This book offers an accessible introduction to strategic interaction in economics and business. It starts from basic scenarios, about how individuals and firms discard dominated strategies that they would never use, how to find their best responses, and how to identify Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies. It then guides readers to more advanced topics such as repeated games, incomplete information games, auctions, and signaling. The writing is intuitive and approachable, relying only on basic algebra and minimizing formal notation, making the material suitable for students with varied backgrounds while remaining rigorous enough for advanced undergraduate courses. Each chapter is concise, providing a manageable alternative to lengthy game theory texts without sacrificing core content. To reinforce understanding, every chapter ends with a guided exercise and a detailed solution, allowing students to practice the tools introduced in the text.

This book offers an accessible introduction to strategic interaction in economics and business. It starts from basic scenarios, about how individuals and firms discard dominated strategies that they would never use, how to find their best responses, and how to identify Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies. It then guides readers to more advanced topics such as repeated games, incomplete information games, auctions, and signaling. The writing is intuitive and approachable, relying only on basic algebra and minimizing formal notation, making the material suitable for students with varied backgrounds while remaining rigorous enough for advanced undergraduate courses. Each chapter is concise, providing a manageable alternative to lengthy game theory texts without sacrificing core content. To reinforce understanding, every chapter ends with a guided exercise and a detailed solution, allowing students to practice the tools introduced in the text.

This book offers an accessible introduction to strategic interaction in economics and business. It starts from basic scenarios, about how individuals and firms discard dominated strategies that they would never use, how to find their best responses, and how to identify Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies. It then guides readers to more advanced topics such as repeated games, incomplete information games, auctions, and signaling. The writing is intuitive and approachable, relying only on basic algebra and minimizing formal notation, making the material suitable for students with varied backgrounds while remaining rigorous enough for advanced undergraduate courses. Each chapter is concise, providing a manageable alternative to lengthy game theory texts without sacrificing core content. To reinforce understanding, every chapter ends with a guided exercise and a detailed solution, allowing students to practice the tools introduced in the text.