Rik Peels – författare

Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Scientism answers both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by both proponents and critics of scientism.Before scientism can be evaluated, it needs to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next, several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case, either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a plausible general epistemological outlook and whether science has limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality and is a scientistic moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism related to physicalism? And is experimental philosophy really a form of scientism tailored to philosophy?

Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Scientism answers both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by both proponents and critics of scientism.Before scientism can be evaluated, it needs to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next, several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case, either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a plausible general epistemological outlook and whether science has limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality and is a scientistic moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism related to physicalism? And is experimental philosophy really a form of scientism tailored to philosophy?

What we believe and what we do not believe has a great impact on what we do and fail to do. Hence, if we want to act responsibly, we should believe responsibly. However, do we have the kind of control over our beliefs that such responsibility for our beliefs seems to require? Do we have certain obligations to control or influence our beliefs on particular occasions? And do we sometimes believe responsibly despite violating such obligations, namely because we are excused by, say, indoctrination or ignorance?By answering each of these questions, Rik Peels provides a theory of what it is to believe responsibly. He argues that we lack control over our beliefs, but that we can nonetheless influence our beliefs by performing actions that make a difference to what we believe. We have a wide variety of moral, prudential, and epistemic obligations to perform such belief-influencing actions. We can be held responsible for our beliefs in virtue of such influence on our beliefs. Sometimes, we believe responsibly despite having violated such obligations, namely if we are excused, by force, ignorance, or luck. A careful consideration of these excuses teaches us, respectively, that responsible belief entails that we could have failed to have that belief, that responsible belief is in a specific sense radically subjective, and that responsible belief is compatible with its being a matter of luck that we hold that belief.

What we believe and what we do not believe has a great impact on what we do and fail to do. Hence, if we want to act responsibly, we should believe responsibly. However, do we have the kind of control over our beliefs that such responsibility for our beliefs seems to require? Do we have certain obligations to control or influence our beliefs on particular occasions? And do we sometimes believe responsibly despite violating such obligations, namely because we are excused by, say, indoctrination or ignorance?By answering each of these questions, Rik Peels provides a theory of what it is to believe responsibly. He argues that we lack control over our beliefs, but that we can nonetheless influence our beliefs by performing actions that make a difference to what we believe. We have a wide variety of moral, prudential, and epistemic obligations to perform such belief-influencing actions. We can be held responsible for our beliefs in virtue of such influence on our beliefs. Sometimes, we believe responsibly despite having violated such obligations, namely if we are excused, by force, ignorance, or luck. A careful consideration of these excuses teaches us, respectively, that responsible belief entails that we could have failed to have that belief, that responsible belief is in a specific sense radically subjective, and that responsible belief is compatible with its being a matter of luck that we hold that belief.

Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Scientism answers both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by both proponents and critics of scientism.Before scientism can be evaluated, it needs to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next, several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case, either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a plausible general epistemological outlook and whether science has limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality and is a scientistic moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism related to physicalism? And is experimental philosophy really a form of scientism tailored to philosophy?

Ignorance: A Philosophical Study provides an in-depth exploration of ignorance in its many dimensions. Philosophers have long examined epistemological concepts like belief, knowledge, and understanding, but they have paid less attention to ignorance. Socrates famously claimed to be ignorant about a wide variety of issues, such as physical matters and ethics, but did not study ignorance itself. It was not until the 1960's and 70's that ignorance itself became a topic of concern in philosophy, when the fields of agnotology, philosophy of race, and feminist philosophy were born. These fields, however, focused on specific properties of ignorance, rather than ignorance itself.Rik Peels provides a full-on epistemology of ignorance, and then applies that epistemology to a wide variety of philosophical issues. Among the questions he addresses are: What kinds of ignorance are there? What is it to be ignorant of a proposition? What varieties of propositional ignorance are there? What is group ignorance? What is it for ignorance to come in degrees? What is strategic ignorance? What is "white ignorance"? What does ignorance excuse? When is ignorance culpable? Can ignorance be a proper aim in education? Peels presents a wide-angle exploration that is relevant to the interests of philosophers across epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and other disciplines.

