Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He is the author (with Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010), and he recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008).Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. He is the author (with Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010) and Understanding People (Oxford University Press, 2004). He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005. Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh since 2007. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.

• Introduction ; Analytical Table of Contents ; 1. Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology ; 2. Testimony, Advocacy, Ignorance: Thinking Ecologically About Social Knowledge ; 3. Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time ; 4. On Saying that Someone Knows: Themes from Craig ; 5. The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist ; 6. From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism ; 7. Norms of Trust ; 8. Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension ; 9. Knowing From Being Told ; 10. Can A Priori Entitlement Be Preserved By Testimony? ; 11. The Assurance View of Testimony ; 12. The Epistemology of Silence ; 13. Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement ; 14. The Epistemology of Disagreement ; 15. A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance

Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He is the author (with Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010), and he recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008).Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. He is the author (with Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010) and Understanding People (Oxford University Press, 2004). He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005. Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh since 2007. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.

• Introduction ; Analytical Table of Contents ; 1. Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology ; 2. Testimony, Advocacy, Ignorance: Thinking Ecologically About Social Knowledge ; 3. Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time ; 4. On Saying that Someone Knows: Themes from Craig ; 5. The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist ; 6. From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism ; 7. Norms of Trust ; 8. Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension ; 9. Knowing From Being Told ; 10. Can A Priori Entitlement Be Preserved By Testimony? ; 11. The Assurance View of Testimony ; 12. The Epistemology of Silence ; 13. Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement ; 14. The Epistemology of Disagreement ; 15. A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance

Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He is the author (with Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010), and he recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008).Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. He is the author (with Adrian Haddock and Duncan Pritchard) of The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010) and Understanding People (Oxford University Press, 2004). He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005. Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh since 2007. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.

• Introduction ; Analytical Table of Contents ; 1. Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology ; 2. Testimony, Advocacy, Ignorance: Thinking Ecologically About Social Knowledge ; 3. Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time ; 4. On Saying that Someone Knows: Themes from Craig ; 5. The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist ; 6. From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism ; 7. Norms of Trust ; 8. Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension ; 9. Knowing From Being Told ; 10. Can A Priori Entitlement Be Preserved By Testimony? ; 11. The Assurance View of Testimony ; 12. The Epistemology of Silence ; 13. Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement ; 14. The Epistemology of Disagreement ; 15. A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance