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Expert Partisan är ett rollspel, skrivet av Anders Blixt. Det bygger på regelsystemet Expert Nova och är förlagt i ett realistisk alternativhistoriskt 1980-tal där Sverige invaderats av Sovjetunionen och dess allierade. Som spelare tar ni på er rollen som civila partisaner med målet att överleva och bekämpa ockupationen.

Nya texter från Europa om Europa. Om imperiedrömmarnas återkomst, om Gayropas förmodade fall, bulgarisk feed-backdemokrati, slovensk kolonialism, den ukrainska hbt-rörelsen efter Euromajdan, den kroatiska kvinnorörelsen efter kommunismen, den riktige ryske mannen, den belarusiska konstens plats, det jugoslaviska Atlantis och hotet att bli turk. Och om att ockupera Venedig, annektera Wien och semestra på Krim.

A compact volume on the history, organisation, uniforms and equipment of the Communist-led and non-Communist resistance groups resisting German occupation.During 1941 the Germans occupied first Greece and the former Yugoslavia, then enormous areas of European Russia. Once the front line troops had moved on the struggle continued as bands of resistance fighters waged war against the occupation forces until their final withdrawal. The term 'partisan' is associated with Communist-led bands and they were often the most fanatical defenders of the Soviet realm. However, there were also non-Communist resistance groups which were nationalist and broadly constitutionalist and as a result a complicated three-way war developed.This book details the guerrilla war which was waged in the various regions and the uniforms and equipment of the combatants.

Party identification may be the single most powerful predictor of voting behavior, yet scholars continue to disagree on whether this is good or bad for democracy. Some argue that party identification functions as a highly efficient information shortcut, guiding voters to candidates that represent their interests. Others argue that party identification biases voters' perceptions, thereby undermining accountability. Competing Motives in the Partisan Mind provides a framework for understanding the conditions under which each of the characterizations is most apt. The answer hinges on whether a person has sufficient motivation and ability to defend her party identity or whether norms of good citizenship motivate her to adjust her party identity to reflect her disagreements.A series of surveys and experiments provide a window into the partisan mind during times of conflict between party identity and political attitudes. These studies show that individuals devote cognitive resources to defending their party identities against dissonant thoughts, often resorting to elaborate justifications. However, when cognitive resources are insufficient, these defenses break down and partisans are forced to adjust their identities to reflect disagreements. In addition, thoughts of civic duty can stimulate responsiveness motivation to the point that it overwhelms partisan motivation, leading individuals to adjust their identities to reflect their disagreements.In demonstrating the influence of competing motives, this book reconciles the two dominant theories of party identification. Rather than characterizing party identification as either a highly stable affective attachment or a running tally of political evaluations, it suggests that the nature of party identification hinges on the interplay between the motivations that underlie it. Perhaps even more importantly, this book shifts the discussion away from partisan change versus stability to the normative implications of party identification. While the polarization of American politics may be exacerbating partisan biases, there is plenty of reason for hope. By simply making citizens' widespread feelings of civic duty salient to them, these biases may be overcome.

Whereas some Western democracies have turned toward substantially tougher law and order policies, others have not. How can we account for this discrepancy? In The Partisan Politics of Law and Order, Georg Wenzelburger argues that partisan politics have shaped the development of law and order policies in Western countries over the past twenty-five years. Wenzelburger establishes an integrated framework based on issue competition, institutional context, and policy feedback as the driving factors shaping penal policy. Using a large-scale quantitative analysis of twenty Western industrialized countries covering the period from 1995 to 2012, supplemented by case studies in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Sweden, Wenzelburger presents robust empirical evidence for the central role of political parties in law-and-order policy-making. By demonstrating how the configuration of party systems and institutional context affect law and order policies, this book addresses an understudied but key dynamic in penal legislation. The argument and evidence presented here will be of interest to political scientists, sociologists, criminologists, and criminal justice scholars.

