Duncan Pritchard – författare

What is knowledge? Where does it come from? What kinds of knowledge are there? Can we know anything at all? What is the practical relevance of learning about epistemology?This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology. Both traditional issues and contemporary ideas are discussed in 22 easily digestible chapters, each of which concludes with a useful summary of the main ideas discussed, study questions, annotated further reading, and a guide to internet resources.Each chapter also features text boxes providing bite-sized summaries of key concepts and major philosophers, and clear and interesting examples are used throughout. The book concludes with an annotated guide to general introductions to epistemology, a glossary of key terms, and a summary of the main examples used in epistemology. This is an ideal first textbook in the theory of knowledge for undergraduates coming to philosophy for the first time.This fifth edition has been revised throughout and features a new part devoted to social epistemology. In addition, the text as a whole has been refreshed to keep it up-to-date with current developments.

Throughout history scepticism and the urge to question accepted truths has been a powerful force for change and growth. Today, as we are bombarded by adverts, scientific studies praising the latest superfoods, and political rhetoric, a healthy amount of scepticism is widely encouraged. But when is such scepticism legitimate - for example, as a driver of new ideas - and when is it problematic? And what role might adopting a sceptical outlook play in leading an intellectually virtuous life?In this Very Short Introduction Duncan Pritchard explores both the advantages of scepticism, in challenging outdated notions, and also how it can have unhelpful social consequences, in generating distrust. He considers the role of scepticism at the source of contemporary social and political movements such as climate change denial, post-truth politics, and fake news. Pritchard also examines the philosophical arguments for a radical form of scepticism which maintains that knowledge is impossible, and explores some of the main responses to these arguments. Finally, he considers the part scepticism might play in applying better thinking and learning to achieve a more meaningful life. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

Duncan Pritchard offers an original defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). Such an account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. Pritchard's aim in Epistemological Disjunctivism is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and also to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were available on account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, he argues that epistemological disjunctivism offers a way through the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical scepticism.

One of the most important research programmes in contemporary cognitive science is that of extended cognition, whereby features of a subject's cognitive environment can in certain conditions become constituent parts of the cognitive process itself. The aim of this volume is to explore the epistemological ramifications of this idea. The volume brings together a range of distinguished and emerging academics, from a variety of different perspectives, to investigate the very idea of an extended epistemology. The first part of the volume explores foundational issues with regard to an extended epistemology, including from a critical perspective. The second part of the volume examines the applications of extended epistemology and the new theoretical directions that it might take us. These include its ethical ramifications, its import to the epistemology of education and emerging digital technologies, and how this idea might dovetail with certain themes in Chinese philosophy.

Socially Extended Epistemology explores the epistemological ramifications of one of the most important research programmes in contemporary cognitive science: distributed cognition. In certain conditions, according to this programme, groups of people can generate distributed cognitive systems that consist of all participating members. This volume brings together a range of distinguished and early career academics, from a variety of different perspectives, to investigate the very idea of socially extended epistemology. They ask, for example: can distributed cognitive systems generate knowledge in a similar way to individuals? And if so, how, if at all, does this kind of knowledge differ from normal, individual knowledge? The first part of the volume examines foundational issues, including from a critical perspective. The second part of the volume turns to applications of this idea, and the new theoretical directions that it might take us. These include the ethical ramifications of socially extended epistemology, its societal impact, and its import for emerging digital technologies.

This book offers a collective study of issues to do with experts and expertise, a topic of tremendous contemporary significance. The perspectives are philosophical but draw on relevant work from the sciences and social sciences. In addition, in keeping with other volumes in Oxford University Press's Engaging Philosophy series, many of the papers in the volume have an applied dimension, in that they examine the issues in practical settings. The questions discussed include the following: What is an expert? Who decides who the experts are? Should we always defer to experts? How should expertise inform public policy? What happens when the experts disagree? Must experts be unbiased? Should all experts be treated the same, or does it matter what the source of the expertise is? How should the testimony of experts be reported by the media? The chapters in the volume are organized into six sections: expertise and trust; situated and group expertise; expertise and public policy; expertise and virtue; expertise about value; and new directions. This volume will be of interest to scholars in such fields as philosophy, sociology, political theory, psychology, cognitive science, and bioethics. It will also be of relevance to policy-makers interested in the role that expertise plays in public policy.

