Studies in Philosophy and Religion – serie

Charles Hartshorne's considerable writings have been influential in contem­ 1 porary religious and philosophical thought. Not only is he regarded as the leading living representative of process thought as well as a much respected interpreter of Whitehead, but he has also established himself as an original 2 and creative thinker in his own right. The literature on his philosophy has been rapidly increasing. His thought and influence have also been the subject 3 of a number of conferences and gatherings of scholars. One of Hartshorne's most notable contributions to contemporary philoso­ 4 phy and theology is his concept of God. In his writings he has set out "to formulate the idea of deity so as to preserve, perhaps increase, its religious value, while yet avoiding the contradictions which seem inseparable from the 5 idea as customarily defined." The result of his efforts has been the develop­ ment of the concept of a "dipolar God" (insofar as contrasting metaphysical predicates, e.g. relative/absolute, contingent/necessary, finite/infinite and so on, are affirmed as applicable to God although always in an eminent way). Inasmuch as he has elaborated this concept in close dialogue with classical theism, he also refers to it as "neo-classical". Because of the emphasis he places on the reality of change and becoming in his metaphysics (which regards God as the chief exemplification of metaphysical principles), the term 6 "process" has likewise been used to describe his notion of God.

With a few notable exceptions, analytical philosophy of religion in the West still continues to focus almost entirely on the Iudaeo-Christian tradition. In particular, it is all too customary to ignore the rich fund of concepts and arguments supplied by the Indian religious tradition. This is a pity, for it gratuitously impoverishes the scope of much contemporary philosophy of religion and precludes the attainment of any insights into Indian religions comparable to those that the clarity and rigour of analytic philosophy has made possible for the Iudaeo-Christian tradition. This volume seeks to redress the imbalance. The original idea was to invite a number of Indian and Western philosophers to contribute essays treating of Indian religious concepts in the style of contemporary analytical philosophy of religion. No further restrietion was placed upon the contributors and the resulting essays (all previously unpublished) exhibit a diversity of themes and approaches. Many arrangements of the material herein are doubtless defensible. The rationale for the one that has been adopted is perhaps best presented through some introductory remarks about the essays themselves.

The task of the following considerations is the elucidation of the relationship of religion to thought. Every philosophical investigation with this task proceeds under the expectation that it will take into account religious self-understanding. Herein lies the special difficulty of a philosophical theory of religion. On the one hand, the philosopher of religion may not assume this self-understanding in order to avoid offering a religious theory (a theology) instead of the philosophical theory expected from him. On the other hand, he cannot by-pass religious self-understanding because this is the key to insight into the uniqueness of religious discourse. Without knowledge of this uniqueness, it is impossible to indicate the conditions under which religious statements lead to the question of truth. Even if religion cannot prescribe to philosophical investigation, whose methods the latter must apply to examine its object, it may in addition require that the standard by which it is measured be suited to grasp those special characteristics which mark it as different from other realms of life. Therefore, it may be required of the philosophical interpretation, that the question of the legitimacy and validity of religious self-understanding be treated from the very beginning as an open one, and not as one already decided. If this question is rashly decided in the negative, then all analysis of religious propositions is necessarily done along the guidelines of a method that in its foundation masks of the religious thematic.

In the 20th century, the interests of most philosophers and theologians have fallen into only one of three areas: logic, God or metaphysics. Since much of Anglo-American philosophy in this century has been analytic and antimetaphysical because of the influence of positivism, there have been few attempts at continuing metaphysical inquiry. In the early part of the century, the logical atomists combined logic and metaphysics by arguing that the structure of reality is mirrored isomorphically in the structure of a formal, logically perfect, truth-functional language, but their effort was short-lived. Alfred North Whitehead and process philosophers have focused upon God and metaphysics but usually by adopting terminology and distinctions which are unique to certain systems - making rigorous, logical analysis difficult or impossible. The papers included in this volume are illustrative of the application of careful, rigorous logical analysis (and sometimes logical systems) to critical philosophy of religion and what has been called constructive metaphysics.

