Epistemic Value

Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008).Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005. Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.

This impressive collection of essays exhibits the recent âvalue turnâ in epistemology.

• Introduction ; PART ONE: THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE ; 1. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge ; 2. Is There a Value Problem? ; 3. Testimony and the Value of Knowledge ; 4. The Value of Understanding ; 5. Ugly Analyses and Value ; 6. The Goods and the Motivation of Believing ; 7. Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge ; 8. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value ; 9. Luck, Knowledge, and Control ; PART TWO: TRUTH AND EPISTEMIC APPRAISAL ; 10. The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values ; 11. Epistemic Normativity ; 12. Curiosity and the Value of Truth ; 13. Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth ; APPENDIX: SYMPOSIUM ON JONATHAN KVANVIG'S THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE PURSUIT OF UNDERSTANDING ; 14. Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding ; 15. The Value Problem ; 16. Is Understanding Factive? ; 17. Understanding, Knowledge and the Meno Requirement ; 18. Responses to Critics