Elements in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant – Serie

This Element introduces Kant's ideas of reason, focussing on the ideas of theoretical reason in the study of nature. It offers a novel interpretation that shows how such ideas as the soul, the world-whole, and God provide a regulative orientation for coping with human perspectival situatedness in the world. This perspectivalist interpretation reconciles two interpretive tendencies: a realist reading, according to which ideas refer to real things independent of the human mind, and a fictionalist reading, according to which ideas are heuristic fictions without reference to anything real. The perspectivalist interpretation recognizes two functions of ideas: first, ideas outline domains of possible objects, thus presenting the human mind with contexts of intelligibility in which the cognition of objects can be meaningful at all. Second, ideas project an ultimate reality as a focus imaginarius, which serves as a normative ideal for evaluating the success of human inquiries into nature.

This Element examines the entirety of Kant's Critique of Taste (in Part One of the Critique of Judgment) with particular emphasis on its political and moral aims. Kant's critical treatment of aesthetic judgment is both an extended theoretical response to influential predecessors and contemporaries, including Rousseau and Herder, and a practical intervention in its own right meant to nudge history forward at a time of civilizational crisis. Attention to these themes helps resolve a number of puzzles, both textual and philosophic, including the normative force and meaning of judgments of taste, and the relation between natural and artful beauty.

Kant's final drafts, known as his Opus postumum, attempt to make what he calls a 'transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics.' Interpreters broadly agree that in this project Kant seeks to connect the general a priori principles of natural science, as set out in the major critical works, to the specific results of empirical physics. Beyond this, however, basic interpretative issues remain controversial. This Element outlines a framework that aims to combine the systematic ambition of early twentieth-century readings with the rigor of more recent studies. The author argues that a question that has animated much recent scholarship - which 'gap' in Kant's previous philosophy does the Opus postumum seek to fill? - can be profitably set aside. In its place, renewed attention should be given to a crucial part of the manuscript, fascicles X/XI, and to the problematic 'arrival point' of the transition, namely, Kant's question: What is physics?

This Element introduces the reader to Kant's theory of peace and to its place in the broader context of the critical philosophy. It also delves into one aspect of the model that has generated much debate among interpreters, given Kant's changing thoughts on the matter. This aspect relates to the nature and powers of the international federation. Defending the idea that national sovereignty is indissolubly linked to states' full autonomy regarding the use of military power, this Element offers an interpretation and defense of the Kantian federation that, in many regards, departs from the mainstream reading. Special emphasis is placed on the problematic coexistence of two conflicting theoretical desiderata: on the one hand, the necessity of establishing an international institution with coercive powers for securing peace; on the other hand, the necessity of avoiding the risk of an excessive erosion of states' sovereignty.

Kant's early critics maintained that his theory of freedom faces a dilemma: either it reduces the will's activity to strict necessity by making it subject to the causality of the moral law, or it reduces the will's activity to blind chance by liberating it from rules of any kind. This Element offers a new interpretation of Kant's theory against the backdrop of this controversy. It argues that Kant was a consistent proponent of the claim that the moral law is the causal law of a free will, and that the supposed ability of free will to choose indifferently between options is an empty concept. Freedom, for Kant, is a power to initiate action from oneself, and the only way to exercise this power is through the law of one's own will, the moral law. Immoral action is not thereby rendered impossible, but it also does not express a genuine ability.

This Element examines Kant's innovative account of labour in his political philosophy and develops an intersectional analysis of Kant. By demonstrating that Kant's analysis of slavery, citizenship, and sex developed in inter-linked ways over several decades, culminating in his development of a 'trichotomy' of Right, the author shows that Kant's normative account of independence is configured through his theory of labour, and is continuous with his anthropological accounts of race and gender, providing a systemic justification for the dependency of women and non-whites embedded in his philosophy of right. By examining Kant's arguments about slavery as intertwined with his account of domestic labour, the author argues that his ultimate rejection of slavery may owe more to his changing conceptualization of labour than to his theory of race, and that his final arguments against slavery rehearse strategies for embedding intersectional patterns of domestic dependence in his account of the rightful state.