Whereas some Western democracies have turned toward substantially tougher law and order policies, others have not. How can we account for this discrepancy? In The Partisan Politics of Law and Order, Georg Wenzelburger argues that partisan politics have shaped the development of law and order policies in Western countries over the past twenty-five years. Wenzelburger establishes an integrated framework based on issue competition, institutional context, and policy feedback as the driving factors shaping penal policy. Using a large-scale quantitative analysis of twenty Western industrialized countries covering the period from 1995 to 2012, supplemented by case studies in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Sweden, Wenzelburger presents robust empirical evidence for the central role of political parties in law-and-order policy-making. By demonstrating how the configuration of party systems and institutional context affect law and order policies, this book addresses an understudied but key dynamic in penal legislation. The argument and evidence presented here will be of interest to political scientists, sociologists, criminologists, and criminal justice scholars.

Whereas some Western democracies have turned toward substantially tougher law and order policies, others have not. How can we account for this discrepancy? In The Partisan Politics of Law and Order, Georg Wenzelburger argues that partisan politics have shaped the development of law and order policies in Western countries over the past twenty-five years. Wenzelburger establishes an integrated framework based on issue competition, institutional context, and policy feedback as the driving factors shaping penal policy. Using a large-scale quantitative analysis of twenty Western industrialized countries covering the period from 1995 to 2012, supplemented by case studies in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Sweden, Wenzelburger presents robust empirical evidence for the central role of political parties in law-and-order policy-making. By demonstrating how the configuration of party systems and institutional context affect law and order policies, this book addresses an understudied but key dynamic in penal legislation. The argument and evidence presented here will be of interest to political scientists, sociologists, criminologists, and criminal justice scholars.

How do state parties react to the challenge of peripheral parties demanding political power to be devolved to their culturally distinct territories? Is devolution the best response to these demands? Why do national governments implement devolution given the high risk that devolution will encourage peripheral parties to demand ever more devolved powers? The aim of this book is to answer these questions through a comparative analysis of devolution in four Europeancountries: Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The author argues that electoral competition between state and peripheral parties pushes some state parties to prefer devolution at some particular point in time. Devolution is an electoral strategy adopted in order to make it more difficult inthe long term for peripheral parties to increase their electoral support by claiming the monopoly of representation of the peripheral territory and the people in it. The strategy of devolution is preferred over short-term tactics of convergence towards the peripheral programmatic agenda because the pro-periphery tactics of state parties in unitary centralised states are not credible in the eyes of voters. The price that state parties pay for making their electoral tactics credible is the''entrenchment'' of the devolution programmatic agenda in the electoral arena. The final implication of this argument is that in democratic systems devolution is not a decision to protect the state from the secessionist threat. It is, instead, a decision by state parties to protect their needed electoralmajorities.Comparative Politics is a series for students, teachers, and researchers of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterised by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu. The Comparative Politics series is edited by Professor David M.Farrell, School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Kenneth Carty, Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia, and Professor Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Institute of Political Science, Philipps University, Marburg.

National Identity Identity and Partisan Polarization examines how national identity has become a central issue in political and social life across the world. Questions of identity--who should be counted as a "true member" of a society and who deserves assistance from the government--have displaced other social and economic issues across nations in many countries. This study considers the role of identity theoretically and in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Austria, Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Israel, and Taiwan. Identity varies over time and over countries. Some such as Sweden have a more "inclusive" sense of identity--one does not need to be born in the country or have ancestry to be considered a "true Swede." Other countries, such as Austria, France, Hungary, Poland, Israel, and Taiwan, have a more "exclusive" notion of identity--where one was born and a common heritage (race, religion, ethnicity) are seen as essential for seeing others as "true" members of society. "Outsiders" are viewed negatively, often as threatening a national culture and not deserving of government assistance. In the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the major political parties take opposing positions on identity. In the United States and the United Kingdom, issues of identity have become highly correlated (polarized) with social and economic issues. In the former Communist countries of Hungary and Poland, the dominant parties have taken nationalist positions on identity but favor generous welfare policies for people of their own background. In Israel and Taiwan, social and economic issues have become less important than nationalism.

