M. R. Bennett is Professor of Neuroscience, University Chair and Scientific Director of the Brain and Mind Research Institute at the University of Sydney. He is the author of many papers and books on neuroscience as well as the history and philosophy of neuroscience, including The Idea of Consciousness (1997) and A History of the Synapse (2001). He is past President of the International Society for Autonomic Neuroscience, past President of the Australian Neuroscience Society, as well as the recipient of numerous awards for his research, including the Neuroscience Medal, the Ramaciotti Medal, the Macfarlane Burnet Medal and the Order of Australia. P. M. S. Hacker is an Emeritus Research Fellow of St John’s College, Oxford, UK. He is the author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of the mind and philosophy of language, and is the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Among his many publications is the four-volume Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, and its epilogue, Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. His most recent work is Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, the first volume of a trilogy on human nature.Together, M. R. Bennet and P. M. S. Hacker have authored the acclaimed Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003).

Select Guide Rating

• List of figures xiiList of plates xviForeword by Sir Anthony Kenny (President of the British Academy, 1989–93) xviiAcknowledgements xxIntroduction 11. Perceptions, Sensations and Cortical Function: Helmholtz to Singer 41.1 Visual Illusions and their Interpretation by Cognitive Scientists 41.1.1 Misdescription of visual illusions by cognitive scientists 91.2 Gestalt Laws of Vision 101.3 Split-Brain Commissurotomy; the Two Hemispheres may Operate Independently 111.3.1 Misdescription of the results of commissurotomy 131.3.2 Explaining the discoveries derived from commissurotomies 131.4 Specificity of Cortical Neurons 151.4.1 Cardinal cells 181.4.2 Misdescription of experiments leading to the conception of cardinal cells 201.5 Multiple Pathways Connecting Visual Cortical Modules 221.6 Mental Images and Representations 261.6.1 Misconceptions about images and representations 281.7 What and Where Pathways in Object Recognition and Maps 301.8 Misuse of the Term ‘Maps’ 311.9 The Binding Problem and 40 Hz Oscillations 321.9.1 Misconceptions concerning the existence of a binding problem 371.9.2 On the appropriate interpretation of synchronicity of neuronal firing in visual cortex 381.10 Images and Imagining 391.10.1 Misconceptions concerning images and imagining 412. Attention, Awareness and Cortical Function: Helmholtz to Raichle 442.1 The Concept of Attention 442.2 The Psychophysics of Attention 462.3 Neuroscience of Attention 552.3.1 Attention and arousal 562.3.2 Selective attention 582.4 Attention Related to Brain Structures 602.4.1 Superior colliculus 602.4.2 Parietal cortex 672.4.3 Visual cortex 712.4.4 Auditory cortex 722.5 Conclusion 743. Memory and Cortical Function: Milner to Kandel 773.1 Memory 773.1.1 The hippocampus is required for memory, which decays at two different rates 773.1.2 Memory is of two kinds: declarative and non-declarative 773.1.3 Cellular and molecular studies of non-declarative memory in invertebrates 803.1.4 Declarative memory and the hippocampus 823.1.5 Long-term potentiation (LTP) of synaptic transmission in the hippocampus 843.1.6 Cellular and molecular mechanisms of declarative memory in the hippocampus 933.1.7 Summary 943.2 Memory and Knowledge 963.2.1 Memory 993.2.2 Memory and storage 1033.3 The Contribution of Neuroscience to Understanding Memory 1134. Language and Cortical Function: Wernicke to Levelt 1154.1 Introduction: Psycholinguistics and the Neuroanatomy of Language 1154.2 The Theory of Wernicke/Lichtheim 1204.2.1 Introduction: Wernicke 1204.2.1.1 Images of sensations 1214.2.1.2 Movement images 1224.2.1.3 Voluntary movement 1234.2.1.4 Sound images and language 1254.2.1.5 Language acquisition, words and concepts 1264.2.2 Lichtheim’s concept centre 1284.2.3 Concepts and representations 1294.2.4 Conclusion 1304.3 The Mental Dictionary and its Units: Treisman 1304.4 The Modular Study of Word Recognition and Reading Aloud: Morton 1324.4.1 The model system 1324.4.2 The cognitive system 1354.4.3 Thought units 1404.4.4 Computational studies 1414.5 The Modular Study of Fluent Speech: Levelt 1414.5.1 The model study 1414.5.2 Development of the model system 1454.6 The Functional Neuroanatomy of Language Comprehension 1474.6.1 Attention to visual compared with semantic aspects of words 1474.6.2 Auditory compared with visual presentation of words 1494.6.3 Attention to the semantic as compared to the syntactic aspect of a sentence 1494.7 The Functional Neuroanatomy of Speech 1524.7.1 Speech 1524.7.2 Spoken action words and colour words 1534.7.3 Naming animals and tools 1544.7.4 Speaking with strings of words compared with single words 1584.7.5 Word repetition 1614.8 The