Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research – serie

This volume contains contributions to the "systematic study of knowledge." They suggest both an extension and a new path for classical epistemology. The topics in the first volume are the following: concepts and forms of knowledge, epistemic perspectivism, knowledge and world-views, perceptual knowledge, scientific knowledge, models in science, distributed and integrated knowledge, interaction of forms of knowledge, and relation between forms of knowledge and forms of representation.

The volume “Conceptions of Knowledge” collects current essays on contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. The essays are primarily concerned with pragmatic and contextual extensions of analytic epistemology but also deal with traditional questions like the nature of knowledge and skepticism. The topics include the connection between “knowing that” and “knowing how,” the relevance of epistemic abilities, the embedding of knowledge ascriptions in context and contrast classes, the interpretation of skeptical doubt, and the various forms of knowledge.

Recent philosophy and history of science has seen a surge of interest in the role of concepts in scientific research. Scholars working in this new field focus on scientific concepts, rather than theories, as units of analysis and on the ways in which concepts are formed and used rather than on what they represent. They analyze what has traditionally been called the context of discovery, rather than (or in addition to) the context of justification. And they examine the dynamics of research rather than the status of the finished research results.This volume provides detailed case studies and general analyses to address questions raised by these points, such as:- Can concepts be clearly distinguished from the sets of beliefs we have about their referents?- What - if any - sense can be made of the separation between concepts and theories?- Can we distinguish between empirical and theoretical concepts?- Are there interesting similarities and differences between the role of concepts in the empirical sciences and in mathematics?- What underlying notion of investigative practice could be drawn on to explicate the role of concept in such practice? - From a philosophical point of view, is the distinction between discovery and justification a helpful frame of reference for inquiring into the dynamics of research?- From a historiographical point of view, does a focus on concepts face the danger of falling back into an old-fashioned history of ideas?

This volume contains contributions to the “systematic study of knowledge.” They suggest both an extension and a new path for classical epistemology. The topics in the second volume are the following: variants of skepticism; knowledge of the first, second, and third person; practical knowledge and the structure of action; knowledge and the problem of dualism; and disjunctivism concerning experience and perception.

This volume brings out the varieties of forms of philosophical skepticism that have continued to preoccupy philosophers for the past of couple of centuries, as well as the specific varieties of philosophical response that these have engendered — above all, in the work of those who have sought to take their cue from Kant, Wittgenstein, or Cavell — and to illuminate how these philosophical approaches are related to and bear upon one another. The philosophers brought together in this volume are united by the thought that a proper appreciation of the depth of the skeptical challenge must reveal it to be deeply disquieting, in the sense that skepticism threatens not just some set of theoretical commitments, but also-and fundamentally-our very sense of self, world, and other. Second, that skepticism is the proper starting point for any serious attempt to make sense of what philosophy is, and to gauge the prospects of philosophical progress.

The papers in this volume present some of the most recent results of the work about contradictions in philosophical logic and metaphysics; examine the history of contradiction in crucial phases of philosophical thought; consider the relevance of contradictions for political and philosophical actuality. From this consideration a common question emerges: the question of the irreducibility, reality and productive force of (some) contradictions.

Die Monographie untersucht den Gebrauch von Diagrammen zu Erkenntniszwecken. Anhand der Schlüsselszenen von euklidischer Geometrie und spätmittelalterlicher Physik zeigt die Studie, wie Diagramme Räumlichkeit und Regeln, Logik und epistemischen Überschuss, Doppeldeutigkeit und Präzision so verbinden, dass neue Einsichten gewonnen und unbekannte Phänomene erschlossen werden. Zunächst wird erarbeitet, warum konstruierte Diagramme im Allgemeinen mehr Informationen zeigen als zu ihrer Konstruktion aufgewendet werden, mithin einen Erkenntnisüberschuss produzieren. Dieser Überschuss wird gegen eine mächtige bildkritische Tradition als zentrales und legitimes Prinzip der Figurenbeweise der euklidischen Geometrie identifiziert. Schließlich rekonstruiert die Arbeit, wie Nicole Oresme in seiner bahnbrechenden Konfigurationsdoktrin im 14. Jahrhundert die Diagramme Euklids als epistemisches Instrument einsetzt, um eine universale Quantifizierung aller Naturvorgänge vorzunehmen.

