Roger D. Congleton is the BB&T Professor of Economics at West Virginia University. He is coeditor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy , and has publishing well over a hundred fifty articles on public choice related topics in journals and academic books.Professor Congleton also served as president of the Public Choice Society from March 2018 through March 2020.Bernard Grofman is the Jack W. Peltason Chair of Democracy Studies and Professor of Political Science, University of California, IrvineStefan Voigt is professor of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg in Germany. He is best known for his research in constitutional political economy. Together with Roger Congleton, he is editor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy

The articles are written for serious readers, and they give clear and concise statements of the material they cover... the essays in this Handbook will provide wonderful insights into the present state of public choice.

• PART I: Introductory Essays 1. Rational Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research Program and Methodology of Public ChoiceRoger D. Congleton 2. Choosing among GovernmentsAlan Hamlin 3. Public Choice: Early ContributionsDennis C. Mueller PART II: VOTING AND ELECTIONS A. Modelling Collective Choice in Voting 4. From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow's TheoremDonald G. Saari 5. Institution-induced StabilityKenneth A. Shepsle 6. Voting PowerStefan Napel 7. Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting RulesShmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush B. Spatial Voting Models 8. Political Choices in One Dimension: TheoryBernard Grofman 9. Political Choices in One Dimension: ApplicationsBernard Grofman 10. Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two DimensionsJames F. Adams 11. Spatial Social ChoiceNorman Schofield C. Other Aspects of Voter and Party Choice 12. Economic VotingMichael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier 13. Valence PoliticsHaldun Evrenk 14. The Study of Strategic VotingAndré Blais and Arianna Degan 15. Turnout: Why do voters vote?Serguei Kaniovski 16. Expressive VotingAlan Hamlin and Colin Jennings 17. Altruism and Political ParticipationRichard Jankowski 18. Social Embeddedness and Rational TurnoutCarole Jean Uhlaner 19. Information cues and rational ignoranceShaun Bowler and Stephen P. Nicholson 20. ManipulationCharles R. Plott D. Democracy in Practice 21. Campaign FinanceThomas Stratmann 22. Primaries, conventions, and other methods for nominating candidates: How do they matter?Gilles Serra 23. Logrolling and CoalitionsAnthony J. McGann PART III: INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AND RENT SEEKING A. Interest Group Politics 24. Collective ActionJac C. Heckelman 25. Rent seeking: The social cost of contestable benefitsArye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long 26. The Structure of Contests and the Extent of DissipationKarl Wärneryd 27. The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent ExtractionRoger D. Congleton 28. Empirical evidence on rent seeking costsIgnacio Del Rosal B. Political Agency Problems and Trust in Government 29. 'The Bureaucracy' as an Interest GroupPatrick Dunleavy 30. Interest Groups and Regulatory CaptureWilliam F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas 31. CorruptionToke Aidt 32. The Political Economy of TrustChristian Bjørnskov C. Persuasion 33. Contested Political PersuasionStergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya 34. Stochastic Process Models of Preference ChangeMichel Regenwetter and Yung-Fong Hsu 35. Leadership as PersuasionBenjamin E. Hermalin PART IV: NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY: EVALUATING POLICIES AND POLITIES 36. Fairness ConceptsChristian Klamler 37. Social Contract vs. Invisible Hand: Agreeing to Solve Social DilemmasViktor J. Vanberg 38. Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State ActionNicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann 39. Public Choice and HappinessBruno Frey and Alois Stutzer 40. Kantianism and Political InstitutionsGeoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt 41. Public choice and libertarianismPeter J. Boettke and Ennio E. Piano 42. Public choice and social democracyPeter Kurrild-Klitgaard 43. Supreme Values, Totalitarianism and TerrorismPeter Bernholz 44. Fair Division in Dispute ResolutionSteven J. Brams 45. Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet MinistriesSteven J. Brams

Roger D. Congleton is the BB&T Professor of Economics at West Virginia University. He is coeditor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy , and has publishing well over a hundred fifty articles on public choice related topics in journals and academic books.Professor Congleton also served as president of the Public Choice Society from March 2018 through March 2020.Bernard Grofman is the Jack W. Peltason Chair of Democracy Studies and Professor of Political Science, University of California, IrvineStefan Voigt is professor of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg in Germany. He is best known for his research in constitutional political economy. Together with Roger Congleton, he is editor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy

The articles are written for serious readers, and they give clear and concise statements of the material they cover... the essays in this Handbook will provide wonderful insights into the present state of public choice.

