Bálint Magyar is Research Fellow at CEU Democracy Institute, working on the subject of patronalism in post-communist countries.He was a member of the Hungarian Parliament (1990-2010). As a Minister of Education (1996-1998; 2002-2006) he initiated and carried out reforms in public and higher education.Bálint Madlovics (*1993) is a political scientist and economist. He is a junior research fellow at the CEU Democracy Institute. He holds MA in Political Science (2018) from Central European University in Budapest, and BA in Applied Economics (2016) from Corvinus University of Budapest.

"This thought-provoking and comprehensive volume comes at a propitious time. Thirty years following the Soviet Union’s collapse, it asks fundamental questions about the nature of the post-communist transition, the quality of governance in the post-Soviet world (and beyond), and the sources of regime variation. With the benefit of hindsight, Bálint Magyar and Bálint Madlovics reflect on an extensive literature in a context of some abject democratic failure and increasingly consolidated corrupt networks in select countries, alongside more positive evelopments, including, variously, sustained economic growth (including in China—a perhaps surprising case for inclusion in the study) and/or increased freedoms in particular regions. For such an extensive investigation, the authors do an admirable job of sustaining the argument. Like all great studies, this one tries to answer some key questions while also provoking pressing new ones."

• List of Tables and FiguresAcknowledgmentsReader’s Manual for QR Codes and Online Supplementary MaterialPreface by Alena LedenevaIntroductionTrapped in the Language of DemocratizationThe Inadequacy of Existing Models for the Post-Communist RegionThe Multi-Dimensional Analytical Framework: Spanning Conceptual SpacesHow It is Made: The Construction of a Conceptual ToolkitHow to Look at It: The Framework as a Structural ConstructionHow to Read It: A Textbook with Original ContributionsHow It Unfolds: Outline of the Content1. Stubborn Structures1.1. Guide to the Chapter1.2. Thesis A: Regime Type Depends on the Separation of Spheres of Social Action1.3. Thesis B: The Separation of Spheres Followed Civilizational Boundaries1.3.1. Civilizations and the Three Historical Regions1.3.2. The Basic Structure of Unseparated Spheres in a Feudal Framework1.4. Thesis C: Communist Dictatorships Arrested and Reversed the Separation of Spheres1.4.1. The Basic Structure of Merged Spheres in Communist Dictatorships1.4.2. The Effect of Communism on the Separation of Spheres in Different Regions1.5. Thesis D: Democratization Did Not Change the Separation of Spheres1.5.1. The Basic Structure of Unseparated Spheres in a Democratic Framework1.5.2. Single-Pyramid and Multi-Pyramid Systems: The Determinants of Democratization in the Three Historical Regions1.6. Beyond Hybridology: A Triangular Conceptual Space of Regimes2. State2.1. Guide to the Chapter2.2. General Definitions: The Basic Concepts of the Framework2.2.1. Regime, State, Violence, and Coercion2.2.2. Elite, Ruling Elite, Patronalism, and Informality2.3. The Dominant Principle of State Functioning2.3.1. Societal Interest, Elite Interest, and Ideology Implementation2.3.2. States in Democracies and Dictatorships: from Constitutional State to Party State and from Night-Watchman State through Welfare State to Developmental State2.4. Conceptualization of States Running on Elite Interest2.4.1. Interpretative Layers: What is the Nature of the Ruling Elite?2.4.2. Interpretative Layers: What is the Action Targeting State Institutions?2.4.3. Interpretative Layers: What is the Action Targeting Property?2.4.4. Interpretative Layers: What is the Legal Status of Elite-Interested Action?2.4.5. Combining Layers of Different Dimensions: Defining the Mafia State2.4.6. Constitutional State vs. Mafia State: Normativity and Discretionality2.5. Challenges to the Monopoly of Violence2.5.1. State Failure, Violent Entrepreneurs, and Oligarchic Anarchy2.5.2. The Legitimate Use of Violence: A Typology2.5.3. Sub-Sovereign Mafia States2.6. The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand: A Comparative Framework for State Types3. Actors3.1. Guide to the Chapter3.2. The Three Spheres of Social Action3.3. Political Actors in the Three Polar Type Regimes3.3.1. President/Prime Minister—Chief Patron—General Party Secretary3.3.2. Cabinet—Patron’s Court—Politburo3.3.3. Politician—Poligarch / Political Front Man—High Level Party Cadre3.3.4. Trustee – Patron’s Hand (Smotryashchiy)—Middle/Low Level Party Cadre3.3.5. Civil Servant—Patronal Servant—Administrative Cadre (Apparatchik)3.3.6. State’s Secret Service—Patron’s Secret Service—Party’s Secret Service3.3.7. Democratic Party (Politicians’ Party)—Patron’s Party (Vassals’ Party)— Centralized Party (Cadres’ Party)3.3.8. Governing Party—Transmission-Belt Party – State Party3.3.9. Opposition Party—Marginalized / Domesticated / Absorbed / ....

