Paul Guyer – författare

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most important works in the Western philosophical tradition, which made seminal contributions to epistemology, metaphysics, and the foundations of moral philosophy. This second edition streamlines and updates its editors' Introduction, and extensively updates its Bibliography. It renders Kant's terminology and style of argument more accurately and accessibly than any other translation into English. It also supplies more extensive annotation and contextualization of Kant's work than any other edition in English or even in German, recording not only all the variations between the two substantially different editions of the book that Kant published in 1781 and 1787 but, for the first time in any edition, all of the notes he made in his own copy in the period between those two editions. This translation makes well-informed study of the Critique in English more possible than ever before.

In this updated edition of his outstanding introduction to Kant, Paul Guyer uses Kant’s central conception of autonomy as the key to his thought.Beginning with a helpful overview of Kant’s life and times, Guyer introduces Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology, carefully explaining his arguments about the nature of space, time and experience in his most influential but difficult work, The Critique of Pure Reason. He offers an explanation and critique of Kant’s famous theory of transcendental idealism and shows how much of Kant’s philosophy is independent of this controversial doctrine.He then examines Kant’s moral philosophy, his celebrated ‘categorical imperative’ and his theories of duty, freedom of will and political rights. This section of the work has been substantially revised to clarify the relation between Kant’s conceptions of "internal" and "external" freedom. In his treatments of Kant’s aesthetics and teleology, Guyer focuses on their relation to human freedom and happiness. Finally, he considers Kant’s view that the development of human autonomy is the only goal that we can conceive for both natural and human history.Including a chronology, glossary, chapter summaries and up-to-date further reading, Kant, second edition is an ideal introduction to this demanding yet pivotal figure in the history of philosophy, and essential reading for all students of philosophy.

The essays collected in this volume by Paul Guyer, one of the world''s foremost Kant scholars, explore Kant''s attempt to develop a morality grounded on the intrinsic and unconditional value of the human freedom to set our own ends. When regulated by the principle that the freedom of all is equally valuable, the freedom to set our own ends -- what Kant calls "humanity" - becomes what he calls autonomy. These essays explore Kant''s strategies for establishing the premise that freedom is the inner worth of the world or the essential end of humankind, as he says, and for deriving the specific duties that fundamental principle of morality generates in the empirical circumstances of human existence. The Virtues of Freedom further investigates Kant''s attempts to prove that we are always free to live up to this moral ideal, that is, that we have free will no matter what, as well as his more successful explorations of the ways in which our natural tendencies to be moral -- dispositions to the feeling of respect and more specific feelings such as love and self-esteem -- can and must be cultivated and educated. Guyer finally examines the various models of human community that Kant develops from his premise that our associations must be based on the value of freedom for all. The contrasts but also similarities of Kant''s moral philosophy to that of David Hume but many of his other predecessors and contemporaries, such as Stoics and Epicureans, Pufendorf and Wolff, Hutcheson, Kames, and Smith, are also explored.

The essays collected in this volume by Paul Guyer, one of the world''s foremost Kant scholars, explore Kant''s attempt to develop a morality grounded on the intrinsic and unconditional value of the human freedom to set our own ends. When regulated by the principle that the freedom of all is equally valuable, the freedom to set our own ends -- what Kant calls "humanity" - becomes what he calls autonomy. These essays explore Kant''s strategies for establishing the premise that freedom is the inner worth of the world or the essential end of humankind, as he says, and for deriving the specific duties that fundamental principle of morality generates in the empirical circumstances of human existence. The Virtues of Freedom further investigates Kant''s attempts to prove that we are always free to live up to this moral ideal, that is, that we have free will no matter what, as well as his more successful explorations of the ways in which our natural tendencies to be moral -- dispositions to the feeling of respect and more specific feelings such as love and self-esteem -- can and must be cultivated and educated. Guyer finally examines the various models of human community that Kant develops from his premise that our associations must be based on the value of freedom for all. The contrasts but also similarities of Kant''s moral philosophy to that of David Hume but many of his other predecessors and contemporaries, such as Stoics and Epicureans, Pufendorf and Wolff, Hutcheson, Kames, and Smith, are also explored.

