Law and Politics – serie

This book addresses the relevance of the state of exception for the analysis of law, while reflecting on the deeper symbolic and jurisprudential significance of the coalescence between law and force.The concept of the state of exception has become a central topos in political and legal philosophy as well as in critical theory. The theoretical apparatus of the state of exception sharply captures the uneasy relationship between law, life and politics in the contemporary global setting, while also challenging the comforting narratives that uncritically connect democracy with the tradition of the rule of law. Drawing on critical legal theory, continental jurisprudence, political philosophy and history, this book explores the genealogy of the concept of the state of exception and reflects on its legal embodiment in past and present contexts – including Weimar and Nazi Germany, contemporary Europe and Turkey. In doing so, it explores the disruptive force of the exception for legal and political thought, as it recuperates its contemporary critical potential.The book will be of interest to students and scholars in the field of jurisprudence, philosophy and critical legal theory.

First published in 1917 (Part 1) and 1918 (Part 2), with a second edition in 1946, this is the first English translation of Santi Romano’s classic work, L’ordinamento giuridico (The Legal Order). The main focus of The Legal Order is the notion of institution, which Romano considers to be both the core and distinguishing feature of law. After criticising accounts of the nature of law centred on notions of rule, coercion or authority, he offers a compelling conception, not merely of law as an institution, but of the institution as ‘the first, original and essential manifestation of law’. Romano advances a definition of a legal institution as any group who share rules within a bounded context: for example, a family, a firm, a factory, a prison, an association, a church, an illegal organisation, a state, the community of states, and so on. Therefore, this understanding of legal institutionalism at the same time provides a ground-breaking theory of legal pluralism whereby ‘there are as many legal orders as institutions’. The acme of a jurisprudential current long overlooked in the Anglophone environment (Romano’s work is highly regarded in France, Germany, Spain and South America, as well as in Italy), The Legal Order not only proposes what Carl Schmitt described as a ‘very significant theory’. More importantly, it offers precious insights for a thorough rethinking of the relationship between law and society in today’s world.

This book develops a historical concept of liberal democratic law through readings of the pivotal twentieth century legal theoretical positions articulated in the work of Herbert Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Duncan Kennedy, Rudolf Smend, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt.It assesses the jurisprudential projects and positions of these theorists against the background of a long history of European metaphysics from which the modern concept of liberal democratic law emerged. Two key narratives are central to this history of European political and legal metaphysics. Both concern the historical development of the concept of nomos that emerged in early Greek legal and political thought. The first concerns the history of philosophical reflection on the epistemological and ontological status of legal concepts that runs from Plato to Hobbes (the realist-nominalist debate as it became known later). The second concerns the history of philosophical and political discourses on law, sovereignty and justice that starts with the nomos-physis debate in fifth century Athens and runs through medieval, modern and twentieth century conceptualisations of the relationship between law and power. Methodologically, the reading of the legal theoretical positions of Hart, Dworkin, Kennedy, Smend, Kelsen and Schmitt articulated in this book is presented as a distillation process that extracts the pure elements of liberal democratic law from the metaphysical narratives that not only cradled it, but also smothered and distorted its essential aspirations.Drawing together key insights from across the fields of jurisprudence and philosophy, this book offers an important and original re-articulation of the concept of democratic law.

This book develops a historical concept of liberal democratic law through readings of the pivotal twentieth century legal theoretical positions articulated in the work of Herbert Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Duncan Kennedy, Rudolf Smend, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt.It assesses the jurisprudential projects and positions of these theorists against the background of a long history of European metaphysics from which the modern concept of liberal democratic law emerged. Two key narratives are central to this history of European political and legal metaphysics. Both concern the historical development of the concept of nomos that emerged in early Greek legal and political thought. The first concerns the history of philosophical reflection on the epistemological and ontological status of legal concepts that runs from Plato to Hobbes (the realist-nominalist debate as it became known later). The second concerns the history of philosophical and political discourses on law, sovereignty and justice that starts with the nomos-physis debate in fifth century Athens and runs through medieval, modern and twentieth century conceptualisations of the relationship between law and power. Methodologically, the reading of the legal theoretical positions of Hart, Dworkin, Kennedy, Smend, Kelsen and Schmitt articulated in this book is presented as a distillation process that extracts the pure elements of liberal democratic law from the metaphysical narratives that not only cradled it, but also smothered and distorted its essential aspirations.Drawing together key insights from across the fields of jurisprudence and philosophy, this book offers an important and original re-articulation of the concept of democratic law.

