Primary Sources in Phenomenology – serie

Phenomenology was in large part the discovery of Edmund Husserl, whose Logical Investigations of 1900/01 are normally regarded as the work that launched the phenomenological movement. Yet Husserl's phenomenology, in particular in the form in which it is set out in this his most important contribution to philosophy, is itself part of an Austrian philosophical tradi- tion inspired by Brentano and continued, in very different ways, by Meinong, Stumpf, Twardowski, Ehrenfels, Husserl - and Marty. Like Brentano and all his heirs Marty's philosophical interests were in the philosophy of mind, where this is taken to include or at least ground the philosophy of language, and analytic metaphysics. It is Marty's discussions of topics in these two areas that provide the contributions to this volume with their subject-matter. The papers by Roderick Chisholm, S. -Y. Kuroda, Barry Smith, Peter Simons, Rosaria Egidi, Karl Schuhmann, Elmar Holenstein, Edgar Morscher, Wolf- gang Wenning and myself were presented at the 1984 conference on Anton Marty in Fribourg, Switzerland. Our host in Fribourg was Guido Kung, the conference was made possible by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.I should like to thank both for their help. Geneva, April 1988 KEVIN MULLIGAN Xl Abbreviations Employed in the Text Anton Marty's two major works, the Untersuchungen and the posthumously published Raum und Zeit are referred to in what follows in the following style. U Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, Vol. I (only volume published). Halle a. S.

This volume brings together contributions that explore the philosophy of Franz Brentano. It looks at his work both critically and in the context of contemporary philosophy. For instance, Brentano influenced the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong, the early development of the Gestalt theory, the philosophy of language of Anton Marty, the works of Carl Stumpf in the psychology of tone, and many others. Readers will also learn the contributions of Brentano's work to much debated contemporary issues in philosophy of mind, ontology, and the theory of emotions.The first section deals with Brentano’s conception of the history of philosophy. The next approaches his conception of empirical psychology from an empirical standpoint and in relation with competing views on psychology from the period. The third section discusses Brentano’s later programme of a descriptive psychology or “descriptive phenomenology” and some of his most innovative developments, for instance in the theory of emotions. The final section examines metaphysical issues and applications of his mereology. His reism takes here an important place.The intended readership of this book comprises phenomenologists, analytic philosophers, philosophers of mind and value, as well as metaphysicians. It will appeal to both graduate and undergraduate students, professors, and researchers in philosophy and psychology.

This volume brings together contributions that explore the philosophy of Franz Brentano. It looks at his work both critically and in the context of contemporary philosophy. For instance, Brentano influenced the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong, the early development of the Gestalt theory, the philosophy of language of Anton Marty, the works of Carl Stumpf in the psychology of tone, and many others. Readers will also learn the contributions of Brentano's work to much debated contemporary issues in philosophy of mind, ontology, and the theory of emotions.The first section deals with Brentano’s conception of the history of philosophy. The next approaches his conception of empirical psychology from an empirical standpoint and in relation with competing views on psychology from the period. The third section discusses Brentano’s later programme of a descriptive psychology or “descriptive phenomenology” and some of his most innovative developments, for instance in the theory of emotions. The final section examines metaphysical issues and applications of his mereology. His reism takes here an important place.The intended readership of this book comprises phenomenologists, analytic philosophers, philosophers of mind and value, as well as metaphysicians. It will appeal to both graduate and undergraduate students, professors, and researchers in philosophy and psychology.

Here, for the first time in English, is Franz Brentano’s The Teaching of Jesus, a compendium of texts Brentano assembled for publication shortly before his death that constitute a frank, public settling of accounts with the Christian religion. Originally conceived by Brentano as a volume that might help others similarly led to doubt the doctrines of Christianity, the book is remarkably free of bitterness or spitefulness. On the contrary, what makes the book of singular importance, especially now, is its careful attempt at taking stock of the positive and negative influence Christianity has had in history.  This text appeals to those researchers and scholars interested in the work of Franz Brentano and his work on the philosophy of religion, in this case, Christianity.