The concept of systematicity is central to Immanuel Kant''s conception of scientific knowledge and to his practical philosophy. But Kant also held that we must be able to unite the separate systems of nature and freedom into a single system: on the one hand, morality itself requires that we be able to see its commands and goals as realizable within nature, while on the other hand our experience of nature itself leads us to see it as a system with the goal of human moral development. The essays in this volume, including two published here for the first time, explore various aspects of Kant''s conception of the system of nature, the system of freedom, and the system of nature and freedom. The essays in the first part explore the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goal of natural science, consider the implications of Kant''s account of our experience of organisms for the goal of the unity of science, and examine Kant''s attempts to prove that the existence of an ether is a necessary condition for a physical system of nature. The essays in the second part explore Kant''s view that morality requires a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of the ends that persons set for themselves, and examine the system of duties and obligations necessary to realize such a systematic union of persons and their ends. These essays thus examine both the general foundations of Kant''s moral philosophy and his final account of the duties of right or justice and of ethics or virtue in his late work, the Metaphysics of Morals. The essays in the third part examine Kant''s attempt, in the last of his three great critiques, the Critique of the Power of Judgment., to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology as a theory of the creation of organic nature into an account of our experience of organic nature and of nature as a whole.

''Pain and pleasure are simple ideas, incapable of definition.''In 1757 the 27-year-old Edmund Burke argued that our aesthetic responses are experienced as pure emotional arousal, unencumbered by intellectual considerations. In so doing he overturned the Platonic tradition in aesthetics that had prevailed from antiquity until the eighteenth century, and replaced metaphysics with psychology and even physiology as the basis for the subject. Burke''s theory of beauty encompasses the female form, nature, art, and poetry, and he analyses our delight in sublime effects that thrill and excite us. His revolution in method continues to have repercussions in the aesthetic theories of today, and his revolution in sensibility has paved the way for literary and artistic movements from the Gothic novel through Romanticism, twentieth-century painting, and beyond. In this new edition Paul Guyer conducts the reader through Burke''s Enquiry, focusing on its place in the history of aesthetics and highlighting its innovations, as well as its influence on many subsequent authors from Kant and Schiller to Ruskin and Nietzsche. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World''s Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford''s commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more.

''Pain and pleasure are simple ideas, incapable of definition.''In 1757 the 27-year-old Edmund Burke argued that our aesthetic responses are experienced as pure emotional arousal, unencumbered by intellectual considerations. In so doing he overturned the Platonic tradition in aesthetics that had prevailed from antiquity until the eighteenth century, and replaced metaphysics with psychology and even physiology as the basis for the subject. Burke''s theory of beauty encompasses the female form, nature, art, and poetry, and he analyses our delight in sublime effects that thrill and excite us. His revolution in method continues to have repercussions in the aesthetic theories of today, and his revolution in sensibility has paved the way for literary and artistic movements from the Gothic novel through Romanticism, twentieth-century painting, and beyond. In this new edition Paul Guyer conducts the reader through Burke''s Enquiry, focusing on its place in the history of aesthetics and highlighting its innovations, as well as its influence on many subsequent authors from Kant and Schiller to Ruskin and Nietzsche. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World''s Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford''s commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more.

Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant provides the first in-depth examination of the lifelong intellectual relationship between two of the greatest figures of the European Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). Both were engaged in a common project of striking the right balance between rationalism and empiricism. They sometimes borrowed from one another, often disagreed with one another, and can usefully be compared even when they did not directly interact. Guyer examines a series of comparisons and contrasts: their arguments and conclusions on a range of metaphysical issues, including proofs of the existence of God, immortality, and idealism; their shared interests in aesthetics; and their path-breaking work on the "religion of reason" and the separation of church and state. Setting the work of both philosophers in historical context, Guyer shows that, where Kant sometimes provides deeper insight into the underlying structure of human thought, Mendelssohn is often the deeper student of the variety of human experience. This is evident above all in their treatments of aesthetics and religion: Mendelssohn recognizes more deeply than Kant the emotional impact of art, and while Kant imagines that organized religion will one day be superseded by pure morality, Mendelssohn argued that organized religion in all its varieties seems here to stay, and so toleration for religious variety is an inescapable requirement of human morality. Based on an exhaustive study of a wide range of texts, this study demonstrates the on-going relevance of Kant and Mendelssohn to modern thought.

Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant provides the first in-depth examination of the lifelong intellectual relationship between two of the greatest figures of the European Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). Both were engaged in a common project of striking the right balance between rationalism and empiricism. They sometimes borrowed from one another, often disagreed with one another, and can usefully be compared even when they did not directly interact. Guyer examines a series of comparisons and contrasts: their arguments and conclusions on a range of metaphysical issues, including proofs of the existence of God, immortality, and idealism; their shared interests in aesthetics; and their path-breaking work on the "religion of reason" and the separation of church and state. Setting the work of both philosophers in historical context, Guyer shows that, where Kant sometimes provides deeper insight into the underlying structure of human thought, Mendelssohn is often the deeper student of the variety of human experience. This is evident above all in their treatments of aesthetics and religion: Mendelssohn recognizes more deeply than Kant the emotional impact of art, and while Kant imagines that organized religion will one day be superseded by pure morality, Mendelssohn argued that organized religion in all its varieties seems here to stay, and so toleration for religious variety is an inescapable requirement of human morality. Based on an exhaustive study of a wide range of texts, this study demonstrates the on-going relevance of Kant and Mendelssohn to modern thought.

This book tells the story of idealism in modern philosophy, from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. Paul Guyer and Rolf-Peter Horstmann define idealism as the reduction of all reality to something mental in nature. Rather than distinguishing between metaphysical and epistemological versions of idealism, they distinguish between metaphysical and epistemological motivations for idealism. They argue that while metaphysical arguments for idealism have only rarely been accepted, for example by Bishop Berkeley in the early eighteenth century and the British idealists Bradley and McTaggart in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, epistemological arguments for idealism have been widely accepted, even in the so-called analytic philosophy of the twentieth century.Guyer and Horstmann discuss many philosophers who have played a role in the development of idealism, from Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, through Kant; the German idealists Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; the British and American idealists such as Green and Royce in addition to Bradley and McTaggart; G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, Neo-Kantians such as Ernst Cassirer; and twentieth-century philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Collingwood, Carnap, Sellars, and McDowell.

This book tells the story of idealism in modern philosophy, from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. Paul Guyer and Rolf-Peter Horstmann define idealism as the reduction of all reality to something mental in nature. Rather than distinguishing between metaphysical and epistemological versions of idealism, they distinguish between metaphysical and epistemological motivations for idealism. They argue that while metaphysical arguments for idealism have only rarely been accepted, for example by Bishop Berkeley in the early eighteenth century and the British idealists Bradley and McTaggart in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, epistemological arguments for idealism have been widely accepted, even in the so-called analytic philosophy of the twentieth century.Guyer and Horstmann discuss many philosophers who have played a role in the development of idealism, from Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, through Kant; the German idealists Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; the British and American idealists such as Green and Royce in addition to Bradley and McTaggart; G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, Neo-Kantians such as Ernst Cassirer; and twentieth-century philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Collingwood, Carnap, Sellars, and McDowell.

This book tells the story of idealism in modern philosophy, from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. Paul Guyer and Rolf-Peter Horstmann define idealism as the reduction of all reality to something mental in nature. Rather than distinguishing between metaphysical and epistemological versions of idealism, they distinguish between metaphysical and epistemological motivations for idealism. They argue that while metaphysical arguments for idealism have only rarely been accepted, for example by Bishop Berkeley in the early eighteenth century and the British idealists Bradley and McTaggart in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, epistemological arguments for idealism have been widely accepted, even in the so-called analytic philosophy of the twentieth century.Guyer and Horstmann discuss many philosophers who have played a role in the development of idealism, from Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, through Kant; the German idealists Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; the British and American idealists such as Green and Royce in addition to Bradley and McTaggart; G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, Neo-Kantians such as Ernst Cassirer; and twentieth-century philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Collingwood, Carnap, Sellars, and McDowell.

This book tells the story of idealism in modern philosophy, from the seventeenth century to the turn of the twenty-first. Paul Guyer and Rolf-Peter Horstmann define idealism as the reduction of all reality to something mental in nature. Rather than distinguishing between metaphysical and epistemological versions of idealism, they distinguish between metaphysical and epistemological motivations for idealism. They argue that while metaphysical arguments for idealism have only rarely been accepted, for example by Bishop Berkeley in the early eighteenth century and the British idealists Bradley and McTaggart in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, epistemological arguments for idealism have been widely accepted, even in the so-called analytic philosophy of the twentieth century.Guyer and Horstmann discuss many philosophers who have played a role in the development of idealism, from Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, through Kant; the German idealists Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; the British and American idealists such as Green and Royce in addition to Bradley and McTaggart; G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, Neo-Kantians such as Ernst Cassirer; and twentieth-century philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Collingwood, Carnap, Sellars, and McDowell.