Presenting legal and philosophical essays on money, this book exploresthe conditions according to which an object like a piece of paper, or anelectronic signal, has come to be seen as having a value.Money plays a crucial role in the regulation of social relationships andtheir normative determination. It is thus integral to the very nature of the“social”, and the question of how society is kept together by a networkof agreements, conventions, exchanges, and codes. All of which mustbe traced down. The technologies of money discussed here by Searle,Ferraris, and Condello show how we conceive the category of the social atthe intersection of individual and collective intentionality, documentality,and materiality. All of these dimensions, as the introduction to this volumedemonstrates, are of vital importance for legal theory and for a whole set oflegal concepts that are crucial in reflections on the relationship between law,philosophy, and society.

The Politics of Juridification offers a timely contribution to debates about how politics is being affected by the increasing relevance of judicial bodies to the daily administration of Western political communities. While most critical analyses portray juridification as a depoliticizing, de-democratizing transferral of political authority to the courts (whether national or international), this book centres on the workable ambivalence of such a far-reaching phenomenon. While juridification certainly intensifies the power and competences of judicial bodies to the disadvantage of representative political institutions, it cannot be easily reduced to the demise of democratic politics. By focusing on the multiple ways in which social agents make use of the law, The Politics of Juridification teases out the agential and transformative aspects of the various negotiations social agents engage with legal institutions with a view to obtaining political visibility. In particular, the book homes in on two seemingly distinct phenomena: on one hand, the regulation of sexuality and emerging kinship formations; on the other, the fragmentation of legal settings due to the claims to legal autonomy advanced by sub-state cultural and religious groups. By doing so, the book makes the case for an unexpected convergence between the struggles for legal recognition of sexual minorities and religious and cultural minorities. The conclusion is that juridification does entail normalization and favour the infiltration of law into the social realm. But because of its ambivalent nature, it can and does serve as an alternative vehicle for social change – one that attaches more importance to how social agents produce law on a daily basis and how this law permeates official legal orders.

This book addresses how the erosion of traditional forms of political association and legal regulation has given rise to a pluralism of "imperfect communities" constantly exposed to the risk of dissolution. These are niches and micro-worlds that are connected through precarious and ambivalent ties. Such a far-reaching transformation affects at one and the same time both our psychic and social identity. The book argues that this phenomenon is linked to the proliferation of new forms of psychic "disorder" – depression, personality disorder, dissociation – typical of hypermodern societies. However, while these can easily turn into genuine disorders, they can also open onto richer forms of identity, more complex than those of the past. Based on this analysis, the book’s main claim is that this dynamic epitomizes a general anthropological paradox – one that has always marked the human animal: humans are bound by their own biological constitution to fend off disorder by drawing the boundaries of artificial niches, and yet they are inclined to expose themselves to unlimited contingency so that they can find a truly suitable environment.Pursuing a novel understanding of the apparent collapse of traditional juridico-political settings, this book makes the case that the emergence of dissociations at several levels – individual, social, political, legal – does not stem from a lack of political imagination. Rather, it is a situation with which humans are inevitably confronted: a perennial tension between the limited and the unlimited, between the desire to take refuge and the desire to cross borders.

In the last decade, the changing role of time in society has once again taken centre stage in the academic debate. A prominent, but surely not the only, aspect of this debate hinges on the so-called acceleration of time and its societal consequences. Despite the fact that time is fundamental to the way in which law and politics function, the influence of the contemporary experience of time on law and politics remains underdeveloped. How, for example, does society’s structural acceleration impact on justice? Does law actually offer stability and predictability in an ever-changing global world? How can legal and political institutions function in the wake of ever-increasing uncertainty? Both law and politics employ time to order society but they are also limited in what can be effectuated by time. It is this very tension between temporal possibilities and limitations that the contributors to this collection – drawn from different fields of law, as well as from other disciplines – examine.