One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know very much, or else that luck is compatible with knowledge after all. In this book, Duncan Pritchard argues that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer examination of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren't. Moreover, Pritchard shows that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between luck and knowledge can cast light on many of the most central topics in contemporary epistemology. These topics include: the externalism/internalism distinction; virtue epistemology; the problem of scepticism; metaepistemological scepticism; modal epistemology; and the problem of moral luck. All epistemologists will need to come to terms with Pritchard's original and incisive contribution.

Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.

One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know very much, or else that luck is compatible with knowledge after all. In this book, Duncan Pritchard argues that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer examination of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren't. Moreover, Pritchard shows that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between luck and knowledge can cast light on many of the most central topics in contemporary epistemology. These topics include: the externalism/internalism distinction; virtue epistemology; the problem of scepticism; metaepistemological scepticism; modal epistemology; and the problem of moral luck.All epistemologists will need to come to terms with Pritchard's original and incisive contribution.

Timothy Williamson's 2000 book Knowledge and Its Limits is perhaps the most important work of philosophy of the decade. Eighteen leading philosophers have now joined forces to give a critical assessment of ideas and arguments in this work, and the impact it has had on contemporary philosophy. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.

Timothy Williamson's 2000 book Knowledge and Its Limits is perhaps the most important work of philosophy of the decade. Eighteen leading philosophers have now joined forces to give a critical assessment of ideas and arguments in this work, and the impact it has had on contemporary philosophy. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.

Duncan Pritchard offers an original defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). Such an account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. Pritchard's aim in Epistemological Disjunctivism is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and also to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were available on account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, he argues that epistemological disjunctivism offers a way through the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical scepticism.

The idea of approaching epistemological concerns from a social perspective is relatively new. For much of its history the epistemological enterprise -- and arguably philosophy more generally -- has been cast along egocentric lines. Where a non-egocentric approach has been taken, as in the recent work of naturalist epistemologists, the focus has been on individuals interacting with their environment rather than on the significance of social interaction for an understanding of the nature and value of knowledge. The fifteen new essays presented in this volume aim to show the fertility and variety of social epistemology and to set the agenda for future research. They examine not only the well-established topic of testimony, but also newer topics such as disagreement, comprehension, the norm of trust, epistemic value, and the epistemology of silence. Several contributors discuss metaphilosophical issues to do with the nature of social epistemology and what it can contribute to epistemology more generally. Social Epistemology will be essential reading for anyone interested in this fast-growing area of philosophy.

This volume comprises three distinct investigations into the relationship between the nature and the value of knowledge. Each is written by one of the authors in consultation with the other two. 'Knowledge and Understanding' (by Duncan Pritchard) critically examines virtue-theoretic responses to the problem of the value of knowledge, and argues that the finally valuable cognitive state is not knowledge but understanding. 'Knowledge and Recognition' (by Alan Millar) develops an account of knowledge in which the idea of a recognitional ability plays a prominent role, and argues that this account enables us better to understand knowledge and its value. 'Knowledge and Action' (by Adrian Haddock) argues for an account of knowledge and justification which explains why knowledge is valuable, and enables us to make sense of the knowledge we have of our intentional actions.

