Oxford Political Theory - Böcker

In The Ethics of Immigration, Joseph Carens synthesizes a lifetime of work to explore and illuminate one of the most pressing issues of our time. Immigration poses practical problems for western democracies and also challenges the ways in which people in democracies think about citizenship and belonging, about rights and responsibilities, and about freedom and equality. Carens begins by focusing on current immigration controversies in North America and Europe about access to citizenship, the integration of immigrants, temporary workers, irregular migrants and the admission of family members and refugees. Working within the moral framework provided by liberal democratic values, he argues that some of the practices of democratic states in these areas are morally defensible, while others need to be reformed. In the last part of the book he moves beyond the currently feasible to ask questions about immigration from a more fundamental perspective. He argues that democratic values of freedom and equality ultimately entail a commitment to open borders. Only in a world of open borders, he contends, will we live up to our most basic principles. Many will not agree with some of Carens' claims, especially his controversial conclusion, but none will be able to dismiss his views lightly. Powerfully argued by one of the world's leading political philosophers on the issue, The Ethics of Immigration is a landmark work on one of the most important global social trends of our era.

Immigration is one of the most polarizing issues in contemporary politics. It raises questions about identity, economic well-being, the legitimacy of state power, and the boundaries of membership and justice. How should we think about immigration and what policies should democratic societies pursue? Some contend that borders should generally be open and people should be free to migrate in search of better lives. Others insist that governments have the right to unilaterally close their borders and should do so. In Immigration and Democracy, Sarah Song develops an intermediate ethical position that takes seriously both the claims of receiving countries and the claims of prospective migrants. She argues that political membership is morally significant, even if morally arbitrary. Political membership grounds particular rights and obligations, and a government may show some partiality toward the interests of its members. Yet, we also have universal obligations to those outside our orders. Where prospective migrants have urgent reasons to move, as in the case of refugees, their interests may trump the less weighty interests of members. What is required is not open or closed borders but open doors. An accessible ethical framework that clarifies and deepens the ideas with which members of democratic societies can debate immigration, Immigration and Democracy considers the implications of a realistically utopian theory for immigration law and policy.

Classical and contemporary republicans offer a compelling political vision built on a commitment to promoting freedom from domination, establishing popular control over public officials, and securing the empire of law. The Well-Ordered Republic provides the most rigorous, comprehensive, and up-to-date account of republican political theory presently available, while also showing how that theory can be extended to address new issues of economic justice, workplace democracy, identity politics, emergency powers, education, migration, and foreign policy. Frank Lovett argues that our shared freedom from domination is constituted by republican institutions such as democracy, the rule of law, and the public provision of an unconditional basic income. As a public good whose continued supply depends on robust civic engagement, republican freedom is a valuable but ongoing collective achievement: all citizens must remain dedicated to shared republican institutions for their freedom to endure.Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter.Series Editors: Will Kymlicka and David Miller.

Justificatory Liberalism advances a theory of personal, public and political justification. Drawing on current work in epistemology and cognitive psychology, the book develops a theory of personally justified belief. Building on this account, it then advances an account of public justification that is more normative and less `populist' than that of `political liberals'.

Seemingly there is no political debate which does not devolve into an argument over rights. For centuries a cornerstone of liberal theory, rights claims have become so over-used as to blur cases of real abuse. In this original and provocative study, Dagger argues for a republican liberalism that, while celebrating the liberal heritage of autonomy and rights, solidly places these within social relations and obligations, which while ubiquitous, are often obscured and forgotten.

