Ernest R. May – författare

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 left Americans wondering how such a breach of security could have occurred. Relatives and friends of the victims pushed for the creation of a National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States to investigate the governments preparedness for and response to the attacks and to provide recommendations for preventing future disasters. As Senior Advisor to the 9/11 Commission, Ernest R. May provides students with a firsthand account of the commissions methods and actions. His introduction, which describes the drafting process and the collaboration of the commissioners despite the bitter political divisions surrounding them, allows students to view the report as an historical document. The report itself has been carefully abridged for the classroom while preserving the essence of the complete version. A cast of characters, a glossary of political acronyms, a chronology, a selected bibliography, and questions for consideration make this edition ideal for students.

Neorealists argue that all states aim to acquire power and that state cooperation can therefore only be temporary, based on a common opposition to a third country. This view condemns the world to endless conflict for the indefinite future. Based upon careful attention to actual historical outcomes, this book contends that, while some countries and leaders have demonstrated excessive power drives, others have essentially underplayed their power and sought less position and influence than their comparative strength might have justified. Featuring case studies from across the globe, History and Neorealism examines how states have actually acted. The authors conclude that leadership, domestic politics, and the domain (of gain or loss) in which they reside play an important role along with international factors in raising the possibility of a world in which conflict does not remain constant and, though not eliminated, can be progressively reduced.

Neorealists argue that all states aim to acquire power and that state cooperation can therefore only be temporary, based on a common opposition to a third country. This view condemns the world to endless conflict for the indefinite future. Based upon careful attention to actual historical outcomes, this book contends that, while some countries and leaders have demonstrated excessive power drives, others have essentially underplayed their power and sought less position and influence than their comparative strength might have justified. Featuring case studies from across the globe, History and Neorealism examines how states have actually acted. The authors conclude that leadership, domestic politics, and the domain (of gain or loss) in which they reside play an important role along with international factors in raising the possibility of a world in which conflict does not remain constant and, though not eliminated, can be progressively reduced.

In essays that illuminate not only the recent past but shortcomings in today's intelligence assessments, sixteen experts show how prospective antagonists appraised each other prior to the World Wars. This cautionary tale, warns that intelligence agencies can do certain things very well--but other things poorly, if at all. Originally published in 1985. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In essays that illuminate not only the recent past but shortcomings in today's intelligence assessments, sixteen experts show how prospective antagonists appraised each other prior to the World Wars. This cautionary tale, warns that intelligence agencies can do certain things very well--but other things poorly, if at all. Originally published in 1985. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Why did Hitler turn against France in the spring of 1940 and not before? And why were his poor judgement and inadequate intelligence about the Allies nonetheless correct? Why didn't France take the offensive earlier, when it might have led to victory? What explains the French failure to detect and respond to Germany's attack plan? "Strange Victory" is a riveting book about France and Germany in the years leading up to World War II, offering a dramatic new interpretation of the German lightning attack that swept the Wehrmacht to Paris in the spring of 1940. Skilfully weaving together decisions of the high commands with the confused responses from exhausted and ill-informed, or ill-advised, officers in the field, the distinguished diplomatic historian Ernest R. May offers many new insights into the tragic paradoxes of the battle for France. "Strange Victory" is a book of lasting importance to our understanding of WorldWar II, and its effect on both the German and the Allied sides.

Många amerikanska makthavare saknar historisk medvetenhet, konstaterade historikern Ernest May och statsvetaren Richard Neustadt: De kunde inget om historia att tala om och hade ingen känsla av att de saknade något. När historia ändå användes, var det för att stärka argument eller sprida tröst. Utifrån övertygelsen att historia kan användas både oftare och bättre i beslutsfattande, skrev May och Neustadt denna bok 1986. Med utgångspunkt i centrala händelser i modern amerikansk historia de flesta av dem skräckhistorier om misslyckat beslutsfattande diskuterar May och Neustadt vad som hade kunnat hända om historiska erfarenheter hade tagits till vara. Detta är inte en bok om historia i sig utan om hur historia kan användas. May och Neustadt utvecklade tidigt ett intresse för frågan om varför politikens resultat så ofta landade långt från avsikterna. Med historia som analytiskt redskap hade misstagen kunna undvikas. Boken innehåller också ett antal frågor som bör ställas före ett politiskt beslut, och inte när misslyckandet är ett faktum. Att med det förflutnas hjälp kunna se alternativa framtidsscenarion det är att lära av historien. Denna utgåva ingår i serien Engelsbergsklassiker. Boken har ett nyskrivet förord av Mattias Hessérus.