Elements in Ancient Philosophy - Böcker

This Element offers a systematic outline of ancient conceptions and uses of suspension of belief (understood broadly) while engaging with contemporary philosophy. It discusses the notion of epochē ('suspension of judgement') and other related terms, like aporia, aphasia, paradox, hypothesis, agnosticism, and Socratic wisdom. It examines the Academic and Pyrrhonian sceptics and some of their arguments and strategies for suspension. It also includes the use and conditions for suspension of belief in other philosophers like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus, Protagoras, and Democritus. The Element is divided into four thematic sections, each addressing one of the following questions: What is suspension of belief? When does it arise? What could its scope be? And what are its practical and moral implications?

The Stoics distinguish two forms of eros. In vicious agents eros is indeed a passion and thus born out of a defective rational judgment about what is needed for happiness. But there is also a positive form of erotic love, practiced by the Sage on the basis of knowledge, which aims to reproduce his virtuous condition in others. In this Element, the author shows how the Stoics' wider theoretical commitments in ethics, epistemology, aesthetics, and psychology support their duplex account of eros. They also consider the influence of Plato's Symposium on the Stoic account, arguing for hitherto unrecognized links with Socratic moral psychology. The Element concludes with an assessment of how the Stoic erotic ideal fares in relation to our intuitions about the non-egoistic and particularized nature of love.

This Element provides an overview of how the ancient thinkers (Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle) theorised about properties; such overview puts in relief the inquiries, problems and solutions they were pursuing while engaged in dialogue with each other. It examines alternative philosophical perspectives existing in antiquity concerning the explanation of property qualification, qualitative similarity, compositeness, and oneness. It further argues that although Plato was the first to conceptualise recurring universals, he did not reify them and did not admit them in his ontology; it was Aristotle who did, and developed his metaphysics around them. Aristotle, building on Plato's work, identified the metaphysical phenomenon of the instantiation of properties and developed an account for it. Finally, this Element outlines Aristotle's 'sophisticated' account of the oneness of a substance and argues that it was not hylomorphic.

Mathematician and astronomer Eudoxus of Cnidus was a younger contemporary of Plato and an older contemporary of Aristotle, on both of whom he exerted some influence during his stays in Athens. This is perhaps most apparent with regard to his ethical doctrine that identifies the good as pleasure (hedonism). While Plato seems rather unsure how seriously to take this proposal, Aristotle provides the materials for reconstructing the battery of ingenious arguments that Eudoxus brought forward in its defence. Taken together in this Element, these arguments foreshadow almost everything that has been said in the Western tradition in favour of the positive value of pleasure, and, if taken aright, point in the direction of a hedonism that sets store by the cultivation of activities akin to those for which Eudoxus has been most renowned: mathematics and astronomy.

This Element concerns the civic value of contemplation in Plato and Aristotle: how does intellectual contemplation contribute to the happiness of the ideal state? The texts discussed include the Republic, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, works in which contemplation is viewed from a political angle. The Element concludes that in the Republic contemplation has purely instrumental value, whereas in the Politics and Nicomachean Ethics it has purely intrinsic value. To do justice to the complexity of the issues involved, the author addresses a broader question about the nature of civic happiness: whether it is merely the aggregate of individual happiness or an organic quality that arises from the structure of the state. Answering this question has implications for how contemplation contributes to civic happiness. The Element also discusses how many citizens Plato and Aristotle expected to be engaged in contemplation in the ideal state.

Many think that reality is structured such that some beings are more fundamental than others and characterize this structure in terms of "grounding." Grounding is typically regarded as explanatory and as exhibiting certain order-theoretic properties: asymmetry, irreflexivity, and transitivity. Aristotle's notion of ontological priority, which inspired discussions of grounding, also has these features. This Element clarifies Aristotle's discussions of ontological priority, explores how it relates to other kinds of priority, and identifies important connections to metaphysical grounding. Aristotle provides numerous examples that appear to impugn ontological priority's order-theoretic coherence. This is Aristotle's "Priority Problem." But Aristotle has an independently motivated solution that eliminates the threat from each of the apparently problematic examples and explains why such examples are ubiquitous. The Element argues that a ground-theoretic analog of Aristotle's solution to the Priority Problem addresses recent challenges to grounding. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Mathematician and astronomer Eudoxus of Cnidus was a younger contemporary of Plato and an older contemporary of Aristotle, on both of whom he exerted some influence during his stays in Athens. This is perhaps most apparent with regard to his ethical doctrine that identifies the good as pleasure (hedonism). While Plato seems rather unsure how seriously to take this proposal, Aristotle provides the materials for reconstructing the battery of ingenious arguments that Eudoxus brought forward in its defence. Taken together in this Element, these arguments foreshadow almost everything that has been said in the Western tradition in favour of the positive value of pleasure, and, if taken aright, point in the direction of a hedonism that sets store by the cultivation of activities akin to those for which Eudoxus has been most renowned: mathematics and astronomy.