With a Foreword by Lars Vinx, this book is the first complete English translation of the Italian jurist, Emilio Betti’s classic work Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften, originally published in 1962.Betti’s hermeneutical theory is presented here as a ‘general methodology of the sciences of the spirit’, such as to allow the achievement of objectivity, however relative it might be. Its central focus is the tension between an object, to be considered in its autonomy, and the subjectivity of the interpreter, who can understand the object only by means of his or her own categories, historical-cultural conditions, and interests. Set against the work of Bultmann and Gadamer, Betti is concerned to limit the arbitrariness of subjectivity without diminishing the place of interpretation. Detailing the principles that govern, and therefore, guide any interpretation, Betti traces how interpretation in art and in literature, as well as in the fields of science, jurisprudence, sociology, and economy, can be said to be objective, albeit only ever in a relative sense. This summa of Betti’s key contribution to hermeneutic theory will be of interest across a range of disciplines, including legal and literary theory, philosophy, as well as the history and sociology of law.

This book addresses the relevance of the state of exception for the analysis of law, while reflecting on the deeper symbolic and jurisprudential significance of the coalescence between law and force.The concept of the state of exception has become a central topos in political and legal philosophy as well as in critical theory. The theoretical apparatus of the state of exception sharply captures the uneasy relationship between law, life and politics in the contemporary global setting, while also challenging the comforting narratives that uncritically connect democracy with the tradition of the rule of law. Drawing on critical legal theory, continental jurisprudence, political philosophy and history, this book explores the genealogy of the concept of the state of exception and reflects on its legal embodiment in past and present contexts – including Weimar and Nazi Germany, contemporary Europe and Turkey. In doing so, it explores the disruptive force of the exception for legal and political thought, as it recuperates its contemporary critical potential.The book will be of interest to students and scholars in the field of jurisprudence, philosophy and critical legal theory.

Addressing the influential analysis of law and literature, this book offers a new perspective on their relationship. The law and literature movement that has gained global prominence in the course of last decades of the twentieth and the first decades of the twenty-first centuries has provided the research and teaching of law with a considerable body of new and valuable knowledge and understanding. Most of the knowledge and insights generated by the movement concern either a thematic overlap between legal and literary discourses – suggesting they deal with the same moral concerns – or a rhetorical, semiotic or general linguistic comparability or ‘sameness’ between them – imputing to both the same or very similar narrative structures. The Literary Exception and the Rule of Law recognises the wealth of knowledge generated by this approach to the relationship between law and literature, and acknowledges its debt to this genre of scholarship. It nevertheless also proposes, on the basis of a number of revealing phenomenological inquiries, a different approach to law and literary studies: one that emphasises the irreducible difference between law and literature. It does so with the firm believe that a regard for the very different and indeed opposite discursive trajectories of legal and literary language allows for a more profound understanding of the unique and indeed separate roles that the discourses of law and literature generally play in the sustenance of relatively stable legal cultures.This important rethinking of the relationship between law and literature will appeal to scholars and students of legal theory, jurisprudence, philosophy, politics and literary theory.

Addressing the influential analysis of law and literature, this book offers a new perspective on their relationship. The law and literature movement that has gained global prominence in the course of last decades of the twentieth and the first decades of the twenty-first centuries has provided the research and teaching of law with a considerable body of new and valuable knowledge and understanding. Most of the knowledge and insights generated by the movement concern either a thematic overlap between legal and literary discourses – suggesting they deal with the same moral concerns – or a rhetorical, semiotic or general linguistic comparability or ‘sameness’ between them – imputing to both the same or very similar narrative structures. The Literary Exception and the Rule of Law recognises the wealth of knowledge generated by this approach to the relationship between law and literature, and acknowledges its debt to this genre of scholarship. It nevertheless also proposes, on the basis of a number of revealing phenomenological inquiries, a different approach to law and literary studies: one that emphasises the irreducible difference between law and literature. It does so with the firm believe that a regard for the very different and indeed opposite discursive trajectories of legal and literary language allows for a more profound understanding of the unique and indeed separate roles that the discourses of law and literature generally play in the sustenance of relatively stable legal cultures.This important rethinking of the relationship between law and literature will appeal to scholars and students of legal theory, jurisprudence, philosophy, politics and literary theory.

Presenting legal and philosophical essays on money, this book exploresthe conditions according to which an object like a piece of paper, or anelectronic signal, has come to be seen as having a value.Money plays a crucial role in the regulation of social relationships andtheir normative determination. It is thus integral to the very nature of the“social”, and the question of how society is kept together by a networkof agreements, conventions, exchanges, and codes. All of which mustbe traced down. The technologies of money discussed here by Searle,Ferraris, and Condello show how we conceive the category of the social atthe intersection of individual and collective intentionality, documentality,and materiality. All of these dimensions, as the introduction to this volumedemonstrates, are of vital importance for legal theory and for a whole set oflegal concepts that are crucial in reflections on the relationship between law,philosophy, and society.