What would our decision-making procedures look like if they were actually guided by the much-discussed concept of "deliberative democracy"? What does rule by the people for the people entail? And how can a modern government's reliance on administrative agencies be reconciled with this populist ideal? What form must democratic reasoning take in the modern administrative state?Democratic Autonomy squarely faces these challenges to the deliberative democratic ideal. It identifies processes of reasoning that avert bureaucratic domination and bring diverse people into political agreement. To bridge our differences intelligently, Richardson argues, we cannot rely on instrumentalist approaches to policy reasoning, such as cost-benefit analysis. Instead, citizens must arrive at reasonable compromises through fair, truth-oriented processes of deliberation. Using examples from programs as diverse as disability benefits and environmental regulation, he shows how the administrative policy-making necessary to carrying out most legislation can be part of our deciding what to do. Opposing both those liberal theorists who have attacked the populist ideal and those neo-republican theorists who have given up on it, Richardson builds an account of popular rule that is sensitive to the challenges to public deliberation that arise from relying on liberal constitutional guarantees, representative institutions, majority rule, and administrative rulemaking.Written in a nontechnical style and engaged with practical issues of everyday politics, this highly original and rigorous restatement of what democracy entails is essential reading for political theorists, philosophers, public choice theorists, constitutional and administrative lawyers, and policy analysts.

In the summer of 2020, angry citizens took to the streets of Minneapolis after a recording of the murder of George Floyd went viral. They set fire to a police station, destroyed cars and shops, and clashed with police. In the summer of 2023, violent disorder broke out across France after police killed a seventeen year-old boy. In 2011, protests spread from London across England after police murdered a young Black man during a police arrest. State authorities were quick to denounce such uprisings as callous lawlessness. Were they right? Are violent protestors unscrupulous criminals, or might their revolt be justified despite its lawlessness and the heavy costs it imposes? In No Justice, No Peace, Avia Pasternak highlights the political nature of such protests, offering an in-depth examination of these pressing questions. Violent protestors, she argues, disrupt the peace in order to achieve justice, and to express their defiance of an unjust political order. Pasternak shows that even in liberal democracies, resorting to violence on behalf of these important goals can be necessary and proportionate. Combining empirical analysis of political oppression in contemporary states with a normative assessment of ordinary citizens' duty to resist oppression, Pasternak asserts that violence in protest against state injustice can be permissible, while also acknowledging its key limits.

How should we think about immigration and what policies should democratic societies pursue? Sarah Song offers a political theory of immigration that takes seriously both the claims of receiving countries and the claims of prospective migrants.Immigration is one of the most polarizing issues in contemporary politics. It raises questions about identity, economic well-being, the legitimacy of state power, and the boundaries of membership and justice. How should we think about immigration and what policies should democratic societies pursue? Some contend that borders should generally be open and people should be free to migrate in search of better lives. Others insist that governments have the right to unilaterally close their borders and should do so. In Immigration and Democracy, Sarah Song develops an intermediate ethical position that takes seriously both the claims of receiving countries and the claims of prospective migrants. She argues that political membership is morally significant, even if morally arbitrary. Political membership grounds particular rights and obligations, and a government may show some partiality toward the interests of its members. Yet, we also have universal obligations to those outside our orders. Where prospective migrants have urgent reasons to move, as in the case of refugees, their interests may trump the less weighty interests of members. What is required is not open or closed borders but open doors. An accessible ethical framework that clarifies and deepens the ideas with which members of democratic societies can debate immigration, Immigration and Democracy considers the implications of a realistically utopian theory for immigration law and policy.

Almost every country today contains adherents of different religions and different secular conceptions of the good life. Is there any alternative to a power struggle among them, leading most probably to either civil war or repression? In this important new work of political philosophy, Brian Barry argues that justice as impartiality offers a solution. The follow-up to his prize-winning book Theories of Justice, it offers a contemporary restatement of the Enlightenment idea that certain basic principles can validly claim the allegiance of every reasonable human being.

Nationalism is a dominating force in contemporary politics, but political philosophers have been markedly reluctant to discuss, let alone endorse, nationalist ideas.In this book David Miller defends the principle of nationality. He argues that national identities are valid sources of personal identity; that we are justified in recognizing special obligations to our co-nationals; that nations have good grounds for wanting to be politically self-determining; but that recognizing the claims of nationality does not entail suppressing other sources of personal identity, such as ethnicity. Finally, he considers the claim that national identities are dissolving in the late twentieth century.This timely and provocative book offers the most compelling defence to date of nationality from a radical perspective.Series descriptionOxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter.