National Identity Identity and Partisan Polarization examines how national identity has become a central issue in political and social life across the world. Questions of identity--who should be counted as a "true member" of a society and who deserves assistance from the government--have displaced other social and economic issues across nations in many countries. This study considers the role of identity theoretically and in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Austria, Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Israel, and Taiwan. Identity varies over time and over countries. Some such as Sweden have a more "inclusive" sense of identity--one does not need to be born in the country or have ancestry to be considered a "true Swede." Other countries, such as Austria, France, Hungary, Poland, Israel, and Taiwan, have a more "exclusive" notion of identity--where one was born and a common heritage (race, religion, ethnicity) are seen as essential for seeing others as "true" members of society. "Outsiders" are viewed negatively, often as threatening a national culture and not deserving of government assistance. In the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the major political parties take opposing positions on identity. In the United States and the United Kingdom, issues of identity have become highly correlated (polarized) with social and economic issues. In the former Communist countries of Hungary and Poland, the dominant parties have taken nationalist positions on identity but favor generous welfare policies for people of their own background. In Israel and Taiwan, social and economic issues have become less important than nationalism.

National Identity Identity and Partisan Polarization examines how national identity has become a central issue in political and social life across the world. Questions of identity--who should be counted as a "true member" of a society and who deserves assistance from the government--have displaced other social and economic issues across nations in many countries. This study considers the role of identity theoretically and in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Austria, Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Israel, and Taiwan. Identity varies over time and over countries. Some such as Sweden have a more "inclusive" sense of identity--one does not need to be born in the country or have ancestry to be considered a "true Swede." Other countries, such as Austria, France, Hungary, Poland, Israel, and Taiwan, have a more "exclusive" notion of identity--where one was born and a common heritage (race, religion, ethnicity) are seen as essential for seeing others as "true" members of society. "Outsiders" are viewed negatively, often as threatening a national culture and not deserving of government assistance. In the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the major political parties take opposing positions on identity. In the United States and the United Kingdom, issues of identity have become highly correlated (polarized) with social and economic issues. In the former Communist countries of Hungary and Poland, the dominant parties have taken nationalist positions on identity but favor generous welfare policies for people of their own background. In Israel and Taiwan, social and economic issues have become less important than nationalism.

Below the surface of America's polarized, hyper-competitive standoff between the national Republican and Democratic parties, a dramatic partisan change is occurring at the local and state level. In Partisan Places, Irwin L. Morris describes the shift in American politics caused by domestic migration patterns. Places with growing populations are becoming more Democratic, while places with declining or stagnating communities are increasingly Republican. These partisan shifts are primarily a function of the demographic profile of movers--who tend to be younger, more educated, more racially diverse, and more Democratic than stayers who remain in their hometowns. Interestingly, this phenomenon is occurring regardless of a place's status as urban or rural: higher rates of immigration from other states or counties results in more Democratic support, while more emigration, especially in predominantly White communities, fosters Republican strength. Morris' analysis has significant implications for the future trajectory of party competition in the US, indicating that the Republican party should aim to attract "mover" support to remain competitive. With case studies from across the nation, Partisan Places lays a foundation for understanding the evolving geography of American politics.

Below the surface of America's polarized, hyper-competitive standoff between the national Republican and Democratic parties, a dramatic partisan change is occurring at the local and state level. In Partisan Places, Irwin L. Morris describes the shift in American politics caused by domestic migration patterns. Places with growing populations are becoming more Democratic, while places with declining or stagnating communities are increasingly Republican. These partisan shifts are primarily a function of the demographic profile of movers--who tend to be younger, more educated, more racially diverse, and more Democratic than stayers who remain in their hometowns. Interestingly, this phenomenon is occurring regardless of a place's status as urban or rural: higher rates of immigration from other states or counties results in more Democratic support, while more emigration, especially in predominantly White communities, fosters Republican strength. Morris' analysis has significant implications for the future trajectory of party competition in the US, indicating that the Republican party should aim to attract "mover" support to remain competitive. With case studies from across the nation, Partisan Places lays a foundation for understanding the evolving geography of American politics.

