Laura García-Portela is an assistant professor of philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Before that, she held postdoctoral positions at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT, Germany) and the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). She has also held visiting, research, and teaching positions at University of Valencia (Spain), Keele University (UK), and University of Washington (US). She graduated in summer 2021 from the Department of Philosophy and the Interdisciplinary Doctoral Program in Climate Change, University of Graz. Her dissertation was awarded the Luis Díez del Corral Prize from the Center of Political and Constitutional Studies in Spain (research centered attached to the Spanish Ministry of Presidency) and the Roland Atefie Preis from the Austrian Academy of Science. Her work lies at the intersection between political philosophy, philosophy of climate science, and philosophy of climate law and is published in numerous international journals.

• Introduction1 An international mechanism for loss and damage1.1 A brief history of loss and damage1.2 Contributing to an international mechanism for loss and damage1.3 The contested role of compensation in climate negotiations2 A terminological note3 Philosophical methodology3.1 General methodology: reflective equilibrium3.2 Climate justice specific methodology4. Assumptions and limitations4.1 The scope of justice: recipients and duty-bearers of climate justice4.2 Sufficientarianism: background theory of distributive justice5 Summary of chapters2 A minimal capabilities-based approach1 Life disruptions as harm and the minimal understanding of loss and damage2 A minimal capabilities-based account of loss and damage3 Answering some challenges to an ex post categorization of L&D4 Conceptual clarifications and types of reparation for loss and damage4.1 The notions of ‘loss’ and ‘damage’ in loss and damage4.2 Reparations for economic damage, non-economic losses, and non-economic damage5 Conclusion3 In search for a justified rectificatory justice principle1 Two objections against the polluter pays principle2 The beneficiary pays principle and some intuitive reactions to the objections3 The causation objection and the beneficiary pays principle4 The excusable ignorance objection and fairness considerations4.1 A fresh look at the excusable ignorance objection4.2 Fairness considerations, the beneficiary pays principle, and replies to some objections5 Conclusion4 Reasons awaiting satisfaction1 The continuity thesis and the continuity account2 The continuity account and some objections against the polluter pays principle3 Alternative accounts3.1 Strict liability3.2 Counterfactual liability3.3 Outcome responsibility4 Conclusion5 Climate harm and attribution science1 Attribution methods: the probabilistic and the storyline approach2 The reaction and criticism of the PEA community toward the storyline approach3 The storyline approach and the criticism of overstatement4 On how the probabilistic approach is affected by similar objections5 Conclusion6 Toward a rectificatory policy mechanism for loss and damage1 Toward an adequacy-for-purpose view for attribution methods2 An adequacy-for-purpose view for rectifying climate injustice3 Distributing liability and achieving rectificatory justice4 The political feasibility objection4.1 Introducing and exploring the feasibility concern4.2 Motivational and psychological aspects of the political feasibility objection5 ConclusionFinal conclusions

Laura García-Portela is an assistant professor of philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Before that, she held postdoctoral positions at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT, Germany) and the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). She has also held visiting, research, and teaching positions at University of Valencia (Spain), Keele University (UK), and University of Washington (US). She graduated in summer 2021 from the Department of Philosophy and the Interdisciplinary Doctoral Program in Climate Change, University of Graz. Her dissertation was awarded the Luis Díez del Corral Prize from the Center of Political and Constitutional Studies in Spain (research centered attached to the Spanish Ministry of Presidency) and the Roland Atefie Preis from the Austrian Academy of Science. Her work lies at the intersection between political philosophy, philosophy of climate science, and philosophy of climate law and is published in numerous international journals.