This is the first full-length presentation of a republican alternative to the liberal and communitarian theories that have dominated political philosophy in recent years. Professor Pettit's eloquent, compelling account opens with an examination of the traditional republican conception of freedom as non-domination, contrasting this with established negative and positive views of liberty. The first part traces the rise and decline of this conception, displays its many attractions, and makes a case for why it should still be regarded as a central political ideal. The second part looks at what the implementation of the ideal would imply for substantive policy-making, constitutional and democratic design, regulatory control and the relation between state and civil society. Prominent in this account is a novel concept of democracy, under which government is exposed to systematic contestation, and a vision of relations between state and society founded upon civility and trust.Professor Pettit's powerful and insightful new work offers not only a unified, theoretical overview of the many strands of republican ideas, it also provides a new and sophisticated perspective on studies in related fields including the history of ideas, jurisprudence, and criminology.

The increasingly multicultural fabric of modern societies has given rise to many new issues and conflicts, as ethnic and national minorities demand recognition and support for their cultural identity. This book presents a new conception of the rights and status of minority cultures.It argues that certain sorts of `collective rights' for minority cultures are consistent with liberal democratic principles, and that standard liberal objections to recognizing such rights on grounds of individual freedom, social justice, and national unity, can be answered. However, Professor Kymlicka emphasises that no single formula can be applied to all groups and that the needs and aspirations of immigrants are very different from those of indigenous peoples and national minorities. The book discusses issues such as language rights, group representation, religious education, federalism, and secession - issues which are central to understanding multicultural politics, but which have been surprisingly neglected in contemporary liberal theory.

Almost every country today contains adherents of different religions and different secular conceptions of the good life. Is there any alternative to a power struggle among them, leading most probably to either civil war or oppression? The argument of this book is that justice as impartiality offers a solution.According to the theory of justice as impartiality, principles of justice are those principles that provide a reasonable basis for the unforced assent of those subject to them. The object of this book is to set out the theory, explain its rationale, and respond to the variety of criticisms that have been made of it.This is the second volume of A Treatise on Social Justice. The first, Theories of Justice, explored alternative theories and concluded by asserting the superiority of justice as impartiality. This conclusion is built on in Justoce as Impartiality, but it does not presuppose acquaintance with Theories of Justice.

Any liberal democratic state must honour religious and cultural pluralism in its educational policies. To fail to honour them would betray ideals of freedom and toleration fundamental to liberal democracy. Yet if such ideals are to flourish from one generation to the next, allegiance to the distinctive values of liberal democracy is a necessary educational end, whose pursuit will constrain pluralism. The problem of political education is therefore to ensure the continuity across generations of the constitutive ideals of liberal democracy, while remaining hospitable to a diversity of conduct and belief that sometimes threatens those very ideals. Creating Citizens addresses this crucial problem. In lucid and elegant prose, Professor Callan, one of the world's foremost philosophers of education, identifies both the principal ends of civic education, and the rights that limit their political pursuit. This timely new study sheds light on some of the most divisive educational controversies, such as state sponsorship and regulation of denominational schooling, as well as the role of non-denominational schools in the moral and political development of children. Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. The series editors are David Miller and Alan Ryan.

Nationalism is a dominating force in contemporary politics, but political philosophers have been markedly reluctant to discuss, let alone endorse, nationalist ideas. David Miller here defends the principle of nationality. He argues that national identities are valid sources of personal identity; that we are justified in recognizing special obligations to our co-nationals; that nations have good grounds for wanting to be politically self-determining; but that recognizing the claims of nationality does not entail suppressing other sources of personal identity, such as ethnicity. Finally, he considers the claim that national identities are dissolving in the late twentieth century. This timely and provocative study offers the most compelling defence to date of nationality from a radical perspective.

