Philosophy of Race – serie

What does it really mean to be "undocumented," particularly in the contemporary United States? Political philosophers, immigration policy makers, and others have tended to define the term "undocumented migrant" legalistically-that is, in terms of lacking legal authorization to live and work in one's current country of residence. In Socially Undocumented, Reed-Sandoval challenges this "legalistic understanding" by arguing that being socially undocumented is to possess a real, visible, and embodied social identity that does not always track one's legal status. She further argues that achieving immigration justice in the U.S. (and elsewhere) requires a philosophical understanding of the racialized, class-based, and gendered components of socially undocumented identity and oppression. Socially Undocumented offers a new vision of immigration justice by integrating a descriptive and phenomenological account of socially undocumented identity with a normative and political account of how the oppression with which it is associated ought to be dealt with as a matter of social justice. It also addresses concrete ethical challenges such as the question of whether open borders are morally required, the militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border, the perilous journey that many migrants undertake to get to the United States, the difficult experiences of the women who cross U.S. borders seeking prenatal care while pregnant, and more.

What does it really mean to be "undocumented," particularly in the contemporary United States? Political philosophers, immigration policy makers, and others have tended to define the term "undocumented migrant" legalistically-that is, in terms of lacking legal authorization to live and work in one's current country of residence. In Socially Undocumented, Reed-Sandoval challenges this "legalistic understanding" by arguing that being socially undocumented is to possess a real, visible, and embodied social identity that does not always track one's legal status. She further argues that achieving immigration justice in the U.S. (and elsewhere) requires a philosophical understanding of the racialized, class-based, and gendered components of socially undocumented identity and oppression. Socially Undocumented offers a new vision of immigration justice by integrating a descriptive and phenomenological account of socially undocumented identity with a normative and political account of how the oppression with which it is associated ought to be dealt with as a matter of social justice. It also addresses concrete ethical challenges such as the question of whether open borders are morally required, the militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border, the perilous journey that many migrants undertake to get to the United States, the difficult experiences of the women who cross U.S. borders seeking prenatal care while pregnant, and more.

Reparations for slavery have become a reinvigorated topic for public debate over the last decade. Most theorizing about reparations treats it as a social justice project - either rooted in reconciliatory justice focused on making amends in the present; or, they focus on the past, emphasizing restitution for historical wrongs. Olúfemi O. Táíwò argues that neither approach is optimal, and advances a different case for reparations - one rooted in a hopeful future that tackles the issue of climate change head on, with distributive justice at its core. This view, which he calls the "constructive" view of reparations, argues that reparations should be seen as a future-oriented project engaged in building a better social order; and that the costs of building a more equitable world should be distributed more to those who have inherited the moral liabilities of past injustices. This approach to reparations, as Táíwò shows, has deep and surprising roots in the thought of Black political thinkers such as James Baldwin, Martin Luther King Jr, and Nkechi Taifa, as well as mainstream political philosophers like John Rawls, Charles Mills, and Elizabeth Anderson. Táíwò's project has wide implications for our views of justice, racism, the legacy of colonialism, and climate change policy.

In Kant's Universalism and the Concept of Race, Jameliah Inga Shorter-Bourhanou provides an account of Kant's views on universalism, with a particular focus on Kant's racism and its surrounding controversy. In this book, Shorter-Bourhanou embraces both sides of the traditional debate around this topic, agreeing with such philosophers as Pauline Kleingeld and Allen W. Wood that Kant's universalist theory offers moral, social, and political philosophies worth preserving. Shorter also agrees with philosophers Robert Bernasconi and Charles W. Mills that Kant's racist ideas impact his moral, social, and political philosophies.Shorter-Bourhanou carefully seeks a middle-ground between these two interpretations to account for Kant's racism, while at once offering important assertions about universalism that would reflect a truly inclusive ideology. She argues that Kant's discussion of race -- and the impact of these claims on his universalist views -- indeed influence his moral, historical, social, and political philosophies. In order to discover the possibility for a concept of a Kant-inspired universalism that is truly inclusive, she reconciles his racism as a path toward generating new possibilities for Kantian philosophy at large.