The essays collected in this volume by Paul Guyer, one of the world's foremost Kant scholars, explore Kant's attempt to develop a morality grounded on the intrinsic and unconditional value of the human freedom to set our own ends. When regulated by the principle that the freedom of all is equally valuable, the freedom to set our own ends -- what Kant calls "humanity" - becomes what he calls autonomy. These essays explore Kant's strategies for establishing the premise that freedom is the inner worth of the world or the essential end of humankind, as he says, and for deriving the specific duties that fundamental principle of morality generates in the empirical circumstances of human existence. The Virtues of Freedom further investigates Kant's attempts to prove that we are always free to live up to this moral ideal, that is, that we have free will no matter what, as well as his more successful explorations of the ways in which our natural tendencies to be moral -- dispositions to the feeling of respect and more specific feelings such as love and self-esteem -- can and must be cultivated and educated. Guyer finally examines the various models of human community that Kant develops from his premise that our associations must be based on the value of freedom for all. The contrasts but also similarities of Kant's moral philosophy to that of David Hume but many of his other predecessors and contemporaries, such as Stoics and Epicureans, Pufendorf and Wolff, Hutcheson, Kames, and Smith, are also explored.

The essays collected in this volume by Paul Guyer, one of the world's foremost Kant scholars, explore Kant's attempt to develop a morality grounded on the intrinsic and unconditional value of the human freedom to set our own ends. When regulated by the principle that the freedom of all is equally valuable, the freedom to set our own ends -- what Kant calls "humanity" - becomes what he calls autonomy. These essays explore Kant's strategies for establishing the premise that freedom is the inner worth of the world or the essential end of humankind, as he says, and for deriving the specific duties that fundamental principle of morality generates in the empirical circumstances of human existence. The Virtues of Freedom further investigates Kant's attempts to prove that we are always free to live up to this moral ideal, that is, that we have free will no matter what, as well as his more successful explorations of the ways in which our natural tendencies to be moral -- dispositions to the feeling of respect and more specific feelings such as love and self-esteem -- can and must be cultivated and educated. Guyer finally examines the various models of human community that Kant develops from his premise that our associations must be based on the value of freedom for all. The contrasts but also similarities of Kant's moral philosophy to that of David Hume but many of his other predecessors and contemporaries, such as Stoics and Epicureans, Pufendorf and Wolff, Hutcheson, Kames, and Smith, are also explored.

Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant provides the first in-depth examination of the lifelong intellectual relationship between two of the greatest figures of the European Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). Both were engaged in a common project of striking the right balance between rationalism and empiricism. They sometimes borrowed from one another, often disagreed with one another, and can usefully be compared even when they did not directly interact. Guyer examines a series of comparisons and contrasts: their arguments and conclusions on a range of metaphysical issues, including proofs of the existence of God, immortality, and idealism; their shared interests in aesthetics; and their path-breaking work on the "religion of reason" and the separation of church and state. Setting the work of both philosophers in historical context, Guyer shows that, where Kant sometimes provides deeper insight into the underlying structure of human thought, Mendelssohn is often the deeper student of the variety of human experience. This is evident above all in their treatments of aesthetics and religion: Mendelssohn recognizes more deeply than Kant the emotional impact of art, and while Kant imagines that organized religion will one day be superseded by pure morality, Mendelssohn argued that organized religion in all its varieties seems here to stay, and so toleration for religious variety is an inescapable requirement of human morality. Based on an exhaustive study of a wide range of texts, this study demonstrates the on-going relevance of Kant and Mendelssohn to modern thought.