Capitalist societies are full of unacceptable inequalities. Freedom is of paramount importance. These two convictions are widely shared across the world. Yet they often seem in complete contradiction with each other. Fighting inequality jeopardizes freedom; taking freedom seriously boosts inequality. What can be done? Can the circle be squared? Philippe Van Parijs offers a ground breaking solution to the dilemma. Assessing and rejecting the claims of both socialism and conventional capitalism, he presents a clear and compelling alternative vision of the just society: a capitalist society offering a substantial unconditional basic income to all its members. Moving beyond pure political theory, Van Parijs shows what his ideal of free society means in the real world by drawing out its controversial policy implications. Real Freedom for All will be essential reading for anyone concerned about the just society and the welfare state as we move into the twenty first century.

One of the most hotly-contested debates in contemporary democracy revolves around issues of political presence, and whether the fair representation of disadvantaged groups requires their presence in elected assemblies. Representation as currently understood derives its legitimacy from a politics of ideas, which considers accountability in relation to declared policies and programmes, and makes it a matter of relative indifference who articulates political preferences or beliefs. But what happens to the meaning of representation and accountability when we make the gender or ethnic composition of elected assemblies an additional area of concern? In this innovative contribution to the theory of representation - which draws on debates about gender quotas in Europe, minority voting rights in the USA, and the multi-layered politics of inclusion in Canada - Anne Phillips argues that the politics of ideas is an inadequate vehicle for dealing with political exclusion. But rejecting any essentialist grounding to group identity or group interest, she also argues against any either/or choice between ideas and political presence. The politics of presence then combines with contemporary explorations of deliberative democracy to establish a different balance between accountability and autonomy. Series description Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series contains work of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. The series editors are David Miller and Alan Ryan.`the latest, thoughtful contribution in Anne Phillip's ongoing enquiry into issues of equality, gender and democracy...an excellent contribution to democratic theory'. Political Studies

Many governments today are engaged in far-reaching programs of 'welfare reform'. But what would a just program of welfare reform consist in? Is the current emphasis on linking welfare 'rights' to 'responsibilities' justifiable? In this book, Stuart White reconsiders the principles of economic citizenship appropriate to a democratic society, and explores the radical implications of these principles for public policy. According to White, justice demands that economic cooperation satisfy a standard of 'fair reciprocity'. Against a background of institutions that are sufficiently just in other respects, those citizens who share in the social product have an obligation to make a productive contribution back to the community in return: every citizen should 'do her bit'. While prominent in the work of many past egalitarian thinkers, this duty to contribute has not received much attention in recent political theory. White seeks to redress this neglect, and to show why and how the claims of reciprocity should be integrated with other important concerns that have featured more prominently in recent literature. These include the concerns to prevent brute luck disadvantage and economic vulnerability.From the standpoint of fair reciprocity, it is not necessarily unjust to link welfare rights with the performance of work-related responsibilities. But the justice of such a linkage depends on how far economic institutions meet other requirements of justice. In policy terms, fair reciprocity thus calls for a generous 'civic minimum' in which work-related welfare benefits are complemented by other policies designed to prevent poverty and vulnerability, secure opportunity for meaningful work, and eliminate class-based inequalities in educational opportunity and inherited wealth. In concluding, White contests the fashionable view that egalitarian reform is unfeasible in contemporary circumstances. The philosophy of fair reciprocity provides the basis for a new public conversation about economic citizenship, in which all citizens - not just those currently amongst the welfare poor - are encouraged to confront their responsibility to others.

This is the first full-length presentation of a republican alternative to the liberal and communitarian theories that have dominated political philosophy in recent years. The author's eloquent, compelling account opens with an examination of the traditional republican conception of freedom as non-domination, contrasting this with established negative and positive views of liberalism. The book examines what the implementation of the ideal would imply for substantive policy-making, constitutional and democratic design, regulatory control and the relation between state and civil society. Professor Pettit's powerful and insightful new work offers not only a unified, theoretical overview of the many strands of republican ideas, it also provides a new and sophisticated perspective on studies in related fields including the history of ideas, jurisprudence, and criminology. The author had included a new postscript to this paperback edition, which offers a sketch of the crucial republican ideas, and to reinforce the argument that the republican tradition deserves more attention than it has generally received among contemporary political theorists.