Despite the disapproval that "visibly" Muslim women face in the West, the U.S. does not ban the hijab or niqab. Nevertheless, it does find a way to manage assertive Muslim women. How so? Subtly and without outright confrontation: through the courts, bureaucratic processes and liberal discourses. From a range of juridical decisions connected not only by a distinctly neocolonial gaze, but also through the tacit dimension of race, Muslim women-among other women of color-are reconceived as neonates who must be taught to behave: as Americans, as professional women, and as autonomous, mildly independent subjects. Focusing on the discrimination claims of Muslim women, this study examines juridical and political approaches that dismiss Muslim women and other populations of color as culturally backward, misguided in their thinking, and gratuitously nonconformist. Likewise, it analyses the experience of racial dismissal through excruciation: the phenomenon by which vulnerable populations are pressed into hopeless performances of cultural assimilation. Racial dismissal is excavated through legal opinions, court transcripts, and other encounters between Muslim women and the state. Ultimately, this work finds that the racial address of dismissal and the phenomena of excruciation have been pivotal to a liberal juridical order that otherwise claims neutrality. By concentrating on the treatment of Muslim women, this book uncovers dynamics of social and racial division which have inhabited and bolstered liberal legal neutrality from its inception. This book's framework, while focusing on Muslim women in the U.S., is a template for understanding how exclusion is juridically implemented for other racialized and marginalized populations.

Despite the disapproval that "visibly" Muslim women face in the West, the U.S. does not ban the hijab or niqab. Nevertheless, it does find a way to manage assertive Muslim women. How so? Subtly and without outright confrontation: through the courts, bureaucratic processes and liberal discourses. From a range of juridical decisions connected not only by a distinctly neocolonial gaze, but also through the tacit dimension of race, Muslim women-among other women of color-are reconceived as neonates who must be taught to behave: as Americans, as professional women, and as autonomous, mildly independent subjects. Focusing on the discrimination claims of Muslim women, this study examines juridical and political approaches that dismiss Muslim women and other populations of color as culturally backward, misguided in their thinking, and gratuitously nonconformist. Likewise, it analyses the experience of racial dismissal through excruciation: the phenomenon by which vulnerable populations are pressed into hopeless performances of cultural assimilation. Racial dismissal is excavated through legal opinions, court transcripts, and other encounters between Muslim women and the state. Ultimately, this work finds that the racial address of dismissal and the phenomena of excruciation have been pivotal to a liberal juridical order that otherwise claims neutrality. By concentrating on the treatment of Muslim women, this book uncovers dynamics of social and racial division which have inhabited and bolstered liberal legal neutrality from its inception. This book's framework, while focusing on Muslim women in the U.S., is a template for understanding how exclusion is juridically implemented for other racialized and marginalized populations.

Unmarried Black mothers in the United States face a precarious existence. Their precarity reflects the deep-seated ills of anti-Black racism, systemic poverty, disenfranchisement, and state violence that adversely impact the daily lives of most Black Americans. Scholarly and popular discourses across racial boundaries reflect the prevalence of negative judgements of those Americans. These discourses illuminate the vulnerabilities particular to unmarried Black mothers, who are, more often than not, held blameworthy for their diminished life conditions. Single Black mothers, however, are not parasitic problems in need of eradication. The institution of marriage is the problem.Contemporary debates on marriage are often situated within feminist philosophy, queer philosophy, and critical race theory, but sustained engagement within Africana philosophy is virtually nonexistent. Single Black Mother fills this gap and corrects the impoverished narrative of single Black motherhood by engaging the following questions: How has the American marital institution served to confine political, moral, and economic capital amongst elites to the detriment of unmarried Black mothers and their families? How should considerations of anti-Black racism inform our deliberations concerning the role, if any, the state should undertake regarding intimate relationships? How can we affirm the matrifocal dyad as a productive site of racial justice?Anika Maaza Simpson here offers an original and novel contribution to the canon of Africana philosophy, and the philosophical literature on marriage. Arguing that non-normative families, specifically families headed by unmarried Black women, should be regarded as generative sites of moral worthiness and liberation practices. Single Black Mother deploys a queer Black feminist lens to illuminate the multiple vectors of harm, inclusive of material, moral, and political harms that serve to undermine the freedom of unmarried Black mothers existing outside of the state marital regime.

