Edited by Luis C. Corchón, Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain and Marco A. Marini, Department of Social and Economic Sciences, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy

'With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. Corchon and Marini have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had and still continues to have on the field of industrial organization over the recent years. Any serious researcher willing to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider to study the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.'--David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France'The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.'--From the foreword by Eric Maskin'Game theoretic methods are central in the study of oligopoly markets. The surveys in this Handbook provide a broad introduction to the relevant game theory topics and their applications in oligopoly theory. There is an emphasis on recent developments, such as lattice theory and supermodular games. The Handbook will be a valuable resource for researchers and students.'--Robert Porter, Northwestern University, US

• Contents:Foreword by Eric Maskin1. IntroductionLuis C. Corchón and Marco A. MariniPART I BASIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2. Strategic complementarities in oligopolyXavier Vives 3. On the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies and the theory of supermodular gamesRabah Amir4. Aggregative gamesMartin Kaae Jensen 5. Monopolistic competition without apologyJacques-François Thisse and Philip Ushchev 6. Oligopoly and product differentiationJean J. Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola7. Oligopolistic competition and welfareRobert A. Ritz PART II DYNAMIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8. Dynamic gamesKlaus Ritzberger 9. Strategic refinementsCarlos Pimienta10. Stackelberg gamesLudovic A. Julien11. Entry games and free entry equilibriaMichele Polo 12. Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive playersGian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi PART III GAMES OF COLLUSION IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION13. Coalitions and networks in oligopoliesFrancis Bloch 14. TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperationJingang ZhaoPART IV INFORMATION GAMES15. Trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative implicationsAndrea Attar and Claude d’Aspremont 16. Moral hazard: Base models and two extensionsInés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez‐Castrillo17. Learning in marketsAmparo Urbano18. Information sharing in oligopolySergio Currarini and Francesco FeriIndex

Edited by Luis C. Corchón, Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain and Marco A. Marini, Department of Social and Economic Sciences, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy

'With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. Corchon and Marini have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had and still continues to have on the field of industrial organization over the recent years. Any serious researcher willing to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider to study the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.'--David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France'The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.'--From the foreword by Eric Maskin'Game theoretic methods are central in the study of oligopoly markets. The surveys in this Handbook provide a broad introduction to the relevant game theory topics and their applications in oligopoly theory. There is an emphasis on recent developments, such as lattice theory and supermodular games. The Handbook will be a valuable resource for researchers and students.'--Robert Porter, Northwestern University, US

• Contents:Foreword by Eric Maskin1. IntroductionLuis C. Corchón and Marco A. MariniPART I BASIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2. Strategic complementarities in oligopolyXavier Vives 3. On the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies and the theory of supermodular gamesRabah Amir4. Aggregative gamesMartin Kaae Jensen 5. Monopolistic competition without apologyJacques-François Thisse and Philip Ushchev 6. Oligopoly and product differentiationJean J. Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola7. Oligopolistic competition and welfareRobert A. Ritz PART II DYNAMIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8. Dynamic gamesKlaus Ritzberger 9. Strategic refinementsCarlos Pimienta10. Stackelberg gamesLudovic A. Julien11. Entry games and free entry equilibriaMichele Polo 12. Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive playersGian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi PART III GAMES OF COLLUSION IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION13. Coalitions and networks in oligopoliesFrancis Bloch 14. TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperationJingang ZhaoPART IV INFORMATION GAMES15. Trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative implicationsAndrea Attar and Claude d’Aspremont 16. Moral hazard: Base models and two extensionsInés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez‐Castrillo17. Learning in marketsAmparo Urbano18. Information sharing in oligopolySergio Currarini and Francesco FeriIndex

Edited by Luis C. Corchón, Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain and Marco A. Marini, Department of Social and Economic Sciences, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy

'With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. Corchon and Marini have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had and still continues to have on the field of industrial organization over the recent years. Any serious researcher willing to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider to study the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.'--David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France'The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.'--From the foreword by Eric Maskin'Game theoretic methods are central in the study of oligopoly markets. The surveys in this Handbook provide a broad introduction to the relevant game theory topics and their applications in oligopoly theory. There is an emphasis on recent developments, such as lattice theory and supermodular games. The Handbook will be a valuable resource for researchers and students.'--Robert Porter, Northwestern University, US

• Contents:Foreword by Eric Maskin1. IntroductionLuis C. Corchón and Marco A. MariniPART I BASIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2. Strategic complementarities in oligopolyXavier Vives 3. On the Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies and the theory of supermodular gamesRabah Amir4. Aggregative gamesMartin Kaae Jensen 5. Monopolistic competition without apologyJacques-François Thisse and Philip Ushchev 6. Oligopoly and product differentiationJean J. Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola7. Oligopolistic competition and welfareRobert A. Ritz PART II DYNAMIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8. Dynamic gamesKlaus Ritzberger 9. Strategic refinementsCarlos Pimienta10. Stackelberg gamesLudovic A. Julien11. Entry games and free entry equilibriaMichele Polo 12. Evolutionary oligopoly games with heterogeneous adaptive playersGian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Davide Radi PART III GAMES OF COLLUSION IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION13. Coalitions and networks in oligopoliesFrancis Bloch 14. TU oligopoly games and industrial cooperationJingang ZhaoPART IV INFORMATION GAMES15. Trading under asymmetric information: positive and normative implicationsAndrea Attar and Claude d’Aspremont 16. Moral hazard: Base models and two extensionsInés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez‐Castrillo17. Learning in marketsAmparo Urbano18. Information sharing in oligopolySergio Currarini and Francesco FeriIndex