Here, for the first time in English, is Franz Brentano’s The Teaching of Jesus, a compendium of texts Brentano assembled for publication shortly before his death that constitute a frank, public settling of accounts with the Christian religion. Originally conceived by Brentano as a volume that might help others similarly led to doubt the doctrines of Christianity, the book is remarkably free of bitterness or spitefulness. On the contrary, what makes the book of singular importance, especially now, is its careful attempt at taking stock of the positive and negative influence Christianity has had in history.  This text appeals to those researchers and scholars interested in the work of Franz Brentano and his work on the philosophy of religion, in this case, Christianity.

Oskar Kraus (1872–1942) war unter den Vertretern der orthodoxen Brentano-Schule der vielleicht originellste Kopf. Er hat sich nicht nur als Mitherausgeber von Franz Brentanos nachgelassenen Schriften verdient gemacht, sondern er hat auch Brentanos werttheoretischen Ansatz für die Gebiete der Ethik, der Rechtsphilosophie und der Ökonomie fruchtbar gemacht. In seinem 1937 erschienenen Hauptwerk „Die Werttheorien. Geschichte und Kritik“ rekonstruiert Oskar Kraus detailliert Brentanos werttheoretischen Ansatz und entwirft davon ausgehend eine kritische Geschichte der Werttheorie von der Antike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert. Im Zentrum steht dabei die Auseinandersetzung mit den relativistischen Theorien seiner Zeitgenossen, denn Kraus sah in Brentanos Ansatz der Wertbegründung ein Mittel gegen diesen ethischen Relativismus.Oskar Kraus gehörte zur zweiten Generation der Brentano-Schule. In Prag hatte er neben Rechtswissenschaften auch Philosophie bei Anton Marty studiert. Dieser gehörte neben anderen bedeutenden Philosophen wie Edmund Husserl, Thomas G. Masaryk oder Christian von Ehrenfels zur ersten Generation der Brentano-Schule und gilt als der treueste Schüler Franz Brentanos.Dieses wichtigste Werk von Oskar Kraus ist einerseits für die Brentano-Forschung von Bedeutung. Es richtet sich aber auch an Masterstudierende und Wissenschaftler, die sich für die Grundlagen der Ethik oder generell für die Geschichte der Moralphilosophie und insbesondere die des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts interessieren. Eingeleitet wird das Buch von Thomas Binder und Hynek Janoušek, die zahlreiche Beiträge zur aktuellen Brentano-Forschung verfasst haben.

This is an open-access book which is devoted to rediscovering the early history of phenomenology in confrontation with the legacy of Franz Brentano by discussing Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy. It offers a unique perspective on the history of the phenomenological movement by presenting the development of Blaustein’s theory. Blaustein was a philosopher educated by Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov, but he also held research stays in Freiburg im Breisgau (where he studied under Edmund Husserl) and in Berlin (where he met Carl Stumpf). Blaustein’s work is usually classified as phenomenology yet some scholars question this by claiming that Blaustein was radically critical of Husserl’s phenomenology. This text addresses these divergent opinions by claiming that Blaustein was both a descriptive psychologist and a phenomenologist. Moreover, the book shows that these two motives were intertwined in Blaustein’s writings and require a reference to other traditions such as the Gestalt theory of Stumpf, and the humanistic psychology of Dilthey. This volume examines sources, context, and applications of the methods used by Blaustein in his original philosophy. It appeals to philosophers, especially phenomenologists, epistemologies, and historians. The more specialized chapters are also relevant to historians of the phenomenological movement and the Brentanian tradition.