Functional Neuroanatomy that Underpins Psycholinguistic Accounts of Language 1625. Emotion and Cortical-Subcortical Function: Darwin to Damasio 1645.1 Introduction 1645.2 Darwin 1675.3 Cognitive versus Precognitive Theories for the Expression of Emotions 1695.3.1 On physiological measurements of emotional responses 1735.3.2 Involvement of the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex in the emotional responses to faces 1745.4 The Amygdala 1745.4.1 Faces expressing different emotions and the amygdala: PET and fMRI 1745.4.2 Behavioural studies involving face recognition following damage to the amygdala 1795.4.3 Fear conditioning and the amygdala 1815.4.4 Is cognitive appraisal an important ingredient in emotional experience? LeDoux’s interpretations of his experiments on the amygdala 1815.4.5 ‘Fear’ is unrepresentative of the emotions 1825.5 The Orbitofrontal Cortex 1835.5.1 Behavioural studies involving face recognition following damage to the orbitofrontal cortex 1835.5.2 The orbitofrontal cortex and face recognition: PET and fMRI 1835.5.3 The orbitofrontal cortex and the satisfying of appetites: Rolls’s interpretation of his experiments on the orbitofrontal cortex 1865.5.4 Misconceptions about emotions and appetites 1875.6 Neural Networks: Amygdala and Orbitofrontal Cortex in Vision 1875.6.1 Amygdala 1875.6.2 Orbitofrontal cortex 1905.7 The Origins of Emotional Experience 1915.7.1 The claims of LeDoux 1915.7.2 The claims of Rolls 1935.7.3 The claims of Damasio, following James 1935.7.4 Misconceptions concerning the somatic marker hypothesis of James/Damasio 1946. Motor Action and Cortical-Spinal Cord Function: Galen to Broca and Sherrington 1996.1 The Ventricular Doctrine, from Galen to Descartes 1996.1.1 Galen: motor and sensory centres 1996.1.2 Galen: the functional localization of the rational soul in the anterior ventricles 2016.1.3 Nemesius: the attribution of all mental functions to the ventricles 2016.1.4 One thousand years of the ventricular doctrine 2036.1.5 Fernel: the origins of neurophysiology 2066.1.6 Descartes 2086.2 The Cortical Doctrine: from Willis to du Petit 2146.2.1 Thomas Willis: the origins of psychological functions in the cortex 2146.2.2 The cortex 100 years after Willis 2166.3 The Spinal Soul, the Spinal Sensorium Commune, and the Idea of a Reflex 2196.3.1 The spinal cord can operate independently of the enkephalon 2196.3.2 Bell and Magendie: the identification of sensory and motor spinal nerves 2226.3.3 Marshall Hall: isolating sensation from sense-reaction in the spinal cord 2236.3.4 Elaboration of the conception of the ‘true spinal marrow’ 2256.3.5 Implications of the conception of a reflex for the function of the cortex 2276.4 The Localization of Function in the Cortex 2276.4.1 Broca: the cortical area for language 2276.4.2 Fritsch and Hitzig: the motor cortex 2276.4.3 Electrical phenomena in the cortex support the idea of a motor cortex 2316.5 Charles Scott Sherrington: the Integrative Action of Synapses in the Spinal Cord and Cortex 2316.5.1 Integrative action in the spinal cord 2316.5.2 The motor cortex 2367. Conceptual Presuppositions of Cognitive Neuroscience 2377.1 Conceptual Elucidation 2377.2 Two Paradigms: Aristotle and Descartes 2407.3 Aristotle’s Principle and the Mereological Fallacy 2417.4 Is the Mereological Fallacy Really Mereological? 2437.5 The Rationale of the Mereological Principle 2457.5.1 Consciousness 2457.5.2 Knowledge 2467.5.3 Perception 2477.6 The Location of Psychological Attributes 2507.7 Linguistic Anthropology, Auto-anthropology, Metaphor and Extending Usage 2537.8 Qualia 2607.9 Enskulled Brains 2627.10 Cognitive Neuroscience 262References 264Index 281

M. R. Bennett is Professor of Neuroscience, University Chair and Scientific Director of the Brain and Mind Research Institute at the University of Sydney. He is the author of many papers and books on neuroscience as well as the history and philosophy of neuroscience, including The Idea of Consciousness (1997) and A History of the Synapse (2001). He is past President of the International Society for Autonomic Neuroscience, past President of the Australian Neuroscience Society, as well as the recipient of numerous awards for his research, including the Neuroscience Medal, the Ramaciotti Medal, the Macfarlane Burnet Medal and the Order of Australia. P. M. S. Hacker is an Emeritus Research Fellow of St John’s College, Oxford, UK. He is the author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of the mind and philosophy of language, and is the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Among his many publications is the four-volume Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, and its epilogue, Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. His most recent work is Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, the first volume of a trilogy on human nature.Together, M. R. Bennet and P. M. S. Hacker have authored the acclaimed Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003).