Below the surface of America's polarized, hyper-competitive standoff between the national Republican and Democratic parties, a dramatic partisan change is occurring at the local and state level. In Partisan Places, Irwin L. Morris describes the shift in American politics caused by domestic migration patterns. Places with growing populations are becoming more Democratic, while places with declining or stagnating communities are increasingly Republican. These partisan shifts are primarily a function of the demographic profile of movers--who tend to be younger, more educated, more racially diverse, and more Democratic than stayers who remain in their hometowns. Interestingly, this phenomenon is occurring regardless of a place's status as urban or rural: higher rates of immigration from other states or counties results in more Democratic support, while more emigration, especially in predominantly White communities, fosters Republican strength. Morris' analysis has significant implications for the future trajectory of party competition in the US, indicating that the Republican party should aim to attract "e;mover"e; support to remain competitive. With case studies from across the nation, Partisan Places lays a foundation for understanding the evolving geography of American politics.

Below the surface of America's polarized, hyper-competitive standoff between the national Republican and Democratic parties, a dramatic partisan change is occurring at the local and state level. In Partisan Places, Irwin L. Morris describes the shift in American politics caused by domestic migration patterns. Places with growing populations are becoming more Democratic, while places with declining or stagnating communities are increasingly Republican. These partisan shifts are primarily a function of the demographic profile of movers--who tend to be younger, more educated, more racially diverse, and more Democratic than stayers who remain in their hometowns. Interestingly, this phenomenon is occurring regardless of a place's status as urban or rural: higher rates of immigration from other states or counties results in more Democratic support, while more emigration, especially in predominantly White communities, fosters Republican strength. Morris' analysis has significant implications for the future trajectory of party competition in the US, indicating that the Republican party should aim to attract "e;mover"e; support to remain competitive. With case studies from across the nation, Partisan Places lays a foundation for understanding the evolving geography of American politics.

Historians of political thought interested in partisanship have long privileged the perspective of male canonical thinkers. Scholars have turned to Thucydides and Plato for insights on stasis, Aristotle on civic friendship, Niccolo Machiavelli on tumults, David Hume and Edmund Burke on political parties, and The Federalist on faction. Even political theorists who are primarily concerned with contemporary theories of partisanship often turn to these "e;usual suspects"e; to strengthen their otherwise largely non-historical arguments. Yet this narrow focus on canonical men has led scholars to neglect an important if counterintuitive perspective on partisanship which we find in the political thought of eighteenth-century women, for whom partisanship offered an unexpected but essential means to political inclusion. Partisan Virtue focuses on two such women political thinkers from opposite ends of the political spectrum: the Tory conservative and early feminist Mary Astell and the historian and radical republican Catharine Macaulay. Their identity as women and partisans placed them on the margins of politics--neither fully excluded nor included. As women, they were not allowed to hold public office or cast votes. Yet they were nonetheless partisans who belonged to a political group and intervened in the principal debates of their time. This marginal position enabled Astell and Macaulay to appreciate both the benefits of partisanship as a mechanism of political inclusion for those formally excluded from politics--a mechanism their male contemporaries ignored--and the dangers of the political virtues these men advocated to bridle partisanship. The book argues that the approach to political ethics that emerges from Astell and Macaulay's works should be of continuing interest to contemporary political theorists. Not only does it speak more satisfactorily to current political concerns about polarisation and echo chambers, but theirs is a far more inclusive kind of partisanship than the one offered by their male contemporaries and present-day scholars. It does not ask of people on the margins to get rid of their anger, indignation, or righteousness, before becoming partisans. Instead, Astell and Macaulay embrace these features, and recognise that partisanship, when done right, is precisely the vehicle for the political inclusion of those on the margins.

