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    1. Ekonomi och Ledarskap
    2. Nationalekonomi

    Arbitrage and Rational Decisions

    AvRobert Nau

    Inbunden, Engelska, 2025

    Del i serien Chapman and Hall/CRC Financial Mathematics Series

    1 467 kr

    Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar. Fri frakt över 249 kr.

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    E-bok

    1 660 kr

    E-bok

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    Beskrivning

    This unique book offers a unified approach to the modeling of rational decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and strategic and competitive interactions among agents. Its most elementary axiom of rationality is the principle of no-arbitrage, namely that neither an individual decision maker nor a small group of strategic competitors nor a large group of market participants should behave in such a way as to provide a riskless profit opportunity to an outside observer.Both those who work in the finance area and those who work in decision theory more broadly will be interested to find that basic tools from finance (arbitrage pricing and risk-neutral probabilities) have broader applications, including the modeling of uncertainty aversion, inseparable beliefs and tastes, nonexpected utility, ambiguity, and noncooperative games.The book emphasizes the use of money (rather than varieties of utility) in the quantification of rational economic thought. It provides not only a medium of exchange and an objective to maximize but also a language for cognition, interpersonal expression of preferences, aggregation of beliefs, and construction of common knowledge in terms of precise numbers. At the same time it provides an obvious standard of economic rationality that applies equally to individuals and groups: don’t throw it away or allow your pocket to be picked. The modeling issues that arise here provide some perspective on issues that arise in quantitative modeling of decisions in which objects of choice are less concrete or higher-dimensional or more personal in nature.One of the book’s key contributions is to show how noncooperative game theory can be directly unified with Bayesian decision theory and financial market theory without introducing separate assumptions about strategic rationality. The no-arbitrage standard of rationality leads straight to the conclusion that correlated equilibrium rather than Nash equilibrium is the fundamental solution concept, and risk-neutral probabilities come into play when agents are uncertainty-averse.The book also provides some history of developments in the field over the last century, emphasizing universal themes as well as controversies and paradigm shifts. It is written to be accessible to advanced undergraduates, graduate students, researchers in the field, and professionals.

    Produktinformation

    • Utgivningsdatum:2025-01-31
    • Mått:174 x 246 x 29 mm
    • Vikt:680 g
    • Format:Inbunden
    • Språk:Engelska
    • Serie:Chapman and Hall/CRC Financial Mathematics Series
    • Antal sidor:328
    • Förlag:Taylor & Francis Ltd
    • ISBN:9781032863511

    Utforska kategorier

    • Nationalekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap
    • Optimering inom Naturvetenskap och teknik
    • Matematisk statistik inom Naturvetenskap och teknik

    Mer om författaren

    Robert Nau is a Professor Emeritus of Business Administration in the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He received his Ph.D. in Operations Research from the University of California at Berkeley. His research deals with mathematical models of decision-making under uncertainty, and his papers have been published in journals such as Operations Research, Management Science, Annals of Statistics, Journal of Economic Theory, and the International Journal of Game Theory. Throughout his career he taught a Ph.D. course on rational choice theory that drew students from other departments and schools at Duke University, as well as graduate courses in decision modeling and statistical forecasting.

    Innehållsförteckning

    • 1 Introduction1.1 Social physics1.2 The importance of having money1.3 The impossibility of measuring beliefs1.4 Risk-neutral probabilities1.5 No-arbitrage as common knowledge of rationality1.6 A road map of the book2 Preference axioms, fixed points, and separating hyperplanes2.1 The axiomatization of probability and utility2.2 The independence axiom2.3 The difficulty of measuring utility2.4 The fixed point theorem2.5 The separating hyperplane theorem2.6 Primal/dual linear programs to search for arbitrage opportunities2.7 No-arbitrage and the fundamental theorems of rational choice3 Subjective probability3.1 Elicitation of beliefs3.2 A 3-state example of probability assessment3.3 The fundamental theorem of subjective probability3.4 Bayes’ theorem and (not) learning over time3.5 Incomplete preferences and imprecise probabilities3.6 Continuous probability distributions3.7 Prelude to game theory: no-ex-post-arbitrage and zero probabilities4 Expected utility4.1 Elicitation of tastes4.2 The fundamental theorem of expected utility4.3 Continuous payoff distributions and measurement of risk aversion4.4 The fundamental theorem of utilitarianism (social aggregation)5 Subjective expected utility5.1 Joint elicitation of beliefs and tastes5.2 The fundamental theorem of subjective expected utility5.3 (In)separability of beliefs and tastes (state-dependent utility)5.4 Incomplete preferences with state-dependent utilities5.5 Representation by sets of probability/utility pairs6 State-preference theory, risk aversion, and risk-neutral probabilities6.1 The state-preference framework for choice under uncertainty6.2 Examples of utility functions for risk-averse agents6.3 The fundamental theorem of state-preference theory6.4 Risk-neutral probabilities and their matrix of derivatives6.5 The risk aversion matrix6.6 A generalized risk premium measure6.7 Risk-neutral probabilities and the Slutsky matrix7 Ambiguity and source-dependent risk aversion7.1 Introduction7.2 Ellsberg’s paradox and smooth non-expected-utility preferences7.3 Source-dependent utility revealed by risk-neutral probabilities7.4 A 3x3 example of a two-source model7.5 The second-order-uncertainty smooth model7.6 Discussion7.7 Some history of non-expected-utility8 Noncooperative games8.1 Introduction8.2 Solution of a 1-player game by no-arbitrage8.3 Solution of a 2-player game by no-arbitrage8.4 Games of coordination: chicken, battle of the sexes, and stag hunt8.5 An overview of correlated equilibrium and its properties8.6 The fundamental theorem of noncooperative games8.7 Examples of Nash and correlated equilibria8.8 Correlated equilibrium vsNash equilibrium and rationalizability8.9 Risk aversion and risk-neutral equilibria8.10 Playing a new game8.11 Games of incomplete information8.12 Discussion9 Asset pricing9.1 Introduction9.2 Risk-neutral probabilities and the fundamental theorem9.3 The multivariate normal/exponential/quadratic model9.4 Market aggregation of means and covariances9.5 The subjective capital asset pricing model (CAPM)10 Summary of the fundamental theorems and models10.1 Perspectives on the foundations of rational choice theory10.2 Axioms for preferences and acceptable bets10.3 Subjective probability theory10.4 Expected utility theory10.5 Subjective expected utility theory10.6 State-preference theory and risk-neutral probabilities10.7 Source-dependent utility and ambiguity aversion10.8 Noncooperative game theory10.9 Asset pricing theory11 Linear programming models for seeking arbitrage opportunities11.1 LP models for arbitrage in subjective probability theory11.2 LP model for for arbitrage in expected utility theory11.3 LP model for for arbitrage in subjective expected utility theory11.4 LP model for ex-post-arbitrage and correlated equilibria in games11.5 LP model for arbitrage in asset pricing theory12 Selected proofsBibliographyIndex