Select Guide Rating

• List of figures xiiList of plates xviForeword by Sir Anthony Kenny (President of the British Academy, 1989–93) xviiAcknowledgements xxIntroduction 11. Perceptions, Sensations and Cortical Function: Helmholtz to Singer 41.1 Visual Illusions and their Interpretation by Cognitive Scientists 41.1.1 Misdescription of visual illusions by cognitive scientists 91.2 Gestalt Laws of Vision 101.3 Split-Brain Commissurotomy; the Two Hemispheres may Operate Independently 111.3.1 Misdescription of the results of commissurotomy 131.3.2 Explaining the discoveries derived from commissurotomies 131.4 Specificity of Cortical Neurons 151.4.1 Cardinal cells 181.4.2 Misdescription of experiments leading to the conception of cardinal cells 201.5 Multiple Pathways Connecting Visual Cortical Modules 221.6 Mental Images and Representations 261.6.1 Misconceptions about images and representations 281.7 What and Where Pathways in Object Recognition and Maps 301.8 Misuse of the Term ‘Maps’ 311.9 The Binding Problem and 40 Hz Oscillations 321.9.1 Misconceptions concerning the existence of a binding problem 371.9.2 On the appropriate interpretation of synchronicity of neuronal firing in visual cortex 381.10 Images and Imagining 391.10.1 Misconceptions concerning images and imagining 412. Attention, Awareness and Cortical Function: Helmholtz to Raichle 442.1 The Concept of Attention 442.2 The Psychophysics of Attention 462.3 Neuroscience of Attention 552.3.1 Attention and arousal 562.3.2 Selective attention 582.4 Attention Related to Brain Structures 602.4.1 Superior colliculus 602.4.2 Parietal cortex 672.4.3 Visual cortex 712.4.4 Auditory cortex 722.5 Conclusion 743. Memory and Cortical Function: Milner to Kandel 773.1 Memory 773.1.1 The hippocampus is required for memory, which decays at two different rates 773.1.2 Memory is of two kinds: declarative and non-declarative 773.1.3 Cellular and molecular studies of non-declarative memory in invertebrates 803.1.4 Declarative memory and the hippocampus 823.1.5 Long-term potentiation (LTP) of synaptic transmission in the hippocampus 843.1.6 Cellular and molecular mechanisms of declarative memory in the hippocampus 933.1.7 Summary 943.2 Memory and Knowledge 963.2.1 Memory 993.2.2 Memory and storage 1033.3 The Contribution of Neuroscience to Understanding Memory 1134. Language and Cortical Function: Wernicke to Levelt 1154.1 Introduction: Psycholinguistics and the Neuroanatomy of Language 1154.2 The Theory of Wernicke/Lichtheim 1204.2.1 Introduction: Wernicke 1204.2.1.1 Images of sensations 1214.2.1.2 Movement images 1224.2.1.3 Voluntary movement 1234.2.1.4 Sound images and language 1254.2.1.5 Language acquisition, words and concepts 1264.2.2 Lichtheim’s concept centre 1284.2.3 Concepts and representations 1294.2.4 Conclusion 1304.3 The Mental Dictionary and its Units: Treisman 1304.4 The Modular Study of Word Recognition and Reading Aloud: Morton 1324.4.1 The model system 1324.4.2 The cognitive system 1354.4.3 Thought units 1404.4.4 Computational studies 1414.5 The Modular Study of Fluent Speech: Levelt 1414.5.1 The model study 1414.5.2 Development of the model system 1454.6 The Functional Neuroanatomy of Language Comprehension 1474.6.1 Attention to visual compared with semantic aspects of words 1474.6.2 Auditory compared with visual presentation of words 1494.6.3 Attention to the semantic as compared to the syntactic aspect of a sentence 1494.7 The Functional Neuroanatomy of Speech 1524.7.1 Speech 1524.7.2 Spoken action words and colour words 1534.7.3 Naming animals and tools 1544.7.4 Speaking with strings of words compared with single words 1584.7.5 Word repetition 1614.8 The Functional Neuroanatomy that Underpins Psycholinguistic Accounts of Language 1625. Emotion and Cortical-Subcortical Function: Darwin to Damasio 1645.1 Introduction 1645.2 Darwin 1675.3 Cognitive versus Precognitive Theories for the Expression of Emotions 1695.3.1 On physiological measurements of emotional responses 1735.3.2 Involvement of the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex in the emotional responses to faces 1745.4 The Amygdala 1745.4.1 Faces expressing different emotions and the amygdala: PET and fMRI 1745.4.2 Behavioural studies involving face recognition following damage to the amygdala 1795.4.3 Fear conditioning and the amygdala 1815.4.4 