In the wake of Brexit and Trump, the debate surrounding post-truth fills the newspapers and is at the center of the public debate. Democratic institutions and the rule of law have always been constructed and legitimized by discourses of truth. And so the issue of "post-truth" or "fake truth" can be regarded as a contemporary degeneration of that legitimacy. But what, precisely, is post-truth from a theoretical point of view? Can it actually change perceptions of law, of institutions and political power? And can it affect our understanding of society and social relations? What are its ideological premises? What are the technical conditions that foster it? And most importantly, does it have anything to teach lovers of the truth? Pursuing an interdisciplinary perspective, this book gathers both well-known and newer scholars from a range of subject areas, to engage in a philosophical interrogation of the relationship between truth and law.

With a Foreword by Lars Vinx, this book is the first complete English translation of the Italian jurist, Emilio Betti’s classic work Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften, originally published in 1962.Betti’s hermeneutical theory is presented here as a ‘general methodology of the sciences of the spirit’, such as to allow the achievement of objectivity, however relative it might be. Its central focus is the tension between an object, to be considered in its autonomy, and the subjectivity of the interpreter, who can understand the object only by means of his or her own categories, historical-cultural conditions, and interests. Set against the work of Bultmann and Gadamer, Betti is concerned to limit the arbitrariness of subjectivity without diminishing the place of interpretation. Detailing the principles that govern, and therefore, guide any interpretation, Betti traces how interpretation in art and in literature, as well as in the fields of science, jurisprudence, sociology, and economy, can be said to be objective, albeit only ever in a relative sense. This summa of Betti’s key contribution to hermeneutic theory will be of interest across a range of disciplines, including legal and literary theory, philosophy, as well as the history and sociology of law.

In every Western democracy today, inheritances have a very profound influence on people’s lives. This motivates renewed scholarship on inheritance law by philosophy and the legal sciences. The present volume aims to contribute to some ongoing areas of inquiry while also filling some gaps in research.It is organized in a highly interdisciplinary way. In the thirteen chapters of the book, written by outstanding philosophers and legal scholars, the following questions, among others, are discussed: What is the nature of the right to bequeath? What are the social functions of bequest and inheritance? What arguments concerning justice have philosophers and legal scholars advanced in favour or against practices of bequest and inheritance? How should we think about taxing the wealth transfers that occur in bequest and inheritance? In discussing these questions, the authors break new ground and offer much needed insight into several related domains, such as the philosophy of law; legal theory; general and applied ethics; social and political philosophy; theories of justice; and the history of legal, political, and economic thought.This book will be of great interest to scholars in these areas as well as policy-makers.

Oriented around the theme of a ‘politics of philosophy’, this book tracks the phases in which Foucault’s genealogy of power, law, and subjectivity was reorganized during the 14 years of his teaching at the College de France, as his focus shifted from sovereignty to governance. This theme, Sandro Chignola argues here, is the key to understanding four features of Foucault’s work over this period. First, it foregrounds its immediate political character. Second, it demonstrates that Foucault’s "Greek trip" also aims at a politics of the subject that is able to face the processes of the governmentalization of power. Third, it makes clear that the idea of the "government of the self" is – drawing on an ethics of intellectual responsibility that is Weberian in origin – an answer to the processes that, within neoliberal governance, produce the subject as an individual (as a consumer, a market agent, an entrepreneur, and so on). Fourth, the theme of a ‘politics of philosophy’ implies that Foucault’s research was never simply scholarly or neutral; but rather was characterized by a specific political position. Against recent interpretations that risk turning Foucault into a scholar, here then Foucault is re-presented as a key figure for jurisprudential and political-philosophical research.