This volume comprises three distinct investigations into the relationship between the nature and the value of knowledge. Each is written by one of the authors in consultation with the other two. 'Knowledge and Understanding' (by Duncan Pritchard) critically examines virtue-theoretic responses to the problem of the value of knowledge, and argues that the finally valuable cognitive state is not knowledge but understanding. 'Knowledge and Recognition' (by Alan Millar) develops an account of knowledge in which the idea of a recognitional ability plays a prominent role, and argues that this account enables us better to understand knowledge and its value. 'Knowledge and Action' (by Adrian Haddock) argues for an account of knowledge and justification which explains why knowledge is valuable, and enables us to make sense of the knowledge we have of our intentional actions.

Skepticism is one of the perennial problems of philosophy: from antiquity, to the early modern period of Descartes and Hume, and right through to the present day. It remains a fundamental and widely studied topic and, as Annalisa Coliva and Duncan Pritchard show in Skepticism, it presents us with a paradox with important ramifications not only for epistemology but also for many other core areas of philosophy.This book provides a thorough grounding in contemporary debates about skepticism, exploring the following key topics: the core skeptical arguments, with a particular focus on Cartesian and Humean radical skepticism the epistemic principles that are held to underlie skeptical arguments, such as the Closure and Underdetermination principlesthe content externalism of Putnam, Davidson, and Chalmers, and how it might help us respond to radical skepticism the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction and how it relates to the skeptical problematic contextualism in epistemology and its anti-skeptical import the various interpretations of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology the viability of epistemological disjunctivism, including whether it can be combined with hinge epistemology as part of a dual response to radical skepticism liberal and conservative responses to the Humean skeptical paradox. Both authors are prominent figures who work on skepticism, and so one novelty of the book is that it provides an insight into their own contrasting responses to this philosophical difficulty. With the addition of annotated further reading and a glossary, this is an ideal starting point for anyone studying the philosophy of skepticism, along with students of epistemology, metaphysics, and contemporary analytic philosophy.

Skepticism is one of the perennial problems of philosophy: from antiquity, to the early modern period of Descartes and Hume, and right through to the present day. It remains a fundamental and widely studied topic and, as Annalisa Coliva and Duncan Pritchard show in Skepticism, it presents us with a paradox with important ramifications not only for epistemology but also for many other core areas of philosophy.This book provides a thorough grounding in contemporary debates about skepticism, exploring the following key topics: the core skeptical arguments, with a particular focus on Cartesian and Humean radical skepticism the epistemic principles that are held to underlie skeptical arguments, such as the Closure and Underdetermination principlesthe content externalism of Putnam, Davidson, and Chalmers, and how it might help us respond to radical skepticism the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction and how it relates to the skeptical problematic contextualism in epistemology and its anti-skeptical import the various interpretations of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology the viability of epistemological disjunctivism, including whether it can be combined with hinge epistemology as part of a dual response to radical skepticism liberal and conservative responses to the Humean skeptical paradox. Both authors are prominent figures who work on skepticism, and so one novelty of the book is that it provides an insight into their own contrasting responses to this philosophical difficulty. With the addition of annotated further reading and a glossary, this is an ideal starting point for anyone studying the philosophy of skepticism, along with students of epistemology, metaphysics, and contemporary analytic philosophy.

This volume brings together new research on the topic of epistemic closure from both leading philosophers and emerging voices in epistemology. It connects epistemic closure principles to related themes in epistemology such as scepticism, dogmatism, evidentialism, epistemic logic, and modal epistemology. Epistemic closure is of central importance to contemporary epistemology, so much so that no epistemology is complete without an answer to the question of where it stands on the issue. The chapters in this book touch on the central themes of closure and transmission and argue for and against different closure and transmission principles. The contributors address issues such as whether knowledge and justification are closed under deductive entailment; whether scepticism can be properly contained by restricting closure principles; whether justification for a set of premises can fail to transmit across inference to a conclusion; Moore’s Paradox; and which theories of knowledge—contextualism, contrastivism, or relevant alternatives epistemology—emerge from denying closure.New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology.

