplines as well, including sociology, education, economics, theology, and even science policy. James A. Marcum's book focuses on the following questions: What exactly was Kuhn's historiographic revolution? How did it come about? Why did it have the impact it did? What, if any, will its future impact be for both academia and society? At the heart of the answers to these questions is the person of Kuhn himself, i.e., his personality, his pedagogical style, his institutional and social commitments, and the intellectual and social context in which he practiced his trade. Drawing on the rich archival sources at MIT, and engaging fully with current scholarship on Kuhn, Marcum's is the first book to show in detail how Kuhn's influence transcended the boundaries of the history and philosophy of science community to reach many others - sociologists, economists, theologians, political scientists, educators, and even policy makers and politicians.

This is the first book about the women of the early American idealist movement in philosophy and a chapter is devoted to the life, practical work, and philosophical ideas of each of them. The American idealist movement started in St. Louis, Missouri in 1858, becoming more influential as women joined and influenced its development. Susan Elizabeth Blow was well known as an educator and pedagogical theorist who founded the first public kindergarten program in America (1873-1884).Anna C. Brackett was a feminist and pedagogical theorist and the first female principal of a secondary school (St. Louis Normal School, 1863-72). Grace C. Bibb was a feminist literary critic and the first female dean at the University of Missouri, Columbia (1878-84). American idealism took on a new form in the 1880s with the founding of the Concord School of Philosophy in Massachusetts. Ellen M. Mitchell participated in the movement in both St. Louis and Concord. She was one of the first women to teach philosophy at a co-educational college (University of Denver, 1890-92).Lucia Ames Mead, Marietta Kies, and Eliza Sunderland joined the movement in Concord.Lucia Ames Mead became a chief pacifist theorist in the early twentieth century. Kies and Sunderland were among the first women to earn the Ph.D. in philosophy (University of Michigan, 1891, 1892). Kies wrote on political altruism and shared with Mitchell the distinction of teaching at a coeducational institution (Butler College, 1896-99). These were the first American women as a group to plunge into philosophy proper, bridging those years between the amateur, paraprofessional and professional academic philosopher. Dorothy Rogers' new book at last gives them the attention they deserve. "America's First Women Philosophers" is indexed in H.W. Wilson's Essay and General Literature Index.

This is the first book about the women of the early American Idealist movement in philosophy. The movement started in St. Louis, Missouri in 1858, becoming more influential as women joined and influenced its development. Many of these women were pioneers in feminist thought, in the expansion of education, and of the woman's role in it as teachers and scholars. Chief among them were Susan E. Blow, Anna C. Brackett, Grace C. Bibb, Ellen M. Mitchell, and Marietta Kies. This book devotes a chapter to the life, practical work, and philosophical ideas of each of them. These were the first American women as a group to plunge into philosophy proper, bridging those years between the amateur, paraprofessional, and professional academic philosopher. Dorothy Rogers' new book at last gives them the attention they deserve.

John Rawls was unquestionably the most important moral and political philosopher of the last one hundred years. His A Theory of Justice published in 1971 is already a classic text, and his political philosophy is more widely studied than that of any other theorist. Interest in Rawls's work has increased still further since his recent death and the publication of his complete works, but until now, there has been no single volume that explores the legacy of his work. This book fills the void, making a substantial contribution not only to work on Rawls's thought but to contemporary debates in ethics and justice as well. The book will be of great interest to academics and students in philosophy, politics, and law departments alike.

John Searle (1932-) is one of the most famous living American philosophers. A pupil of J. L. Austin at Oxford in the 1950s, he is currently Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley. In 1995 John Searle published "The Construction of Social Reality", a text which not only promises to disclose the institutional backdrop against which speech takes place, but initiate a new 'philosophy of society'. Since then "The Construction of Social Reality" has been subject to a flurry of criticism. While many of Searle's interlocutors share the sense that the text marks an important breakthrough, he has time and again accused critics of misunderstanding his claims. Despite Searle's characteristic crispness and clarity there remains some confusion, among both philosophers and sociologists, regarding the significance of his proposals. This book traces some of the high points of this dialogue, leveraging Searle's own clarifications to propose a new way of understanding the text. In particular, Joshua Rust looks to Max Weber in suggesting that Searle has articulated an ideal type.In locating The Construction of Social Reality under the umbrella of one of sociology's founding fathers, this book not only makes Searle's text more accessible to the readers in the social sciences, but presents Max Weber as a thinker worthy of philosophical reconsideration. Moreover, the recharacterization of Searle's claims in terms of the ideal type helps facilitate a comparison between Searle and other social theorists such as Talcott Parsons.