Kant's main work in the philosophy of law – the Doctrine of Right (1797) – is notoriously difficult for modern readers to understand. Kant clearly argues that rightful relations between human beings can only be achieved if we enter into a civil legal condition taking a defined constitutional form. In this Element, we emphasise that Kant considers this claim to be a postulate of practical reason, thus identifying the pure idea of the state as the culmination of his entire practical philosophy. The Doctrine of Right makes sense as an attempt to clarify the content of the postulate of public right and constructively interpret existing domestic and international legal arrangements in the light of the noumenal republic it postulates. Properly understood, Kant's postulate of public right is the epistemological foundation of a non-positivist legal theory that remains of central significance to modern legal philosophy and legal doctrinal method.

This Element's focus is Kant's history of human reason: his teleological vision of the past development of our rational capacities from their very emergence until Kant's own 'age of Enlightenment.' One of the goals is to connect Kant's speculative account of the very beginning of rationality – a topic that has thus far been largely neglected in Kantian scholarship – to his well-known theory of humankind's progress. The Element elucidates Kant's hopes with regard to reason's future progress and his guidelines for how to achieve this progress by unifying them with his vision of reason's past. Another goal is to bring more attention to Kant's essay 'Conjectural Beginning of Human History,' where this account is presented, and to show that this unusual text does not stand in conflict with Kant's philosophy and is not merely tangentially related to it, but illuminates and complements certain aspects of his critical philosophy.

This Element proposes a new understanding of Kant's account of marriage by examining the context and background conversations that shaped its development and by discussing the conception of equality at its core. Marriage as Kant understands it relies on a certain form of equality between spouses. Yet this conception of equality does not precede marriage, and carries important limitations - one of which being its inaccessibility to a significant proportion of the German population at the time. The protections and rights conferred by marriage were thus not accessible to all. Their shared preoccupation with this issue allows the author to put Kant's thoughts in relation with those of eighteenth-century feminist writers Theodor von Hippel and Marianne Ehrmann. Despite these limitations, the author finds that Kant's conception of marriage is compatible with the achievement of certain egalitarian goals, suggesting that it may be able to improve women's lives in a liberal state.

This Element explains Kant's distinction between rational sympathy and natural sympathy. Rational sympathy is regulated by practical reason and is necessary for adopting as our own those ends of others which are contingent from the perspective of practical rationality. Natural sympathy is passive and can prompt affect and dispose us to act wrongly. Sympathy is a function of a posteriori productive imagination. In rational sympathy, we freely use the imagination to step into others' first-person perspectives and associate imagined intuitional contents with the concepts others use to communicate their feelings. This prompts feelings in us that are like their feelings.

This Element argues that property rights and the territorial rights of states in Kant's legal theory provide a strong justification for the expansion of international law. Central to the argument is Kant's theory of legal obligation, according to which a right to external things is only possible if it can genuinely bind all those on whom it must impose an external duty. Given the global scope of this legal obligation in Kant's account, it can only be achieved through the implementation of a shared international legal order regulated by a principle of reciprocity in external relations. Kant's conception of legal obligation thus requires us to leave the state of nature beyond domestic legal systems towards an international legal order. The author also examines how the international legal order differs from a world state, and how it can be consistent with national legal systems.

This Element analyses how Kant's practical philosophy approaches social suffering, while also taking into account the elusiveness of this concept in his work, especially when viewed through a contemporary lens. It claims that Kant's theory of human dignity is a vital tool for detecting social structures in need of improvement, even if the high demands it imposes on the subject show a propensity to conceal situations of domination and oppression. In his writings, Kant investigated various societal challenges such as widespread poverty, duties towards animals, care for the mentally ill, and motherhood out of wedlock, suggesting that the state should solve most of these through financial support from the wealthier segments of society. Although the direct testimony of victims of social suffering does not play a role in Kant's approach, the author holds that he views social interdependence - including, notably, non-humans - as a fundamental commitment underpinning human development.