Democratic equality entails a principle that everyone whose basic interests are affected by policies should be included in the process of making them. Yet individuals and groups often claim that decision making processes are dominated by only some of the interests and perspectives in the society. What are the ideals of inclusion through which such criticisms should be made, and which might guide more inclusive political practice? This book considers that question from the point of view of norms of democratic communication, processes of representation and association, and how wide the scope of political jurisdictions should be.Democratic theorists have not sufficiently attended to the ways processes of debate and decision making often marginalize individuals and groups because the norms of political discussion are biased against some forms of expression. Inclusion and Democracy broadens our understanding of democratic communication by reflecting on the positive political functions of narrative, rhetorically situated appeals, and public protest. It reconstructs concepts of civil society and public sphere as enacting such plural forms of communication among debating citizens in large-scale societies. The book considers issues of the scope of the polity at two levels: global and local. The scope of a polity should extend as wide as the scope of social and economic interactions that raise issues of justice. Today this implies the need for global democratic institutions. At a more local level, processes of residential segregation and the design of municipal jurisdictions often result in the ability for actions in one locale to affect those in other locales without those making the decisions having to include some of those affected in the decision making process. Metropolitan governments which preserve significant local autonomy may therefore be necessary to promote political equality.

In Europe and throughout the world, competence in English is spreading at a speed never achieved by any language in human history. This apparently irresistible growing dominance of English is frequently perceived and sometimes indignantly denounced as being grossly unjust. Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World starts off arguing that the dissemination of competence in a common lingua franca is a process to be welcomed and accelerated, most fundamentally because it provides the the struggle for greater justice with an essential weapon: a cheap medium of cross-border communication and mobilization.However, the resulting linguistic situation is arguably unjust in three distinct senses. Firstly, the adoption of one natural language as the lingua franca implies that its native speakers are getting a free ride by benefiting costlessly from the learning effort of others. Secondly, Anglophones gain greater opportunities as a result of competence in their native language becoming a more valuable asset. Thirdly, the privilege given to one language failes to show equal respect for the various langauges with which different portions of the population concerned identify.The book spells out the corresponding interpretations of linguistic justice as cooperative justice, distributive justice, and parity of esteem. It discusses a wide range of policies that might help achieve linguistic justice in these three senses, from a linguistic tax on Anglophone countries to the banning of dubbing or the linguistic territoriality principle. It also argues that linguistic diversity, though not valuable in itself, will nonetheless need to be protected as a by-product of the pursuit of linguistic justice as parity of esteem.

Should character formation be a goal of civic education in a liberal democracy? In addition to teaching knowledge and skills, should civic education shape children's values, beliefs, preferences, habits, identities, and sentiments? Most contemporary political and educational theorists who address these questions respond with a heavily qualified yes. They argue that education for civil character is vital to the survival and flourishing of liberal democracy but its content must be strictly limited to avoid compromising its recipients' ability to think and act as critically autonomous citizens. This means that civic character education should not extend beyond inculcating in children the basic and universal moral values that constitute the ideal of liberal democracy itself. Civics Beyond Critics argues that this orthodox view is wrong to prioritize critical autonomy over three other valuable character traits that have traditionally been fostered by civic education: law-abidingness, civic identification, and support for the fundamental political institutions of one's society. But the best alternative is not simply to reverse the priority. The goal of this book is to show how we can recognize the value of the kinds of character formation that civic education has traditionally involved without losing the portion of the truth that can be found in the orthodox view. Civics Beyond Critics warns against neglecting character traits that, although commonly labeled 'conservative', are realistically essential for the future of all liberal democracies.Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. Series Editors: Will Kymlicka, David Miller, and Alan Ryan.