The influence of Thomas Kuhn (1922 -1996) on the history and philosophy of science has been truly enormous. In 1962, Kuhn's famous work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, helped to inaugurate a revolution - the historiographic revolution - in the latter half of the twentieth century, providing a new understanding of science in which 'paradigm shifts' (scientific revolutions) are punctuated with periods of stasis (normal science). Kuhn's revolution not only had a huge impact on the history and philosophy of science but on other disciplines as well, including sociology, education, economics, theology, and even science policy. James A. Marcum's new book focuses on the following questions: What exactly was Kuhn's historiographic revolution? How did it come about? Why did it have the impact it did? What, if any, will its future impact be for both academia and society? At the heart of the answers to these questions is the person of Kuhn himself, i.e., his personality, his pedagogical style, his institutional and social commitments, and the intellectual and social context in which he practiced his trade.Drawing on the rich archival sources at MIT, and engaging fully with current scholarship on Kuhn, Marcum's is the first book to show in detail how Kuhn's influence transcended the boundaries of the history and philosophy of science community to reach many others - sociologists, economists, theologians, political scientists, educators, and even policy makers and politicians.

Relativism about knowledge or truth has always provoked the ire of philosophers. Ever since Protagoras declared in antiquity that 'man is the measure of all things', relativism has been repeatedly attacked. Recently, however, Alasdair MacIntyre has observed that 'relativism...is one of those doctrines that have by now been refuted a number of times too often'. Along with MacIntyre, Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty have also argued that while relativism may be problematic, there are valuable insights in it that philosophers need to take notice of. This book sorts out exactly what those relativistic insights are, and where they are to be found within the works of these three leading late-twentieth-century philosophers. Timothy Mosteller begins with a review of the major traditional definitions of relativism and the classical arguments against it. He then examines twentieth-century accounts and defences of relativism and points out that each account faces problems similar to those of the traditional versions. The continues with substantial treatments of the views of macIntyre, Putnam and Rorty on relativism, with each thinker robustly engaging the opinions of the others.Mosteller concludes the book by developing an alternative approach to relativismabout knowledge, which recognizes that while there may be no single 'global' criterion for all knowledge claims, there can be 'local' standards for settling particular disputes in such a way as to avoid the traditional hazards of relativism.Timothy M. Mosteller (Ph.D University of Miami) teaches philosophy at the University of San Diego, California.

Willard Van Orman Quine was certainly the greatest analytic philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century. Born in 1908, he held the Edgar Pierce Chair of Philosophy at Harvard University from 1956 to 2000. He made highly important contributions to such areas as mathematical logic, set theory, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of logic. His best known works include "From a Logical Point of View", "Ontological Relativity" and other essays, and his most influential Word and Object. One of Quine's central doctrines is the 'indeterminacy of translation' - the assertion that there is no objective answer to the question of what someone means by any given sentence. This view was first put forward in Word and Object and was shocking enough to draw criticisms from other leading philosophers like Noam Chomsky and Richard Rorty. Eve Gaudet argues that these controversies stem partly from Quine's ambiguities and changes of mind, and partly from his readers' misunderstandings. Gaudet dissipates the confusion by examining afresh.Quine's whole concept of 'a fact of the matter', and evaluating the contributions to the debate by Chomsky, Rorty, Friedman, Gibson and Follesdal in the light of her new interpretation. This is the first book devoted to a defence of Quine's indeterminacy of translation doctrine. Unlike many who conclude in Quine's favour, Gaudet adopts a critical and nuanced approach to Quine's texts, showing that Quine sometimes changed his positions and was not always as clear and consistent as many assume.

For much of the twentieth century, many Anlgo-American philosophers supported three theses - one about reality, one about truth, and one about human knowledge - that, taken together, underwrote debates in epistemology. The first was realism: the commonsensical-sounding view that the world of physical objects exists independently of human thought or language. The second was the correspondence theory of truth, according to which true statements or beliefs are those accurately represent the way the world is. And the third was foundationalism: the view that our knowledge of the world, like an edifice, must rest on firm foundations. In the last two decades, however, a radical anti-epistemology movement led by the influential American philosopher Richard Rorty has put patisans of all three theses on the defensive.In this important new book, Douglas McDermid argues persuasively for two key claims: first, that the so-called 'Neo-Pragmatist' critique of traditional epistemology is thoroughly unconvincing; second, that Rorty is guilty of taking the name of Pragmatism in vain, since there are crucial and far-reaching differences between Neo-Pragmatism ad the Classical Pragmatism of james and Dewey.The Varieties of Pragmatism will take its place in the forefront of the literature on this most vital part of the American philosophical legacy. Douglas McDermid teaches Philosophy at Trent University, Canada.