Kant defined 'Right' (Recht) as the condition that obtains among a population of physically embodied persons capable of setting their own ends who live on a finite surface and therefore cannot avoid interaction with each other if each is as free to set their own ends as is consistent with the freedom of all to do the same. He regarded this rational idea, heir to the traditional idea of 'natural Right, as the test of the legitimacy of the laws of any actual state, or 'positive Right.' He clearly considered Right to be part of morality as a whole, namely the coercively enforceable part, as contrasted to Ethics, which is the non-coercively enforceable part of morality. Some have questioned whether Right is part of morality, but this Element shows how Kant's "Universal Principle of Right" follows straightforwardly from the foundational idea of Kant's moral philosophy as a whole.

Kant defined 'Right' (Recht) as the condition that obtains among a population of physically embodied persons capable of setting their own ends who live on a finite surface and therefore cannot avoid interaction with each other if each is as free to set their own ends as is consistent with the freedom of all to do the same. He regarded this rational idea, heir to the traditional idea of 'natural Right, as the test of the legitimacy of the laws of any actual state, or 'positive Right.' He clearly considered Right to be part of morality as a whole, namely the coercively enforceable part, as contrasted to Ethics, which is the non-coercively enforceable part of morality. Some have questioned whether Right is part of morality, but this Element shows how Kant's "Universal Principle of Right" follows straightforwardly from the foundational idea of Kant's moral philosophy as a whole.

This Element explains Kant's distinction between rational sympathy and natural sympathy. Rational sympathy is regulated by practical reason and is necessary for adopting as our own those ends of others which are contingent from the perspective of practical rationality. Natural sympathy is passive and can prompt affect and dispose us to act wrongly. Sympathy is a function of a posteriori productive imagination. In rational sympathy, we freely use the imagination to step into others' first-person perspectives and associate imagined intuitional contents with the concepts others use to communicate their feelings. This prompts feelings in us that are like their feelings.

This Element considers Kant's conception of self-control and the role it plays in his moral philosophy. It offers a detailed interpretation of the different terms used by Kant to explain the phenomenon of moral self-control, such as 'autocracy' and 'inner freedom'. Following Kant's own suggestions, the proposed reading examines the Kantian capacity for self-control as an ability to 'abstract from' various sensible impressions by looking beyond their influence on the mind. This analysis shows that Kant's conception of moral self-control involves two intimately related levels, which need not meet the same criteria. One level is associated with realizing various ends, the other with setting moral ends. The proposed view most effectively accommodates self-control's role in the adoption of virtuous maxims and ethical end-setting. It explains why self-control is central to Kant's conception of virtue and sheds new light on his discussions of moral strength and moral weakness.

This Element introduces Kant's ideas of reason, focussing on the ideas of theoretical reason in the study of nature. It offers a novel interpretation that shows how such ideas as the soul, the world-whole, and God provide a regulative orientation for coping with human perspectival situatedness in the world. This perspectivalist interpretation reconciles two interpretive tendencies: a realist reading, according to which ideas refer to real things independent of the human mind, and a fictionalist reading, according to which ideas are heuristic fictions without reference to anything real. The perspectivalist interpretation recognizes two functions of ideas: first, ideas outline domains of possible objects, thus presenting the human mind with contexts of intelligibility in which the cognition of objects can be meaningful at all. Second, ideas project an ultimate reality as a focus imaginarius, which serves as a normative ideal for evaluating the success of human inquiries into nature.