Immanuel Kant introduced a new paradigm into modern moral philosophy, first with his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals in 1785, followed by his Critique of Practical Reason in 1788, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason in 1793, and Metaphysics of Morals in 1798. For Kant, the fundamental goal of morality is not the realization of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, under some interpretation of that formula, but the realization of human autonomy governed by pure reason in the form of the "categorical imperative." Kant''s ideal of autonomy is nothing less than the greatest possible freedom of each human being to set his or her own ends compatible with the equal freedom of every other human being to do the same. As Kant put it in lectures to his own students, freedom "not restrained under certain rules . . . is the most terrible thing there could ever be," but the condition "under which alone the greatest use of freedom is possible, and under which it can be self-consistent" is the "essential end of humankind" and the "inner worth of the world."Kant''s work immediately drew the attention of both critics and supporters. While some argued that Kant''s categorical imperative was an "empty formalism," that he left no room for happiness in his morality, that he could not explain responsibility for evil, and that he allowed no room for moral feeling in morally worthy motivation, others have found inspiration in his underlying idea that maximal but equal freedom is the "inner worth of the world." This book examines the response to Kant by other significant moral philosophers from Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel to through T.H. Green, Josiah Royce, and Friedrich Nietzsche, to John Rawls, Onora O''Neill, Christine Korsgaard, and Derek Parfit, with many stops along the way. The book is not a history of Kant scholarship, but an examination of Kant''s impact on other major moral philosophers from his time to our own. While it attempts to do justice to the arguments of every philosopher discussed, the book argues that the most profound responses to Kant have been precisely those that have developed in their own way Kant''s ideal of freedom as the inner worth of the world.

Immanuel Kant introduced a new paradigm into modern moral philosophy, first with his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals in 1785, followed by his Critique of Practical Reason in 1788, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason in 1793, and Metaphysics of Morals in 1798. For Kant, the fundamental goal of morality is not the realization of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, under some interpretation of that formula, but the realization of human autonomy governed by pure reason in the form of the "categorical imperative." Kant''s ideal of autonomy is nothing less than the greatest possible freedom of each human being to set his or her own ends compatible with the equal freedom of every other human being to do the same. As Kant put it in lectures to his own students, freedom "not restrained under certain rules . . . is the most terrible thing there could ever be," but the condition "under which alone the greatest use of freedom is possible, and under which it can be self-consistent" is the "essential end of humankind" and the "inner worth of the world."Kant''s work immediately drew the attention of both critics and supporters. While some argued that Kant''s categorical imperative was an "empty formalism," that he left no room for happiness in his morality, that he could not explain responsibility for evil, and that he allowed no room for moral feeling in morally worthy motivation, others have found inspiration in his underlying idea that maximal but equal freedom is the "inner worth of the world." This book examines the response to Kant by other significant moral philosophers from Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel to through T.H. Green, Josiah Royce, and Friedrich Nietzsche, to John Rawls, Onora O''Neill, Christine Korsgaard, and Derek Parfit, with many stops along the way. The book is not a history of Kant scholarship, but an examination of Kant''s impact on other major moral philosophers from his time to our own. While it attempts to do justice to the arguments of every philosopher discussed, the book argues that the most profound responses to Kant have been precisely those that have developed in their own way Kant''s ideal of freedom as the inner worth of the world.

Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant provides the first in-depth examination of the lifelong intellectual relationship between two of the greatest figures of the European Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86). Both were engaged in a common project of striking the right balance between rationalism and empiricism. They sometimes borrowed from one another, often disagreed with one another, and can usefully be compared even when they did not directly interact. Guyer examines a series of comparisons and contrasts: their arguments and conclusions on a range of metaphysical issues, including proofs of the existence of God, immortality, and idealism; their shared interests in aesthetics; and their path-breaking work on the "religion of reason" and the separation of church and state. Setting the work of both philosophers in historical context, Guyer shows that, where Kant sometimes provides deeper insight into the underlying structure of human thought, Mendelssohn is often the deeper student of the variety of human experience. This is evident above all in their treatments of aesthetics and religion: Mendelssohn recognizes more deeply than Kant the emotional impact of art, and while Kant imagines that organized religion will one day be superseded by pure morality, Mendelssohn argued that organized religion in all its varieties seems here to stay, and so toleration for religious variety is an inescapable requirement of human morality. Based on an exhaustive study of a wide range of texts, this study demonstrates the ongoing relevance of Kant and Mendelssohn to modern thought.