This volume brings together new research on the topic of epistemic closure from both leading philosophers and emerging voices in epistemology. It connects epistemic closure principles to related themes in epistemology such as scepticism, dogmatism, evidentialism, epistemic logic, and modal epistemology. Epistemic closure is of central importance to contemporary epistemology, so much so that no epistemology is complete without an answer to the question of where it stands on the issue. The chapters in this book touch on the central themes of closure and transmission and argue for and against different closure and transmission principles. The contributors address issues such as whether knowledge and justification are closed under deductive entailment; whether scepticism can be properly contained by restricting closure principles; whether justification for a set of premises can fail to transmit across inference to a conclusion; Moore’s Paradox; and which theories of knowledge—contextualism, contrastivism, or relevant alternatives epistemology—emerge from denying closure.New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology.

What is knowledge? What are the sources of knowledge? What is the value of knowledge? What can we know? Arguing About Knowledge offers a fresh and engaging perspective on the theory of knowledge. This comprehensive and imaginative selection of readings examines the subject in an unorthodox and entertaining manner whilst covering the fundamentals of the theory of knowledge. It includes classic and contemporary pieces from the most influential philosophers from Descartes, Russell, Quine and G.E. Moore to Richard Feldman, Edward Craig, Gilbert Harman and Roderick Chisholm. In addition, students will find fascinating alternative pieces from literary and popular work such as Lewis Caroll, Jorges Luis Borges and Paul Boghossian. Each article selected is clear, interesting and free from unnecessary jargon. The editors provide lucid introductions to each section in which they give an overview of the debate and outline the arguments of the papers. Arguing About Knowledge is an inventive and stimulating reader for students new to the theory of knowledge.

What is knowledge? What are the sources of knowledge? What is the value of knowledge? What can we know? Arguing About Knowledge offers a fresh and engaging perspective on the theory of knowledge. This comprehensive and imaginative selection of readings examines the subject in an unorthodox and entertaining manner whilst covering the fundamentals of the theory of knowledge. It includes classic and contemporary pieces from the most influential philosophers from Descartes, Russell, Quine and G.E. Moore to Richard Feldman, Edward Craig, Gilbert Harman and Roderick Chisholm. In addition, students will find fascinating alternative pieces from literary and popular work such as Lewis Caroll, Jorges Luis Borges and Paul Boghossian. Each article selected is clear, interesting and free from unnecessary jargon. The editors provide lucid introductions to each section in which they give an overview of the debate and outline the arguments of the papers. Arguing About Knowledge is an inventive and stimulating reader for students new to the theory of knowledge.

Epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge, is at the core of many of the central debates and issues in philosophy, interrogating the notions of truth, objectivity, trust, belief and perception. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology provides a comprehensive and the up-to-date survey of epistemology, charting its history, providing a thorough account of its key thinkers and movements, and addressing enduring questions and contemporary research in the field. Organized thematically, the Companion is divided into ten sections: Foundational Issues, The Analysis of Knowledge, The Structure of Knowledge, Kinds of Knowledge, Skepticism, Responses to Skepticism, Knowledge and Knowledge Attributions, Formal Epistemology, The History of Epistemology, and Metaepistemological Issues. Seventy-eight chapters, each between 5000 and 7000 words and written by the world’s leading epistemologists, provide students with an outstanding and accessible guide to the field. Designed to fit the most comprehensive syllabus in the discipline, this text will be an indispensible resource for anyone interested in this central area of philosophy.The Routledge Companion to Epistemology is essential reading for students of philosophy.

What is this thing called Philosophy? is the definitive textbook for all who want a thorough introduction to the field. It introduces philosophy using a question-led approach that reflects the discursive nature of the discipline. Edited by Duncan Pritchard, each section is written by a high-profile contributor focusing on a key area of philosophy, and contains three or four question-based chapters offering an accessible point of engagement. The core areas of philosophy covered are: EthicsPolitical PhilosophyAestheticsEpistemologyPhilosophy of MindMetaphysicsPhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of ReligionThe Meaning of Life.The accompanying Routledge companion website features valuable online resources for both instructors and students including links to audio and video material, multiple-choice questions, interactive flashcards, essay questions and annotated further reading. This is the essential textbook for students approaching the study of philosophy for the first time.

