Mirja Hartimo – författare

The aim of this volume is to offer an updated account of the transcendental character of phenomenology. The main question concerns the sense and relevance of transcendental philosophy today: What can such philosophy contribute to contemporary inquiries and debates after the many reasoned attacks against its idealistic, aprioristic, absolutist and universalistic tendencies—voiced most vigorously by late 20th century postmodern thinkers—as well as attacks against its apparently circular arguments and suspicious metaphysics launched by many analytic philosophers? Contributors also aim to clarify the relations of transcendental phenomenology to other post-Kantian philosophies, most importantly to pragmatism and Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations. Finally, the volume offers a set of reflections on the meaning of post-transcendental phenomenology.

Husserl's Philosophy of Mathematical Practice explores the applicability of the phenomenological method to philosophy of mathematical practice. The first section elaborates on Husserl's own understanding of the method of radical sense-investigation (Besinnung), with which he thought the mathematics of his time should be approached. The second section shows how Husserl himself practiced it, tracking both constructive and platonistic features in mathematical practice. Finally, the third section situates Husserlian phenomenology within the contemporary philosophy of mathematical practice, where the examined styles are more diverse. Husserl's phenomenology is presented as a method, not a fixed doctrine, applicable to study and unify philosophy of mathematical practice and the metaphysics implied in it. In so doing, this Element develops Husserl's philosophy of mathematical practice as a species of Kantian critical philosophy and asks after the conditions of possibility of social and self-critical mathematical practices. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

Husserl's Philosophy of Mathematical Practice explores the applicability of the phenomenological method to philosophy of mathematical practice. The first section elaborates on Husserl's own understanding of the method of radical sense-investigation (Besinnung), with which he thought the mathematics of his time should be approached. The second section shows how Husserl himself practiced it, tracking both constructive and platonistic features in mathematical practice. Finally, the third section situates Husserlian phenomenology within the contemporary philosophy of mathematical practice, where the examined styles are more diverse. Husserl's phenomenology is presented as a method, not a fixed doctrine, applicable to study and unify philosophy of mathematical practice and the metaphysics implied in it. In so doing, this Element develops Husserl's philosophy of mathematical practice as a species of Kantian critical philosophy and asks after the conditions of possibility of social and self-critical mathematical practices. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.

This volume investigates forms of normativity through the phenomenological methods of description, analysis, and interpretation. It takes a broad approach to norms, covering not only rules and commands but also goals, values, and passive drives and tendencies.Part I "Basic Perspectives" begins with an overview of the phenomena of normativity and then clarifies the constitution of norms by Husserlian and Heideggerian concepts. It offers phenomenological alternatives to the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian approaches that dominate contemporary debates on the "sources of normativity." Part II "From Perception to Imagination" turns to the normativity of three basic types of experiences. This part first sheds light on the normativity of perception and then illuminates the kind of normativity characteristic of imagination and drive intentionality. Part III "Social Dimensions" analyzes the norms that regulate the formation of practical communities. It takes a broad view of practical norms, discussing social and moral norms as well as the epistemic norms of scientific practices. By clarifying the divergences and interrelations between various types and levels of norms, the volume demonstrates that normativity is not one phenomenon but a complex set of various phenomena with multiple sources.Contemporary Phenomenologies of Normativity: Norms, Goals, and Values will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on issues of normativity in phenomenology, epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy.

This volume investigates forms of normativity through the phenomenological methods of description, analysis, and interpretation. It takes a broad approach to norms, covering not only rules and commands but also goals, values, and passive drives and tendencies.Part I "Basic Perspectives" begins with an overview of the phenomena of normativity and then clarifies the constitution of norms by Husserlian and Heideggerian concepts. It offers phenomenological alternatives to the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian approaches that dominate contemporary debates on the "sources of normativity." Part II "From Perception to Imagination" turns to the normativity of three basic types of experiences. This part first sheds light on the normativity of perception and then illuminates the kind of normativity characteristic of imagination and drive intentionality. Part III "Social Dimensions" analyzes the norms that regulate the formation of practical communities. It takes a broad view of practical norms, discussing social and moral norms as well as the epistemic norms of scientific practices. By clarifying the divergences and interrelations between various types and levels of norms, the volume demonstrates that normativity is not one phenomenon but a complex set of various phenomena with multiple sources.Contemporary Phenomenologies of Normativity: Norms, Goals, and Values will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on issues of normativity in phenomenology, epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy.

This book examines positions that challenge the Fregean logic-first view. It raises criticalquestions about logic by examining various ways in which logic may be entangled with mathematics and metaphysics.Is logic topic-neutral and general? Can we take the application of logic for granted? This book suggests that we should not be dogmatic about logic but ask similar critical questions about logic as those Kant raised about metaphysics and mathematics. It challenges the Fregean logic-first view according to which logic is fundamental and hence independent of any extra-logical considerations. Whereas Quine assimilated logic and mathematics to the theoretical parts of empirical science, the present volume explores views that stop short of his thoroughgoing holism but instead take logic to be answerable to or entangled with some particular disciplines. The contributions provide views that assign primacy to mathematical reasons, Kantian metaphysical grounds, Husserlian transcendental phenomenological reflection, or normative considerations about how terms ought to be defined in various fields of empirical science or mathematics. Space is thereby carved out between a Fregean position on the one hand and Quinean holism on the other.Critical Views of Logic will be a key resource for academics, researchers, and advanced students of philosophy, linguistics, mathematics, and computer science, as well as those engaged in various fields of empirical science. The chapters in this book, except for chapter 4, were originally published in the journal Inquiry.

This book examines positions that challenge the Fregean logic-first view. It raises criticalquestions about logic by examining various ways in which logic may be entangled with mathematics and metaphysics.Is logic topic-neutral and general? Can we take the application of logic for granted? This book suggests that we should not be dogmatic about logic but ask similar critical questions about logic as those Kant raised about metaphysics and mathematics. It challenges the Fregean logic-first view according to which logic is fundamental and hence independent of any extra-logical considerations. Whereas Quine assimilated logic and mathematics to the theoretical parts of empirical science, the present volume explores views that stop short of his thoroughgoing holism but instead take logic to be answerable to or entangled with some particular disciplines. The contributions provide views that assign primacy to mathematical reasons, Kantian metaphysical grounds, Husserlian transcendental phenomenological reflection, or normative considerations about how terms ought to be defined in various fields of empirical science or mathematics. Space is thereby carved out between a Fregean position on the one hand and Quinean holism on the other.Critical Views of Logic will be a key resource for academics, researchers, and advanced students of philosophy, linguistics, mathematics, and computer science, as well as those engaged in various fields of empirical science. The chapters in this book, except for chapter 4, were originally published in the journal Inquiry.

Husserl and Mathematics explains the development of Husserl's phenomenological method in the context of his engagement in modern mathematics and its foundations. Drawing on his correspondence and other written sources, Mirja Hartimo details Husserl's knowledge of a wide range of perspectives on the foundations of mathematics, including those of Hilbert, Brouwer and Weyl, as well as his awareness of the new developments in the subject during the 1930s. Hartimo examines how Husserl's philosophical views responded to these changes, and offers a pluralistic and open-ended picture of Husserl's phenomenology of mathematics. Her study shows Husserl's phenomenology to be a method capable of both shedding light on and internally criticizing scientific practices and concepts.

Husserl and Mathematics explains the development of Husserl's phenomenological method in the context of his engagement in modern mathematics and its foundations. Drawing on his correspondence and other written sources, Mirja Hartimo details Husserl's knowledge of a wide range of perspectives on the foundations of mathematics, including those of Hilbert, Brouwer and Weyl, as well as his awareness of the new developments in the subject during the 1930s. Hartimo examines how Husserl's philosophical views responded to these changes, and offers a pluralistic and open-ended picture of Husserl's phenomenology of mathematics. Her study shows Husserl's phenomenology to be a method capable of both shedding light on and internally criticizing scientific practices and concepts.

The aim of this volume is to offer an updated account of the transcendental character of phenomenology. The main question concerns the sense and relevance of transcendental philosophy today: What can such philosophy contribute to contemporary inquiries and debates after the many reasoned attacks against its idealistic, aprioristic, absolutist and universalistic tendencies—voiced most vigorously by late 20th century postmodern thinkers—as well as attacks against its apparently circular arguments and suspicious metaphysics launched by many analytic philosophers? Contributors also aim to clarify the relations of transcendental phenomenology to other post-Kantian philosophies, most importantly to pragmatism and Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations. Finally, the volume offers a set of reflections on the meaning of post-transcendental phenomenology.

During Edmund Husserl’s lifetime, modern logic and mathematics rapidly developed toward their current outlook and Husserl’s writings can be fruitfully compared and contrasted with both 19th century figures (Boole, Schröder, Weierstrass) as well as the 20th century characters (Heyting, Zermelo, Gödel).