• PART I: Introductory Essays 1. Rational Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research Program and Methodology of Public ChoiceRoger D. Congleton 2. Choosing among GovernmentsAlan Hamlin 3. Public Choice: Early ContributionsDennis C. Mueller PART II: VOTING AND ELECTIONS A. Modelling Collective Choice in Voting 4. From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow's TheoremDonald G. Saari 5. Institution-induced StabilityKenneth A. Shepsle 6. Voting PowerStefan Napel 7. Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting RulesShmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush B. Spatial Voting Models 8. Political Choices in One Dimension: TheoryBernard Grofman 9. Political Choices in One Dimension: ApplicationsBernard Grofman 10. Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two DimensionsJames F. Adams 11. Spatial Social ChoiceNorman Schofield C. Other Aspects of Voter and Party Choice 12. Economic VotingMichael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier 13. Valence PoliticsHaldun Evrenk 14. The Study of Strategic VotingAndré Blais and Arianna Degan 15. Turnout: Why do voters vote?Serguei Kaniovski 16. Expressive VotingAlan Hamlin and Colin Jennings 17. Altruism and Political ParticipationRichard Jankowski 18. Social Embeddedness and Rational TurnoutCarole Jean Uhlaner 19. Information cues and rational ignoranceShaun Bowler and Stephen P. Nicholson 20. ManipulationCharles R. Plott D. Democracy in Practice 21. Campaign FinanceThomas Stratmann 22. Primaries, conventions, and other methods for nominating candidates: How do they matter?Gilles Serra 23. Logrolling and CoalitionsAnthony J. McGann PART III: INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AND RENT SEEKING A. Interest Group Politics 24. Collective ActionJac C. Heckelman 25. Rent seeking: The social cost of contestable benefitsArye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long 26. The Structure of Contests and the Extent of DissipationKarl Wärneryd 27. The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent ExtractionRoger D. Congleton 28. Empirical evidence on rent seeking costsIgnacio Del Rosal B. Political Agency Problems and Trust in Government 29. 'The Bureaucracy' as an Interest GroupPatrick Dunleavy 30. Interest Groups and Regulatory CaptureWilliam F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas 31. CorruptionToke Aidt 32. The Political Economy of TrustChristian Bjørnskov C. Persuasion 33. Contested Political PersuasionStergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya 34. Stochastic Process Models of Preference ChangeMichel Regenwetter and Yung-Fong Hsu 35. Leadership as PersuasionBenjamin E. Hermalin PART IV: NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY: EVALUATING POLICIES AND POLITIES 36. Fairness ConceptsChristian Klamler 37. Social Contract vs. Invisible Hand: Agreeing to Solve Social DilemmasViktor J. Vanberg 38. Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State ActionNicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann 39. Public Choice and HappinessBruno Frey and Alois Stutzer 40. Kantianism and Political InstitutionsGeoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt 41. Public choice and libertarianismPeter J. Boettke and Ennio E. Piano 42. Public choice and social democracyPeter Kurrild-Klitgaard 43. Supreme Values, Totalitarianism and TerrorismPeter Bernholz 44. Fair Division in Dispute ResolutionSteven J. Brams 45. Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet MinistriesSteven J. Brams

Roger D. Congleton is the BB&T Professor of Economics at West Virginia University. He is coeditor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy , and has publishing well over a hundred fifty articles on public choice related topics in journals and academic books.Professor Congleton also served as president of the Public Choice Society from March 2018 through March 2020.Bernard Grofman is the Jack W. Peltason Chair of Democracy Studies and Professor of Political Science, University of California, IrvineStefan Voigt is professor of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg in Germany. He is best known for his research in constitutional political economy. Together with Roger Congleton, he is editor of the journal, Constitutional Political Economy

The articles are written for serious readers, and they give clear and concise statements of the material they cover... the essays in this Handbook will provide wonderful insights into the present state of public choice.

• PART I: Introductory Essays 1. Rational Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research Program and Methodology of Public ChoiceRoger D. Congleton 2. Choosing among GovernmentsAlan Hamlin 3. Public Choice: Early ContributionsDennis C. Mueller PART II: VOTING AND ELECTIONS A. Modelling Collective Choice in Voting 4. From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow's TheoremDonald G. Saari 5. Institution-induced StabilityKenneth A. Shepsle 6. Voting PowerStefan Napel 7. Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting RulesShmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush B. Spatial Voting Models 8. Political Choices in One Dimension: TheoryBernard Grofman 9. Political Choices in One Dimension: ApplicationsBernard Grofman 10. Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two DimensionsJames F. Adams 11. Spatial Social ChoiceNorman Schofield C. Other Aspects of Voter and Party Choice 12. Economic VotingMichael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier 13. Valence PoliticsHaldun Evrenk 14. The Study of Strategic VotingAndré Blais and Arianna Degan 15. Turnout: Why do voters vote?Serguei Kaniovski 16. Expressive VotingAlan Hamlin and Colin Jennings 17. Altruism and Political ParticipationRichard Jankowski 18. Social Embeddedness and Rational TurnoutCarole Jean Uhlaner 19. Information cues and rational ignoranceShaun Bowler and Stephen P. Nicholson 20. ManipulationCharles R. Plott D. Democracy in Practice 21. Campaign FinanceThomas Stratmann 22. Primaries, conventions, and other methods for nominating candidates: How do they matter?Gilles Serra 23. Logrolling and CoalitionsAnthony J. McGann PART III: INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AND RENT SEEKING A. Interest Group Politics 24. Collective ActionJac C. Heckelman 25. Rent seeking: The social cost of contestable benefitsArye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long 26. The Structure of Contests and the Extent of DissipationKarl Wärneryd 27. The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent ExtractionRoger D. Congleton 28. Empirical evidence on rent seeking costsIgnacio Del Rosal B. Political Agency Problems and Trust in Government 29. 'The Bureaucracy' as an Interest GroupPatrick Dunleavy 30. Interest Groups and Regulatory CaptureWilliam F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas 31. CorruptionToke Aidt 32. The Political Economy of TrustChristian Bjørnskov C. Persuasion 33. Contested Political PersuasionStergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya 34. Stochastic Process Models of Preference ChangeMichel Regenwetter and Yung-Fong Hsu 35. Leadership as PersuasionBenjamin E. Hermalin PART IV: NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY: EVALUATING POLICIES AND POLITIES 36. Fairness ConceptsChristian Klamler 37. Social Contract vs. Invisible Hand: Agreeing to Solve Social DilemmasViktor J. Vanberg 38. Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State ActionNicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann 39. Public Choice and HappinessBruno Frey and Alois Stutzer 40. Kantianism and Political InstitutionsGeoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt 41. Public choice and libertarianismPeter J. Boettke and Ennio E. Piano 42. Public choice and social democracyPeter Kurrild-Klitgaard 43. Supreme Values, Totalitarianism and TerrorismPeter Bernholz 44. Fair Division in Dispute ResolutionSteven J. Brams 45. Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet MinistriesSteven J. Brams