The Politics of Juridification offers a timely contribution to debates about how politics is being affected by the increasing relevance of judicial bodies to the daily administration of Western political communities. While most critical analyses portray juridification as a depoliticizing, de-democratizing transferral of political authority to the courts (whether national or international), this book centres on the workable ambivalence of such a far-reaching phenomenon. While juridification certainly intensifies the power and competences of judicial bodies to the disadvantage of representative political institutions, it cannot be easily reduced to the demise of democratic politics. By focusing on the multiple ways in which social agents make use of the law, The Politics of Juridification teases out the agential and transformative aspects of the various negotiations social agents engage with legal institutions with a view to obtaining political visibility. In particular, the book homes in on two seemingly distinct phenomena: on one hand, the regulation of sexuality and emerging kinship formations; on the other, the fragmentation of legal settings due to the claims to legal autonomy advanced by sub-state cultural and religious groups. By doing so, the book makes the case for an unexpected convergence between the struggles for legal recognition of sexual minorities and religious and cultural minorities. The conclusion is that juridification does entail normalization and favour the infiltration of law into the social realm. But because of its ambivalent nature, it can and does serve as an alternative vehicle for social change – one that attaches more importance to how social agents produce law on a daily basis and how this law permeates official legal orders.

This first book-length study into the influence of Emmanuel Levinas on the thought and philosophy of Giorgio Agamben, Law, Relationality and the Ethical Life, demonstrates how Agamben’s immanent thought can be read as presenting a compelling, albeit flawed, alternative to Levinas’s ethics of the Other. The publication of the English translation of The Use of Bodies in 2016 ended Giorgio Agamben’s 20-year multi-volume Homo Sacer study. Over this time, Agamben’s thought has greatly influenced scholarship in law, the wider humanities and social sciences. This book places Agamben’s figure of form-of-life in relation to Levinasian understandings of alterity, relationality and the law. Considering how Agamben and Levinas craft their respective forms of embodied existence – that is, a fully-formed human that can live an ethical life – the book considers Agamben’s attempt to move beyond Levinasian ethics through the liminal figures of the foetus and the patient in a persistent vegetative state. These figures, which Agamben uses as examples of bare life, call into question the limits of Agamben’s non-relational use and form of existence. As such, it is argued, they reveal the limitations of Agamben’s own ethics, whilst suggesting that his ‘abandoned’ project can and must be taken further. This book will be of interest to scholars, researchers, graduate students and anyone with an interest in the thought of Giorgio Agamben and Emmanuel Levinas in the fields of law, philosophy, the humanities and the social sciences.

This book examines the role of law in Europe at a time when economic policies have become dominant not only on this continent but globally. Can law be seen as a mere infrastructure? Or does it contribute to defining the social and legal order through its own inherent rules? If the second hypothesis is true, what might these rules be, and how may they be identified? Lastly, to what extent can agreeing a definition of the role of law affect the future of Europe? With the Next Generation European Union, the EU has introduced an unprecedented investment plan for economic recovery and resilience. In doing so, it has become the most important financial intermediary on the continent. But is this simply the prelude to a European economic and financial revival, or does it also aim to strengthen the European legal order in social, political, and constitutional terms? This book argues that the role of law in Europe should be to achieve a balanced relationship between freedom and solidarity; encouraging economic competition, but also social cohesion. Analyzing the role of law in the project of European integration, it maintains that law should be more than an infrastructure for finance and economics, showing how it can act as a guide and a binding force to achieve a more balanced relationship between economics, politics, and law. This book will be of interest to scholars in the fields of public law, European law, law and economics, the philosophy of law, legal history, political theory, and political science, as well as others concerned with the future of European integration.

This book examines the role of law in Europe at a time when economic policies have become dominant not only on this continent but globally. Can law be seen as a mere infrastructure? Or does it contribute to defining the social and legal order through its own inherent rules? If the second hypothesis is true, what might these rules be, and how may they be identified? Lastly, to what extent can agreeing a definition of the role of law affect the future of Europe? With the Next Generation European Union, the EU has introduced an unprecedented investment plan for economic recovery and resilience. In doing so, it has become the most important financial intermediary on the continent. But is this simply the prelude to a European economic and financial revival, or does it also aim to strengthen the European legal order in social, political, and constitutional terms? This book argues that the role of law in Europe should be to achieve a balanced relationship between freedom and solidarity; encouraging economic competition, but also social cohesion. Analyzing the role of law in the project of European integration, it maintains that law should be more than an infrastructure for finance and economics, showing how it can act as a guide and a binding force to achieve a more balanced relationship between economics, politics, and law. This book will be of interest to scholars in the fields of public law, European law, law and economics, the philosophy of law, legal history, political theory, and political science, as well as others concerned with the future of European integration.