• Introduction1 An international mechanism for loss and damage1.1 A brief history of loss and damage1.2 Contributing to an international mechanism for loss and damage1.3 The contested role of compensation in climate negotiations2 A terminological note3 Philosophical methodology3.1 General methodology: reflective equilibrium3.2 Climate justice specific methodology4. Assumptions and limitations4.1 The scope of justice: recipients and duty-bearers of climate justice4.2 Sufficientarianism: background theory of distributive justice5 Summary of chapters2 A minimal capabilities-based approach1 Life disruptions as harm and the minimal understanding of loss and damage2 A minimal capabilities-based account of loss and damage3 Answering some challenges to an ex post categorization of L&D4 Conceptual clarifications and types of reparation for loss and damage4.1 The notions of ‘loss’ and ‘damage’ in loss and damage4.2 Reparations for economic damage, non-economic losses, and non-economic damage5 Conclusion3 In search for a justified rectificatory justice principle1 Two objections against the polluter pays principle2 The beneficiary pays principle and some intuitive reactions to the objections3 The causation objection and the beneficiary pays principle4 The excusable ignorance objection and fairness considerations4.1 A fresh look at the excusable ignorance objection4.2 Fairness considerations, the beneficiary pays principle, and replies to some objections5 Conclusion4 Reasons awaiting satisfaction1 The continuity thesis and the continuity account2 The continuity account and some objections against the polluter pays principle3 Alternative accounts3.1 Strict liability3.2 Counterfactual liability3.3 Outcome responsibility4 Conclusion5 Climate harm and attribution science1 Attribution methods: the probabilistic and the storyline approach2 The reaction and criticism of the PEA community toward the storyline approach3 The storyline approach and the criticism of overstatement4 On how the probabilistic approach is affected by similar objections5 Conclusion6 Toward a rectificatory policy mechanism for loss and damage1 Toward an adequacy-for-purpose view for attribution methods2 An adequacy-for-purpose view for rectifying climate injustice3 Distributing liability and achieving rectificatory justice4 The political feasibility objection4.1 Introducing and exploring the feasibility concern4.2 Motivational and psychological aspects of the political feasibility objection5 ConclusionFinal conclusions

Laura García-Portela is an assistant professor of philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Before that, she held postdoctoral positions at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT, Germany) and the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). She has also held visiting, research, and teaching positions at University of Valencia (Spain), Keele University (UK), and University of Washington (US). She graduated in summer 2021 from the Department of Philosophy and the Interdisciplinary Doctoral Program in Climate Change, University of Graz. Her dissertation was awarded the Luis Díez del Corral Prize from the Center of Political and Constitutional Studies in Spain (research centered attached to the Spanish Ministry of Presidency) and the Roland Atefie Preis from the Austrian Academy of Science. Her work lies at the intersection between political philosophy, philosophy of climate science, and philosophy of climate law and is published in numerous international journals.

• Introduction1 An international mechanism for loss and damage1.1 A brief history of loss and damage1.2 Contributing to an international mechanism for loss and damage1.3 The contested role of compensation in climate negotiations2 A terminological note3 Philosophical methodology3.1 General methodology: reflective equilibrium3.2 Climate justice specific methodology4. Assumptions and limitations4.1 The scope of justice: recipients and duty-bearers of climate justice4.2 Sufficientarianism: background theory of distributive justice5 Summary of chapters2 A minimal capabilities-based approach1 Life disruptions as harm and the minimal understanding of loss and damage2 A minimal capabilities-based account of loss and damage3 Answering some challenges to an ex post categorization of L&D4 Conceptual clarifications and types of reparation for loss and damage4.1 The notions of ‘loss’ and ‘damage’ in loss and damage4.2 Reparations for economic damage, non-economic losses, and non-economic damage5 Conclusion3 In search for a justified rectificatory justice principle1 Two objections against the polluter pays principle2 The beneficiary pays principle and some intuitive reactions to the objections3 The causation objection and the beneficiary pays principle4 The excusable ignorance objection and fairness considerations4.1 A fresh look at the excusable ignorance objection4.2 Fairness considerations, the beneficiary pays principle, and replies to some objections5 Conclusion4 Reasons awaiting satisfaction1 The continuity thesis and the continuity account2 The continuity account and some objections against the polluter pays principle3 Alternative accounts3.1 Strict liability3.2 Counterfactual liability3.3 Outcome responsibility4 Conclusion5 Climate harm and attribution science1 Attribution methods: the probabilistic and the storyline approach2 The reaction and criticism of the PEA community toward the storyline approach3 The storyline approach and the criticism of overstatement4 On how the probabilistic approach is affected by similar objections5 Conclusion6 Toward a rectificatory policy mechanism for loss and damage1 Toward an adequacy-for-purpose view for attribution methods2 An adequacy-for-purpose view for rectifying climate injustice3 Distributing liability and achieving rectificatory justice4 The political feasibility objection4.1 Introducing and exploring the feasibility concern4.2 Motivational and psychological aspects of the political feasibility objection5 ConclusionFinal conclusions