Historians of political thought interested in partisanship have long privileged the perspective of male canonical thinkers. Scholars have turned to Thucydides and Plato for insights on stasis, Aristotle on civic friendship, Niccolo Machiavelli on tumults, David Hume and Edmund Burke on political parties, and The Federalist on faction. Even political theorists who are primarily concerned with contemporary theories of partisanship often turn to these "e;usual suspects"e; to strengthen their otherwise largely non-historical arguments. Yet this narrow focus on canonical men has led scholars to neglect an important if counterintuitive perspective on partisanship which we find in the political thought of eighteenth-century women, for whom partisanship offered an unexpected but essential means to political inclusion. Partisan Virtue focuses on two such women political thinkers from opposite ends of the political spectrum: the Tory conservative and early feminist Mary Astell and the historian and radical republican Catharine Macaulay. Their identity as women and partisans placed them on the margins of politics--neither fully excluded nor included. As women, they were not allowed to hold public office or cast votes. Yet they were nonetheless partisans who belonged to a political group and intervened in the principal debates of their time. This marginal position enabled Astell and Macaulay to appreciate both the benefits of partisanship as a mechanism of political inclusion for those formally excluded from politics--a mechanism their male contemporaries ignored--and the dangers of the political virtues these men advocated to bridle partisanship. The book argues that the approach to political ethics that emerges from Astell and Macaulay's works should be of continuing interest to contemporary political theorists. Not only does it speak more satisfactorily to current political concerns about polarisation and echo chambers, but theirs is a far more inclusive kind of partisanship than the one offered by their male contemporaries and present-day scholars. It does not ask of people on the margins to get rid of their anger, indignation, or righteousness, before becoming partisans. Instead, Astell and Macaulay embrace these features, and recognise that partisanship, when done right, is precisely the vehicle for the political inclusion of those on the margins.

Historians of political thought interested in partisanship have long privileged the perspective of male canonical thinkers. Scholars have turned to Thucydides and Plato for insights on stasis, Aristotle on civic friendship, Niccolò Machiavelli on tumults, David Hume and Edmund Burke on political parties, and The Federalist on faction. Even political theorists who are primarily concerned with contemporary theories of partisanship often turn to these “usual suspects” to strengthen their otherwise largely non-historical arguments. Yet this narrow focus on canonical men has led scholars to neglect an important if counterintuitive perspective on partisanship which we find in the political thought of eighteenth-century women, for whom partisanship offered an unexpected but essential means to political inclusion.Partisan Virtue focuses on two such women political thinkers from opposite ends of the political spectrum: the Tory conservative and early feminist Mary Astell and the historian and radical republican Catharine Macaulay. Their identity as women and partisans placed them on the margins of politics--neither fully excluded nor included. As women, they were not allowed to hold public office or cast votes. Yet they were nonetheless partisans who belonged to a political group and intervened in the principal debates of their time. This marginal position enabled Astell and Macaulay to appreciate both the benefits of partisanship as a mechanism of political inclusion for those formally excluded from politics--a mechanism their male contemporaries ignored--and the dangers of the political virtues these men advocated to bridle partisanship. The book argues that the approach to political ethics that emerges from Astell and Macaulay's works should be of continuing interest to contemporary political theorists. Not only does it speak more satisfactorily to current political concerns about polarisation and echo chambers, but theirs is a far more inclusive kind of partisanship than the one offered by their male contemporaries and present-day scholars. It does not ask of people on the margins to get rid of their anger, indignation, or righteousness, before becoming partisans. Instead, Astell and Macaulay embrace these features, and recognise that partisanship, when done right, is precisely the vehicle for the political inclusion of those on the margins.

Ada Gobetti's Partisan Diary is both diary and memoir. From the German entry into Turin on 10 September 1943 to the liberation of the city on 28 April 1945, Gobetti recorded an almost daily account of events, sentiments, and personalities, in a cryptic English only she could understand. Italian senator and philosopher Benedetto Croce encouraged Ada to convert her notes into a book. Published by Giulio Einaudi editore in 1956, it won the Premio Prato, an annual prize for a work inspired by the Italian Resistance (Resistenza). From a political and military point of view, the Partisan Diary provides firsthand knowledge of how the partisans in Piedmont fought, what obstacles they encountered, and who joined the struggle against the Nazis and the Fascists. The mountainous terrain and long winters of the Alpine regions (the site of many of their battles) and the ever-present threat of reprisals by German occupiers and their fascist partners exacerbated problems of organization among the various partisan groups. So arduous was their fight, that key military events--Italy's declaration of war on Germany, the fall of Rome, and the Allied landings on D-Day --appear in the diary as remote and almost unrelated incidents. Ada Gobetti writes of the heartbreak of mothers who lost their sons or watched them leave on dangerous missions of sabotage, relating it to worries about her own son Paolo. She reflects on the relationship between anti-fascist thought of the 1920s, in particular the ideas of her husband, Piero Gobetti, and the Italian resistance movement (Resistenza) in which she and her son were participating. While the Resistenza represented a culmination of more than twenty years of anti-fascist activity for Ada, it also helped illuminate the exceptional talents, needs, and rights of Italian women, more than one hundred thousand of whom participated.