Natural theology is the project of articulating, defending and CntlClzmg arguments for the existence and nature of God without the aid of special revelation. Philosophical theology, which employs the rational methods of natural theology, is not restricted to premises that are discernible through observation and reason; it may rightly employ premises that are knowable through special revelation. While the project of natural theology may be construed as an attempt to demonstrate God's existence, one cannot ignore the importance of using reason or experience to understand, determine or assess attributes. One will want to know at the conclusion of a proof in natural God's theology if one has proved the existence of God and not merely the prim urn mobilum, source of moral obligation or a committee of finite designers; while God may be the prime mover and designer of the cosmos, none of these attributes alone is sufficient for making a claim to divinity. It is, therefore, difficult to distinguish sharply the project of natural theology from philosophi­ cal theology. The project of classical natural theology has been the attempt to prove God's existence and nature with arguments that employ premises that all rational creatures are obliged to accept.

There is a consensus among Christian theologians that the symbol of the "kingdom of God" inherited from the Judaic tradition, is the key to understanding Christianity, but theologians have for millenia differed among themselves as to the interpretation of this symbol. Political ramifications of, or reactions to, this Judaeo-Christian idea have included the Holy Roman Empire, the Crusades, the "Third Rome", American manifest destiny, Zionism, the Third Reich, and Liberation Theology. This text focuses on the question of whether the Kingdom of God is necessarily related to certain political implementations, and its possible implications for democracy and democratic theory. It examines the development of the symbol in the Old and New Testaments, the diversity of related theological interpretations and political concomitants, and the significance of the "Kingdom of God" in the development of present and future political formations and political theory.

This collection of articles, written by leading contemporary philosophers of religion, is presented in celebration of the 25th anniversary of the "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion". Following the introduction, in which the editor develops the changing philosophical context for the creation and development of the journal, articles by William Rowe, William Alston and Bowman Clarke focus on the concept of God. Rowe considers what conceptions of God may fit with the tradition of American naturalism. Alston argues that irrealism is subversive of the Christian conception of God, and Bowman Clarke analyzes two different process conceptions of God and their metaphysical frameworks. Next, Richard Swinburne argues that God can allow creatures to suffer evils so long as, on balance, the package of their lives is good. The next four essays are concerned with the role of philosophical reason in the analysis of religion. John Smith argues for a position in which philosophy and religion are understood to be complementary and Robert Scharlemann analyzes and expands upon Paul Tillich's understanding of philosophy of religion.David Burrell takes up the question of the relation between reason, faith and analogical language and Merold Westphal explores the postmodern critique of metaphysics and religion. The last two essays are concerned with the issue of religious pluralism. Philip Quinn analyzes John Hick's and William Alston's approach to religious diversity and argues for an approach which does not impugn the rationality of those who lean towards thicker religious phenomenologies and thinner theologies. Robert Neville argues for a new and comparative approach to the philosophy of religion which takes into account our increased knowledge of the major religious faiths. The book also includes a 25-year index of articles and reviews published in the "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion".

In May 1998, a distinguished group of philosophers met in Munich to discuss the rationality of theism. This volume is a collection of the papers read at that conference. While in recent years the rationality of theistic belief has been widely discussed, the Munich conference was an event of some moment in the history of philosophical dialogue: for the first time German- and English-speaking philosophers of religion, representatives of both the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon traditions, joined together to grapple with a common philosophical theme. This multiplicity of perspectives brought a unique richness to the analysis of rationality that no one tradition by itself could provide. Readers will find that richness displayed in the pages of this book. Professional philosophers will find here a great deal to stimulate and challenge them; but graduate students, capable undergraduates, and all others with a serious interest in the philosophy of religion will be well rewarded for their efforts to come to grips with these thought-provoking papers.

In A Theodicy of Hell Charles Seymour tackles one of the most difficult problems facing the western theistic tradition: to show the consonance between eternal punishment and the goodness of God. Medieval theology attempted to resolve the dilemma by arguing that any sin, no matter how slight, merits unending torment. Contemporary thinkers, on the other hand, tend to eliminate the retributive element from hell entirely. Combining historical breadth with detailed argumentation, the author develops a novel understanding of hell which avoids the extremes of both its traditional and modern rivals. He then surveys the battery of objections ranged against the possibility of eternal punishment and shows how his `freedom view of hell' can withstand the attack. The work will be of particular importance for those interested in philosophy of religion and theology, including academics, students, seminarians, clergy, and anyone else with a personal desire to come to terms with this perennially challenging doctrine.