Unmarried Black mothers in the United States face a precarious existence. Their precarity reflects the deep-seated ills of anti-Black racism, systemic poverty, disenfranchisement, and state violence that adversely impact the daily lives of most Black Americans. Scholarly and popular discourses across racial boundaries reflect the prevalence of negative judgements of those Americans. These discourses illuminate the vulnerabilities particular to unmarried Black mothers, who are, more often than not, held blameworthy for their diminished life conditions. Single Black mothers, however, are not parasitic problems in need of eradication. The institution of marriage is the problem.Contemporary debates on marriage are often situated within feminist philosophy, queer philosophy, and critical race theory, but sustained engagement within Africana philosophy is virtually nonexistent. Single Black Mother fills this gap and corrects the impoverished narrative of single Black motherhood by engaging the following questions: How has the American marital institution served to confine political, moral, and economic capital amongst elites to the detriment of unmarried Black mothers and their families? How should considerations of anti-Black racism inform our deliberations concerning the role, if any, the state should undertake regarding intimate relationships? How can we affirm the matrifocal dyad as a productive site of racial justice?Anika Maaza Simpson here offers an original and novel contribution to the canon of Africana philosophy, and the philosophical literature on marriage. Arguing that non-normative families, specifically families headed by unmarried Black women, should be regarded as generative sites of moral worthiness and liberation practices. Single Black Mother deploys a queer Black feminist lens to illuminate the multiple vectors of harm, inclusive of material, moral, and political harms that serve to undermine the freedom of unmarried Black mothers existing outside of the state marital regime.

Kathryn Sophia Belle centers feminist frameworks, discourses, and vocabularies of Black women and other Women of Color that existed prior to and have continued to exist after The Second Sex. She centers and amplifies the voices of Black women and other Women of Color, such as Lorraine Hansberry, Angela Davis, Chikwenye Ogunyemi, Deborah King, Oyèrónké Oywùmí, Mariana Ortega, Kathy Glass, bell hooks, Kyoo Lee, Stephanie Rivera Berruz, Patricia Hill Collins, and Alia Al-Saji. Special attention is also given to Claudia Jones and Audre Lorde, both of whom implicitly and indirectly engage with The Second Sex. Beauvoir and Belle demonstrates the myriad ways in which these frameworks both expose and surpass the limits of The Second Sex. Belle argues against the frameworks of oppression used by Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, a foundational text of white feminist philosophy. She frames Beauvoir's analogies as limitations, and shows how Beauvoir either does not engage with Black women and other Women of Color-or engages with them in problematic ways. Belle explores how Black and other Women of Color have critically written and talked about The Second Sex, and in so doing exposes the ways in which the existing Beauvoir scholarship has mostly ignored these engagements, thereby replicating Beauvoir's exclusions.