Ada Gobetti''s Partisan Diary is both diary and memoir. From the German entry into Turin on 10 September 1943 to the liberation of the city on 28 April 1945, Gobetti recorded an almost daily account of events, sentiments, and personalities, in a cryptic English only she could understand. Italian senator and philosopher Benedetto Croce encouraged Ada to convert her notes into a book. Published by the Italian publisher Giulio Einaudi in 1956, it won the Premio Prato, an annual prize for a work inspired by the Italian Resistance (Resistenza). From a political and military point of view, the Partisan Diary provides firsthand knowledge of how the partisans in Piedmont fought, what obstacles they encountered, and who joined the struggle against the Nazis and the Fascists. The mountainous terrain and long winters of the Alpine regions (the site of many of their battles) and the ever-present threat of reprisals by German occupiers and their fascist partners exacerbated problems of organization among the various partisan groups. So arduous was their fight, that key military events--Italy''s declaration of war on Germany, the fall of Rome, and the Allied landings on D-Day --appear in the diary as remote and almost unrelated incidents. Ada Gobetti writes of the heartbreak of mothers who lost their sons or watched them leave on dangerous missions of sabotage, relating it to worries about her own son Paolo. She reflects on the relationship between anti-fascist thought of the 1920s, in particular the ideas of her husband, Piero Gobetti, and the Italian resistance movement (Resistenza) in which she and her son were participating. While the Resistenza represented a culmination of more than twenty years of anti-fascist activity for Ada, it also helped illuminate the exceptional talents, needs, and rights of Italian women, more than one hundred thousand of whom participated.

Ada Gobetti''s Partisan Diary is both diary and memoir. From the German entry into Turin on 10 September 1943 to the liberation of the city on 28 April 1945, Gobetti recorded an almost daily account of events, sentiments, and personalities, in a cryptic English only she could understand. Italian senator and philosopher Benedetto Croce encouraged Ada to convert her notes into a book. Published by the Italian publisher Giulio Einaudi in 1956, it won the Premio Prato, an annual prize for a work inspired by the Italian Resistance (Resistenza). From a political and military point of view, the Partisan Diary provides firsthand knowledge of how the partisans in Piedmont fought, what obstacles they encountered, and who joined the struggle against the Nazis and the Fascists. The mountainous terrain and long winters of the Alpine regions (the site of many of their battles) and the ever-present threat of reprisals by German occupiers and their fascist partners exacerbated problems of organization among the various partisan groups. So arduous was their fight, that key military events--Italy''s declaration of war on Germany, the fall of Rome, and the Allied landings on D-Day --appear in the diary as remote and almost unrelated incidents. Ada Gobetti writes of the heartbreak of mothers who lost their sons or watched them leave on dangerous missions of sabotage, relating it to worries about her own son Paolo. She reflects on the relationship between anti-fascist thought of the 1920s, in particular the ideas of her husband, Piero Gobetti, and the Italian resistance movement (Resistenza) in which she and her son were participating. While the Resistenza represented a culmination of more than twenty years of anti-fascist activity for Ada, it also helped illuminate the exceptional talents, needs, and rights of Italian women, more than one hundred thousand of whom participated.