Bálint Magyar is Research Fellow at CEU Democracy Institute, working on the subject of patronalism in post-communist countries.He was a member of the Hungarian Parliament (1990-2010). As a Minister of Education (1996-1998; 2002-2006) he initiated and carried out reforms in public and higher education.Bálint Madlovics (*1993) is a political scientist and economist. He is a junior research fellow at the CEU Democracy Institute. He holds MA in Political Science (2018) from Central European University in Budapest, and BA in Applied Economics (2016) from Corvinus University of Budapest.

"This thought-provoking and comprehensive volume comes at a propitious time. Thirty years following the Soviet Union’s collapse, it asks fundamental questions about the nature of the post-communist transition, the quality of governance in the post-Soviet world (and beyond), and the sources of regime variation. With the benefit of hindsight, Bálint Magyar and Bálint Madlovics reflect on an extensive literature in a context of some abject democratic failure and increasingly consolidated corrupt networks in select countries, alongside more positive evelopments, including, variously, sustained economic growth (including in China—a perhaps surprising case for inclusion in the study) and/or increased freedoms in particular regions. For such an extensive investigation, the authors do an admirable job of sustaining the argument. Like all great studies, this one tries to answer some key questions while also provoking pressing new ones."

• List of Tables and FiguresAcknowledgmentsReader’s Manual for QR Codes and Online Supplementary MaterialPreface by Alena LedenevaIntroductionTrapped in the Language of DemocratizationThe Inadequacy of Existing Models for the Post-Communist RegionThe Multi-Dimensional Analytical Framework: Spanning Conceptual SpacesHow It is Made: The Construction of a Conceptual ToolkitHow to Look at It: The Framework as a Structural ConstructionHow to Read It: A Textbook with Original ContributionsHow It Unfolds: Outline of the Content1. Stubborn Structures1.1. Guide to the Chapter1.2. Thesis A: Regime Type Depends on the Separation of Spheres of Social Action1.3. Thesis B: The Separation of Spheres Followed Civilizational Boundaries1.3.1. Civilizations and the Three Historical Regions1.3.2. The Basic Structure of Unseparated Spheres in a Feudal Framework1.4. Thesis C: Communist Dictatorships Arrested and Reversed the Separation of Spheres1.4.1. The Basic Structure of Merged Spheres in Communist Dictatorships1.4.2. The Effect of Communism on the Separation of Spheres in Different Regions1.5. Thesis D: Democratization Did Not Change the Separation of Spheres1.5.1. The Basic Structure of Unseparated Spheres in a Democratic Framework1.5.2. Single-Pyramid and Multi-Pyramid Systems: The Determinants of Democratization in the Three Historical Regions1.6. Beyond Hybridology: A Triangular Conceptual Space of Regimes2. State2.1. Guide to the Chapter2.2. General Definitions: The Basic Concepts of the Framework2.2.1. Regime, State, Violence, and Coercion2.2.2. Elite, Ruling Elite, Patronalism, and Informality2.3. The Dominant Principle of State Functioning2.3.1. Societal Interest, Elite Interest, and Ideology Implementation2.3.2. States in Democracies and Dictatorships: from Constitutional State to Party State and from Night-Watchman State through Welfare State to Developmental State2.4. Conceptualization of States Running on Elite Interest2.4.1. Interpretative Layers: What is the Nature of the Ruling Elite?2.4.2. Interpretative Layers: What is the Action Targeting State Institutions?2.4.3. Interpretative Layers: What is the Action Targeting Property?2.4.4. Interpretative Layers: What is the Legal Status of Elite-Interested Action?2.4.5. Combining Layers of Different Dimensions: Defining the Mafia State2.4.6. Constitutional State vs. Mafia State: Normativity and Discretionality2.5. Challenges to the Monopoly of Violence2.5.1. State Failure, Violent Entrepreneurs, and Oligarchic Anarchy2.5.2. The Legitimate Use of Violence: A Typology2.5.3. Sub-Sovereign Mafia States2.6. The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand: A Comparative Framework for State Types3. Actors3.1. Guide to the Chapter3.2. The Three Spheres of Social Action3.3. Political Actors in the Three Polar Type Regimes3.3.1. President/Prime Minister—Chief Patron—General Party Secretary3.3.2. Cabinet—Patron’s Court—Politburo3.3.3. Politician—Poligarch / Political Front Man—High Level Party Cadre3.3.4. Trustee – Patron’s Hand (Smotryashchiy)—Middle/Low Level Party Cadre3.3.5. Civil Servant—Patronal Servant—Administrative Cadre (Apparatchik)3.3.6. State’s Secret Service—Patron’s Secret Service—Party’s Secret Service3.3.7. Democratic Party (Politicians’ Party)—Patron’s Party (Vassals’ Party)— Centralized Party (Cadres’ Party)3.3.8. Governing Party—Transmission-Belt Party – State Party3.3.9. Opposition Party—Marginalized / Domesticated / Absorbed / ....

