Torsten Persson – författare

This is the first of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and a commentary presented at invited symposium sessions of the Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in London in August 2005. The papers summarise and interpret key developments, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics in economics and econometrics. The papers cover both theory and applications. Written by leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique survey of progress in the discipline.

This is the second of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and a commentary presented at invited symposium sessions of the Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in London in August 2005. The papers summarize and interpret key developments, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics in economics and econometrics. The papers cover both theory and applications. Written by leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique survey of progress in the discipline.

This is the third book of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and a commentary presented at the Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in London in August 2005. The papers summarise and interpret key developments, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics in economics and econometrics. The papers cover both theory and applications. Written by leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique survey of progress in the discipline.

This is the first of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and a commentary presented at invited symposium sessions of the Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in London in August 2005. The papers summarise and interpret key developments, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics in economics and econometrics. The papers cover both theory and applications. Written by leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique survey of progress in the discipline.

This is the second of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and a commentary presented at invited symposium sessions of the Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in London in August 2005. The papers summarize and interpret key developments, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics in economics and econometrics. The papers cover both theory and applications. Written by leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique survey of progress in the discipline.

This is the third book of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and a commentary presented at the Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in London in August 2005. The papers summarise and interpret key developments, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics in economics and econometrics. The papers cover both theory and applications. Written by leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique survey of progress in the discipline.

"Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters - places that tend to combine effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high per-capita incomes. To achieve peace, the authors stress the avoidance of repressive government and civil conflict. Easy taxes, they argue, refers not to low taxes, but a tax system with widespread compliance that collects taxes at a reasonable cost from a broad base, like income. And a tolerable administration of justice is about legal infrastructure that can support the enforcement of contracts and property rights in line with the rule of law.The authors show that countries tend to enjoy all three pillars of prosperity when they have evolved cohesive political institutions that promote common interests, guaranteeing the provision of public goods. In line with much historical research, international conflict has also been an important force behind effective states by fostering common interests. The absence of common interests and/or cohesive political institutions can explain the existence of very different development clusters in fragile states that are plagued by poverty, violence, and weak state capacity.

"Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters--places that tend to combine effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high per-capita incomes. To achieve peace, the authors stress the avoidance of repressive government and civil conflict. Easy taxes, they argue, refers not to low taxes, but a tax system with widespread compliance that collects taxes at a reasonable cost from a broad base, like income. And a tolerable administration of justice is about legal infrastructure that can support the enforcement of contracts and property rights in line with the rule of law.The authors show that countries tend to enjoy all three pillars of prosperity when they have evolved cohesive political institutions that promote common interests, guaranteeing the provision of public goods. In line with much historical research, international conflict has also been an important force behind effective states by fostering common interests. The absence of common interests and/or cohesive political institutions can explain the existence of very different development clusters in fragile states that are plagued by poverty, violence, and weak state capacity.

Below is a list of the prizewinners during the period 1991 – 1995 with a description of the works which won them their prizes:(1991) R H COASE — for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy; (1992) G S BECKER — for having extended the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behaviour and interaction, including nonmarket behaviour; (1993) R W FOGEL & D C NORTH – for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change; (1994) J C HARSANYI, J F NASH & R SELTEN – for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games; (1995) R E LUCAS – for having developed and applied the hypothesis of rational expectations, and thereby having transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our understanding of economic policy.

Below is a list of the prizewinners during the period 1991 – 1995 with a description of the works which won them their prizes:(1991) R H COASE — for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy; (1992) G S BECKER — for having extended the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behaviour and interaction, including nonmarket behaviour; (1993) R W FOGEL & D C NORTH – for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change; (1994) J C HARSANYI, J F NASH & R SELTEN – for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games; (1995) R E LUCAS – for having developed and applied the hypothesis of rational expectations, and thereby having transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our understanding of economic policy.

Below is a list of the prizewinners during the period 1996 – 2000 with a description of the works which won them their prizes:(1996) J A MIRRLEES & W S VICKREY — for their fundamental contributions to the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information; (1997) R C MERTON & M A SCHOLES — for a new method to determine the value of derivatives; (1998) A K SEN — for his contributions to welfare economics; (1999) R A MUNDELL — for his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas; (2000) J J HECKMAN — for his development of theory and methods for analyzing selective samples & D L McFADDEN — for his development of theory and methods for analyzing discrete choice.