How do state parties react to the challenge of peripheral parties demanding political power to be devolved to their culturally distinct territories? Is devolution the best response to these demands? Why do national governments implement devolution given the high risk that devolution will encourage peripheral parties to demand ever more devolved powers? The aim of this book is to answer these questions through a comparative analysis of devolution in four European countries: Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The author argues that electoral competition between state and peripheral parties pushes some state parties to prefer devolution at some particular point in time. Devolution is an electoral strategy adopted in order to make it more difficult in the long term for peripheral parties to increase their electoral support by claiming the monopoly of representation of the peripheral territory and the people in it. The strategy of devolution is preferred over short-term tactics of convergence towards the peripheral programmatic agenda because the pro-periphery tactics of state parties in unitary centralised states are not credible in the eyes of voters. The price that state parties pay for making their electoral tactics credible is the 'entrenchment' of the devolution programmatic agenda in the electoral arena. The final implication of this argument is that in democratic systems devolution is not a decision to protect the state from the secessionist threat. It is, instead, a decision by state parties to protect their needed electoral majorities.Comparative Politics is a series for students, teachers, and researchers of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterised by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu. The Comparative Politics series is edited by Professor David M. Farrell, School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Kenneth Carty, Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia, and Professor Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Institute of Political Science, Philipps University, Marburg.

Over the past half century, two overarching questions have dominated the study of mass political behavior: How do ordinary citizens form their political judgments, and how good are those judgments from a normative perspective? The authors of The Ambivalent Partisan offer a novel approach to these questions, one in which political reasoning is viewed as arising from trade-offs among three generally conflicting psychological goals: making decisions easily, getting them right, and maintaining cognitive consistency. Taking aim at decades of received wisdom, the central claim of this book is that high-quality political judgment hinges less on citizens' cognitive ability than on their willingness to temporarily suspend partisan habits and follow the "evidence" wherever it leads. This occurs most readily when citizens experience a disjuncture between their stable political identities and their contemporary evaluations of party performance, a state the authors refer to as partisan ambivalence. Drawing on both experimental and survey methods -- as well as five decades of American political history -- the authors demonstrate that compared to other citizens, ambivalent partisans perceive the political world accurately, form their policy preferences in a principled manner, and communicate those preferences by making issues an important component of their electoral decisions. The book's most important conclusion is that a non-trivial portion of the electorate manages to escape the vicissitudes of apathy or wanton bias, and it is these citizens -- these ambivalent partisans -- who reliably approximate a desirable standard of democratic citizenship.

Party identification may be the single most powerful predictor of voting behavior, yet scholars continue to disagree whether this is good or bad for democracy. Some argue that party identification functions as a highly efficient information shortcut, guiding voters to candidates that represent their interests. Others argue that party identification biases voters' perceptions, thereby undermining accountability. Competing Motives in the Partisan Mind provides a framework for understanding the conditions under which each of the characterizations is most apt. The answer hinges on whether a person has sufficient motivation and ability to defend her party identity or whether norms of good citizenship motivate her to adjust her party identity to reflect her disagreements.A series of surveys and experiments provide a window into the partisan mind during times of conflict between party identity and political attitudes. These studies show that individuals devote cognitive resources to defending their party identities against dissonant thoughts, often resorting to elaborate justifications. However, when cognitive resources are insufficient, these defenses break down and partisans are forced to adjust their identities to reflect disagreements. In addition, thoughts of civic duty can stimulate responsiveness motivation to the point that it overwhelms partisan motivation, leading individuals to adjust their identities to reflect their disagreements.In demonstrating the influence of competing motives, this book reconciles the two dominant theories of party identification. Rather than characterizing party identification as either a highly stable affective attachment or a running tally of political evaluations, it suggests that the nature of party identification hinges on the interplay between the motivations that underlie it. Perhaps even more importantly, this book shifts the discussion away from partisan change versus stability to the normative implications of party identification. While the polarization of American politics may be exacerbating partisan biases, there is plenty of reason for hope. By simply making citizens' widespread feelings of civic duty salient to them, these biases may be overcome.