Paul Guyer is acknowledged as one of the world's foremost Kant specialists, and he collects here some of his most celebrated essays from the past decade and a half. The governing theme of the volume is the role of systematicity in Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy. Featuring twobrand-new papers and an introduction to orient the reader, Kant's System of Nature and Freedom will be an essential purchase for anyone working on the history of philosophy and related areas of ethics, philosophy of science, and metaphysics.

The concept of systematicity is central to Immanuel Kant's conception of scientific knowledge and to his practical philosophy. But Kant also held that we must be able to unite the separate systems of nature and freedom into a single system: on the one hand, morality itself requires that we be able to see its commands and goals as realizable within nature, while on the other hand our experience of nature itself leads us to see it as a system with the goal of human moral development. The essays in this volume, including two published here for the first time, explore various aspects of Kant's conception of the system of nature, the system of freedom, and the system of nature and freedom. The essays in the first part explore the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goal of natural science, consider the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of the unity of science, and examine Kant's attempts to prove that the existence of an ether is a necessary condition for a physical system of nature. The essays in the second part explore Kant's view that morality requires a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of the ends that persons set for themselves, and examine the system of duties and obligations necessary to realize such a systematic union of persons and their ends. These essays thus examine both the general foundations of Kant's moral philosophy and his final account of the duties of right or justice and of ethics or virtue in his late work, the Metaphysics of Morals. The essays in the third part examine Kant's attempt, in the last of his three great critiques, the Critique of the Power of Judgment., to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology as a theory of the creation of organic nature into an account of our experience of organic nature and of nature as a whole.

Immanuel Kant introduced a new paradigm into modern moral philosophy, first with his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals in 1785, followed by his Critique of Practical Reason in 1788, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason in 1793, and Metaphysics of Morals in 1798. For Kant, the fundamental goal of morality is not the realization of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, under some interpretation of that formula, but the realization of human autonomy governed by pure reason in the form of the "categorical imperative." Kant's ideal of autonomy is nothing less than the greatest possible freedom of each human being to set his or her own ends compatible with the equal freedom of every other human being to do the same. As Kant put it in lectures to his own students, freedom "not restrained under certain rules . . . is the most terrible thing there could ever be," but the condition "under which alone the greatest use of freedom is possible, and under which it can be self-consistent" is the "essential end of humankind" and the "inner worth of the world."Kant's work immediately drew the attention of both critics and supporters. While some argued that Kant's categorical imperative was an "empty formalism," that he left no room for happiness in his morality, that he could not explain responsibility for evil, and that he allowed no room for moral feeling in morally worthy motivation, others have found inspiration in his underlying idea that maximal but equal freedom is the "inner worth of the world." This book examines the response to Kant by other significant moral philosophers from Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel to through T.H. Green, Josiah Royce, and Friedrich Nietzsche, to John Rawls, Onora O'Neill, Christine Korsgaard, and Derek Parfit, with many stops along the way. The book is not a history of Kant scholarship, but an examination of Kant's impact on other major moral philosophers from his time to our own. While it attempts to do justice to the arguments of every philosopher discussed, the book argues that the most profound responses to Kant have been precisely those that have developed in their own way Kant's ideal of freedom as the inner worth of the world.

'Pain and pleasure are simple ideas, incapable of definition.'In 1757 the 27-year-old Edmund Burke argued that our aesthetic responses are experienced as pure emotional arousal, unencumbered by intellectual considerations. In so doing he overturned the Platonic tradition in aesthetics that had prevailed from antiquity until the eighteenth century, and replaced metaphysics with psychology and even physiology as the basis for the subject. Burke's theory of beauty encompasses the female form, nature, art, and poetry, and he analyses our delight in sublime effects that thrill and excite us. His revolution in method continues to have repercussions in the aesthetic theories of today, and his revolution in sensibility has paved the way for literary and artistic movements from the Gothic novel through Romanticism, twentieth-century painting, and beyond. In this new edition Paul Guyer conducts the reader through Burke's Enquiry, focusing on its place in the history of aesthetics and highlighting its innovations, as well as its influence on many subsequent authors from Kant and Schiller to Ruskin and Nietzsche. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more.