This volume treats the topic of rationality developing a perspective that integrates elements of philosophy of language, phenomenology, pragmatism, and philosophy of life. The two reference authors, Wittgenstein and Ortega, are contemporaries but come from different philosophical traditions. Wittgenstein's early work was influenced by logical positivism. Later he developed an influential approach to philosophy of language. Ortega was influenced by Neo-Kantianism, perspectivism, life philosophy, and phenomenology. On this basis, he developed an independent approach that has become known as ratiovitalism. Astonishing affinities between their respective reflections on rationality motivated the experiment of bringing the different approaches into a synergetic relation. Both investigate the structures and limits of rationality, emphasize the importance of basic beliefs, and criticize the restriction of rationality concepts to the intellectual sphere.The contributions of the volume focus on: dynamics of belief and knowledge, implicit and explicit knowledge, the concept of “vital reason”, the role of world-pictures and forms of life, questions regarding certainty, ignorance, doubt, and madness, as well as matters of pluralism and relativism.

This volume brings out the varieties of forms of philosophical skepticism that have continued to preoccupy philosophers for the past of couple of centuries, as well as the specific varieties of philosophical response that these have engendered — above all, in the work of those who have sought to take their cue from Kant, Wittgenstein, or Cavell — and to illuminate how these philosophical approaches are related to and bear upon one another. The philosophers brought together in this volume are united by the thought that a proper appreciation of the depth of the skeptical challenge must reveal it to be deeply disquieting, in the sense that skepticism threatens not just some set of theoretical commitments, but also-and fundamentally-our very sense of self, world, and other. Second, that skepticism is the proper starting point for any serious attempt to make sense of what philosophy is, and to gauge the prospects of philosophical progress.

How do people and institutions manage to bring their different perspectives into an effective and productive interplay? How can we overcome obstacles for the creative potentials of distributed perspectives? Traditionally, the perspectives of people and institutions are considered to be fixed and isolated points of view. In such a picture, the perspectives seem determined in advance by positions and persons seem trapped within their perspectival horizons. In contrast, the new approach of this volume’s contributions focuses on the simple but fundamental fact that people (in their perceiving, speaking, thinking, and acting) always already refer to fellow human beings and coordinate their own perspectives with those of other persons and institutions. The contributions of the present volume concentrate on the structures, mechanisms, and dynamics of the interplays of different perspectives of interacting, communicating, and cooperating persons and institutions. The volume focuses on how the creative potentials as well as the organizational effectiveness of distributed perspectives can be set free.

There is at present no publication specifically dedicated to analyzing the philosophical implications of augmented reality, especially regarding knowledge formation, which constitutes a fundamental trait of knowledge society. That is why this volume includes an analysis of the applications and implications of augmented reality. While applications cover diverse fields like psychopathology and education, implications concern issues as diverse as negative knowledge, group cognition, the internet of things, and ontological issues, among others. In this way, it is intended not only to generate answers, but also, to draw attention to new problems that arise with the diffusion of augmented reality. In order to contemplate these problems from diverse perspectives, the auhors are from a variety of fields - philosophy, computer sciencess, education, psychology, and many more. Accordingly, the volume offers varied and interesting contributions which are of interest to professionals from multiple disciplines.

World-leading anthropologists and philosophers pursue the perplexing question fundamental to both disciplines: What is it to think of ourselves as human? A common theme is the open-ended and context-dependent nature of our notion of the human, one upshot of which is that perplexities over that notion can only be dealt with in a piecemeal fashion, and in relation to concrete real-life circumstances. Philosophical anthropology, understood as the exploration of such perplexities, will thus be both recognizably philosophical in character and inextricably bound up with anthropological fieldwork. The volume is put together accordingly: Precisely by mixing ostensibly philosophical papers with papers that engage in close anthropological study of concrete issues, it is meant to reflect the vital tie between these two aspects of the overall philosophical-anthropological enterprise. The collection will be of great interest to philosophers and anthropologists alike, and essential reading for anyone interested in the interconnections between the two disciplines.