What is this thing called Philosophy? is the definitive textbook for all who want a thorough introduction to the field. It introduces philosophy using a question-led approach that reflects the discursive nature of the discipline. Edited by Duncan Pritchard, each section is written by a high-profile contributor focusing on a key area of philosophy, and contains three or four question-based chapters offering an accessible point of engagement. The core areas of philosophy covered are: EthicsPolitical PhilosophyAestheticsEpistemologyPhilosophy of MindMetaphysicsPhilosophy of SciencePhilosophy of ReligionThe Meaning of Life.The accompanying Routledge companion website features valuable online resources for both instructors and students including links to audio and video material, multiple-choice questions, interactive flashcards, essay questions and annotated further reading. This is the essential textbook for students approaching the study of philosophy for the first time.

Epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge, is at the core of many of the central debates and issues in philosophy, interrogating the notions of truth, objectivity, trust, belief and perception. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology provides a comprehensive and the up-to-date survey of epistemology, charting its history, providing a thorough account of its key thinkers and movements, and addressing enduring questions and contemporary research in the field. Organized thematically, the Companion is divided into ten sections: Foundational Issues, The Analysis of Knowledge, The Structure of Knowledge, Kinds of Knowledge, Skepticism, Responses to Skepticism, Knowledge and Knowledge Attributions, Formal Epistemology, The History of Epistemology, and Metaepistemological Issues. Seventy-eight chapters, each between 5000 and 7000 words and written by the world’s leading epistemologists, provide students with an outstanding and accessible guide to the field. Designed to fit the most comprehensive syllabus in the discipline, this text will be an indispensible resource for anyone interested in this central area of philosophy.The Routledge Companion to Epistemology is essential reading for students of philosophy.

Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism--the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us. Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting. The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology.

Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism—the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology.

A leading philosopher explains how risk-taking can help us live authentic and flourishing livesWe take risks every day—perhaps not the extreme, dangling-off-the-side-of-a-mountain kind of risks, but risks nonetheless, in decisions about careers, marriage, children, moving house, and other matters. Tempting fate is simply what we have to do from time to time in life. But how we should go about tempting fate in a reasonable way? In this illuminating book, philosopher Duncan Pritchard explains why risk-taking, even extreme risk-taking, can sometimes be both reasonable and admirable, and how it can play a crucial role in living an authentic life.Using Alex Honnold’s famous free solo climb of El Capitan as a paradigm example of admirable risk-taking, Pritchard offers a completely new theory of risk, one that explains it in terms of fragility rather than probability. He shows how fragility can explain why skill and preparation are crucial to sensible risk-taking, even when the activity is unavoidably high risk. Fragility also makes clear that taking risks means riding one’s luck and why both risk and luck are vital to living an authentic and meaningful existence. Pritchard shows that his fragility theory of risk has practical implications for making sense of risk in law, arts, sports, and other domains. Tempting fate, in other words, is not merely thrill-seeking but essential for human flourishing.

An alphabetically arranged guide to all the major epistemological debates and positions.Epistemology A-Z introduces undergraduate and post-graduate students in philosophy (and epistemology in particular) to the main problems and positions in epistemology. It shows where these problems and positions connect and where they part thereby providing a valuable resource both for following connections between ideas and for appreciating the place of key figures and concepts in the subject. The book includes entries on some of the most important historical and contemporary contributors to the field. And all the entries are cross-referenced so that each item is placed within the context of the wider debate, resulting in a multi-layered treatment of all of the main epistemological positions and figures.Key features* Coverage of all major positions and figures;* Clear and concise entries;* All entries are cross-referenced.