The Apologetic Value of Human Holiness begins by providing the first comprehensive account of the model of human holiness developed by the leading theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar. In so doing, the book also provides the first detailed explication of his Christocentric philosophical anthropology. Part 2 argues that von Balthasar anticipates some key developments in late twentieth-century Anglo-American analytical philosophy, and that certain of these developments - in particular, the `internal realism' of Hilary Putnam - provide powerful support for von Balthasar's theological philosophy. The final part elucidates von Balthasar's core intuition that human holiness is of immense apologetic value for religious faith, and concludes with a new, `internalist' theory of religious pluralism. The Apologetic Value of Human Holiness will be seen as an important and original contribution to both Philosophy of Religion and Theology, and is likely to prove essential reading in upper-level undergraduate and postgraduate courses in both subjects.

I was very happy when in 1997 Fiachra Long came to spend part of his sabbatical leave at the Archives Maurice Blondel at Louvain-Ia-Neuve. This allowed him to bring together and complete his translation of three important articles from Maurice Blondel, known as the philosopher of Aix-en-Province. These three articles fonn a unity: they make explicit certain aspects of the method used in the great thesis of 1893, Action. This thesis, it is well known, aroused many polemic debates after its appearance. Thomist theologians accused Blondel of turning back towards Kantian idealism whereas the philosophers of the Revue de metaphysique et de morale accused him on the contrary of falling back on a pre-critical realism. The three articles translated here, each in its own way, attempt to pass beyond these two opposite charges. The Idealist Illusion (1898) underlines the fact that the content of consciousness should be unfurled as it appears, by withdrawing from any idealist or realist prejudice, before judging the consistency of its content as a whole. In this way Blondel supports the "phenomenological" method used in his thesis. The Elementary Principle of a Logic of the Moral Life (1903) is a very well-worked text which shows that "the logic of possession and privation" is broader than "the logic of amnnation and negation. " Using these words, Blondel develops certain striking laws of action such as that of the "parallelogram of contrary forces.

This collection of original articles, written by leading contemporary European and American philosophers of religion, is presented in celebration of the publication of the fiftieth volume of the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Following the Editor's Introduction, John Macquarrie, Adriaan Peperzak, and Hent de Vries take up central themes in continental philosophy of religion. Macquarrie analyzes postmodernism and its influence in philosophy and theology. Peperzak argues for a form of universality different from that of modern philosophy, and de Vries analyzes an intrinsic and structural relationship between religion and the media. The next three essays discuss issues in analytic philosophy of religion. Philip Quinn argues that religious diversity reduces the epistemic status of exclusivism and makes it possible for a religious person to be justified while living within a pluralistic environment. William Wainwright plumbs the work of Jonathan Edwards in order to better understand debates concerning freedom, determinism, and the problem of evil, and William Hasker asks whether theological incompatibilism is less inimical to traditional theism than some have supposed. Representing the Thomist tradition, Fergus Kerr challenges standard readings of Aquinas on the arguments for the existence of God. David Griffin analyzes the contributions of process philosophy to the problem of evil and the relation between science and religion. Illustrating comparative approaches, Keith Ward argues that the Semitic and Indian traditions have developed a similar concept of God that should be revised in view of post-Enlightenment theories of the individual and the historical. Keith Yandell explores themes in the Indian metaphysical tradition and considers what account of persons is most in accord with reincarnation and karma doctrines. Feminist philosophy of religion is represented in Pamela Anderson's article, in which she argues for a gender-sensitive and more inclusive approach to the craving for infinitude.

East/West Summit on the Holy Trinity Held in Moscow - A stellar cast from the Society of Christian Philosophers/West and the Russian Orthodox Church/East met to discuss the mystery of God as three in one. Theologians and philosophers, typically rivals, synergized in their pursuit of truth and understanding regarding this central, unifying Christian belief, demonstrating respective strengths in marvellous complementary array. His holiness Alexei II, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia extended greetings and Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk set the stage. History still has its shining moments. The next best thing to being there are the papers that were presented and polished for this volume.