Against Marriage is a radical argument for the abolition of state-recognised marriage. Clare Chambers argues that state-recognised marriage violates both equality and liberty, even when expanded to include same-sex couples. Instead Chambers proposes the marriage-free state: an egalitarian state in which religious or secular marriages are permitted but have no legal status.Part I makes the case against marriage. Chambers investigates the critique of marriage that has developed within feminist and liberal theory. Feminists have long argued that marriage is a violation of equality since it is both sexist and heterosexist. Chambers endorses the feminist view and argues, in contrast to recent egalitarian pro-marriage movements, that same-sex marriage is not enough to make marriage equal. Chambers argues that state-recognised marriage is also problematic for liberalism, particularly political liberalism, since it imposes a controversial, hierarchical conception of the family that excludes many adults and children.Part II sets out the case for the marriage-free state. Chambers critically assesses recent theories that attempt to make marriage egalitarian, either by replacing it with relationship contracts or by replacing it with alternative statuses such as civil union. She then sets out a new model for the legal regulation of personal relationships. In the marriage-free state regulation is based on relationship practices not relationship status, and these practices are regulated separately rather than as a bundle. The marriage-free state thus employs piecemeal, practice-based regulation. Finally, Chambers considers how the marriage-free state should respond to unequal religious marriage. The result is an inspiring egalitarian approach that fits the diversity of real relationships.

Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration offers a qualified defense of a territorial states-system. It argues that three core values-occupancy, basic justice, and collective self-determination-are served by an international system made up of self-governing, spatially defined political units. The defense is qualified because the book does not actually justify all the sovereignty rights states currently claim, and that are recognized in international law. Instead, the book proposes important changes to states' sovereign prerogatives, particularly with respect to internal autonomy for political minorities, immigration, and natural resources. Part I of the book argues for a right of occupancy, holding that a legitimate function of the international system is to specify and protect people's preinstitutional claims to specific geographical places. Part II turns to the question of how a state might acquire legitimate jurisdiction over a population of occupants. It argues that the state will have a right to rule a population and its territory if it satisfies conditions of basic justice and also facilitates its people's collective self-determination. Finally, Parts III and IV of this book argue that the exclusionary sovereignty rights to control over borders and natural resources that can plausibly be justified on the basis of the three core values are more limited than has traditionally been thought.Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter.Series Editors: Will Kymlicka and David Miller.

Political theorists often imagine themselves as political architects, asking what an ideal set of laws or social structures might look like. Yet persistent injustices can endure for decades or even centuries despite such ideal theorizing. In circumstances of this kind, it is essential for political theorists to think carefully about the political choices available to those who directly face such injustices and seek to change them.This book focuses on the claims of Aboriginal peoples to better treatment from the United States and Canada. Though other groups face similarly persistent injustices (e.g. African Americans in the United States), the specific details of injustice matter a great deal for its analysis. The book focuses on two intertwined issues: the kinds of moral permissions that those facing persistent injustice have when they act politically, and the kinds of transformations that political action may bring about in those who undertake it. The book argues for normative permissions to speak untruth to power; to circumvent or nullify existing law; to give primary attention to protecting one's own community first; and to engage in political experimentation that reshapes future generations. When carefully used, the book argues, these permissions may help political actors to avoid co-optation and self-delusion. At the same time, divisions of labor between those who grapple most closely with state institutions and those who keep their distance may be necessary to facilitate escape from persistent injustice over the long term.Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. Series Editors: Will Kymlicka and David Miller.

Against Marriage argues that marriage violates both equality and liberty and should not be recognized by the state. Clare Chambers shows how feminist and liberal principles require creation of a marriage-free state: one in which private marriages, whether religious or secular, would have no legal status. Part One makes the case against marriage. Chambers investigates the critique of marriage that has developed within feminist and liberal theory. Feminists have long argued that state-recognised marriage is a violation of equality. Chambers endorses the feminist view and argues, in contrast to recent egalitarian pro-marriage movements, that same-sex marriage is not enough to make marriage equal. The egalitarian case against marriage is the most fundamental argument of Against Marriage. But Chambers also argues that state-recognised marriage violates liberty, including the political liberal version of liberty that is based on neutrality between conceptions of the good. Part Two sets out the case for the marriage-free state. Chambers criticizes recent arguments that traditional marriage should be replaced with either a reformed version of marriage, such as civil partnership, or a purely contractual model of relationship regulation. She then sets out a new model for the legal regulation of personal relationships. Instead of regulating by status, the state should regulate relationships according to the practices they involve. Instead of regulating relationships holistically, assuming that relationship practices are bundled together in one significant relationship, the marriage-free state regulates practices on a piecemeal basis. The marriage-free state thus employs piecemeal, practice-based regulation. It may regulate private marriages, including religious marriages, so as to protect equality. But it takes no interest in defining or protecting the meaning of marriage.

