Daniel M. Hausman – författare

In Valuing Health Daniel M. Hausman provides a philosophically sophisticated overview of generic health measurement that suggests improvements in standard methods and proposes a radical alternative. He shows how to avoid relying on surveys and instead evaluate health states directly. Hausman goes on to tackle the deep problems of evaluation, offering an account of fundamental evaluation that does not presuppose the assignment of values to the properties and consequences of alternatives.After discussing the purposes of generic health measurement, Hausman defends a naturalistic concept of health and its relations to measures such as quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). In examining current health-measurement systems, Valuing Health clarifies their value commitments and the objections to relying on preference surveys to assign values to health states. Relying on an interpretation of liberal political philosophy, Hausman argues that the public value of health states should be understood in terms of the activity limits and suffering that health states impose.Hausman also addresses the moral conundrums that arise when policy-makers attempt to employ the values of health states to estimate the health benefits of alternative policies and to adopt the most cost-effective. He concludes with a general discussion of the difficulties of combining consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral considerations in policy-making.

Methods designed to guide the allocation of healthcare so as to maximize population health have been criticized as fundamentally unfair. In a closer analysis of this ethical critique of the use of cost-effectiveness author Daniel M. Hausman responds to the main complaints about the unfairness of cost-effectiveness, while also recognizing that there should be other factors--especially in cases of discrimination--guiding health-related treatment. Central to How Health Care Can Be Cost-Effective and Fair is whether cost-effective allocation of healthcare violates ethical constraints. Several commentators argue that using cost-effective reasoning to guide the distribution of healthcare is fundamentally unfair, not just because it does not take distribution into account, but because it fails to prioritize the severity of illness and fails to give everyone, and especially disabled people and those from historically underprivileged populations, a fair chance of being treated. While Hausman recognizes the complexity and shortcomings of cost-effective reasoning, he maintains that it should be a leading principle in the allocation of health-related resources. In Hausman's view, many values--such as compassion, freedom, respect, and solidarity should govern healthcare in addition to promoting well-being and treating individuals fairly. In its efforts to promote population health fairly, healthcare should respond to and respect individuals' values and choices.

This book, by one of the pre-eminent philosophers of science writing today, offers the most comprehensive account available of causal asymmetries. Causation is asymmetrical in many different ways. Causes precede effects; explanations cite causes not effects. Agents use causes to manipulate their effects; they don't use effects to manipulate their causes. Effects of a common cause are correlated; causes of a common effect are not. This book explains why a relationship that is asymmetrical in one of these regards is asymmetrical in the others. Hausman discovers surprising hidden connections between theories of causation and traces them all to an asymmetry of independence. This is a major book for philosophers of science that will also prove insightful to economists and statisticians.

This collection brings together the essays of one of the foremost American philosophers of economics. Cumulatively they offer fresh perspectives on foundational questions such as: what sort of science is economics? and how successful can economists be in acquiring knowledge of their subject matter?

This book offers a comprehensive overview of the structure, strategy and methods of assessment of orthodox theoretical economics. In Part I Professor Hausman explains how economists theorise, emphasising the essential underlying commitment of economists to a vision of economics as a separate science. In Part II he defends the view that the basic axioms of economics are 'inexact' since they deal only with the 'major' causes; unlike most writers on economic methodology, the author argues that it is the rules that economists espouse rather than their practice that is at fault. Part III links the conception of economics as a separate science to the fact that economic theories offer reasons and justifications for human actions, not just their causes. With its lengthy appendix introducing relevant issues in philosophy of science, this book is a major addition to philosophy of economics and of social science.

This collection brings together the essays of one of the foremost American philosophers of economics. Cumulatively they offer fresh perspectives on foundational questions such as: what sort of science is economics? and how successful can economists be in acquiring knowledge of their subject matter?

This book, by one of the pre-eminent philosophers of science writing today, offers the most comprehensive account available of causal asymmetries. Causation is asymmetrical in many different ways. Causes precede effects; explanations cite causes not effects. Agents use causes to manipulate their effects; they don't use effects to manipulate their causes. Effects of a common cause are correlated; causes of a common effect are not. This book explains why a relationship that is asymmetrical in one of these regards is asymmetrical in the others. Hausman discovers surprising hidden connections between theories of causation and traces them all to an asymmetry of independence. This is a major book for philosophers of science that will also prove insightful to economists and statisticians.