Famously and notoriously, Robert Nozick argues against the welfare state in Anarchy, State and Utopia. While many academics have severely criticized Nozick's notion of a minimal state, neo-conservatives and many ordinary citizens remain convinced by his arguments for limited government. Much has been made of Nozick's critique of the welfare state, yet few philosophers have examined his views on compensation and a meaningful life. Following a brief review of different notions of rights and freedoms, Dale Murray closely examines what Nozick means by compensation, and what injustices that he thinks it can rectify. He then offers a novel reconstruction of Nozick's libertarianism in the light of this analysis - as a possible approach for more positive rights. The book also explores Nozick's unique understanding of risk and his assessment of how we can calculate it. Using health care as a test case, Murray argues that since government-funded projects have tended to worsen people's health, the state should compensate individuals for their ill health. This compensation should come in the form of providing a minimal amount of health care to its citizens.Such welfare rights, however, are not as strong as some universal health care advocates would expect. Here, Murray brings a Nozickian focus to the rationing of care to the elderly. The elderly have the most tenuous claim to a right to health care since 'autonomy' arguments for welfare rights are the hardest to make for them.

The philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is very important at every stage of the history of modern American thought. It informs William James's evolutionary metaphysics, John Dewey's theory of logic, W.V.O. Quine's naturalism, and Richard Rorty's notion of the Linguistic Turn. Similarly, many Continental philosophers, like Jurgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Jacques Derrida, and Umberto Eco, have developed Peirce's semiotic logic as central to their own philosophical views. Yet until now there has been a yawning gap in the literature on what is arguably the most essential idea in the entire Peircean corpus, namely his "fallibilism." The basic idea of fallibilism is that all knowledge claims, including those metaphysical, methodological, introspective, and even mathematical claims - all of these remain uncertain, provisional, merely fallible conjectures. As Elizabeth Cooke explains in Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry, one long-standing concern with the idea of fallibilism is that it might all too easily slide into "skepticism." And this would certainly undermine the overall project of making Peirce's fallibilism the linchpin for any realistic pragmatism.So, it is essential to show Peirce's philosophy does not require any claims to certitude, in order to keep his fallibilism from falling into skepticism or contextualism. Cooke's solution to this problem is to interpret Peirce as having reconceived knowledge - traditionally defined as "foundational" and even "static" - as a dynamic process of inquiry, one which evolves within a larger ontological process of evolution. Her book will be of great interest not only to Peirce and Pragmatism specialists but also to contemporary epistemologists more generally.

Modern ethical theory has experienced a resurgence of interest in the virtues. Long relegated to the ancient and medieval past, virtue theory is now considered by many to be a viable alternative to the otherwise dominant Kantian and Utilitarian ethical theories. Alasdair Maclntyre is a central figure in this movement, whose work forms an expanding yet consistent and influential project to address fundamental issues in ethical theory and American culture. However, many of his ideas were anticipated by John Dewey, who also has a great deal to say about the virtues in a moral life. This aspect of Dewey's work has been too much overlooked. His ethics is radical in many ways and difficult, but it is clear that he holds the virtues in human conduct to be a key element in the development of character and in the larger progress of moral inquiry. This book offers, as it were, a critique of Maclntyre by Dewey that allows these two philosophers to converse about the nature and origins of the virtues and their importance for living a good life.Along the way, several other points of comparison become evident, especially their views on human practices, the nature of the self, a conception of human flourishing, moral inquiry, and the value of liberalism in the modern world. Stephen Carden argues that Dewey has the more comprehensive view of the virtues and that a close comparison of their ideas reveals several significant weaknesses in Maclntyre's position.