In Europe and throughout the world, competence in English is spreading at a speed never achieved by any language in human history. This apparently irresistible growing dominance of English is frequently perceived and sometimes indignantly denounced as being grossly unjust. Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World starts off arguing that the dissemination of competence in a common lingua franca is a process to be welcomed and accelerated, most fundamentally because it provides the struggle for greater justice in Europe and in the world with an essential weapon: a cheap medium of communication and of mobilization.However, the resulting linguistic situation can plausibly be regarded as unjust in three distinct senses. Firstly, the adoption of one natural language as the lingua franca implies that its native speakers are getting a free ride by benefiting costlessly from the learning effort of others. Secondly, they gain greater opportunities as a result of competence in their native language becoming a more valuable asset. And thirdly the privilege systematically given to one language fails to show equal respect for the various languages with which different portions of the population concerned identify. The book spells out the corresponding interpretations of linguistic justice as cooperative justice, distributive justice and parity of esteem, respectively. And it discusses systematically a wide range of policies that might help achieve linguistic justice in these three senses, from a linguistic tax on Anglophone countries to the banning of dubbing or the linguistic territoriality principle.Against this background, the book argues that linguistic diversity is not valuable in itself but it will nonetheless need to be protected as a by-product of the pursuit of linguistic justice as parity of esteem.

In his major new work Chandran Kukathas offers, for the first time, a book-length treatment of this controversial and influential theory of minority rights. The work is a defence of a form of liberalism and multiculturalism. The general question it tries to answer is: what is the principled basis of a free society marked by cultural diversity and group loyalties? More particularly, it explains whether such a society requires political institutions which recognize minorities; how far it should tolerate such minorities when their ways differ from those of the mainstream community; to what extent political institutions should address injustices suffered by minorities at the hands of the wider society, and also at the hands of the powerful within their own communities; what role, if any, the state should play in the shaping of a society's (national) identity; and what fundamental values should guide our reflections on these matters. Its main contention is that a free society is an open society whose fundamental principle is the principle of freedom of association. A society is free to the extent that it is prepared to tolerate in its midst associations which differ or dissent from its standards or practices. An implication of these principles is that political society is also no more than one among other associations; its basis is the willingness of its members to continue to associate under the terms which define it. While it is an 'association of associations', it is not the only such association; it does not subsume all other associations. The principles of a free society describe not a hierarchy of superior and subordinate authorities but an archipelago of competing and overlapping jurisdictions. The idea of a liberal archipelago is defended as one which supplies us with a better metaphor of the free society than do older notions such as the body politic, or the ship of state. This work presents a challenge, and an alternative, to other contemporary liberal theories of multiculturalism.

Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter.Series Editors: Will Kymlicka, David Miller, and Alan Ryan. This book presents a non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice. In contrast to theories that seek to extend principles of social justice, such as equality of opportunity or resources, to the world as a whole, it argues that in a world made up of self-determining national communities, a different conception is needed. The book presents and defends an account of national responsibility which entails that nations may justifiably claim the benefits that their decisions and policies produce, while also being held liable for harms that they inflict on other peoples. Such collective responsibility extends to responsibility for the national past, so the present generation may owe redress to those who have been harmed by the actions of their predecessors. Global justice, therefore, must be understood not in terms of equality, but in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Where these rights are being violated or threatened, remedial responsibility may fall on outsiders. The book considers how this responsibility should be allocated, and how far citizens of democratic societies must limit their pursuit of domestic objectives in order to discharge their global obligations. The book presents a systematic challenge to existing theories of global justice without retreating to a narrow nationalism that denies that we have any responsibilities to the world's poor. It combines discussion of practical questions such as immigration and foreign aid with philosophical exploration of, for instance, the different senses of responsibility, and the grounds of human rights.