An anthology of works on the philosophy of economics, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Completely revamped, this edition contains new selections, a revised introduction and a bibliography. The volume contains 26 chapters organized into five parts: (I) Classic Discussions, (II) Positivist and Popperian Views, (III) Ideology and Normative Economics, (IV) Branches and Schools of Economics and Their Methodological Problems and (V) New Directions in Economic Methodology. It includes crucial historical contributions by figures such as Mill, Marx, Weber, Robbins, Knight, and Veblen and works by most of the leading contemporary figures writing on economic methodology, including five Nobel Laureates in Economics.

This 2006 book shows through accessible argument and numerous examples how understanding moral philosophy can improve economic analysis, how moral philosophy can benefit from economists' analytical tools, and how economic analysis and moral philosophy together can inform public policy. Part I explores rationality and its connections to morality. It argues that in defending their model of rationality, mainstream economists implicitly espouse contestable moral principles. Part II concerns welfare, utilitarianism and standard welfare economics, while Part III considers important moral notions that are left out of standard welfare economics, such as freedom, rights, equality, and justice. Part III also emphasizes the variety of moral considerations that are relevant to evaluating policies. Part IV then introduces technical work in social choice theory and game theory that is guided by ethical concepts and relevant to moral theorizing. Chapters include recommended readings and the book includes a glossary of relevant terms.

An anthology of works on the philosophy of economics, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Completely revamped, this edition contains new selections, a revised introduction and a bibliography. The volume contains 26 chapters organized into five parts: (I) Classic Discussions, (II) Positivist and Popperian Views, (III) Ideology and Normative Economics, (IV) Branches and Schools of Economics and Their Methodological Problems and (V) New Directions in Economic Methodology. It includes crucial historical contributions by figures such as Mill, Marx, Weber, Robbins, Knight, and Veblen and works by most of the leading contemporary figures writing on economic methodology, including five Nobel Laureates in Economics.

Is economics a science? What distinguishes it from other sciences, both natural and social? Like many of the natural sciences, its theories are mathematically complex. Yet, like the social sciences, its 'laws' are largely everyday generalizations. Can such generalizations, which are far from universal truths, constitute a science? Does economics have a distinctive method? The first edition answered these and other questions about the scientific status of economics and its underlying methodology. In this fully updated new edition, Dan Hausman reflects on developments in both economics and the philosophy of economics over the last thirty years. It includes a new chapter on the methodology of macroeconomics, an updated discussion on the use of models, and new discussions causal inference and behavioural economics and their implications for theory appraisal. It is the perfect choice for a new generation of students studying the methodology of modern economics.

Is economics a science? What distinguishes it from other sciences, both natural and social? Like many of the natural sciences, its theories are mathematically complex. Yet, like the social sciences, its 'laws' are largely everyday generalizations. Can such generalizations, which are far from universal truths, constitute a science? Does economics have a distinctive method? The first edition answered these and other questions about the scientific status of economics and its underlying methodology. In this fully updated new edition, Dan Hausman reflects on developments in both economics and the philosophy of economics over the last thirty years. It includes a new chapter on the methodology of macroeconomics, an updated discussion on the use of models, and new discussions causal inference and behavioural economics and their implications for theory appraisal. It is the perfect choice for a new generation of students studying the methodology of modern economics.

This book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. It also explores their uses in everyday language and action, how they are understood in psychology and how they figure in philosophical reflection on action and morality. The book clarifies and for the most part defends the way in which economists invoke preferences to explain, predict and assess behavior and outcomes. Hausman argues, however, that the predictions and explanations economists offer rely on theories of preference formation that are in need of further development, and he criticizes attempts to define welfare in terms of preferences and to define preferences in terms of choices or self-interest. The analysis clarifies the relations between rational choice theory and philosophical accounts of human action. The book also assembles the materials out of which models of preference formation and modification can be constructed, and it comments on how reason and emotion shape preferences.