This book is a study of Richard Rorty's "New Pragmatism" on its own terms, and a critical analysis of its implications for contemporary thought. As an anti-foundationalist and a liberal, Rorty's version of pragmatism is designed to promote personal freedom and democratic solidarity. Having as his target the stultifying effects of Western philo-scientific tradition, encrusted with the barnacles of metaphysical essentialism and epistemic foundationalism, Rorty writes to liberate the contemporary mind and to promote the growth of individual creativity and social tolerance. Admirable as the goals of greater personal creativity and tolerant solidarity are, it is Edward J. Grippe's contention that Rorty fails to achieve either of them. Liberated from the notion of essentialism, Rorty develops a vision of self that is radically unfettered in its originality. So, to forestall the misanthropy that would inevitably emerge, a "solidarity of forbearance" is to be inculcated. But given his anti-foundationalist stance, Rorty cannot appeal to a rational consensus to ground tolerance.With only a Darwinian struggle between competing constructs, sophistic persuasion must be the deciding factor as to which narrative "works." And since there can be no ultimate or "final" vocabulary as arbiter, those that control the meaning of words control the basis for pragmatic conversation, i.e., what counts as "a working solidarity." Thus, the book concludes that Rorty's pragmatism is self-defeating, suppressing genuine conversation and ultimately constricting creativity.

Richard Rorty is regarded as something of a pariah in mainstream philosophical circles. Trained by some of the most eminent philosophers of the twentieth century, he has come to be one of the strongest critics of the philosophical tradition. Over the years Rorty's books have cast serious doubt on philosophical ambitions, such as whether we can provide deep and uncontroversial definitions of justice, truth, and knowledge. He has also questioned whether it makes sense to ask if the beliefs we have, in some deep sense, correspond with the "real world." Instead of trying to resolve deep philosophical questions, Rorty believes we should turn our attention to social issues, broadly conceived as "increasing solidarity". In this book, G. Elijah Dann takes seriously Rorty's writings, showing how, contrary to what many philosophers believe, he actually helps to enhance and enliven both the philosophy of religion and the chances for moral progress. Dann goes on to discuss Rorty's metaethics and reviews. Rorty's well-known article, "Religion as Conversation-stopper," showing how the private/public distinction, though well-placed, needs adjustment.Contrary to Rorty's view that religious values should remain in the private realm, Dann maintains religious values can play an important role in the public square, albeit through a "translation" into secular terms. Finally the book explores how the history of philosophical interests shaped theological ones and Dann looks at Rorty's more recent thoughts about religion, particularly in his discussion with the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo.

This is a new and highly original monograph examining Quine's naturalism, an issue central to the work of this hugely influential analytic philosopher.W. V. Quine was the most important naturalistic philosopher of the twentieth century and a major impetus for the recent resurgence of the view that empirical science is our best avenue to knowledge. His views, however, have not been well understood. Critics charge that Quine's naturalized epistemology is circular and that it cannot be normative. Yet, such criticisms stem from a cluster of fundamental traditional assumptions regarding language, theory, and the knowing subject - the very presuppositions that Quine is at pains to reject. Through investigation of Quine's views regarding language, knowledge, and reality, the author offers a new interpretation of Quine's naturalism. The naturalism/anti-naturalism debate can be advanced only by acknowledging and critiquing the substantial theoretical commitments implicit in the traditional view. Gregory argues that the responses to the circularity and non-normativity objections do just that.His analysis further reveals that Quine's departure from the tradition penetrates the conception of the knowing subject, and he thus offers a new and engaging defence of Quine's naturalism.

Feminist philosophy identifies tensions within mainstream theories of knowledge. To create a more egalitarian epistemology, solutions to these problems have been as diverse as the traditions of philosophy out of which feminists continue to emerge. This book considers two equally formidable approaches theorized by Louise Antony and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. The American philosopher W.V.O. Quine locates knowledge as a branch of empirical science. Shuford shows how both Antony and Nelson use Quine's 'naturalized epistemology' to create empirically robust feminist epistemologies. However, Shuford argues that neither can include physical embodiment as an important epistemic variable. The book argues that John Dewey's theory of inquiry extends beyond Quine's insight that knowledge must be interrogated as an empirical matter. Because Dewey insists that all aspects of experience must be subject to the experimental openness that is the hallmark of scientific reasoning, Shuford concludes that physical embodiment must play an important part in knowledge claims.

John Rawls was unquestionably the most important moral and political philosopher of the last one hundred years. His "A Theory of Justice" published in 1971 is already a classic text, and his political philosophy is more widely studied than that of any other theorist. Interest in Rawls' work has increased still further since his recent death and the publication of his complete works, but until now, there has been no single volume that explores the legacy of his work. This book fills the void, making a substantial contribution not only to work on Rawls' thought but to contemporary debates in ethics and justice as well. The book will be of great interest to academics and students in philosophy, politics, and law departments alike.