Kathryn Sophia Belle centers feminist frameworks, discourses, and vocabularies of Black women and other Women of Color that existed prior to and have continued to exist after The Second Sex. She centers and amplifies the voices of Black women and other Women of Color, such as Lorraine Hansberry, Angela Davis, Chikwenye Ogunyemi, Deborah King, Oyèrónké Oywùmí, Mariana Ortega, Kathy Glass, bell hooks, Kyoo Lee, Stephanie Rivera Berruz, Patricia Hill Collins, and Alia Al-Saji. Special attention is also given to Claudia Jones and Audre Lorde, both of whom implicitly and indirectly engage with The Second Sex. Beauvoir and Belle demonstrates the myriad ways in which these frameworks both expose and surpass the limits of The Second Sex. Belle argues against the frameworks of oppression used by Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, a foundational text of white feminist philosophy. She frames Beauvoir's analogies as limitations, and shows how Beauvoir either does not engage with Black women and other Women of Color-or engages with them in problematic ways. Belle explores how Black and other Women of Color have critically written and talked about The Second Sex, and in so doing exposes the ways in which the existing Beauvoir scholarship has mostly ignored these engagements, thereby replicating Beauvoir's exclusions.

In his last major work, prominent critical race theorist Charles W. Mills offers a searing analysis of the shortcomings of liberal political ideology. With a focus on John Rawls, the pre-eminent liberal political philosopher of the last 50 years, Mills critiques the faults, failures, and inadequacies of liberalism, highlighting its fundamental inability to address white supremacy on a global scale. Along with his intellectual respondents in the volume, Mills asserts the limits of Rawls' class-based principles, particularly within systemically racist societies like the United States, with unprecedented clarity. Through an intersectional exploration of contemporary culture and politics, Mills and the contributors instead emphasize the necessity of a historically corrective racial analysis in the pursuit of true social justice, urging readers to move not only beyond Rawls, but liberalism at large.

Racial injustice, at its core, is the domination of time. Utopia has been one response to this domination. The racially dominated are not free to define what counts as "progress," they are not free from the accumulation of past injustices, and, most importantly, they are not free from the arbitrary organization of work in capitalist labor markets. Racially unjust societies are forms of life where the justifications for how to organize time around life, labor, and leisure are out of the hands of the dominated. In Race, Time, and Utopia, William Paris provides a theoretical account of utopia as the critical analysis of the sources of time domination and the struggle to create emancipatory forms of life.Rather than focusing on inclusion and equality before the law, as found in liberal theories of racial injustice, Paris analyses the neglected "utopian" tradition of justice in black political thought that insists justice can only be secured through the transformation of society as a whole. This transformation is nothing less than the democratic transformation of how organize and narrate our shared time. Bringing into conversation the work W.E.B Du Bois, Martin Delany, Marcus Garvey, Frantz Fanon, and James Boggs with the critical theory of Karl Marx, Ernst Bloch, Rahel Jaeggi, and Rainer Forst, Paris reconstructs a social theory and normative account of forms of life as the struggle over how time will be organized, asking "Can there be freedom without a new order of time?"

Racial injustice, at its core, is the domination of time. Utopia has been one response to this domination. The racially dominated are not free to define what counts as "progress," they are not free from the accumulation of past injustices, and, most importantly, they are not free from the arbitrary organization of work in capitalist labor markets. Racially unjust societies are forms of life where the justifications for how to organize time around life, labor, and leisure are out of the hands of the dominated. In Race, Time, and Utopia, William Paris provides a theoretical account of utopia as the critical analysis of the sources of time domination and the struggle to create emancipatory forms of life.Rather than focusing on inclusion and equality before the law, as found in liberal theories of racial injustice, Paris analyses the neglected "utopian" tradition of justice in black political thought that insists justice can only be secured through the transformation of society as a whole. This transformation is nothing less than the democratic transformation of how organize and narrate our shared time. Bringing into conversation the work W.E.B Du Bois, Martin Delany, Marcus Garvey, Frantz Fanon, and James Boggs with the critical theory of Karl Marx, Ernst Bloch, Rahel Jaeggi, and Rainer Forst, Paris reconstructs a social theory and normative account of forms of life as the struggle over how time will be organized, asking "Can there be freedom without a new order of time?"

