Wittgenstein Rehinged

AvAnnalisa Coliva

Häftad, Engelska, 2024

Del i serien Anthem Studies in Wittgenstein

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Beskrivning

This volume brings together thirteen papers on hinge epistemology written by Annalisa Coliva and published after her influential monographs Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (2010), Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology (2015). By mixing together Wittgenstein scholarship and systematic philosophy, they illuminate the significance of hinge epistemology for current debates on skepticism, relativism, realism and anti-realism, as well as alethic pluralism, and envision its possible extension to the epistemology of logic. Along the way, other varieties of hinge epistemology, such as Moyal-Sharrock’s, Pritchard’s, Williams’ and Wright’s, are considered, both with respect to Wittgenstein scholarship and in their own right.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2024-04-16
Mått:153 x 229 x 26 mm
Vikt:454 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Anthem Studies in Wittgenstein
Antal sidor:214
Förlag:Anthem Press
ISBN:9781839992469

Utforska kategorier

Filosofi inom Filosofi och religion
Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Mer om författaren

Annalisa Coliva is Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine.

Recensioner i media

“Over the last decade, the topic of hinge epistemology has become central to many key debates in epistemology. Annalisa Coliva’s work has played a seminal role in this welcome development. This timely book brings together the pioneering articles of Coliva on the interrelated topics of Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology, scepticism, relativism, and anti-realism. The book is essential reading both for those interested in the latest developments in epistemology and readers who wish to have a more in depth understanding of Wittgenstein and his last work, On Certainty.” — Maria Baghramian, School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Ireland.

Innehållsförteckning

Introduction; Acknowledgements; Credits; Part I In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology, Chapter One, Which Hinge Epistemology?; Chapter Two, Which Hinge Epistemology between Animal, Biscopic, and Constitutivist?; Chapter Three, “I Know,” “I Know,” “I Know”: Hinge Epistemology, Invariantism, and Skepticism; Chapter Four, Propositional and Doxastic Hinge Assumptions; Chapter Five, Are There Mathematical Hinges?; Part II Hinge Epistemology, Anti-Realism, and Relativism, Chapter Six, What Anti-realism About Hinges Could Possibly Be; Chapter Seven, Relativism and Hinge Epistemology; Chapter Eight, Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?; Chapter Nine, Rituals, Philosophy, Science, and Progress: Wittgenstein on Frazer; Bibliography; Author Index; Subject Index