In this updated edition of his outstanding introduction to Kant, Paul Guyer uses Kant’s central conception of autonomy as the key to his thought.Beginning with a helpful overview of Kant’s life and times, Guyer introduces Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology, carefully explaining his arguments about the nature of space, time and experience in his most influential but difficult work, The Critique of Pure Reason. He offers an explanation and critique of Kant’s famous theory of transcendental idealism and shows how much of Kant’s philosophy is independent of this controversial doctrine.He then examines Kant’s moral philosophy, his celebrated ‘categorical imperative’ and his theories of duty, freedom of will and political rights. This section of the work has been substantially revised to clarify the relation between Kant’s conceptions of "internal" and "external" freedom. In his treatments of Kant’s aesthetics and teleology, Guyer focuses on their relation to human freedom and happiness. Finally, he considers Kant’s view that the development of human autonomy is the only goal that we can conceive for both natural and human history.Including a chronology, glossary, chapter summaries and up-to-date further reading, Kant, second edition is an ideal introduction to this demanding yet pivotal figure in the history of philosophy, and essential reading for all students of philosophy.

The fundamental task of philosophy since the seventeenth century has been to determine whether the essential principles of both knowledge and action can be discovered by human beings unaided by an external agency. No one philosopher contributed more to this enterprise than Kant, whose Critique of Pure Reason (1781) shook the very foundations of the intellectual world. Kant argued that the basic principles of the natural science are imposed on reality by human sensibility and understanding, and thus that human beings are also free to impose their own free and rational agency on the world. This 1992 volume is the only systematic and comprehensive account of the full range of Kant''s writings available, and the first major overview of his work to be published in more than a dozen years. An internationally recognised team of Kant scholars explore Kant''s conceptual revolution in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, moral and political philosophy, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion.

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is the watershed of modern thought, which irrevocably changed the landscape of the field and prepared the way for all the significant philosophical movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This 2006 volume, which complements The Cambridge Companion to Kant, covers every aspect of Kant''s philosophy, with a particular focus on his moral and political philosophy. It also provides detailed coverage of Kant''s historical context and of the enormous impact and influence that his work has had on the subsequent history of philosophy. The bibliography also offers extensive and organized coverage of both classical and recent books on Kant. This volume thus provides the broadest and deepest introduction currently available on Kant and his place in modern philosophy, making accessible the philosophical enterprise of Kant to those coming to his work for the first time.

Values of Beauty discusses major ideas and figures in the history of aesthetics from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the end of the twentieth century. The core of the book features Paul Guyer''s essays on the epochal contribution of Immauel Kant, and sets Kant''s work in the context of predecessors, contemporaries, and successors including David Hume, Alexander Gerard, Archibald Alison, Arthur Schopenhauer, and John Stuart Mill All of the essays emphasize the complexity rather than isolation of our aesthetic experience of both nature and art; and the interconnection of aesthetic values such as beauty and sublimity on the one hand, and prudential and moral values on the other. Guyer emphasizes that the idea of the freedom of the imagination as the key to both artistic creation and aesthetic experience has been a common thread throughout the modern history of aesthetics, although the freedom of the imagination has been understood and connected to other forms of freedom in a variety of ways.

This volume provides an extensive translation of the notes and fragments that survived Kant's death in 1804. These include marginalia, lecture notes, and sketches and drafts for his published works. They are important as an indispensable resource for understanding Kant's intellectual development and published works, casting fresh light on Kant's conception of his own philosophical methods and his relations to his predecessors, as well as on central doctrines of his work such as the theory of space, time and categories, the refutations of scepticism and metaphysical dogmatism, the theory of the value of freedom and the possibility of free will, the conception of God, the theory of beauty, and much more.

This book offers a radically new account of the development and structure of the central arguments of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: the defense of the objective validity of such categories as substance, causation, and independent existence. Paul Guyer makes far more extensive use than any other commentator of historical materials from the years leading up to the publication of the Critique and surrounding its revision, and he shows that the work which has come down to us is the result of some striking and only partially resolved theoretical tensions. Kant had originally intended to demonstrate the validity of the categories by exploiting what he called 'analogies of appearance' between the structure of self-knowledge and our knowledge of objects. The idea of a separate 'transcendental deduction', independent from the analysis of the necessary conditions of empirical judgements, arose only shortly before publication of the Critique in 1781, and distorted much of Kant's original inspiration. Part of what led Kant to present this deduction separately was his invention of a new pattern of argument - very different from the 'transcendental arguments' attributed by recent interpreters to Kant - depending on initial claims to necessary truth.