Is cognitive appraisal an important ingredient in emotional experience? LeDoux’s interpretations of his experiments on the amygdala 1815.4.5 ‘Fear’ is unrepresentative of the emotions 1825.5 The Orbitofrontal Cortex 1835.5.1 Behavioural studies involving face recognition following damage to the orbitofrontal cortex 1835.5.2 The orbitofrontal cortex and face recognition: PET and fMRI 1835.5.3 The orbitofrontal cortex and the satisfying of appetites: Rolls’s interpretation of his experiments on the orbitofrontal cortex 1865.5.4 Misconceptions about emotions and appetites 1875.6 Neural Networks: Amygdala and Orbitofrontal Cortex in Vision 1875.6.1 Amygdala 1875.6.2 Orbitofrontal cortex 1905.7 The Origins of Emotional Experience 1915.7.1 The claims of LeDoux 1915.7.2 The claims of Rolls 1935.7.3 The claims of Damasio, following James 1935.7.4 Misconceptions concerning the somatic marker hypothesis of James/Damasio 1946. Motor Action and Cortical-Spinal Cord Function: Galen to Broca and Sherrington 1996.1 The Ventricular Doctrine, from Galen to Descartes 1996.1.1 Galen: motor and sensory centres 1996.1.2 Galen: the functional localization of the rational soul in the anterior ventricles 2016.1.3 Nemesius: the attribution of all mental functions to the ventricles 2016.1.4 One thousand years of the ventricular doctrine 2036.1.5 Fernel: the origins of neurophysiology 2066.1.6 Descartes 2086.2 The Cortical Doctrine: from Willis to du Petit 2146.2.1 Thomas Willis: the origins of psychological functions in the cortex 2146.2.2 The cortex 100 years after Willis 2166.3 The Spinal Soul, the Spinal Sensorium Commune, and the Idea of a Reflex 2196.3.1 The spinal cord can operate independently of the enkephalon 2196.3.2 Bell and Magendie: the identification of sensory and motor spinal nerves 2226.3.3 Marshall Hall: isolating sensation from sense-reaction in the spinal cord 2236.3.4 Elaboration of the conception of the ‘true spinal marrow’ 2256.3.5 Implications of the conception of a reflex for the function of the cortex 2276.4 The Localization of Function in the Cortex 2276.4.1 Broca: the cortical area for language 2276.4.2 Fritsch and Hitzig: the motor cortex 2276.4.3 Electrical phenomena in the cortex support the idea of a motor cortex 2316.5 Charles Scott Sherrington: the Integrative Action of Synapses in the Spinal Cord and Cortex 2316.5.1 Integrative action in the spinal cord 2316.5.2 The motor cortex 2367. Conceptual Presuppositions of Cognitive Neuroscience 2377.1 Conceptual Elucidation 2377.2 Two Paradigms: Aristotle and Descartes 2407.3 Aristotle’s Principle and the Mereological Fallacy 2417.4 Is the Mereological Fallacy Really Mereological? 2437.5 The Rationale of the Mereological Principle 2457.5.1 Consciousness 2457.5.2 Knowledge 2467.5.3 Perception 2477.6 The Location of Psychological Attributes 2507.7 Linguistic Anthropology, Auto-anthropology, Metaphor and Extending Usage 2537.8 Qualia 2607.9 Enskulled Brains 2627.10 Cognitive Neuroscience 262References 264Index 281

M. R. Bennett is Professor of Neuroscience, University Chair and Scientific Director of the Brain and Mind Research Institute at the University of Sydney. He is the author of many papers and books on neuroscience as well as the history and philosophy of neuroscience, including The Idea of Consciousness (1997) and A History of the Synapse (2001). He is past President of the International Society for Autonomic Neuroscience, past President of the Australian Neuroscience Society, as well as the recipient of numerous awards for his research, including the Neuroscience Medal, the Ramaciotti Medal, the Macfarlane Burnet Medal and the Order of Australia. P. M. S. Hacker is an Emeritus Research Fellow of St John’s College, Oxford, UK. He is the author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of the mind and philosophy of language, and is the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Among his many publications is the four-volume Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, and its epilogue, Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. His most recent work is Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, the first volume of a trilogy on human nature.Together, M. R. Bennet and P. M. S. Hacker have authored the acclaimed Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003).