Philosophy of Religion for a New Century represents the work of nineteen scholars presented at a conference in honor of Eugene T. Long at the University of South Carolina, April 5-6, 2002. This volume is a good example of philosophy in dialogue; there is both respect and genuine disagreement. First, an account of our present situation in the Philosophy of Religion is given, leading to a discussion of the very idea of a 'Christian Philosophy' and the coherence of the traditional concept of God. The implications of science and a concern for the environment in our concepts of God are carefully examined. A discussion follows on the possibility of speech about God and silence about God. Since much of modern European philosophy is concerned with the `Death of God' theme, the positions of Nietzsche and some of his twentieth-century interpreters are presented. There are presentations on Feminist Approaches to Philosophy of Religion, and Comparative Religion is examined in relation to cultures and the demands of rationality. The volume concludes with a critical dialogue on the relation of Religious Discourse to the Public Sphere. Developing global awareness has led to significant change in the Philosophy of Religion. One-dimensional approaches have given way to honest dialogue. The traditional boundaries between the secular and the religious have shifted, and new approaches to traditional problems are required. This volume presents examples of these new approaches.

Philosophy of Religion for a New Century represents the work of nineteen scholars presented at a conference in honor of Eugene T. Long at the University of South Carolina, April 5-6, 2002. This volume is a good example of philosophy in dialogue; there is both respect and genuine disagreement. First, an account of our present situation in the Philosophy of Religion is given, leading to a discussion of the very idea of a 'Christian Philosophy' and the coherence of the traditional concept of God. The implications of science and a concern for the environment in our concepts of God are carefully examined. A discussion follows on the possibility of speech about God and silence about God. Since much of modern European philosophy is concerned with the 'Death of God' theme, the positions of Nietzsche and some of his twentieth-century interpreters are presented. There are presentations on Feminist Approaches to Philosophy of Religion, and Comparative Religion is examined in relation to cultures and the demands of rationality. The volume concludes with a critical dialogue on the relation of Religious Discourse to the Public Sphere. Developing global awareness has led to significant change in

Today, when systematic philosophy - and reason itself - are challenged both outside of and within philosophy, is it still possible to do metaphysics? This volume provides a broad perspective on contemporary approaches to the nature and the fundamental questions of metaphysics. Drawing on scholars from continental Europe, Asia, Canada, the United States, and Great Britain, and representing a variety of philosophical cultures and traditions, this volume surveys and extends work in metaphysics and its implications for broader philosophical concerns (e.g., in ethics and social philosophy, in mathematics and logic, and in epistemology). It also addresses such questions as the role of history and historicity in undertaking metaphysics, the nature of metaphysics, the priority of metaphysics over epistemology, and the challenges of empiricism and postmodernism.

For quite some time I have corresponded with Nick Trakakis, a very t- ented young philosopher at Monash University in Australia. He was c- pleting a manuscript on the problem of evil. Although we’ve never met, I’ve come to greatly admire his philosophical ability, even, or I hope particularly, when he notes weaknesses, if not outright mistakes, in my own writings on this topic. His knowledge of the relevant literature is nothing short of extraordinary. I am deeply impressed by the clarity and quality of his wr- ing, his measured judgments, as well as his philosophical ability. In this volume Trakakis begins with my 1979 paper, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” sets forth the evidential argument from evil, and considers the large body of literature developed in response to that argument. He examines and evaluates with great care the objections raised by Wykstra, Howard-Snyder, Durston,Alston, and others, along with my responses to those forceful objections. Noting the importance of the assumption that if there are God-justifying goods for horrendous human and animal suffering then it is likely that humans would have some awareness of what those justifying goods might be, Trakakis carefully evaluates the lit- ature bearing on this crucial issue, including, of course, the significance of what is commonly known as the problem of divine hiddenness, and the line of response proposed by the sceptical theists – philosophers who are theists but sceptical of arguments against theism.