Ignorance: A Philosophical Study provides an in-depth exploration of ignorance in its many dimensions. Philosophers have long examined epistemological concepts like belief, knowledge, and understanding, but they have paid less attention to ignorance. Socrates famously claimed to be ignorant about a wide variety of issues, such as physical matters and ethics, but did not study ignorance itself. It was not until the 1960''s and 70''s that ignorance itself became a topic of concern in philosophy, when the fields of agnotology, philosophy of race, and feminist philosophy were born. These fields, however, focused on specific properties of ignorance, rather than ignorance itself.Rik Peels provides a full-on epistemology of ignorance, and then applies that epistemology to a wide variety of philosophical issues. Among the questions he addresses are: What kinds of ignorance are there? What is it to be ignorant of a proposition? What varieties of propositional ignorance are there? What is group ignorance? What is it for ignorance to come in degrees? What is strategic ignorance? What is "white ignorance"? What does ignorance excuse? When is ignorance culpable? Can ignorance be a proper aim in education? Peels presents a wide-angle exploration that is relevant to the interests of philosophers across epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and other disciplines.

Ignorance: A Philosophical Study provides an in-depth exploration of ignorance in its many dimensions. Philosophers have long examined epistemological concepts like belief, knowledge, and understanding, but they have paid less attention to ignorance. Socrates famously claimed to be ignorant about a wide variety of issues, such as physical matters and ethics, but did not study ignorance itself. It was not until the 1960''s and 70''s that ignorance itself became a topic of concern in philosophy, when the fields of agnotology, philosophy of race, and feminist philosophy were born. These fields, however, focused on specific properties of ignorance, rather than ignorance itself.Rik Peels provides a full-on epistemology of ignorance, and then applies that epistemology to a wide variety of philosophical issues. Among the questions he addresses are: What kinds of ignorance are there? What is it to be ignorant of a proposition? What varieties of propositional ignorance are there? What is group ignorance? What is it for ignorance to come in degrees? What is strategic ignorance? What is "white ignorance"? What does ignorance excuse? When is ignorance culpable? Can ignorance be a proper aim in education? Peels presents a wide-angle exploration that is relevant to the interests of philosophers across epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and other disciplines.

Co-authored by three philosophers, this ground-breaking book explores a range of new and classic questions concerning the humanities. For example, do the humanities (like the sciences) really make progress? Is there anything that unifies scholarship in the humanities, across fields as diverse as history, literary studies, philosophy, and musicology? And what should we make of the political aims of the humanities--for example, the desire by many scholars in the humanities to uncover systems of oppression and domination? Does this interfere with "objective" scholarship or not?In many ways this book is the first of its kind, considering new topics such as the value of replication studies in the humanities, and deference to other humanities scholars. A Philosophy of the Humanities offers new ways of thinking about the nature of the humanities and the distinctive contributions they make to human understanding.

Co-authored by three philosophers, this ground-breaking book explores a range of new and classic questions concerning the humanities. For example, do the humanities (like the sciences) really make progress? Is there anything that unifies scholarship in the humanities, across fields as diverse as history, literary studies, philosophy, and musicology? And what should we make of the political aims of the humanities--for example, the desire by many scholars in the humanities to uncover systems of oppression and domination? Does this interfere with "objective" scholarship or not?In many ways this book is the first of its kind, considering new topics such as the value of replication studies in the humanities, and deference to other humanities scholars. A Philosophy of the Humanities offers new ways of thinking about the nature of the humanities and the distinctive contributions they make to human understanding.

Co-authored by three philosophers, this ground-breaking book explores a range of new and classic questions concerning the humanities. For example, do the humanities (like the sciences) really make progress? Is there anything that unifies scholarship in the humanities, across fields as diverse as history, literary studies, philosophy, and musicology? And what should we make of the political aims of the humanities--for example, the desire by many scholars in the humanities to uncover systems of oppression and domination? Does this interfere with "e;objective"e; scholarship or not?In many ways this book is the first of its kind, considering new topics such as the value of replication studies in the humanities, and deference to other humanities scholars. A Philosophy of the Humanities offers new ways of thinking about the nature of the humanities and the distinctive contributions they make to human understanding.