Race and Racism: A Decolonial Approach argues that the topics of race and racism need a decolonial framing if we are to understand their genealogy in the modern world, and explores their current iterations and the path forward. The chapters develop this argument in three ways. Chapter One presents an account of racialized identities that foreground their essentially historical nature as created through the shared experiences and collective actions of both elite and non-elite groups. Overcoming racial oppression cannot, then, occur simply by a change in policies, but only through new collective experiences of peaceful and just forms of collaborative cohabitation. Chapter Two argues for an expanded focus on cultural racism over individual attitudinal forms. Cultural racism focuses on, and ranks, peoples, and uses this to justify global inequalities and injustices. In truth, all modern cultures, including the West, are the product of transculturation at every level, not only affecting their music and language but also their sciences and political institutions. Cultural supremacy is thus a myth, and cultural ranking an impossibility. It remains vital to engage in criticism and debate over specific ideas and practices, but these discussions are often marred and made ineffective by cultural racism. Chapter Three dissects the current crisis of white identity that is energizing the far right on both sides of the Atlantic, with a focus on migrants as the source of nearly every social problem. The move to ethno-nationalism can only be forestalled by directly addressing the Replacement Theory and the difficult implications of colonialism's continuing effects on global relations. White identities have been based in false histories about the modern era, yet the truly varied experiences of whites are not well represented in the myths that grounded racial supremacy. If we face the truth about our histories, and understand them with more accuracy and nuance, we can formulate a way forward in unity.

This book philosophically explores how changing conceptions of race and equality have affected Supreme Court interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution over the years. In the years since the 14th Amendment was ratified in 1868, in its decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has switched from using a sociocultural concept of race to using a biological concept of race, and during the same time period has switched from using a social to a legal concept of equality. One result of these trends is the recent emergence of something called 'reverse discrimination.' Another result is that the Equal Protection Clause no longer specially protects racialized persons from racial discrimination, as it was originally intended to do. Using the tools of legal hermeneutics, critical philosophy of race, and critical race theory, key cases of racial discrimination in equal protection law are examined through a historical lens. The Supreme Court’s switch, over the years, from interpreting the Equal Protection Clause as specially protecting racialized persons from continued racial discrimination after the end of the institution of chattel slavery, to interpreting the Clause as protecting everyone from racial discrimination, is tracked alongside changing conceptions of race and equality. As the concept of race became biological, the concept of equality became legal, and the result was the elimination of remedying the negative effects of chattel slavery on the equality status of racialized persons from the Supreme Court’s list of priorities.

The Post-Racial Limits of Memorialization: Toward a Political Sense of Mourningattempts to show how post-racial discourse, in general, and post-racial memory, specifically, operates as a context through which the memorialization of anti-black violence and the production of new forms of this violence are connected. Alfred Frankowski argues that aside from being symbolically meaningful, the post-racial context requires that memorialization of anti-black violence in the past produces memory as a type of forgetting. By challenging many of tenants of the critical turn in political philosophy and aesthetics, he argues against a politics of reconciliation and for a political sense of mourning that amplifies the universality of violence embedded in our contemporary sensibility. He argues for a sense of mourning that requires that we deepen our understanding of how remembrance and resistance to oppression remain linked and necessitates a fluid and active reconfiguration relative to the context in which this oppression exists.

The Post-Racial Limits of Memorialization: Toward a Political Sense of Mourning attempts to show how post-racial discourse, in general, and post-racial memory, specifically, operates as a context through which the memorialization of anti-black violence and the production of new forms of this violence are connected. Alfred Frankowski argues that aside from being symbolically meaningful, the post-racial context requires that memorialization of anti-black violence in the past produces memory as a type of forgetting. By challenging many of tenants of the critical turn in political philosophy and aesthetics, he argues against a politics of reconciliation and for a political sense of mourning that amplifies the universality of violence embedded in our contemporary sensibility. He argues for a sense of mourning that requires that we deepen our understanding of how remembrance and resistance to oppression remain linked and necessitates a fluid and active reconfiguration relative to the context in which this oppression exists.