This is an open-access book which is devoted to rediscovering the early history of phenomenology in confrontation with the legacy of Franz Brentano by discussing Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy. It offers a unique perspective on the history of the phenomenological movement by presenting the development of Blaustein’s theory. Blaustein was a philosopher educated by Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov, but he also held research stays in Freiburg im Breisgau (where he studied under Edmund Husserl) and in Berlin (where he met Carl Stumpf). Blaustein’s work is usually classified as phenomenology yet some scholars question this by claiming that Blaustein was radically critical of Husserl’s phenomenology. This text addresses these divergent opinions by claiming that Blaustein was both a descriptive psychologist and a phenomenologist. Moreover, the book shows that these two motives were intertwined in Blaustein’s writings and require a reference to other traditions such as the Gestalt theory of Stumpf, and the humanistic psychology of Dilthey. This volume examines sources, context, and applications of the methods used by Blaustein in his original philosophy. It appeals to philosophers, especially phenomenologists, epistemologies, and historians. The more specialized chapters are also relevant to historians of the phenomenological movement and the Brentanian tradition.

This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentano’s main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational nature of intentionality. It shows that Brentano and the Aristotelian authors from which he drew not only addressed the question whether intentionality is a relation, but also devoted extensive discussions to what kind of relation it is, if any.The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentano’s distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez.This book combines a longue durée approach – focusing on the long-term evolution of philosophical concepts rather than restricting itself to a specific author or period – with systematic analysis in thehistory of philosophy. By studying Brentano and the Aristotelian authors with theoretical sensitivity, it also aims to contribute to our understanding of intentionality and cognate features of the mind.

Phenomenology as practised by Adolf Reinach ( 1883-191 7) in his all too brief philosophical career exemplifies all the virtues of Husserl's Logical Investigations. It is sober, concerned to be clear and deals with specific problems. It is therefore understandable that, in a philosophical climate in which Husserl's masterpiece has come to be regarded as a mere stepping stone on the way to his later Phenomeno­ logy, or even to the writings of a Heidegger, Reinach's contributions to exact philo­ sophy have been all but totally forgotten. The topics on which Reinach wrote most illuminatingly, speech acts (which he called 'social acts') and states of affairs (Sachverhalte ), as well as his realism about the external world, have come to be regarded as the preserve of other traditions of exact philosophy. Like my fellow­ contributors, I hope that the present volume will go some way towards correcting this unfortunate historical accident. Reinach's account of judgements and states of affairs, an account that precedes those of Russell and Wittgenstein, his 1913 treatment of speech acts, his reinter­ pretation of Hume and aspects of his legal philosophy are the main philosophical topics dealt with in what follows. But his analysis of deliberation as well as his work on movement and Zeno's paradoxes get only a passing mention.

Phenomenology was in large part the discovery of Edmund Husserl, whose Logical Investigations of 1900/01 are normally regarded as the work that launched the phenomenological movement. Yet Husserl's phenomenology, in particular in the form in which it is set out in this his most important contribution to philosophy, is itself part of an Austrian philosophical tradi- tion inspired by Brentano and continued, in very different ways, by Meinong, Stumpf, Twardowski, Ehrenfels, Husserl - and Marty. Like Brentano and all his heirs Marty's philosophical interests were in the philosophy of mind, where this is taken to include or at least ground the philosophy of language, and analytic metaphysics. It is Marty's discussions of topics in these two areas that provide the contributions to this volume with their subject-matter. The papers by Roderick Chisholm, S. -Y. Kuroda, Barry Smith, Peter Simons, Rosaria Egidi, Karl Schuhmann, Elmar Holenstein, Edgar Morscher, Wolf- gang Wenning and myself were presented at the 1984 conference on Anton Marty in Fribourg, Switzerland. Our host in Fribourg was Guido Kung, the conference was made possible by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.I should like to thank both for their help. Geneva, April 1988 KEVIN MULLIGAN Xl Abbreviations Employed in the Text Anton Marty's two major works, the Untersuchungen and the posthumously published Raum und Zeit are referred to in what follows in the following style. U Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie, Vol. I (only volume published). Halle a. S.