Bálint Magyar is Research Fellow at CEU Democracy Institute, working on the subject of patronalism in post-communist countries.He was a member of the Hungarian Parliament (1990-2010). As a Minister of Education (1996-1998; 2002-2006) he initiated and carried out reforms in public and higher education.Bálint Madlovics (*1993) is a political scientist and economist. He is a junior research fellow at the CEU Democracy Institute. He holds MA in Political Science (2018) from Central European University in Budapest, and BA in Applied Economics (2016) from Corvinus University of Budapest.

"This thought-provoking and comprehensive volume comes at a propitious time. Thirty years following the Soviet Union’s collapse, it asks fundamental questions about the nature of the post-communist transition, the quality of governance in the post-Soviet world (and beyond), and the sources of regime variation. With the benefit of hindsight, Bálint Magyar and Bálint Madlovics reflect on an extensive literature in a context of some abject democratic failure and increasingly consolidated corrupt networks in select countries, alongside more positive evelopments, including, variously, sustained economic growth (including in China—a perhaps surprising case for inclusion in the study) and/or increased freedoms in particular regions. For such an extensive investigation, the authors do an admirable job of sustaining the argument. Like all great studies, this one tries to answer some key questions while also provoking pressing new ones."

• List of Tables and FiguresAcknowledgmentsReader’s Manual for QR Codes and Online Supplementary MaterialPreface by Alena LedenevaIntroductionTrapped in the Language of DemocratizationThe Inadequacy of Existing Models for the Post-Communist RegionThe Multi-Dimensional Analytical Framework: Spanning Conceptual SpacesHow It is Made: The Construction of a Conceptual ToolkitHow to Look at It: The Framework as a Structural ConstructionHow to Read It: A Textbook with Original ContributionsHow It Unfolds: Outline of the Content1. Stubborn Structures1.1. Guide to the Chapter1.2. Thesis A: Regime Type Depends on the Separation of Spheres of Social Action1.3. Thesis B: The Separation of Spheres Followed Civilizational Boundaries1.3.1. Civilizations and the Three Historical Regions1.3.2. The Basic Structure of Unseparated Spheres in a Feudal Framework1.4. Thesis C: Communist Dictatorships Arrested and Reversed the Separation of Spheres1.4.1. The Basic Structure of Merged Spheres in Communist Dictatorships1.4.2. The Effect of Communism on the Separation of Spheres in Different Regions1.5. Thesis D: Democratization Did Not Change the Separation of Spheres1.5.1. The Basic Structure of Unseparated Spheres in a Democratic Framework1.5.2. Single-Pyramid and Multi-Pyramid Systems: The Determinants of Democratization in the Three Historical Regions1.6. Beyond Hybridology: A Triangular Conceptual Space of Regimes2. State2.1. Guide to the Chapter2.2. General Definitions: The Basic Concepts of the Framework2.2.1. Regime, State, Violence, and Coercion2.2.2. Elite, Ruling Elite, Patronalism, and Informality2.3. The Dominant Principle of State Functioning2.3.1. Societal Interest, Elite Interest, and Ideology Implementation2.3.2. States in Democracies and Dictatorships: from Constitutional State to Party State and from Night-Watchman State through Welfare State to Developmental State2.4. Conceptualization of States Running on Elite Interest2.4.1. Interpretative Layers: What is the Nature of the Ruling Elite?2.4.2. Interpretative Layers: What is the Action Targeting State Institutions?2.4.3. Interpretative Layers: What is the Action Targeting Property?2.4.4. Interpretative Layers: What is the Legal Status of Elite-Interested Action?2.4.5. Combining Layers of Different Dimensions: Defining the Mafia State2.4.6. Constitutional State vs. Mafia State: Normativity and Discretionality2.5. Challenges to the Monopoly of Violence2.5.1. State Failure, Violent Entrepreneurs, and Oligarchic Anarchy2.5.2. The Legitimate Use of Violence: A Typology2.5.3. Sub-Sovereign Mafia States2.6. The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand: A Comparative Framework for State Types3. Actors3.1. Guide to the Chapter3.2. The Three Spheres of Social Action3.3. Political Actors in the Three Polar Type Regimes3.3.1. President/Prime Minister—Chief Patron—General Party Secretary3.3.2. Cabinet—Patron’s Court—Politburo3.3.3. Politician—Poligarch / Political Front Man—High Level Party Cadre3.3.4. Trustee – Patron’s Hand (Smotryashchiy)—Middle/Low Level Party Cadre3.3.5. Civil Servant—Patronal Servant—Administrative Cadre (Apparatchik)3.3.6. State’s Secret Service—Patron’s Secret Service—Party’s Secret Service3.3.7. Democratic Party (Politicians’ Party)—Patron’s Party (Vassals’ Party)— Centralized Party (Cadres’ Party)3.3.8. Governing Party—Transmission-Belt Party – State Party3.3.9. Opposition Party—Marginalized / Domesticated / Absorbed / ....