White Self-Criticality beyond Anti-racism powerfully emphasizes the significance of humility, vulnerability, anxiety, questions of complicity, and how being a “good white” is implicated in racial injustice. This collection sets a new precedent for critical race scholarship and critical whiteness studies to take into consideration what it means specifically to be a white problem rather than simply restrict scholarship to the problem of white privilege and white normative invisibility. Ultimately, the text challenges the contemporary rhetoric of a color-blind or color-evasive world in a discourse that is critically engaging and sophisticated, accessible, and persuasive.

Philosophy and the Mixed Race Experience is a collection of essays by philosophers about the mixed race experience. Each essay is meant to represent one of three possible things: (1) what the philosopher sees as the philosopher’s best work, (2) evidence of the possible impact of the philosopher’s mixed race experience on the philosopher’s work, or (3) the philosopher’s philosophical take on the mixed race experience. The book has two primary goals: (1) to collect together for the first time the work of professional, academic philosophers who have had the mixed race experience, and (2) to bring these essays together for the purpose of adding to the conversation on the question of the degree to which factical identity and philosophical work may be related. The book also examines the possible relationship between the mixed race experience and certain philosophical positions.

Creating a Black Vernacular Philosophy explores how everyday Black vernacular practices, developed to negotiate survival and joy, can be understood as philosophy in their own right. Devonya N. Havis argues that many unique cultural and intellectual practices of African diasporic communities have done the work of traditional philosophies. Focusing on creative practices that take place within Black American diasporic cultures via narratives, the blues, jazz, work songs, and other expressive forms, this book articulates a form of Black vernacular Philosophy that is centered within and emerges from meaning structures cultivated by Black communities. These distinct philosophical practices, running parallel with and often improvising on European philosophy, should be acknowledged for their rigorous theoretical formation and for their disruption of traditional Western philosophical ontologies.

The Habits of Racism examines some of the complex questions raised by the phenomenon and experience of racism. Helen Ngo draws on the resources of Merleau-Ponty to show how the conceptual reworking of habit as bodily orientation helps to identify the subtle but more fundamental workings of racism--to catch its insidious, gestural expressions, as well as its habitual modes of racialized perception. Racism, as Ngo argues, is equally expressed through bodily habits, which, once reformulated, raises important ethical questions regarding the responsibility for one’s racist habits. Ngo also considers what the lived experience of racism and racialization teaches us about the nature of embodied and socially-situated being, arguing that racialized embodiment problematizes and extends existing accounts of embodied experience, and calls into question dominant philosophical paradigms of the “self” as coherent, fluid, and synchronous. Drawing on thinkers such as Fanon, she argues that the racialized body is “in front of itself” and “uncanny” (in the Heideggerian senses of “strange” and “not-at-home”), while exploring the phenomenological and existential implications of this disorientation and displacement. Finally, she returns to the visual register to take up the question of objectification in the racist gaze, critically examining the subject-object ontology presupposed by Sartre’s account of “the gaze” (le regard). Recalling that all embodied being is always already relational and co-constituting, Ngo draws on Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the intertwining to argue that a phenomenology of racialized embodiment reveals to us the ontological violence of racism—not a merely violation of one’s subjectivity as commonly claimed, but also a violation of one’s intersubjectivity. The original arguments in The Habits of Racism will be of particular value to students and scholars interested in critical philosophy of race, phenomenology, and social and political philosophy, and may also be of interest to those working in feminist philosophy, queer studies, and disability studies.