Ancient philosophers offer intriguing accounts of vice - virtue's bad twin. This Element considers injustice and lawlessness in Plato and Aristotle. Starting with Socrates' paradoxical claim that 'tyrants and orators do just about nothing they want to do' (Gorgias 466d-e), it examines discussions of moral ignorance and corruption of character in Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle's account of vice is indebted to Plato's. But his claims have confounded critics. Why is the vicious agent full of regrets when he acts in accordance with his wish? To what extent is vice a form of moral ignorance? Why will the unjust man never get what he wants? These and other questions yield new insights into ancient Greek ethics and moral psychology, as well as surprising perspectives on contemporary debates.

This Element provides an overview of how the ancient thinkers (Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle) theorised about properties; such overview puts in relief the inquiries, problems and solutions they were pursuing while engaged in dialogue with each other. It examines alternative philosophical perspectives existing in antiquity concerning the explanation of property qualification, qualitative similarity, compositeness, and oneness. It further argues that although Plato was the first to conceptualise recurring universals, he did not reify them and did not admit them in his ontology; it was Aristotle who did, and developed his metaphysics around them. Aristotle, building on Plato's work, identified the metaphysical phenomenon of the instantiation of properties and developed an account for it. Finally, this Element outlines Aristotle's 'sophisticated' account of the oneness of a substance and argues that it was not hylomorphic.

This Element offers a systematic outline of ancient conceptions and uses of suspension of belief (understood broadly) while engaging with contemporary philosophy. It discusses the notion of epochē ('suspension of judgement') and other related terms, like aporia, aphasia, paradox, hypothesis, agnosticism, and Socratic wisdom. It examines the Academic and Pyrrhonian sceptics and some of their arguments and strategies for suspension. It also includes the use and conditions for suspension of belief in other philosophers like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus, Protagoras, and Democritus. The Element is divided into four thematic sections, each addressing one of the following questions: What is suspension of belief? When does it arise? What could its scope be? And what are its practical and moral implications?

The Stoics distinguish two forms of eros. In vicious agents eros is indeed a passion and thus born out of a defective rational judgment about what is needed for happiness. But there is also a positive form of erotic love, practiced by the Sage on the basis of knowledge, which aims to reproduce his virtuous condition in others. In this Element, the author shows how the Stoics' wider theoretical commitments in ethics, epistemology, aesthetics, and psychology support their duplex account of eros. They also consider the influence of Plato's Symposium on the Stoic account, arguing for hitherto unrecognized links with Socratic moral psychology. The Element concludes with an assessment of how the Stoic erotic ideal fares in relation to our intuitions about the non-egoistic and particularized nature of love.

This Element examines the arguments advanced by the Tübingen-Milan School in support of the claim that Plato had Unwritten Doctrines (agrapha dogmata), revealed in Aristotle and other testimonia and indicated - but not explicitly treated - in some of his dialogues. The Unwritten Doctrines are primarily concerned with Plato's Theory of Principles of (the One and the Indefinite Dyad) which accounts for unity and multiplicity respectively. This Element considers two opposing approaches to reading Plato: that of sola scriptura (through the writings alone) or via the tradition. While it may appear counter-intuitive to privilege other sources over Plato's own works, his criticism of writing in the Phaedrus and the 'deliberate gaps', where he teases the reader with the possibility of a fuller response than that provided on the current occasion, firmly indicate the existence of doctrines not committed to his dialogues.