Select Guide Rating

• List of figures xiiList of plates xviForeword by Sir Anthony Kenny (President of the British Academy, 1989–93) xviiAcknowledgements xxIntroduction 11. Perceptions, Sensations and Cortical Function: Helmholtz to Singer 41.1 Visual Illusions and their Interpretation by Cognitive Scientists 41.1.1 Misdescription of visual illusions by cognitive scientists 91.2 Gestalt Laws of Vision 101.3 Split-Brain Commissurotomy; the Two Hemispheres may Operate Independently 111.3.1 Misdescription of the results of commissurotomy 131.3.2 Explaining the discoveries derived from commissurotomies 131.4 Specificity of Cortical Neurons 151.4.1 Cardinal cells 181.4.2 Misdescription of experiments leading to the conception of cardinal cells 201.5 Multiple Pathways Connecting Visual Cortical Modules 221.6 Mental Images and Representations 261.6.1 Misconceptions about images and representations 281.7 What and Where Pathways in Object Recognition and Maps 301.8 Misuse of the Term ‘Maps’ 311.9 The Binding Problem and 40 Hz Oscillations 321.9.1 Misconceptions concerning the existence of a binding problem 371.9.2 On the appropriate interpretation of synchronicity of neuronal firing in visual cortex 381.10 Images and Imagining 391.10.1 Misconceptions concerning images and imagining 412. Attention, Awareness and Cortical Function: Helmholtz to Raichle 442.1 The Concept of Attention 442.2 The Psychophysics of Attention 462.3 Neuroscience of Attention 552.3.1 Attention and arousal 562.3.2 Selective attention 582.4 Attention Related to Brain Structures 602.4.1 Superior colliculus 602.4.2 Parietal cortex 672.4.3 Visual cortex 712.4.4 Auditory cortex 722.5 Conclusion 743. Memory and Cortical Function: Milner to Kandel 773.1 Memory 773.1.1 The hippocampus is required for memory, which decays at two different rates 773.1.2 Memory is of two kinds: declarative and non-declarative 773.1.3 Cellular and molecular studies of non-declarative memory in invertebrates 803.1.4 Declarative memory and the hippocampus 823.1.5 Long-term potentiation (LTP) of synaptic transmission in the hippocampus 843.1.6 Cellular and molecular mechanisms of declarative memory in the hippocampus 933.1.7 Summary 943.2 Memory and Knowledge 963.2.1 Memory 993.2.2 Memory and storage 1033.3 The Contribution of Neuroscience to Understanding Memory 1134. Language and Cortical Function: Wernicke to Levelt 1154.1 Introduction: Psycholinguistics and the Neuroanatomy of Language 1154.2 The Theory of Wernicke/Lichtheim 1204.2.1 Introduction: Wernicke 1204.2.1.1 Images of sensations 1214.2.1.2 Movement images 1224.2.1.3 Voluntary movement 1234.2.1.4 Sound images and language 1254.2.1.5 Language acquisition, words and concepts 1264.2.2 Lichtheim’s concept centre 1284.2.3 Concepts and representations 1294.2.4 Conclusion 1304.3 The Mental Dictionary and its Units: Treisman 1304.4 The Modular Study of Word Recognition and Reading Aloud: Morton 1324.4.1 The model system 1324.4.2 The cognitive system 1354.4.3 Thought units 1404.4.4 Computational studies 1414.5 The Modular Study of Fluent Speech: Levelt 1414.5.1 The model study 1414.5.2 Development of the model system 1454.6 The Functional Neuroanatomy of Language Comprehension 1474.6.1 Attention to visual compared with semantic aspects of words 1474.6.2 Auditory compared with visual presentation of words 1494.6.3 Attention to the semantic as compared to the syntactic aspect of a sentence 1494.7 The Functional Neuroanatomy of Speech 1524.7.1 Speech 1524.7.2 Spoken action words and colour words 1534.7.3 Naming animals and tools 1544.7.4 Speaking with strings of words compared with single words 1584.7.5 Word repetition 1614.8 The