This Element reconstructs Kant's puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect (Achtung), which is 'a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different' from all common feelings (4:401n.). The focus is on the systematic position of respect within the framework of Kant's major works and within the faculties of the human mind. The concept of respect is discussed with regard to (i) the transcendental problem of noumenal causation in Kant's first Critique; (ii) the practical problem of moral motivation in Kant's second Critique; (iii) the aesthetic problem of feeling and the dynamic sublime in Kant's third Critique; and (iv) the problem of moral imputability and education in Kant's Religion and Metaphysics of Morals. By considering its self-reflective volitional structure, this Element argues for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and affectivist interpretations are true.

This Element reconstructs Kant's puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect (Achtung), which is 'a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different' from all common feelings (4:401n.). The focus is on the systematic position of respect within the framework of Kant's major works and within the faculties of the human mind. The concept of respect is discussed with regard to (i) the transcendental problem of noumenal causation in Kant's first Critique; (ii) the practical problem of moral motivation in Kant's second Critique; (iii) the aesthetic problem of feeling and the dynamic sublime in Kant's third Critique; and (iv) the problem of moral imputability and education in Kant's Religion and Metaphysics of Morals. By considering its self-reflective volitional structure, this Element argues for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and affectivist interpretations are true.

Kant's main work in the philosophy of law – the Doctrine of Right (1797) – is notoriously difficult for modern readers to understand. Kant clearly argues that rightful relations between human beings can only be achieved if we enter into a civil legal condition taking a defined constitutional form. In this Element, we emphasise that Kant considers this claim to be a postulate of practical reason, thus identifying the pure idea of the state as the culmination of his entire practical philosophy. The Doctrine of Right makes sense as an attempt to clarify the content of the postulate of public right and constructively interpret existing domestic and international legal arrangements in the light of the noumenal republic it postulates. Properly understood, Kant's postulate of public right is the epistemological foundation of a non-positivist legal theory that remains of central significance to modern legal philosophy and legal doctrinal method.

This Element's focus is Kant's history of human reason: his teleological vision of the past development of our rational capacities from their very emergence until Kant's own 'age of Enlightenment.' One of the goals is to connect Kant's speculative account of the very beginning of rationality – a topic that has thus far been largely neglected in Kantian scholarship – to his well-known theory of humankind's progress. The Element elucidates Kant's hopes with regard to reason's future progress and his guidelines for how to achieve this progress by unifying them with his vision of reason's past. Another goal is to bring more attention to Kant's essay 'Conjectural Beginning of Human History,' where this account is presented, and to show that this unusual text does not stand in conflict with Kant's philosophy and is not merely tangentially related to it, but illuminates and complements certain aspects of his critical philosophy.

This Element analyses how Kant's practical philosophy approaches social suffering, while also taking into account the elusiveness of this concept in his work, especially when viewed through a contemporary lens. It claims that Kant's theory of human dignity is a vital tool for detecting social structures in need of improvement, even if the high demands it imposes on the subject show a propensity to conceal situations of domination and oppression. In his writings, Kant investigated various societal challenges such as widespread poverty, duties towards animals, care for the mentally ill, and motherhood out of wedlock, suggesting that the state should solve most of these through financial support from the wealthier segments of society. Although the direct testimony of victims of social suffering does not play a role in Kant's approach, the author holds that he views social interdependence - including, notably, non-humans - as a fundamental commitment underpinning human development.

This Element analyzes Kant's metaphysics and epistemology of the exact science of nature. It explains his theory of true motion and ontology of matter. In addition, it reconstructs the patterns of evidential reasoning behind Kant's foundational doctrines.

This Element proposes a new understanding of Kant's account of marriage by examining the context and background conversations that shaped its development and by discussing the conception of equality at its core. Marriage as Kant understands it relies on a certain form of equality between spouses. Yet this conception of equality does not precede marriage, and carries important limitations - one of which being its inaccessibility to a significant proportion of the German population at the time. The protections and rights conferred by marriage were thus not accessible to all. Their shared preoccupation with this issue allows the author to put Kant's thoughts in relation with those of eighteenth-century feminist writers Theodor von Hippel and Marianne Ehrmann. Despite these limitations, the author finds that Kant's conception of marriage is compatible with the achievement of certain egalitarian goals, suggesting that it may be able to improve women's lives in a liberal state.