In every Western democracy today, inheritances have a very profound influence on people’s lives. This motivates renewed scholarship on inheritance law by philosophy and the legal sciences. The present volume aims to contribute to some ongoing areas of inquiry while also filling some gaps in research.It is organized in a highly interdisciplinary way. In the thirteen chapters of the book, written by outstanding philosophers and legal scholars, the following questions, among others, are discussed: What is the nature of the right to bequeath? What are the social functions of bequest and inheritance? What arguments concerning justice have philosophers and legal scholars advanced in favour or against practices of bequest and inheritance? How should we think about taxing the wealth transfers that occur in bequest and inheritance? In discussing these questions, the authors break new ground and offer much needed insight into several related domains, such as the philosophy of law; legal theory; general and applied ethics; social and political philosophy; theories of justice; and the history of legal, political, and economic thought.This book will be of great interest to scholars in these areas as well as policy-makers.

This book addresses two main questions. Can political theology be overcome? And, is what today – in referring to neoliberalism and its genealogy – many define as "economic theology" truly an alternative to political theology, as Foucault has claimed and as Agamben does today? As a first step, the book addresses and clarifies various misunderstandings about the notion of political theology, in its multiple and even opposite meanings. It then focuses on a conceptualisation inaugurated by Carl Schmitt, which sees political theology as the eloquent matrix of modern politics: insofar as the latter produces and continuously re-elaborates an "excess" that does not belong to it, its core remains theological-political, although secularised. The bulk of the book then pursues a reading of the analogic connection between juridico-political concepts and theological-metaphysical concepts; arguing that, although the ‘turn’ to economic theology is indeed another form of political theology, it is a deeply anti-political one, which forecloses modes of resistance.The book will be of interest to scholars, researchers and advanced students in the fields of modern political and legal philosophy and those researching the crisis of its legacy. In particular, it is addressed to those who study the relationship between theology (and its substitutes, such as hegemony and political myth) and politics, power and law, legitimacy and legality, in the perspective of secularization. In addition, the book offers a contribution to contemporary critical studies on the neoliberal state and the return of the "state of exception" in democracies, as well as a questioning of the moralization of law, which is an effect of globalist ideology and the "humanitarian turn" after 1989.

This book contains the first English translations of Santi Romano’s important essays, ‘On the Decree Laws and the State of Siege During the Earthquakes in Messina and Reggio Calabria’ (1909) and ‘The Modern State and its Crisis’ (1910).Before Santi Romano wrote his masterpiece The Legal Order in 1917–18, he lay the foundations for his ground-breaking theory of law in these two essays, which are still central to scholarly debates about his legacy. The main focus of ‘On the Decree Laws’ is the concept of necessity as a source of law. Such a controversial view anticipated the much more renowned conception of the state of exception advanced later by Carl Schmitt in his Political Theology and has provided a reference point for Giorgio Agamben. The second essay, ‘The Modern State and its Crisis’, is concerned with the emergence of social forces that the early 20th-century administrative state was struggling to tame. Pursuing an insight that he would develop in The Legal Order, Romano argued that a solution could be found in a public law theory that was able to reconcile the need for a shared constitutional frame with the internal orderings of nonstate movements.Indispensable for contemporary scholars to understand how Romano’s most revolutionary notions came about, as well as to fully appreciate the theoretical import of his concept of law, this book will appeal to legal and political theorists and others who are interested in how law deals and should deal with emergencies and social crises.

This book contains the first English translations of Santi Romano’s important essays, ‘On the Decree Laws and the State of Siege During the Earthquakes in Messina and Reggio Calabria’ (1909) and ‘The Modern State and its Crisis’ (1910).Before Santi Romano wrote his masterpiece The Legal Order in 1917–18, he lay the foundations for his ground-breaking theory of law in these two essays, which are still central to scholarly debates about his legacy. The main focus of ‘On the Decree Laws’ is the concept of necessity as a source of law. Such a controversial view anticipated the much more renowned conception of the state of exception advanced later by Carl Schmitt in his Political Theology and has provided a reference point for Giorgio Agamben. The second essay, ‘The Modern State and its Crisis’, is concerned with the emergence of social forces that the early 20th-century administrative state was struggling to tame. Pursuing an insight that he would develop in The Legal Order, Romano argued that a solution could be found in a public law theory that was able to reconcile the need for a shared constitutional frame with the internal orderings of nonstate movements.Indispensable for contemporary scholars to understand how Romano’s most revolutionary notions came about, as well as to fully appreciate the theoretical import of his concept of law, this book will appeal to legal and political theorists and others who are interested in how law deals and should deal with emergencies and social crises.