This Element examines the arguments advanced by the Tübingen-Milan School in support of the claim that Plato had Unwritten Doctrines (agrapha dogmata), revealed in Aristotle and other testimonia and indicated - but not explicitly treated - in some of his dialogues. The Unwritten Doctrines are primarily concerned with Plato's Theory of Principles of (the One and the Indefinite Dyad) which accounts for unity and multiplicity respectively. This Element considers two opposing approaches to reading Plato: that of sola scriptura (through the writings alone) or via the tradition. While it may appear counter-intuitive to privilege other sources over Plato's own works, his criticism of writing in the Phaedrus and the 'deliberate gaps', where he teases the reader with the possibility of a fuller response than that provided on the current occasion, firmly indicate the existence of doctrines not committed to his dialogues.

This Element concerns the civic value of contemplation in Plato and Aristotle: how does intellectual contemplation contribute to the happiness of the ideal state? The texts discussed include the Republic, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, works in which contemplation is viewed from a political angle. The Element concludes that in the Republic contemplation has purely instrumental value, whereas in the Politics and Nicomachean Ethics it has purely intrinsic value. To do justice to the complexity of the issues involved, the author addresses a broader question about the nature of civic happiness: whether it is merely the aggregate of individual happiness or an organic quality that arises from the structure of the state. Answering this question has implications for how contemplation contributes to civic happiness. The Element also discusses how many citizens Plato and Aristotle expected to be engaged in contemplation in the ideal state.

Many think that reality is structured such that some beings are more fundamental than others and characterize this structure in terms of "grounding." Grounding is typically regarded as explanatory and as exhibiting certain order-theoretic properties: asymmetry, irreflexivity, and transitivity. Aristotle's notion of ontological priority, which inspired discussions of grounding, also has these features. This Element clarifies Aristotle's discussions of ontological priority, explores how it relates to other kinds of priority, and identifies important connections to metaphysical grounding. Aristotle provides numerous examples that appear to impugn ontological priority's order-theoretic coherence. This is Aristotle's "Priority Problem." But Aristotle has an independently motivated solution that eliminates the threat from each of the apparently problematic examples and explains why such examples are ubiquitous. The Element argues that a ground-theoretic analog of Aristotle's solution to the Priority Problem addresses recent challenges to grounding. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Theophrastus' so-called Metaphysics presents a series of difficulties for various accounts of first principles, including Platonist ones but also - and especially - Aristotle's. Hence, many scholars think that Theophrastus abandons some of his teacher's core commitments, such as the prime mover or natural teleology. Other interpreters, by contrast, emphasize the aporematic character of the work and do not take Theophrastus to be truly critical of Aristotle. In the author's view, neither reading captures the character of the treatise. For, as argued in this Element, Theophrastus probes the Aristotelian account of first principles in earnest. But this is not to say that he abandons it. Rather, Theophrastus is an internal critic of an Aristotelian framework to which he himself is committed but of which he thinks that it requires further elaboration.

Theophrastus' so-called Metaphysics presents a series of difficulties for various accounts of first principles, including Platonist ones but also - and especially - Aristotle's. Hence, many scholars think that Theophrastus abandons some of his teacher's core commitments, such as the prime mover or natural teleology. Other interpreters, by contrast, emphasize the aporematic character of the work and do not take Theophrastus to be truly critical of Aristotle. In the author's view, neither reading captures the character of the treatise. For, as argued in this Element, Theophrastus probes the Aristotelian account of first principles in earnest. But this is not to say that he abandons it. Rather, Theophrastus is an internal critic of an Aristotelian framework to which he himself is committed but of which he thinks that it requires further elaboration.

This Element offers a new historical account of Aristippus the Elder's views on pleasure and the present. Instead of treating Aristippus as merely proto-Cyrenaic or anachronistically modern, it uncovers in the ancient sources a neglected form of hedonism that endorses a present-focused therapeutic policy, while exploring its underlying motivations. Aristippan hedonism promotes a moment-to-moment disposition to pleasure rather than its maximization through future calculation, supporting a euthymic model of well-being that prioritizes the present. After distinguishing Aristippus from the later Cyrenaics regarding hedonic calculations to maximize pleasure, the Element yet supports continuity with his followers in the cognitive elements of the concept and the experience of pleasure, challenging his alleged sensualism in this way. Once the historical groundwork is in place, the Element introduces the hypothesis of the plasticity of the present, which moves beyond historical interpretation to offer an ethical-psychological account of a sustained focus on present time.