Functional Neuroanatomy that Underpins Psycholinguistic Accounts of Language 1625. Emotion and Cortical-Subcortical Function: Darwin to Damasio 1645.1 Introduction 1645.2 Darwin 1675.3 Cognitive versus Precognitive Theories for the Expression of Emotions 1695.3.1 On physiological measurements of emotional responses 1735.3.2 Involvement of the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex in the emotional responses to faces 1745.4 The Amygdala 1745.4.1 Faces expressing different emotions and the amygdala: PET and fMRI 1745.4.2 Behavioural studies involving face recognition following damage to the amygdala 1795.4.3 Fear conditioning and the amygdala 1815.4.4 Is cognitive appraisal an important ingredient in emotional experience? LeDoux’s interpretations of his experiments on the amygdala 1815.4.5 ‘Fear’ is unrepresentative of the emotions 1825.5 The Orbitofrontal Cortex 1835.5.1 Behavioural studies involving face recognition following damage to the orbitofrontal cortex 1835.5.2 The orbitofrontal cortex and face recognition: PET and fMRI 1835.5.3 The orbitofrontal cortex and the satisfying of appetites: Rolls’s interpretation of his experiments on the orbitofrontal cortex 1865.5.4 Misconceptions about emotions and appetites 1875.6 Neural Networks: Amygdala and Orbitofrontal Cortex in Vision 1875.6.1 Amygdala 1875.6.2 Orbitofrontal cortex 1905.7 The Origins of Emotional Experience 1915.7.1 The claims of LeDoux 1915.7.2 The claims of Rolls 1935.7.3 The claims of Damasio, following James 1935.7.4 Misconceptions concerning the somatic marker hypothesis of James/Damasio 1946. Motor Action and Cortical-Spinal Cord Function: Galen to Broca and Sherrington 1996.1 The Ventricular Doctrine, from Galen to Descartes 1996.1.1 Galen: motor and sensory centres 1996.1.2 Galen: the functional localization of the rational soul in the anterior ventricles 2016.1.3 Nemesius: the attribution of all mental functions to the ventricles 2016.1.4 One thousand years of the ventricular doctrine 2036.1.5 Fernel: the origins of neurophysiology 2066.1.6 Descartes 2086.2 The Cortical Doctrine: from Willis to du Petit 2146.2.1 Thomas Willis: the origins of psychological functions in the cortex 2146.2.2 The cortex 100 years after Willis 2166.3 The Spinal Soul, the Spinal Sensorium Commune, and the Idea of a Reflex 2196.3.1 The spinal cord can operate independently of the enkephalon 2196.3.2 Bell and Magendie: the identification of sensory and motor spinal nerves 2226.3.3 Marshall Hall: isolating sensation from sense-reaction in the spinal cord 2236.3.4 Elaboration of the conception of the ‘true spinal marrow’ 2256.3.5 Implications of the conception of a reflex for the function of the cortex 2276.4 The Localization of Function in the Cortex 2276.4.1 Broca: the cortical area for language 2276.4.2 Fritsch and Hitzig: the motor cortex 2276.4.3 Electrical phenomena in the cortex support the idea of a motor cortex 2316.5 Charles Scott Sherrington: the Integrative Action of Synapses in the Spinal Cord and Cortex 2316.5.1 Integrative action in the spinal cord 2316.5.2 The motor cortex 2367. Conceptual Presuppositions of Cognitive Neuroscience 2377.1 Conceptual Elucidation 2377.2 Two Paradigms: Aristotle and Descartes 2407.3 Aristotle’s Principle and the Mereological Fallacy 2417.4 Is the Mereological Fallacy Really Mereological? 2437.5 The Rationale of the Mereological Principle 2457.5.1 Consciousness 2457.5.2 Knowledge 2467.5.3 Perception 2477.6 The Location of Psychological Attributes 2507.7 Linguistic Anthropology, Auto-anthropology, Metaphor and Extending Usage 2537.8 Qualia 2607.9 Enskulled Brains 2627.10 Cognitive Neuroscience 262References 264Index 281