Pasgaard-Westerman rethinks the ontological and epistemological understanding of world, other and self by opposing the general anthropological paradigm within contemporary philosophy. Signs and interpretations are not functions of Man; instead Man is conceived as certain "signo-interpretational" relations to world, other and self. Opposing more traditional hermeneutical approaches the signo-interpretational relations towards world, other and self are understood as a "skeptical disposition". This skeptical disposition undercuts usual epistemological problems of skepticism and instead designates the permanent incompleteness of the process of interpretation and formulates an ethical imperative. This ethical imperative aims at an active dissolution of fixed signs; an openness towards other signs; and the holding back of definite interpretations. The book discusses how world appear as a sign-world, how the other appear within interpretational patterns, and how our signs of self are experienced. Discussing a wide range of epistemological and ontological questions and taking into account the perspectives of a broad range of philosophical traditions, a signo-interpretational account of reality, world-versions, other persons and self is presented.

Erkenntnisprozesse spielen in der Filmerfahrung eine zentrale Rolle. Dabei vermitteln Filme offenbar nicht einfach nur Tatsachenwissen, wie es gleichermaßen etwa in Aussagen ausgedrückt oder durch Beobachtung belegt würde. Das Wissen, das für die Wahrnehmung filmischer Bewegungsbilder charakteristisch ist, hat vielmehr eine spezifische Form: Es ist bestimmt durch Merkmale der Bildlichkeit, des zeitlich-dynamischen Zeigens, des Filmtons und des sprachlichen Ausdrucks. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden diese Aspekte in ihrer filmischen Einheit gedacht. Ausgehend von dieser Idee tragen einschlägige Positionen der Filmtheorie, der phänomenologischen Bildtheorie und der Epistemologie zu einer systematischen Bestimmung der epistemischen Objekte des Films bei. Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung bilden die Grundlage für eine philosophische Konzeption des Films, in deren Rahmen klassische Fragen der Filmtheorie beantwortet werden können - z. B. nach dem Status von Ton, Musik und Sprache im vermeintlich rein visuellen Filmbild, nach der Rolle der Subjektivität im Film und nach den Möglichkeiten einer besonderen philosophischen Kraft des Films.

Fred Stoutland was a major figure in the philosophy of action and philosophy of language. This collection brings together essays on truth, language, action and mind and thus provides an important summary of many key themes in Stoutland’s own work, as well as offering valuable perspectives on key issues in contemporary philosophy.

Much attention has been paid to Wittgenstein’s treatment of solipsism and to Cavell’s treatment of skepticism. But comparatively little has been made of the striking connections between the early Wittgenstein’s view on the truth of solipsism and Cavell’s view on the truth of skepticism, and how that relates to the claim that the later Wittgenstein sees privacy as a constant human possibility. This book offers close readings of representative writings by both authors and argues that an adequate understanding of solipsism and skepticism requires taking into account a set of underlying difficulties related to a disappointment with finitude which might ultimately lead to the threat of solipsism. That threat is further interpreted as a wish not to bear the burden of having to constantly negotiate and nurture the fragile connections with the world and others which are the conditions of possibility for finite beings to achieve meaning and community. By presenting Wittgenstein’s and Cavell’s responses in an order which reflects the chronology of their writings, the result is a cohesive articulation of some under-appreciated aspects of their philosophical methodologies which has the potential of reorienting our entire reading of their work.

Hilary Whitehall Putnam was one of the leading philosophers of the second half of the 20th century. As student of Rudolph Carnap's and Hans Reichenbach's, he went on to become not only a major figure in North American analytic philosophy, who made significant contributions to the philosophy of mind, language, mathematics, and physics but also to the disciplines of logic, number theory, and computer science. He passed away on March 13, 2016. The present volume is a memorial to his extraordinary intellectual contributions, honoring his contributions as a philosopher, a thinker, and a public intellectual. It features essays by an international team of leading philosophers, covering all aspects of Hilary Putnam's philosophy from his work in ethics and the history of philosophy to his contributions to the philosophy of science, logic, and mathematics. Each essay is an original contribution. “Hilary Putnam is one of the most distinguished philosophers of the modern era, and just speaking personally, one of the smartest and most impressive thinkers I have ever been privileged to know—as a good friend for 70 years. The fine essays collected here are a fitting tribute to a most remarkable figure.” Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology “In Engaging Putnam excellent philosophers engage the writings and ideas of Hilary Putnam, one of the most productive and influential philosophers of the last century. Putnam stands out because of the combination of brilliance and a firm grasp of reality he brought to a very broad range of issues: the logic and the philosophy of mathematics, free-will, skepticism, realism, internalism and externalism and a lot more. Along with this he offered penetrating insights about other great philosophers, from Aristotle to Wittgenstein. All great philosophers make us think. With many, we try to figure out the strange things they say. With Putnam, we are made to think about clearly explained examples and arguments that get to the heart of the issues he confronts. This book is a wonderful contribution to the continuation of Putnam-inspired thinking.” John Perry, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University