W. V. Quine was the most important naturalistic philosopher of the twentieth century and a major impetus for the recent resurgence of the view that empirical science is our best avenue to knowledge. His views, however, have not been well understood. Critics charge that Quine''s naturalized epistemology is circular and that it cannot be normative. Yet, such criticisms stem from a cluster of fundamental traditional assumptions regarding language, theory, and the knowing subject - the very presuppositions that Quine is at pains to reject. Through investigation of Quine''s views regarding language, knowledge, and reality, the author offers a new interpretation of Quine''s naturalism. The naturalism/anti-naturalism debate can be advanced only by acknowledging and critiquing the substantial theoretical commitments implicit in the traditional view. Gregory argues that the responses to the circularity and non-normativity objections do just that. His analysis further reveals that Quine''s departure from the tradition penetrates the conception of the knowing subject, and he thus offers a new and engaging defence of Quine''s naturalism.

W. V. Quine was the most important naturalistic philosopher of the twentieth century and a major impetus for the recent resurgence of the view that empirical science is our best avenue to knowledge. His views, however, have not been well understood. Critics charge that Quine's naturalized epistemology is circular and that it cannot be normative. Yet, such criticisms stem from a cluster of fundamental traditional assumptions regarding language, theory, and the knowing subject GCo the very presuppositions that Quine is at pains to reject. Through investigation of Quine's views regarding language, knowledge, and reality, the author offers a new interpretation of Quine's naturalism. The naturalism/anti-naturalism debate can be advanced only by acknowledging and critiquing the substantial theoretical commitments implicit in the traditional view. Gregory argues that the responses to the circularity and non-normativity objections do just that. His analysis further reveals that Quine's departure from the tradition penetrates the conception of the knowing subject, and he thus offers a new and engaging defence of Quine's naturalism.

In Reality and Its Appearance, Nicholas Rescher aims to address the conceptual and analytical question: how does the concept of reality function and how should we think with regard to the issue of reality's relations to appearances? Rescher argues that the distinction between reality and its appearance is not a substantive distinction between two types of being, but rather relates to different ways of understanding one selfsame mode of being. The book proposes that while realism is a sensible and tenable position, nevertheless there is something to be said for idealism as well. In the cognitive as in the moral life, perfection is beyond our human grasp and we have no choice but to rest content with the best that we can manage to achieve in practice. This perspective shifts the approach from a cognitive absolutism to a pragmatism that is prepared to come to terms with the limitations inherent in our situations. On this basis Rescher defends a substantive realism that itself rests on a justificatory rationale of a decidedly pragmatic orientation.

Pragmatist Metaphysics proposes a pragmatist re-articulation of the nature, aims and methods of metaphysics. Rather than regarding metaphysics as a 'first philosophy', an inquiry into the world independent of human perspectives, the pragmatist views metaphysics as an inquiry into categorizations of reality laden with human practices. Insofar as our categorizations of reality are practice-laden, they are also, inevitably, value-laden. Sami Pihlström argues that metaphysics does not, then, study the world's 'own' categorial structure, but a structure we, through our conceptual and practical activities, impose on the reality we experience and interact with. Engaging with the classical American pragmatists, in particular William James, and neopragmatists, including Hilary Putnam, the author seeks to correct long-held misconceptions regarding the nature of the relationship between metaphysics and pragmatism. He argues that a coherent metaphysical alternative to the currently fashionable realist metaphysics emerges from pragmatism and that pragmatism itself should be reinterpreted in a metaphysically serious manner. Moreover, the book argues that, from a pragmatist perspective, metaphysics must be inextricably linked with ethics.

In this book, John W. Woell shows us how contemporary readings of American Pragmatism founded on mistakenly used categories of the Analytic tradition have led to misreadings of Peirce and James. By focusing on terms drawn largely from Descartes and Kant, contemporary debates between metaphysical realists, antirealists, Realists and Nonrealists, have, argues Woell, failed to shed great light on pragmatism in general and a pragmatic philosophy of religion in particular. Woell contends that paying close attention to the internal relationships among inquiry, belief, and their objects in the respective works of Peirce and James provides a means for fully appreciating pragmatism''s richness as a resource for philosophy of religion. By taking account of a pragmatic point of view in philosophy of religion, this book incites a more productive discussion of the metaphysical status of religious objects and of the epistemic status of religious belief.