Co-authored by three philosophers, this ground-breaking book explores a range of new and classic questions concerning the humanities. For example, do the humanities (like the sciences) really make progress? Is there anything that unifies scholarship in the humanities, across fields as diverse as history, literary studies, philosophy, and musicology? And what should we make of the political aims of the humanities--for example, the desire by many scholars in the humanities to uncover systems of oppression and domination? Does this interfere with "e;objective"e; scholarship or not?In many ways this book is the first of its kind, considering new topics such as the value of replication studies in the humanities, and deference to other humanities scholars. A Philosophy of the Humanities offers new ways of thinking about the nature of the humanities and the distinctive contributions they make to human understanding.

Concepts like extremism and radicalization are highly contested. Their definitions matter, because they influence how we study extremism and radicalization and, in the long run, how these are perceived in the public debate. Rather than adding more definitions, this book explores the underlying challenging conceptual issues in defining, interpreting, and operationalizing notions such as extremism, radicalization, fanaticism, and terrorism. It explores four crucial questions. First, how should each of these extreme phenomena be defined, and what are the desiderata in seeking definitions of each of them? Second, how should the project of defining and conceptualizing these phenomena be undertaken: in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, or family resemblances, or common understandings in the public debate, or something else? Third, what is the role of normativity in defining these extreme phenomena, that is, the proper place of normative or even pejorative concepts and the normative framework of the researcher? Fourth and finally, how do the phenomena of extremism, fanaticism, fundamentalism, terrorism, and conspiracism relate to one another and to things such as apocalypticism, nationalism, cults, charisma, and state terror? Written by global, multidisciplinary experts, this text lays the conceptual groundwork that the other volumes in the Extreme Belief and Behavior Series will build on.

Concepts like extremism and radicalization are highly contested. Their definitions matter, because they influence how we study extremism and radicalization and, in the long run, how these are perceived in the public debate. Rather than adding more definitions, this book explores the underlying challenging conceptual issues in defining, interpreting, and operationalizing notions such as extremism, radicalization, fanaticism, and terrorism. It explores four crucial questions. First, how should each of these extreme phenomena be defined, and what are the desiderata in seeking definitions of each of them? Second, how should the project of defining and conceptualizing these phenomena be undertaken: in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, or family resemblances, or common understandings in the public debate, or something else? Third, what is the role of normativity in defining these extreme phenomena, that is, the proper place of normative or even pejorative concepts and the normative framework of the researcher? Fourth and finally, how do the phenomena of extremism, fanaticism, fundamentalism, terrorism, and conspiracism relate to one another and to things such as apocalypticism, nationalism, cults, charisma, and state terror? Written by global, multidisciplinary experts, this text lays the conceptual groundwork that the other volumes in the Extreme Belief and Behavior Series will build on.

Concepts like extremism and radicalization are highly contested. Their definitions matter, because they influence how we study extremism and radicalization and, in the long run, how these are perceived in the public debate. Rather than adding more definitions, this book explores the underlying challenging conceptual issues in defining, interpreting, and operationalizing notions such as extremism, radicalization, fanaticism, and terrorism. It explores four crucial questions. First, how should each of these extreme phenomena be defined, and what are the desiderata in seeking definitions of each of them? Second, how should the project of defining and conceptualizing these phenomena be undertaken: in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, or family resemblances, or common understandings in the public debate, or something else? Third, what is the role of normativity in defining these extreme phenomena, that is, the proper place of normative or even pejorative concepts and the normative framework of the researcher? Fourth and finally, how do the phenomena of extremism, fanaticism, fundamentalism, terrorism, and conspiracism relate to one another and to things such as apocalypticism, nationalism, cults, charisma, and state terror? Written by global, multidisciplinary experts, this text lays the conceptual groundwork that the other volumes in the Extreme Belief and Behavior Series will build on.

Written by global, multidisciplinary experts, Explaining Extreme Belief and Behavior moves beyond definitions of the phenomena of conspiracy theorizing, extremism, fanaticism, fundamentalism, and terrorism and shifts into how we can explain these extreme beliefs and behaviors. The first part of the book examines various fundamental theoretical and contextual issues such as the relationship between understanding and explaining extremism, challenges in explaining extreme beliefs, and pitfalls of current approaches. The second part delves into related methodological issues, including the desiderata for viable explanations--qualitative and quantitative data, macro-, meso-, and microlevels of analysis, first- and third-person accounts, attitudes and behaviors, or beliefs and actions. The third part explores related empirical issues and challenges--how we conceive and integrate insights into such related phenomena as the turn to extremism in particular contexts, the rise of extremist movements, and radicalization. This volume builds upon the first two in the Extreme Belief and Behavior Series by studying the very project of explaining extreme belief and behavior.

