Roman Frigg is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, Director of the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), and Co-Director of the Centre for the Analysis of Time Series (CATS) at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is the winner of the Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Award of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. He is a permanent visiting professor in the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, and he held visiting appointments in the Rotman Institute of Philosophy of the University of Western Ontario, the Descartes Centre for the History and Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities of the University of Utrecht, the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science of the University of Sydney, and the Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science of the University of Barcelona. He was associate editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, member of the steering committee of the European Philosophy of Science Association, and currently serves on a number of editorial and advisory boards.He holds a PhD in Philosophy from the University of London and masters degrees both in theoretical physics and philosophy from the University of Basel, Switzerland. His research interests lie in general philosophy of science and philosophy of physics, and he has published papers on climate change, quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, randomness, chaos, complexity, probability, scientific realism, computer simulations, modelling, scientific representation, reductionism, confirmation, and the relation between art and science. His current work focuses on predictability and climate change, the foundation of statistical mechanics, and the nature of scientific models and theories.James Nguyen is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the History and Philosophy of Science Program at the University of Notre Dame and a Research Associate of the CPNSS at the LSE. He holds a PhD in Philosophy from the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, also at the LSE, as well as a masters degree from King’s College London and an undergraduate degree from the University of Cambridge. His research interests lie in the general philosophy of science and its intersections with the philosophy of the specific sciences and other areas of philosophy. He has published papers on scientific modeling, scientific representation, the ontology of scientific models, the structure of scientific theories, the relationship between art and science, the applicability of mathematics, and the rationality of theory choice. His current work focuses on developing a comprehensive philosophical account of model based science.

“It addresses the fundamental question of scientific inquiries and provides an in-depth investigation of scientific representation via models. The text should profoundly and intellectually stimulate the interest of philosophers, researchers, and even policy-makers concerned about what and how models tell them about the world around us.” (David Han, Mathematical Reviews, January, 2022)

• Preface.- Introduction.- 1. Problems Concerning Scientific Representation.- 2. General Griceanism and Stipulative Fiat.- 3. The Similarity View.- 4. The Structuralist View.- 5. The Inferential View.- 6. The Fiction View of Models.- 7. Representation-As.- 8. The DEKI Account.- 9. DEKI Goes Forth.

Roman Frigg is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, Director of the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), and Co-Director of the Centre for the Analysis of Time Series (CATS) at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is the winner of the Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Award of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. He is a permanent visiting professor in the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, and he held visiting appointments in the Rotman Institute of Philosophy of the University of Western Ontario, the Descartes Centre for the History and Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities of the University of Utrecht, the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science of the University of Sydney, and the Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science of the University of Barcelona. He was associate editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, member of the steering committee of the European Philosophy of Science Association, and currently serves on a number of editorial and advisory boards.He holds a PhD in Philosophy from the University of London and masters degrees both in theoretical physics and philosophy from the University of Basel, Switzerland. His research interests lie in general philosophy of science and philosophy of physics, and he has published papers on climate change, quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, randomness, chaos, complexity, probability, scientific realism, computer simulations, modelling, scientific representation, reductionism, confirmation, and the relation between art and science. His current work focuses on predictability and climate change, the foundation of statistical mechanics, and the nature of scientific models and theories.James Nguyen is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the History and Philosophy of Science Program at the University of Notre Dame and a Research Associate of the CPNSS at the LSE. He holds a PhD in Philosophy from the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, also at the LSE, as well as a masters degree from King’s College London and an undergraduate degree from the University of Cambridge. His research interests lie in the general philosophy of science and its intersections with the philosophy of the specific sciences and other areas of philosophy. He has published papers on scientific modeling, scientific representation, the ontology of scientific models, the structure of scientific theories, the relationship between art and science, the applicability of mathematics, and the rationality of theory choice. His current work focuses on developing a comprehensive philosophical account of model based science.

“It addresses the fundamental question of scientific inquiries and provides an in-depth investigation of scientific representation via models. The text should profoundly and intellectually stimulate the interest of philosophers, researchers, and even policy-makers concerned about what and how models tell them about the world around us.” (David Han, Mathematical Reviews, January, 2022)

• Preface.- Introduction.- 1. Problems Concerning Scientific Representation.- 2. General Griceanism and Stipulative Fiat.- 3. The Similarity View.- 4. The Structuralist View.- 5. The Inferential View.- 6. The Fiction View of Models.- 7. Representation-As.- 8. The DEKI Account.- 9. DEKI Goes Forth.

Roman Frigg is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, Director of the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), and Co-Director of the Centre for the Analysis of Time Series (CATS) at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is the winner of the Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Award of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. He is a permanent visiting professor in the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, and he held visiting appointments in the Rotman Institute of Philosophy of the University of Western Ontario, the Descartes Centre for the History and Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities of the University of Utrecht, the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science of the University of Sydney, and the Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of Science of the University of Barcelona. He was associate editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, member of the steering committee of the European Philosophy of Science Association, and currently serves on a number of editorial and advisory boards.He holds a PhD in Philosophy from the University of London and masters degrees both in theoretical physics and philosophy from the University of Basel, Switzerland. His research interests lie in general philosophy of science and philosophy of physics, and he has published papers on climate change, quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, randomness, chaos, complexity, probability, scientific realism, computer simulations, modelling, scientific representation, reductionism, confirmation, and the relation between art and science. His current work focuses on predictability and climate change, the foundation of statistical mechanics, and the nature of scientific models and theories.James Nguyen is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the History and Philosophy of Science Program at the University of Notre Dame and a Research Associate of the CPNSS at the LSE. He holds a PhD in Philosophy from the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, also at the LSE, as well as a masters degree from King’s College London and an undergraduate degree from the University of Cambridge. His research interests lie in the general philosophy of science and its intersections with the philosophy of the specific sciences and other areas of philosophy. He has published papers on scientific modeling, scientific representation, the ontology of scientific models, the structure of scientific theories, the relationship between art and science, the applicability of mathematics, and the rationality of theory choice. His current work focuses on developing a comprehensive philosophical account of model based science.

“It addresses the fundamental question of scientific inquiries and provides an in-depth investigation of scientific representation via models. The text should profoundly and intellectually stimulate the interest of philosophers, researchers, and even policy-makers concerned about what and how models tell them about the world around us.” (David Han, Mathematical Reviews, January, 2022)

• Preface.- Introduction.- 1. Problems Concerning Scientific Representation.- 2. General Griceanism and Stipulative Fiat.- 3. The Similarity View.- 4. The Structuralist View.- 5. The Inferential View.- 6. The Fiction View of Models.- 7. Representation-As.- 8. The DEKI Account.- 9. DEKI Goes Forth.