This book provides a new interpretation of ordoliberalism – the influential German version of neoliberalism – by exploring the political, legal and social context of its emergence.Ordoliberal scholars regarded sociology, juridical science and economics as concrete policy-making instruments designed to discipline the structural conflicts of modern society. For, in their view, society should not impinge on the economy. Ordoliberalism is here presented as a political theory of social order, developing out of the crisis of the Weimar Republic and which has proven to be one of the most influential neoliberal accounts of social organization after WWII. Assessing the influence that leading German intellectuals such as Sombart, Schmoller, Savigny and Schmitt have exerted on ordoliberalism, this book provides an in-depth analysis of the social, legal and political theory of Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alfred Müller-Armack, Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow. In so doing, the book offers an invaluable study of the ideological roots of the notion of an economic constitution and a political–theoretical analysis of one of the first articulations of authoritarian liberalism at the European level.This book will appeal to scholars and students of legal, social, political and economic theory.

This book provides a new interpretation of ordoliberalism – the influential German version of neoliberalism – by exploring the political, legal and social context of its emergence.Ordoliberal scholars regarded sociology, juridical science and economics as concrete policy-making instruments designed to discipline the structural conflicts of modern society. For, in their view, society should not impinge on the economy. Ordoliberalism is here presented as a political theory of social order, developing out of the crisis of the Weimar Republic and which has proven to be one of the most influential neoliberal accounts of social organization after WWII. Assessing the influence that leading German intellectuals such as Sombart, Schmoller, Savigny and Schmitt have exerted on ordoliberalism, this book provides an in-depth analysis of the social, legal and political theory of Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alfred Müller-Armack, Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow. In so doing, the book offers an invaluable study of the ideological roots of the notion of an economic constitution and a political–theoretical analysis of one of the first articulations of authoritarian liberalism at the European level.This book will appeal to scholars and students of legal, social, political and economic theory.

This book offers a radical new understanding of law, beyond the confines of its formalization by the state.The book takes off from the late work of Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, for whom law and its institutions came to be liberated from an ideological perspective that had treated them as sterile instruments for the reproduction of domination. Engaging its continental history, it addresses the concept of law, not merely as a ‘command’, but as the result of a much more complex legal operation aimed at dynamically stabilizing the social relations of a community. The book thus sidesteps the usual legal-political focus on those – from Hobbes to Schmitt – who have contributed to the categorical scheme of the modern state, and with it questions of political representation, sovereignty, the rigid distinction between public law and private law, and so on, as it pursues an alternative theoretical trajectory through Ravaisson, Tarde, and Hauriou. Politics, the book maintains, can be no longer be treated simply through the state form. And, relatedly, the law must be seen as a living law: a law that cannot be treated exclusively in formal terms, but must be taken as a grammar capable of articulating a politics of process, relationality, and innovation. Reconceived as such, law can then circumvent the aporias that arise when society is viewed as a private company, and the state seen as the bearer of the only possible means of formalizing its relationships.At the intersection of law and political theory, this book will speak to scholars and others with interests in both these areas, and especially those concerned with the limits of both conventional and critical approaches to law.

This book offers a radical new understanding of law, beyond the confines of its formalization by the state.The book takes off from the late work of Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, for whom law and its institutions came to be liberated from an ideological perspective that had treated them as sterile instruments for the reproduction of domination. Engaging its continental history, it addresses the concept of law, not merely as a ‘command’, but as the result of a much more complex legal operation aimed at dynamically stabilizing the social relations of a community. The book thus sidesteps the usual legal-political focus on those – from Hobbes to Schmitt – who have contributed to the categorical scheme of the modern state, and with it questions of political representation, sovereignty, the rigid distinction between public law and private law, and so on, as it pursues an alternative theoretical trajectory through Ravaisson, Tarde, and Hauriou. Politics, the book maintains, can be no longer be treated simply through the state form. And, relatedly, the law must be seen as a living law: a law that cannot be treated exclusively in formal terms, but must be taken as a grammar capable of articulating a politics of process, relationality, and innovation. Reconceived as such, law can then circumvent the aporias that arise when society is viewed as a private company, and the state seen as the bearer of the only possible means of formalizing its relationships.At the intersection of law and political theory, this book will speak to scholars and others with interests in both these areas, and especially those concerned with the limits of both conventional and critical approaches to law.