The Star of Redemption, * which presents Franz Rosenzweig's system of philosophy, begins with the sentence "from death, (vom Tode) , from the fear of death, originates all cognition of the All" and concludes with the words "into life. " This beginning and this conclusion of the book signify more than the first and last words of philosophical books usually do. Taken together - "from death into life" - they comprise the entire meaning of Rosenzweig's philosophy. The leitmotif of this philosophy is the life and death of the human being and not the I of philosophical idealism, where man ultimately signifies "for ethics" no more than" . . . a point to which it (ethics) relates its problems, as for science also he (man) is only a particular case of its general laws. "l Rosenzweig deals with the individual's actual existence, that which is termi­ nated by death; he speaks of the individual's hic et nunc, of his actions and decisions in the realm of concrete reality. This philosophy is not an exposition of theoretical principles. It is not concerned with man in general in abstract time, but rather with the individual human being, designated by a proper name, living in his particular time. ** Human existence in its finiteness and temporalness forms the focus in which Rosenzweig's motif can be gathered together.

''The problem of Transcendence is the problem of our time. " I Needless to say, Transcendence was a particularly lively i~sue when Karl Heim wrote these words in the mid-1930's. Within the province of philosophi­ cal theology and philosophy of religion, however, it is always the prob­ lem, as Gordon Kaufman has recently reminded us. 2Por the question concerning the nature and the reality of Transcendence has not only to do with self-transcendence, but with the being of Transcendence-Itself, that is to say, with the nature and the reality of God as experienced and understood at any given time or place. Now there are those today who would claim that any further discus­ sion of the latter half of this proposition, namely,Transcendence-Itse1f or God, is worthless and quite beside the point. Such persons would claim that the particular logia represented by the theological sciences has collapsed by virtue of its object having disappeared. Indeed, when one surveys the contemporary scene in philosophy and theology, there is a good deal of evidence that this is the case':"" theology of late having be­ come something of a "spectacle," to use Pritz Buri's term. One of the reasons for this, we here contend, is that the richness and the diversity of the meaning of Transcendence has been lost. And even though we do not here intend to resolve the issue, neither do we assume that such an enqui­ ry is either impossible or irrelevant.

C. S. Peirce's indictment that "the chief cause of [metaphysics'] backward condition is that its leading professors have been theo­ (Collected Papers 6:3) falls heavily at my door. For it logians" was out of reflection upon religious experience and its meaning that the present relational metaphysic was conceived. My hope, however, is that its scope is sufficiently wider than its theological origins to justify its appearance as a work in philosophy. Having been nurtured in existential philosophy and having reached some measure of maturity with the wise counsel of Professor Dr. Fritz Buri, of Basel, I came to feel that theology as a modern discipline had reached an impasse owing to its overextended commitments to a subject-object paradigm of thought. Even those theologians who despaired of these ties seemed unable to find an independent alternative idiom for their ideas. A second tension in my thinking resulted from the inordinate neglect by theologians of the natural world. Also, my natural interest in physical understanding seemed unfulfilled within the narrow confines of theology, even of philosophical theology as then practiced. As I turned decisively toward the study of modern physics, and especially of cosmology, a new world seemed to open up to me. After extensive study with prominent astronomers and physicists, it began to dawn on me that the new physics has devised conceptual paradigms of thought which could be generalized into a metaphysical system of universal interest.

The cross-disciplinary studies in this volume are of special interest because they link human purpose to the present debate between religion and the process of secularization. If that debate is to be a creative one, the notion of the 'human orderer' must be related significantly both to the sacred and secular realms. In fact, if man were not a purposive being, he would have neither religious nor secular problems. Questions about origins and destiny, divine purposiveness and the order of human development, would not arise as topics of human concern. It would appear, then, that few would deny the fact of man's purposiveness in existence, that the pursuit of these purposes constitutes the dramas of history and culture. Yet the case is otherwise. For, concerning 'purposes' itself, widely divergent, even antithetical, views have been held. The common man has mistrusted its guidance for purpose, much too often, 'changes its mind'. Its fluctuations and whimsical nature are too much even for common sense. The sciences have identified purpose with the personal life and viewed it as a function of the subject self. Consequently they had no need for it in scientific method and objective knowledge. The religions of the world have used purpose in its holistic sense, for purposes of establishing grandious systems of religious totality and for stating the ultimate goals in man's destiny.