W. V. Quine was the most important naturalistic philosopher of the twentieth century and a major impetus for the recent resurgence of the view that empirical science is our best avenue to knowledge. His views, however, have not been well understood. Critics charge that Quine's naturalized epistemology is circular and that it cannot be normative. Yet, such criticisms stem from a cluster of fundamental traditional assumptions regarding language, theory, and the knowing subject - the very presuppositions that Quine is at pains to reject. Through investigation of Quine's views regarding language, knowledge, and reality, the author offers a new interpretation of Quine's naturalism. The naturalism/anti-naturalism debate can be advanced only by acknowledging and critiquing the substantial theoretical commitments implicit in the traditional view. Gregory argues that the responses to the circularity and non-normativity objections do just that. His analysis further reveals that Quine's departure from the tradition penetrates the conception of the knowing subject, and he thus offers a new and engaging defence of Quine's naturalism.

In this book, John W. Woell shows us how contemporary readings of American Pragmatism founded on mistakenly used categories of the Analytic tradition have led to misreadings of Peirce and James. By focusing on terms drawn largely from Descartes and Kant, contemporary debates between metaphysical realists, antirealists, Realists and Nonrealists, have, argues Woell, failed to shed great light on pragmatism in general and a pragmatic philosophy of religion in particular. Woell contends that paying close attention to the internal relationships among inquiry, belief, and their objects in the respective works of Peirce and James provides a means for fully appreciating pragmatism's richness as a resource for philosophy of religion. By taking account of a pragmatic point of view in philosophy of religion, this book incites a more productive discussion of the metaphysical status of religious objects and of the epistemic status of religious belief.

For much of the twentieth century, many Anglo-American philosophers supported three theses - one about reality, one about truth, and one about human knowledge - that, taken together, underwrote debates in epistemology. The first was realism: the commonsensical-sounding view that the world of physical objects exists independently of human thought or language. The second was the correspondence theory of truth, according to which true statements or beliefs are those which accurately represent the way the world is. The third was foundationalism: the view that our knowledge of the world, like an edifice, must rest on firm foundations (i.e. on beliefs whose justification does not depend on any other beliefs). In the last two decades, however, a radical anti-epistemology movement led by the influential American philosopher Richard Rorty has put partisans of all three theses on the defensive. Moreover, Rorty has repeatedly claimed that his opposition to the shibboleths of traditional epistemology draws inspiration from the grand tradition of Pragmatism (especially from William James and John Dewey.  In this important new book, Douglas McDermid argues persuasively for two key claims: first, that the so-called "Neo-Pragmatist" critique of traditional epistemology is thoroughly unconvincing; second, that Rorty is guilty of taking the name of Pragmatism in vain, since there are crucial and far-reaching differences between Neo-Pragmatism and the Classical Pragmatism of James and Dewey. The Varieties of Pragmatism will take its place in the forefront of the literature on this most vital part of the American philosophical legacy.

Charles S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, was also the architect of a remarkable theory of signs that continues to puzzle and inspire philosophers today. In this important new book, Mats Bergman articulates a bold new approach to Peirce's semeiotic through a reassessment of the role of rhetoric in his work. This systematic approach, which is offered as an alternative to formalistic accounts of Peirce's project, shows how general sign-theoretical conceptions can plausibly be interpreted as abstractions from everyday communicative experiences and practices. Building on this fallible ground of rhetoric-in-use, Bergman explicates Peirce's semeiotic in a way that is conducive to the development of rhetorical inquiry and philosophical criticism. Following this path, the underpinnings of a uniquely Peircean philosophy of communication is unearthed - a pragmatic conception encased in a normative rhetoric, motivated by the continual need to transform and improve our habits of action.

Feminist philosophy identifies tensions within mainstream theories of knowledge. To create a more egalitarian epistemology, solutions to these problems have been as diverse as the traditions of philosophy out of which feminists continue to emerge. This book considers two equally formidable approaches theorized by Louise Antony and Lynn Hankinson Nelson.The American philosopher W.V.O. Quine locates knowledge as a branch of empirical science. Shuford shows how both Antony and Nelson use Quine's 'naturalized epistemology' to create empirically robust feminist epistemologies. However, Shuford argues that neither can include physical embodiment as an important epistemic variable. The book argues that John Dewey's theory of inquiry extends beyond Quine's insight that knowledge must be interrogated as an empirical matter. Because Dewey insists that all aspects of experience must be subject to the experimental openness that is the hallmark of scientific reasoning, Shuford concludes that physical embodiment must play an important part in knowledge claims.