Votes and Violence

Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India

AvSteven I. Wilkinson

Inbunden, Engelska, 2004

Del i serien Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

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Häftad

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Beskrivning

Why do ethnic riots break out when and where they do? Why do some governments try to prevent ethnic riots while others do nothing or even participate in the violence? In this book, Steven I. Wilkinson uses collected data on Hindu-Muslim riots, socio-economic factors and competitive politics in India to test his theory that riots are fomented in order to win elections and that governments decide whether to stop them or not based on the likely electoral cost of doing so. He finds that electoral factors account for most of the state-level variation in Hindu-Muslim riots: explaining for example why riots took place in Gujarat in 2002 but not in many other states where militants tried to foment violence. The general electoral theory he develops for India is extended to Ireland, Malaysia and Romania as Wilkinson shows that similar political factors motivate ethnic violence in many different countries.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2004-07-19
Mått:152 x 229 x 21 mm
Vikt:630 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Antal sidor:312
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521829168

Utforska kategorier

Val och folkomröstningar inom Samhälle och politik

Mer om författaren

Steven I. Wilkinson is Nilekani Professor of India and South Asia and Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Yale University. Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India was co-winner of the American Political Science Association's 2005 Woodrow Wilson Foundation prize. He is currently researching the links between colonial inheritances and post-independence levels of democracy, governance and conflict.

Recensioner i media

'In this important book, Wilkinson provides strong arguments against some prevailing theories concerning the causes of interethnic violence in competitive political regimes, including those that associate it with state strength or weakness, the presence or absence of consociational arrangements and practices, or 'civic engagement' through 'interethnic associations'. To the contrary, he provides persuasive evidence, from contemporary India and other parts of the world, that electoral calculations and governmental will are decisive factors in promoting or preventing interreligious and interethnic violence.' Paul R. Brass, Professor Emeritus of Political Science and South Asian Studies, University of Washington

Innehållsförteckning

List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgments; 1. The electoral incentives for ethnic violence; 2. Explaining town-level variation in Hindu-Muslim violence; 3. State capacity explanations for Hindu-Muslim violence; 4. The consociational explanation for Hindu-Muslim violence; 5. The electoral incentives for Hindu-Muslim violence; 6. Party competition and Hindu-Muslim violence; 7. The electoral incentives for ethnic violence in comparative perspective; 8. Democracy and ethnic violence; Appendices; References; Index.