Written by global, multidisciplinary experts, Explaining Extreme Belief and Behavior moves beyond definitions of the phenomena of conspiracy theorizing, extremism, fanaticism, fundamentalism, and terrorism and shifts into how we can explain these extreme beliefs and behaviors. The first part of the book examines various fundamental theoretical and contextual issues such as the relationship between understanding and explaining extremism, challenges in explaining extreme beliefs, and pitfalls of current approaches. The second part delves into related methodological issues, including the desiderata for viable explanations--qualitative and quantitative data, macro-, meso-, and microlevels of analysis, first- and third-person accounts, attitudes and behaviors, or beliefs and actions. The third part explores related empirical issues and challenges--how we conceive and integrate insights into such related phenomena as the turn to extremism in particular contexts, the rise of extremist movements, and radicalization. This volume builds upon the first two in the Extreme Belief and Behavior Series by studying the very project of explaining extreme belief and behavior.

Written by global, multidisciplinary experts, Explaining Extreme Belief and Behavior moves beyond definitions of the phenomena of conspiracy theorizing, extremism, fanaticism, fundamentalism, and terrorism and shifts into how we can explain these extreme beliefs and behaviors. The first part of the book examines various fundamental theoretical and contextual issues such as the relationship between understanding and explaining extremism, challenges in explaining extreme beliefs, and pitfalls of current approaches. The second part delves into related methodological issues, including the desiderata for viable explanations--qualitative and quantitative data, macro-, meso-, and microlevels of analysis, first- and third-person accounts, attitudes and behaviors, or beliefs and actions. The third part explores related empirical issues and challenges--how we conceive and integrate insights into such related phenomena as the turn to extremism in particular contexts, the rise of extremist movements, and radicalization. This volume builds upon the first two in the Extreme Belief and Behavior Series by studying the very project of explaining extreme belief and behavior.

Written by global, multidisciplinary experts, Responsibility for Extreme Beliefs and Behaviors explores the relation between responsibility and extreme beliefs and behaviors. The book is divided into three parts. The first part examines the issue of who or what is responsible, such as individuals, groups, the community, or even structural factors. It also addresses how individual responsibility relates to group responsibility. The second part concerns agency and various kinds of responsibility. It studies to what extent we can ascribe agency, both moral and epistemic, to extremists, and explores how epistemic agency depends on cognitive and affective capacities, self-knowledge, and intellectual self-trust, self-esteem, and self-respect. Moreover, it examines which environments foster extreme beliefs and behaviors and whether extremists and terrorists can be described as evil and how that bears on responsibility. The third and final part investigates when responsibility attributions are appropriate. It looks at various excusing and exculpating conditions of individual or group responsibility for extreme beliefs. It studies indoctrination and how much room it leaves for responsibility, and considers factors such as experiencing peer pressure, being in an epistemic bubble or echo chamber, and living in a society dealing with fake news and propaganda, and to what extent such factors can provide an excuse. In doing so, it takes not only the legal but equally the moral and epistemic dimensions of responsibility into account and how these relate to one another.

Common sense philosophy holds that widely and deeply held beliefs are justified in the absence of defeaters. While this tradition has always had its philosophical detractors who have defended various forms of skepticism or have sought to develop rival epistemological views, recent advances in several scientific disciplines claim to have debunked the reliability of the faculties that produce our common sense beliefs. At the same time, however, it seems reasonable that we cannot do without common sense beliefs entirely. Arguably, science and the scientific method are built on, and continue to depend on, common sense.This collection of essays debates the tenability of common sense in the face of recent challenges from the empirical sciences. It explores to what extent scientific considerations—rather than philosophical considerations—put pressure on common sense philosophy. The book is structured in a way that promotes dialogue between philosophers and scientists. Noah Lemos, one of the most influential contemporary advocates of the common sense tradition, begins with an overview of the nature and scope of common sense beliefs, and examines philosophical objections to common sense and its relationship to scientific beliefs. Then, the volume features essays by scientists and philosophers of science who discuss various proposed conflicts between commonsensical and scientific beliefs: the reality of space and time, about the nature of human beings, about free will and identity, about rationality, about morality, and about religious belief. Notable philosophers who embrace the common sense tradition respond to these essays to explore the connection between common sense philosophy and contemporary debates in evolutionary biology, neuroscience, physics, and psychology.

