Susan D. Hyde is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Yale University. She has been on observer missions for organizations in Afghanistan, Albania, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Venezuela. She is coeditor of Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Election Manipulation.

This book tackles an interesting puzzle: Why would pseudo-democrats invite international election observers and cheat in front of them if getting caught is costly? A norm has developed because of leaders' attempts to signal to the international community their democratic credentials, even if they are not really committed to democracy. Susan D Hyde establishes a strategic tension for pseudo-democrats that is straightforward and compelling, and she provides an impressive array of empirical evidence to support her claims: cross-national time-series data, within-country experimental evidence, and qualitative accounts from hundreds of observer reports. The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma is a must-read for those interested in elections and the development of norms.(Perspectives on Politics)

• Introduction1 Signaling Democracy and the Norm of Internationally Observed Elections2 Sovereign Leaders and the Decision to Invite Observers3 Democracy-Contingent Benefits4 Does Election Monitoring Matter?5 The Quality of Monitoring and Strategic ManipulationConclusion: Constrained Leaders and Changing International ExpectationsAppendicesA. Formalization of Signaling GameB. CodebookBibliographyIndex

Susan D. Hyde is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Yale University. She has been on observer missions for organizations in Afghanistan, Albania, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Venezuela. She is coeditor of Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Election Manipulation.

This book tackles an interesting puzzle: Why would pseudo-democrats invite international election observers and cheat in front of them if getting caught is costly? A norm has developed because of leaders' attempts to signal to the international community their democratic credentials, even if they are not really committed to democracy. Susan D Hyde establishes a strategic tension for pseudo-democrats that is straightforward and compelling, and she provides an impressive array of empirical evidence to support her claims: cross-national time-series data, within-country experimental evidence, and qualitative accounts from hundreds of observer reports. The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma is a must-read for those interested in elections and the development of norms.(Perspectives on Politics)

• Introduction1 Signaling Democracy and the Norm of Internationally Observed Elections2 Sovereign Leaders and the Decision to Invite Observers3 Democracy-Contingent Benefits4 Does Election Monitoring Matter?5 The Quality of Monitoring and Strategic ManipulationConclusion: Constrained Leaders and Changing International ExpectationsAppendicesA. Formalization of Signaling GameB. CodebookBibliographyIndex

Susan D. Hyde is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Yale University. She has been on observer missions for organizations in Afghanistan, Albania, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Venezuela. She is coeditor of Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Election Manipulation.

This book tackles an interesting puzzle: Why would pseudo-democrats invite international election observers and cheat in front of them if getting caught is costly? A norm has developed because of leaders' attempts to signal to the international community their democratic credentials, even if they are not really committed to democracy. Susan D Hyde establishes a strategic tension for pseudo-democrats that is straightforward and compelling, and she provides an impressive array of empirical evidence to support her claims: cross-national time-series data, within-country experimental evidence, and qualitative accounts from hundreds of observer reports. The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma is a must-read for those interested in elections and the development of norms.(Perspectives on Politics)

• Introduction1 Signaling Democracy and the Norm of Internationally Observed Elections2 Sovereign Leaders and the Decision to Invite Observers3 Democracy-Contingent Benefits4 Does Election Monitoring Matter?5 The Quality of Monitoring and Strategic ManipulationConclusion: Constrained Leaders and Changing International ExpectationsAppendicesA. Formalization of Signaling GameB. CodebookBibliographyIndex