This book is an important and innovative addition to textbooks in game theory. It provides a detailed discourse on the extension of two of the world's most prominent cooperative game solutions - the seminal Shapley value in games with transferrable payoffs and the classic Nash bargaining scheme in games with non-transferrable payoffs - to a dynamic framework. The extension of these two classic cooperative solution concepts into a dynamic setting is not just of theoretical interest, but also allows many real-life cooperation situations - like global environmental management, nuclear disarmament, disease control, trade disputes and political unions - to be analyzed in an effective way. This book provides: (i) A compendium of dynamic optimization techniques used in its analysis; (ii) a detailed disquisition on cooperative dynamic consistency; (iii) the extension of the Shapley Value to a dynamic framework; (iv) the establishment of a dynamic Nash bargaining paradigm; and (v) the incorporation of stochastic elements into the analyses. Interesting solvable examples are provided to illustrate the practicality and applicability of the dynamic Shapley value and dynamic Nash bargaining scheme in dynamic cooperation.