This Element offers a new historical account of Aristippus the Elder's views on pleasure and the present. Instead of treating Aristippus as merely proto-Cyrenaic or anachronistically modern, it uncovers in the ancient sources a neglected form of hedonism that endorses a present-focused therapeutic policy, while exploring its underlying motivations. Aristippan hedonism promotes a moment-to-moment disposition to pleasure rather than its maximization through future calculation, supporting a euthymic model of well-being that prioritizes the present. After distinguishing Aristippus from the later Cyrenaics regarding hedonic calculations to maximize pleasure, the Element yet supports continuity with his followers in the cognitive elements of the concept and the experience of pleasure, challenging his alleged sensualism in this way. Once the historical groundwork is in place, the Element introduces the hypothesis of the plasticity of the present, which moves beyond historical interpretation to offer an ethical-psychological account of a sustained focus on present time.

A relative change occurs when some item changes a relation. This Element examines how Plato, Aristotle, Stoics and Sextus Empiricus approached relative change. Relative change is puzzling because the following three propositions each seem true but cannot be true together: (1) No relative changes are intrinsic changes; (2) Only intrinsic changes are proper changes; (3) Some relative changes are proper changes. Plato's Theaetetus and Phaedo property relative change. I argue that these dialogues assume relative changes to be intrinsic changes, so denying (1). Aristotle responds differently, by denying (3) that relative change is proper change. The Stoics claimed that some non-intrinsic changes are changes (denying (2)). Finally, I discuss Sextus' argument that relative change shows that there are no relatives at all.

Ancient philosophers offer intriguing accounts of vice - virtue's bad twin. This Element considers injustice and lawlessness in Plato and Aristotle. Starting with Socrates' paradoxical claim that 'tyrants and orators do just about nothing they want to do' (Gorgias 466d-e), it examines discussions of moral ignorance and corruption of character in Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle's account of vice is indebted to Plato's. But his claims have confounded critics. Why is the vicious agent full of regrets when he acts in accordance with his wish? To what extent is vice a form of moral ignorance? Why will the unjust man never get what he wants? These and other questions yield new insights into ancient Greek ethics and moral psychology, as well as surprising perspectives on contemporary debates.

This Element defends an interpretation of Plato's Ion on which its primary concern is with audience reception of poetry. The dialogue countenances and rejects two models of poetic reception, the expertise model and the inspiration model, both of which make the audience entirely passive in relation to poetry; and it presents the character of Ion as a comedic figure, a self-ignorant fool whose foolishness is a function of his passive relation to Homer. In the end, this Element argues that, for Plato, critical engagement is the proper way for audiences to treat poetry. This view holds open the possibility that poetry may express some truths without thereby endorsing the idea that poets are experts who have authoritative knowledge.

This Element provides an account of Aristotle on women which combines what is found in his scientific biology with his practical philosophy. Scholars have often debated how these two fields are related. The current study shows that according to Aristotelian biology, women are set up for intelligence and tend to be milder-tempered than men. Thus, women are not curtailed either intellectually or morally by their biology. The biological basis for the rule of men over women is women's lack of spiritedness. Aristotle's Politics must be read with its audience in mind; there is a need to convince men of the importance of avoiding insurrection both in the city and the household. While their spiritedness gives men the upper hand, they are encouraged to listen to the views of free women in order to achieve the best life for all.

The main objective of this Element is to reconstruct Aristotle's view on the nature of ontological priority in the Categories. Over the last three decades, investigations into ontological dependence and priority have become a major concern in contemporary metaphysics. Many see Aristotle as the originator of these discussions and, as a consequence, there is considerable interest in his own account of ontological dependence. In light of the renewed interest in Aristotelian metaphysics, it will be worthwhile - both historically and systematically - to return to Aristotle himself and to see how he himself conceived of ontological priority (what he calls 'priority in substance' [proteron kata ousian] or 'priority in nature' [proteron tēi phusei]), which is to be understood as a form of asymmetric ontological dependence.