Vulnerability has become part of our everyday vocabulary. We are used to hearing that we ought to act so as to protect the highly vulnerable; the qualifier suggests that we are all vulnerable. In addition to being of contemporary relevance, the notion of vulnerability has also been at the heart of philosophical reflection since the birth of the discipline, playing a vital role across many different traditions. Its prevalence is unsurprising. Vulnerability, which partially defines us as human beings, has appeared in many guises: mortality, finitude, sin, ignorance, etc. However, no attempt has yet been made to fully apply the notion of vulnerability to the domains of epistemology and the philosophy of science, to relate it to our general human vulnerability, and to explore the wide range of consequences that derive from it. The contributors of this book fill this gap; they present new approaches to classical problems. They highlight different aspects of our cognitive vulnerability, from issues related to the realism/antirealism debate to reflections on epistemic success and trust.

The idea that there is a distinctively practical use of reason, and correspondingly a distinctively practical form of knowledge, unites many otherwise diverse voices in the history of practical philosophy: from Aristotle to Kant, from Rousseau to Marx, from Hegel to G.E.M. Anscombe, and many others. This volume gathers works by scholars who take inspiration from these and many other historical figures in order to deepen our systematic understanding of questions raised by their work that still are, or ought to be, at the center of contemporary philosophical debate: the form and nature of practical reasoning, agential self-consciousness or practical knowledge, how knowledge of the good relates to our motivational capacity, and the shape of philosophical thinking about sound forms of living together. Accordingly, the volume is divided into three parts: action theory, meta-ethics, and political philosophy. This fusion of perspectives delivers novel possibilities not only for answering the systematic questions outlined above, but also for understanding both what unifies and distinguishes those historical voices that have sought to articulate the concept of practical reason. “This fascinating volume brings out the richness and profundity of an oft-neglected approach to understanding human agency, one that foregrounds action as itself an exercise of reason. Essays on ethics, mind, action, and political philosophy explore the history, substance, and implications of this idea, cutting across while also revealing the unity underlying various parts of philosophy that are typically treated separately.” – Eric Marcus, Auburn University

Hilary Whitehall Putnam was one of the leading philosophers of the second half of the 20th century. As student of Rudolph Carnap's and Hans Reichenbach's, he went on to become not only a major figure in North American analytic philosophy, who made significant contributions to the philosophy of mind, language, mathematics, and physics but also to the disciplines of logic, number theory, and computer science. He passed away on March 13, 2016. The present volume is a memorial to his extraordinary intellectual contributions, honoring his contributions as a philosopher, a thinker, and a public intellectual. It features essays by an international team of leading philosophers, covering all aspects of Hilary Putnam's philosophy from his work in ethics and the history of philosophy to his contributions to the philosophy of science, logic, and mathematics. Each essay is an original contribution. “Hilary Putnam is one of the most distinguished philosophers of the modern era, and just speaking personally, one of the smartest and most impressive thinkers I have ever been privileged to know—as a good friend for 70 years. The fine essays collected here are a fitting tribute to a most remarkable figure.” Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology “In Engaging Putnam excellent philosophers engage the writings and ideas of Hilary Putnam, one of the most productive and influential philosophers of the last century. Putnam stands out because of the combination of brilliance and a firm grasp of reality he brought to a very broad range of issues: the logic and the philosophy of mathematics, free-will, skepticism, realism, internalism and externalism and a lot more. Along with this he offered penetrating insights about other great philosophers, from Aristotle to Wittgenstein. All great philosophers make us think. With many, we try to figure out the strange things they say. With Putnam, we are made to think about clearly explained examples and arguments that get to the heart of the issues he confronts. This book is a wonderful contribution to the continuation of Putnam-inspired thinking.” John Perry, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University