It would probably be generally admitted that Vedanta is the apex of the Indian (or Eastern) religious philosophies. Yet today it com­ mands so little attention, in part, no doubt, because the modem mood in scholarship refuses anchoring and centering of thought. The present work seeks to address modem thought though not in the modem mood. It is nevertheless motivated by the belief that there are times when the timeless is most timely. It is possible that the sources of a tradition such as Vedanta, if approached propefIy, will yield somethIng which can be brought within the ambience of the contemporary philosophical quest, at least of its still largely unmanifest undercurrents. The present work is intended to be an act, imperfect as it is, in that direction. That marks the difference of this project, called Gnosis and the Question of Thought in Vedanta, from customary studies in Indol­ ogy. The term "gnosis" as employed in this context is a translation of its cognate Sanskrit term jfiana, the latter, however, having a much wider range of meaning than the former, especially in view of the latter's appropriation for a specific usage by the Gnostic traditions of both the East and the West. In the general expression of Vedanta too the Gnostic understanding ofjfiana has undoubtedly persisted especially in the so-called jfiana-marga, or "way of gnosis", made popular from early medieval times on.

One of the controversial issQes which have recently come into prominence among philosophers and theologians is how one should understand the term l God. It seems that, despite the fact that a certain idea of God is assumed by not most, people, there is a degree of disagreement over the meaning many, if of the term. "God" is generally taken to refer to a supreme Being, the Creator, who is perfect and self-existent, holy, personal and loving. This understanding of "God" corresponds to what many have either been brought up to believe in or have come to accept as the meaning of this word. Neverthe­ less, theists appear to be defending a particular idea of God and to be accusing atheists of attacking another, one which does not tie in with the theistic interpretation. Cardinal Maximos IV, for instance, is quoted as saying, "The God the atheists don't believe in is a God I don't believe in either. "2 On the other hand, atheists have been challenging believers to explain clearly what they mean by "God" because these critics cannot see how that idea can have any acceptable meaning. Furthermore, theists them­ selves seem to be divided over the issue. H. P. Owen in his book Concepts of Deity shows quite convincingly that there is "a bewildering variety of concepts of God" among theists. ' One has only to ask around for confirma­ tion of this observation.

One of the controversial issQes which have recently come into prominence among philosophers and theologians is how one should understand the term l God. It seems that, despite the fact that a certain idea of God is assumed by not most, people, there is a degree of disagreement over the meaning many, if of the term. "God" is generally taken to refer to a supreme Being, the Creator, who is perfect and self-existent, holy, personal and loving. This understanding of "God" corresponds to what many have either been brought up to believe in or have come to accept as the meaning of this word. Neverthe­ less, theists appear to be defending a particular idea of God and to be accusing atheists of attacking another, one which does not tie in with the theistic interpretation. Cardinal Maximos IV, for instance, is quoted as saying, "The God the atheists don't believe in is a God I don't believe in either. "2 On the other hand, atheists have been challenging believers to explain clearly what they mean by "God" because these critics cannot see how that idea can have any acceptable meaning. Furthermore, theists them­ selves seem to be divided over the issue. H. P. Owen in his book Concepts of Deity shows quite convincingly that there is "a bewildering variety of concepts of God" among theists. ' One has only to ask around for confirma­ tion of this observation.

The thesis of this essay may be stated quite briefly: Vatican II is a demonstration­ model of the phenomenological method employed on an international scale. It exemplifies the final developmental stage, postulated by Husserl, of an inter­ subjective phenomenology which would take its point of departure, not from individual subjectivity, but from transcendental intersubjectivity. Vatican II, accordingly, offers a unique application of a universal transcendental philosophy in the field of religious reflection for the practical purposes of moral and socio­ cultural renewal. Phenomenology, as a distinctively European development, is relatively un­ known in America - at least in its pure form. Our contact with this style of 1 intuitive reflection is usually filtered through psychology or sociology. How­ ever, Edmund Husserl, The Father of Phenomenology, was originally trained in mathematics, and he entered the field of philosophy because he recognized 2 that the theoretical foundations of modern science were disintegrating. He foresaw that, unless this situation were rectified, modern men would eventually slip into an attitude of absolute scepticism, relativism, and pragmatism. After the First World War he saw this theoretical problem mirrored more and more in the social turbulence of Europe, and his thoughts turned to the need for a 3 renewal at all levels of life. In 1937 when Nazism was triumphant in Germany, and Europe on the brink of World War II, he wrote his last major work, The 4 Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy.

