'All past beliefs about nature have sooner or later turned out to be false. On the record, therefore, the probability that any currently proposed belief will fare better must be close to zero.' So wrote the historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn. A substantial number of contemporary philosophers agree with that pessimistic induction from the history of science. If true, the implications of that inductive argument are profound, suggesting that current so-called scientific knowledge is not what it purports to be - namely, an enduring understanding of our world. The Pessimistic Induction expressed in Kuhn's remark has been extensively discussed in the philosophy of science but heretofore without a synoptic critical examination. Drawing on both the history and the philosophy of science, this book presents a detailed exploration of the Pessimistic Induction and defends an optimistic, yet not necessarily realist, view of an important class of current scientific knowledge claims.