Corporations are legal bodies with duties and powers distinct from those of individual people. Kant discusses them in many places. He endorses universities and churches; he criticises feudal orders and some charitable foundations; he condemns early business corporations' overseas activities. This Element argues that Kant's practical philosophy offers a systematic basis for understanding these bodies. Corporations bridge the central distinctions of his practical philosophy: ethics versus right, public versus private right. Corporations can extend freedom, structure moral activity, and aid progress towards more rightful conditions. Kant's thought also highlights a fundamental threat. In every corporation, some people exercise the corporation's legal powers, without the same liabilities as private individuals. This threatens Kant's principle of innate equality: no citizen should have greater legal rights than any other. This Element explores the justifications and safeguards needed to deal with this threat. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Corporations are legal bodies with duties and powers distinct from those of individual people. Kant discusses them in many places. He endorses universities and churches; he criticises feudal orders and some charitable foundations; he condemns early business corporations' overseas activities. This Element argues that Kant's practical philosophy offers a systematic basis for understanding these bodies. Corporations bridge the central distinctions of his practical philosophy: ethics versus right, public versus private right. Corporations can extend freedom, structure moral activity, and aid progress towards more rightful conditions. Kant's thought also highlights a fundamental threat. In every corporation, some people exercise the corporation's legal powers, without the same liabilities as private individuals. This threatens Kant's principle of innate equality: no citizen should have greater legal rights than any other. This Element explores the justifications and safeguards needed to deal with this threat. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element argues that property rights and the territorial rights of states in Kant's legal theory provide a strong justification for the expansion of international law. Central to the argument is Kant's theory of legal obligation, according to which a right to external things is only possible if it can genuinely bind all those on whom it must impose an external duty. Given the global scope of this legal obligation in Kant's account, it can only be achieved through the implementation of a shared international legal order regulated by a principle of reciprocity in external relations. Kant's conception of legal obligation thus requires us to leave the state of nature beyond domestic legal systems towards an international legal order. The author also examines how the international legal order differs from a world state, and how it can be consistent with national legal systems.

Kant's mature teleological philosophy in the Critique of the Power of Judgment is predicated on innovations that address a set of unprecedented challenges arising from within critical philosophy. The challenges are (1) a threat of "transcendental chaos" between sensibility and understanding, emerging from the structure of critical epistemology; (2) a threat of "critical chaos" between determination and reflection, generated by Kant's response to that first threat. The innovations include (a) a transcendental conception of purposiveness, (b) a principle of nature's purposiveness based on that conception, (c) a power of judgment governed by that principle, (d) and so governed in an unusual (self-given and self-governing) way, (e) a view on which nature does make leaps. This Element argues that Kant's mature teleological philosophy - and a fortiori Kant's aesthetics and philosophy of biology - cannot be understood without a fully systematic account of these challenges and innovations, and it presents such an account.

According to Kant, citizenship amounts to freedom (Freiheit), equality (Gleichheit), and civil self-sufficiency (Selbständigkeit). This Element provides a unifying interpretation of these three elements. Vrousalis argues that Kant affirms the idea of interdependent independence: in the just society, citizens have independent use of their interdependent rightful powers. Kant therefore thinks of the modern state as a system of cooperative production, in which reciprocal entitlements to one another's labour carry a justificatory burden. The empirical form of that ideal is a republic of economically independent commodity producers. It follows that citizenship and poverty, for Kant, are inextricably connected. Vrousalis explains how Kant's arguments anticipate Hegel's discussion of the division of labour, Marx's account of alienated labour, and Rawls' defence of a well-ordered society. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.