The Habits of Racism examines some of the complex questions raised by the phenomenon and experience of racism. Helen Ngo draws on the resources of Merleau-Ponty to show how the conceptual reworking of habit as bodily orientation helps to identify the subtle but more fundamental workings of racism--to catch its insidious, gestural expressions, as well as its habitual modes of racialized perception. Racism, as Ngo argues, is equally expressed through bodily habits, which, once reformulated, raises important ethical questions regarding the responsibility for one’s racist habits. Ngo also considers what the lived experience of racism and racialization teaches us about the nature of embodied and socially-situated being, arguing that racialized embodiment problematizes and extends existing accounts of embodied experience, and calls into question dominant philosophical paradigms of the “self” as coherent, fluid, and synchronous. Drawing on thinkers such as Fanon, she argues that the racialized body is “in front of itself” and “uncanny” (in the Heideggerian senses of “strange” and “not-at-home”), while exploring the phenomenological and existential implications of this disorientation and displacement. Finally, she returns to the visual register to take up the question of objectification in the racist gaze, critically examining the subject-object ontology presupposed by Sartre’s account of “the gaze” (le regard). Recalling that all embodied being is always already relational and co-constituting, Ngo draws on Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the intertwining to argue that a phenomenology of racialized embodiment reveals to us the ontological violence of racism—not a merely violation of one’s subjectivity as commonly claimed, but also a violation of one’s intersubjectivity. The original arguments in The Habits of Racism will be of particular value to students and scholars interested in critical philosophy of race, phenomenology, and social and political philosophy, and may also be of interest to those working in feminist philosophy, queer studies, and disability studies.

Exploring literary possibilities, Politics and Affect reads black women’s text—in particular Frances Harper’s “The Two Offers” (1859), Julia Collins’s The Curse of Caste (1865), Nella Larsen’s Quicksand (1928), and Danzy Senna’s Caucasia (1998)—as richly creative documents saturated with sociopolitical value. Interested in how African American women writers from the nineteenth century to the present have mined the politics of affect and emotion to document love, shame, and suffering in environments shaped by race, Kathy Glass gives sustained attention to the impact of racist affect on the black body, and examines how black women writers deploy emotional states to engender sociopolitical change.

Hip-hop as survivor testimony? Rhymes as critical text? Drawing on her own experiences as a lifelong hip-hop head and philosophy professor, Lissa Skitolsky reveals the existential power of hip-hop to affect our sensibility and understanding of race and anti-black racism. Hip-Hop as Philosophical Text and Testimony: Can I Get a Witness? examines how the exclusion of hip-hop from academic discourse around knowledge, racism, white supremacy, genocide, white nationalism, and trauma reflects the very neoliberal sensibility that hip-hop exposes and opposes. At this critical moment in history, in the midst of a long overdue global reckoning with systemic anti-black racism, Skitolsky shows how it is more important than ever for white people to realize that our failure to see this system—and take hip-hop seriously—has been essential to its reproduction. In this book, she illustrates the unique power of underground hip-hop to interrupt our neoliberal and post-racial sensibility of current events.

Hip-hop as survivor testimony? Rhymes as critical text? Drawing on her own experiences as a lifelong hip-hop head and philosophy professor, Lissa Skitolsky reveals the existential power of hip-hop to affect our sensibility and understanding of race and anti-black racism. Hip-Hop as Philosophical Text and Testimony: Can I Get a Witness? examines how the exclusion of hip-hop from academic discourse around knowledge, racism, white supremacy, genocide, white nationalism, and trauma reflects the very neoliberal sensibility that hip-hop exposes and opposes. At this critical moment in history, in the midst of a long overdue global reckoning with systemic anti-black racism, Skitolsky shows how it is more important than ever for white people to realize that our failure to see this system—and take hip-hop seriously—has been essential to its reproduction. In this book, she illustrates the unique power of underground hip-hop to interrupt our neoliberal and post-racial sensibility of current events.

Iranian Identity, American Experience: Philosophical Reflections on Race, Rights, Capabilities and Oppression is a multidisciplinary study of oppression using the Iranian American community as its case study. In current studies of oppression, there is little philosophical analysis or a theoretical framework to think about race from the perspective of an immigrant community in the United States that appears to be educated and affluent. Iranian Identity, American Experience fills this gap. Alavi discusses a theory of oppression that addresses not only the external oppression inflicted on people of color but also the everyday actions that leave them in oppressive situations. The book ends with suggestions for addressing oppression both individually and as a collective and for fighting to minimize its harms.