Few reference works in philosophy have articles on hope. Few also are systematic or large-scale philosophical studies of hope. Hope is admitted to be important in people's lives, but as a topic for study, hope has largely been left to psychologists and theologians. For the most part philosophers treat hope en passant. My aim is to outline a general theory of hope, to explore its structure, forms, goals, reasonableness, and implications, and to trace the implications of such a theory for atheism or theism. What has been written is quite disparate. Some see hope in an individualistic, often existential, way, and some in a social and political way. Hope is proposed by some as essentially atheistic, and by others as incomprehensible outside of one or another kind of theism. Is it possible to think consistently and at the same time comprehensively about the phenomenon of human hoping? Or is it several phenomena? How could there be such diverse understandings of so central a human experience? On what rational basis could people differ over whether hope is linked to God? What I offer here is a systematic analysis, but one worked out in dialogue with Ernst Bloch, Immanuel Kant, and Gabriel Marcel. Ernst Bloch of course was a Marxist and officially an atheist, Gabriel Marcel a Christian theist, and Immanuel Kant was a theist, but not in a conventional way.

Few reference works in philosophy have articles on hope. Few also are systematic or large-scale philosophical studies of hope. Hope is admitted to be important in people's lives, but as a topic for study, hope has largely been left to psychologists and theologians. For the most part philosophers treat hope en passant. My aim is to outline a general theory of hope, to explore its structure, forms, goals, reasonableness, and implications, and to trace the implications of such a theory for atheism or theism. What has been written is quite disparate. Some see hope in an individualistic, often existential, way, and some in a social and political way. Hope is proposed by some as essentially atheistic, and by others as incomprehensible outside of one or another kind of theism. Is it possible to think consistently and at the same time comprehensively about the phenomenon of human hoping? Or is it several phenomena? How could there be such diverse understandings of so central a human experience? On what rational basis could people differ over whether hope is linked to God? What I offer here is a systematic analysis, but one worked out in dialogue with Ernst Bloch, Immanuel Kant, and Gabriel Marcel. Ernst Bloch of course was a Marxist and officially an atheist, Gabriel Marcel a Christian theist, and Immanuel Kant was a theist, but not in a conventional way.

My first year in graduate school marked by initial expo­ sure to Heidegger and some of his important early essays. At tha~ time, disenchanted with the state in which "religious thought" lay, I was quickly struck by the potential Heidegger presented for breaking new ground in a field that had seeming­ ly exhausted itself by reworking the same old issues and answers. That insight, along with the conviction that Heideg­ ger had been misused and misunderstood by theologians and religious thinkers ever since he burst upon the intellectual scene with the publ ication of Sein und Zei t, grew throughout my graduate career and resulted in a dissertation on Heidegger and religious thinking, of which the present text is a revised and updated version. This text reflects my belief that Heid­ egger, when "properly" understood on such matters as truth, God (and gods), and "faith", presents us with a unique voice and vision that cannot be co-opted into any sort of theology -- be it negative, existential, dialectical or Thomistic -­ and indeed seriously challenges the viability of any "theol­ ogy".

Charles Hartshorne's considerable writings have been influential in contem­ 1 porary religious and philosophical thought. Not only is he regarded as the leading living representative of process thought as well as a much respected interpreter of Whitehead, but he has also established himself as an original 2 and creative thinker in his own right. The literature on his philosophy has been rapidly increasing. His thought and influence have also been the subject 3 of a number of conferences and gatherings of scholars. One of Hartshorne's most notable contributions to contemporary philoso­ 4 phy and theology is his concept of God. In his writings he has set out "to formulate the idea of deity so as to preserve, perhaps increase, its religious value, while yet avoiding the contradictions which seem inseparable from the 5 idea as customarily defined." The result of his efforts has been the develop­ ment of the concept of a "dipolar God" (insofar as contrasting metaphysical predicates, e.g. relative/absolute, contingent/necessary, finite/infinite and so on, are affirmed as applicable to God although always in an eminent way). Inasmuch as he has elaborated this concept in close dialogue with classical theism, he also refers to it as "neo-classical". Because of the emphasis he places on the reality of change and becoming in his metaphysics (which regards God as the chief exemplification of metaphysical principles), the term 6 "process" has likewise been used to describe his notion of God.