Party identification may be the single most powerful predictor of voting behavior, yet scholars continue to disagree whether this is good or bad for democracy. Some argue that party identification functions as a highly efficient information shortcut, guiding voters to candidates that represent their interests. Others argue that party identification biases voters'' perceptions, thereby undermining accountability. Competing Motives in the Partisan Mind provides a framework for understanding the conditions under which each of the characterizations is most apt. The answer hinges on whether a person has sufficient motivation and ability to defend her party identity or whether norms of good citizenship motivate her to adjust her party identity to reflect her disagreements.A series of surveys and experiments provide a window into the partisan mind during times of conflict between party identity and political attitudes. These studies show that individuals devote cognitive resources to defending their party identities against dissonant thoughts, often resorting to elaborate justifications. However, when cognitive resources are insufficient, these defenses break down and partisans are forced to adjust their identities to reflect disagreements. In addition, thoughts of civic duty can stimulate responsiveness motivation to the point that it overwhelms partisan motivation, leading individuals to adjust their identities to reflect their disagreements.In demonstrating the influence of competing motives, this book reconciles the two dominant theories of party identification. Rather than characterizing party identification as either a highly stable affective attachment or a running tally of political evaluations, it suggests that the nature of party identification hinges on the interplay between the motivations that underlie it. Perhaps even more importantly, this book shifts the discussion away from partisan change versus stability to the normative implications of party identification. While the polarization of American politics may be exacerbating partisan biases, there is plenty of reason for hope. By simply making citizens'' widespread feelings of civic duty salient to them, these biases may be overcome.

Forty years ago, viewers who wanted to watch the news could only choose from among the major broadcast networks, all of which presented the same news without any particular point of view. Today we have a much broader array of choices, including cable channels offering a partisan take. With partisan programs gaining in popularity, some argue that they are polarizing American politics, while others counter that only a tiny portion of the population watches such programs and that their viewers tend to already hold similar beliefs. In How Partisan Media Polarize America, Matthew Levendusky confirms - but also qualifies - both of these claims. Drawing on experiments and survey data, he shows that Americans who watch partisan programming do become more certain of their beliefs and less willing to weigh the merits of opposing views or to compromise. And while only a small segment of the American population watches partisan media programs, those who do tend to be more politically engaged, and their effects on national politics are therefore far-reaching.In a time when politics seem doomed to partisan discord, How Partisan Media Polarize America offers a much-needed clarification of the role partisan media might play.

Forty years ago, viewers who wanted to watch the news could only choose from among the major broadcast networks, all of which presented the same news without any particular point of view. Today we have a much broader array of choices, including cable channels offering a partisan take. With partisan programs gaining in popularity, some argue that they are polarizing American politics, while others counter that only a tiny portion of the population watches such programs and that their viewers tend to already hold similar beliefs. In How Partisan Media Polarize America, Matthew Levendusky confirms - but also qualifies - both of these claims. Drawing on experiments and survey data, he shows that Americans who watch partisan programming do become more certain of their beliefs and less willing to weigh the merits of opposing views or to compromise. And while only a small segment of the American population watches partisan media programs, those who do tend to be more politically engaged, and their effects on national politics are therefore far-reaching.In a time when politics seem doomed to partisan discord, How Partisan Media Polarize America offers a much-needed clarification of the role partisan media might play.

As Washington elites drifted toward ideological poles over the past few decades, did ordinary Americans follow their lead? In "The Partisan Sort", Matthew Levendusky reveals that we have responded to this trend - but not, for the most part, by becoming more extreme ourselves. While polarization has filtered down to a small minority of voters, it also has had the more significant effect of reconfiguring the way we sort ourselves into political parties. In a marked realignment since the 1970s - when partisan affiliation did not depend on ideology and both major parties had strong liberal and conservative factions - liberals today overwhelmingly identify with Democrats, as conservatives do with Republicans. This 'sorting', Levendusky contends, results directly from the increasingly polarized terms in which political leaders define their parties. Exploring its far-reaching implications for the American political landscape, he demonstrates that sorting makes voters more loyally partisan, allowing campaigns to focus more attention on mobilizing committed supporters. Ultimately, Levendusky concludes, this new link between party and ideology represents a sea change in American politics.