Iranian Identity, American Experience: Philosophical Reflections on Race, Rights, Capabilities and Oppression is a multidisciplinary study of oppression using the Iranian American community as its case study. In current studies of oppression, there is little philosophical analysis or a theoretical framework to think about race from the perspective of an immigrant community in the United States that appears to be educated and affluent. Iranian Identity, American Experience fills this gap. Alavi discusses a theory of oppression that addresses not only the external oppression inflicted on people of color but also the everyday actions that leave them in oppressive situations. The book ends with suggestions for addressing oppression both individually and as a collective and for fighting to minimize its harms.

The motivation behind this important volume is to weave together two distinct, but we think complementary, traditions – the philosophical engagement with race/whiteness and Buddhist philosophy – in order to explore the ways in which these traditions can inform, correct, and improve each other. This exciting and critically informed volume will be the first of its kind to bring together essays that explicitly connect these two traditions and will mark a major step both in understanding race and whiteness (with the help of Buddhist philosophy) and in understanding Buddhist philosophy (with the help of philosophy of race and theorizations of whiteness). We expand upon a small, but growing, body of work that applies Buddhist philosophical analyses to whiteness and racial injustice in contemporary U.S. culture. Buddhist philosophy has much to contribute to furthering our understanding of whiteness and racial identity, the mechanisms that create and maintain white supremacy, and the possibility of dismantling white supremacy. We are interested both in the possible insights that Buddhist metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical analyses can bring to understanding race and whiteness, as well as the potential limitations of such Buddhist-inspired approaches.In their chapters, contributors draw on Buddhist philosophical and contemplative traditions to offer fresh, insightful, and powerful perspectives on issues regarding racial identity and whiteness, including such themes as cultural appropriation, mechanisms of racial injustice and racial justice, phenomenology of racial oppression, epistemologies of racial ignorance, liberatory practices with regard to racism, Womanism, and the intersections of gender-based, raced-based, and sexuality-based oppressions. Authors make use of both contemporary and ancient Buddhist philosophical and contemplative traditions. These include various Asian traditions, including Theravada, Mahayana, Tantra, and Zen, as well as comparatively new American Buddhist traditions.

The motivation behind this important volume is to weave together two distinct, but we think complementary, traditions – the philosophical engagement with race/whiteness and Buddhist philosophy – in order to explore the ways in which these traditions can inform, correct, and improve each other. This exciting and critically informed volume will be the first of its kind to bring together essays that explicitly connect these two traditions and will mark a major step both in understanding race and whiteness (with the help of Buddhist philosophy) and in understanding Buddhist philosophy (with the help of philosophy of race and theorizations of whiteness). We expand upon a small, but growing, body of work that applies Buddhist philosophical analyses to whiteness and racial injustice in contemporary U.S. culture. Buddhist philosophy has much to contribute to furthering our understanding of whiteness and racial identity, the mechanisms that create and maintain white supremacy, and the possibility of dismantling white supremacy. We are interested both in the possible insights that Buddhist metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical analyses can bring to understanding race and whiteness, as well as the potential limitations of such Buddhist-inspired approaches.In their chapters, contributors draw on Buddhist philosophical and contemplative traditions to offer fresh, insightful, and powerful perspectives on issues regarding racial identity and whiteness, including such themes as cultural appropriation, mechanisms of racial injustice and racial justice, phenomenology of racial oppression, epistemologies of racial ignorance, liberatory practices with regard to racism, Womanism, and the intersections of gender-based, raced-based, and sexuality-based oppressions. Authors make use of both contemporary and ancient Buddhist philosophical and contemplative traditions. These include various Asian traditions, including Theravada, Mahayana, Tantra, and Zen, as well as comparatively new American Buddhist traditions.