This edited collection focuses on the moral and social dimensions of ignorance—an undertheorized category in analytic philosophy. Contributors address such issues as the relation between ignorance and deception, ignorance as a moral excuse, ignorance as a legal excuse, and the relation between ignorance and moral character. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse; some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character; and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Ignorance has certain social dimensions as well: it has been claimed to be the engine of science; it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy; and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. Together, these contributions provide a sustained inquiry into the nature of ignorance and the pivotal role it plays in the moral and social domains.

In this book, Rik Peels explores atheism from a new perspective that aims to go beyond the highly polarized debate about arguments for and against God's existence. Since our beliefs about the most important things in life are not usually based on arguments, we should look beyond atheistic arguments and explore what truly motivates the atheist. Are there certain ideals or experiences that explain the turn to atheism? Could atheism be the default position for us, not requiring any arguments whatsoever? And what about the often-discussed arguments against belief in God-is there something that religious and nonreligious people alike can learn from them? This book explores how a novel understanding of atheism is possible - and how it effectively moves the God debate further. Believers and nonbelievers can learn much from Peels's assessment of arguments for and against atheism.

In this book, Rik Peels explores atheism from a new perspective that aims to go beyond the highly polarized debate about arguments for and against God''s existence. Since our beliefs about the most important things in life are not usually based on arguments, we should look beyond atheistic arguments and explore what truly motivates the atheist. Are there certain ideals or experiences that explain the turn to atheism? Could atheism be the default position for us, not requiring any arguments whatsoever? And what about the often-discussed arguments against belief in God—is there something that religious and nonreligious people alike can learn from them? This book explores how a novel understanding of atheism is possible – and how it effectively moves the God debate further. Believers and non-believers can learn much from Peel''s assessment of arguments for and against atheism.

In this book, Rik Peels explores atheism from a new perspective that aims to go beyond the highly polarized debate about arguments for and against God''s existence. Since our beliefs about the most important things in life are not usually based on arguments, we should look beyond atheistic arguments and explore what truly motivates the atheist. Are there certain ideals or experiences that explain the turn to atheism? Could atheism be the default position for us, not requiring any arguments whatsoever? And what about the often-discussed arguments against belief in God—is there something that religious and nonreligious people alike can learn from them? This book explores how a novel understanding of atheism is possible – and how it effectively moves the God debate further. Believers and non-believers can learn much from Peel''s assessment of arguments for and against atheism.

In this book, Rik Peels explores atheism from a new perspective that aims to go beyond the highly polarized debate about arguments for and against God's existence. Since our beliefs about the most important things in life are not usually based on arguments, we should look beyond atheistic arguments and explore what truly motivates the atheist. Are there certain ideals or experiences that explain the turn to atheism? Could atheism be the default position for us, not requiring any arguments whatsoever? And what about the often-discussed arguments against belief in God-is there something that religious and nonreligious people alike can learn from them? This book explores how a novel understanding of atheism is possible - and how it effectively moves the God debate further. Believers and nonbelievers can learn much from Peels's assessment of arguments for and against atheism.

This Element explores the relation between monotheism and fundamentalism. It does so from both an empirical perspective and a more theoretical one that combines theological and philosophical insights. The empirical part addresses how as a matter of fact, particularly quantitively, monotheism and fundamentalism relate to one another. The more theoretical part studies the relation between the two by considering the doctrine of God and the issue of exclusion, theories of revelation, and ethics. Finally, the book considers whether monotheism has particular resources that can be employed in mitigating the consequences of or even altogether preventing fundamentalism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

This Element explores the relation between monotheism and fundamentalism. It does so from both an empirical perspective and a more theoretical one that combines theological and philosophical insights. The empirical part addresses how as a matter of fact, particularly quantitively, monotheism and fundamentalism relate to one another. The more theoretical part studies the relation between the two by considering the doctrine of God and the issue of exclusion, theories of revelation, and ethics. Finally, the book considers whether monotheism has particular resources that can be employed in mitigating the consequences of or even altogether preventing fundamentalism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.