Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy – serie

In this new explanationist account of epistemic justification, Poston argues that the explanatory virtues provide all the materials necessary for a plausible account of justified belief. There are no purely autonomous reasons. Rather reasons occur only within an explanatory coherent set of beliefs.

Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental integrates the epistemology of reasoning and philosophy of mind. By examining the fundamental competencies involved in reasoning, Gerken argues that reasoning depends on the external environment in ways that are both surprising and epistemologically important.

Treating David Hume as a partner in a continuing philosophical dialogue, this book tries to come to terms with Hume's influential thoughts on scepticism and naturalism in a way that sheds light on contemporary philosophy and its relationship to science.

According to a long tradition, questions about the nature of knowledge are to be answered by analyzing it as a species of true belief. In light of the apparent failure of this approach, knowledge first philosophy takes knowledge as the starting point in epistemology. Knowledge First? offers the first overview of this approach.

As thinkers in the market for knowledge and agents aspiring to morally responsible action, we are inevitably subject to luck. This book presents a comprehensive new theory of luck in light of a critical appraisal of the literature's leading accounts, then brings this new theory to bear on issues in the theory of knowledge and philosophy of action.

This book explores the idea that self-knowledgecomes in many varieties. The author offers an innovative“pluralist” position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of thephenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic” treatment, to pose new andintriguing philosophical challenges.

Is knowledge relative? However those who work in mainstream epistemology generally consider that it is not. Metaepistemology and Relativism questions whether the kind of anti-relativistic background that underlies typical projects in mainstream epistemology can on closer inspection be vindicated.

Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.

This book offers new perspectives on the history of analytical philosophy, surveying recent scholarship on the philosophical study of mind, language, logic and reality over the course of the last 200 years.

Extended Rationality provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address problems such as scepticism and relativism.

When we make claims to each other, we're asserting. But what does it take to assert well? Do we need to know what we're talking about? This book argues that we don't. In fact, it argues that in some special contexts, we can lie.

In this new explanationist account of epistemic justification, Poston argues that the explanatory virtues provide all the materials necessary for a plausible account of justified belief. There are no purely autonomous reasons. Rather reasons occur only within an explanatory coherent set of beliefs.

Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental integrates the epistemology of reasoning and philosophy of mind. By examining the fundamental competencies involved in reasoning, Gerken argues that reasoning depends on the external environment in ways that are both surprising and epistemologically important.

Treating David Hume as a partner in a continuing philosophical dialogue, this book tries to come to terms with Hume's influential thoughts on scepticism and naturalism in a way that sheds light on contemporary philosophy and its relationship to science.

According to a long tradition, questions about the nature of knowledge are to be answered by analyzing it as a species of true belief. In light of the apparent failure of this approach, knowledge first philosophy takes knowledge as the starting point in epistemology. Knowledge First? offers the first overview of this approach.

As thinkers in the market for knowledge and agents aspiring to morally responsible action, we are inevitably subject to luck. This book presents a comprehensive new theory of luck in light of a critical appraisal of the literature's leading accounts, then brings this new theory to bear on issues in the theory of knowledge and philosophy of action.

Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.

Extended Rationality provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address problems such as scepticism and relativism.

Epistemic realists think that epistemic facts (such as the fact that you ought to believe what your evidence supports) exist independently of human judgements and practices, and that they have authority over our judgements and practices.

This book is about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs.

This book offers a compelling examination of our moral and epistemic obligations to be reasonable people who seek to understand the social reality of those who are different from us. Considering the oppressive aspects of socially constructed ignorance, Heikes argues that ignorance produces both injustice and epistemic repression, before going on to explore how our moral and epistemic obligations to be understanding and reasonable can overcome the negative effects of ignorance.Through the combination of three separate areas of philosophical interest- ignorance, understanding, and reasonableness- Heikes seeks to find a way to correct for epistemological and moral injustices, satisfying needs in feminist theory and critical race theory for an epistemology that offers hope of overcoming the ethical problem of oppression.

Key topics covered include: · Curiosity as a subject in the history of philosophy· Curiosity as a possible ethical virtue· The importance of curiosity about oneself· Whether curiosity is good in itself or only as a means to an end (e.g.

Key topics covered include: · Curiosity as a subject in the history of philosophy· Curiosity as a possible ethical virtue· The importance of curiosity about oneself· Whether curiosity is good in itself or only as a means to an end (e.g.

This book examines epistemic pluralism, a brand new area of research in epistemology with dramatic implications for the discipline. Challenging traditional assumptions about the nature of justification, an expert team of contributors explores pluralism about justification, with compelling first-order results – including analysis of the various requisites one might want to impose on the notion of justification (and therefore of knowledge) and why. It is shown why a long-lasting dispute within epistemology about the nature of justification has reached a stalemate and how embracing a different overarching outlook might lead to progress and aid better appreciation of the relationship between the various epistemic projects scholars have been pursuing. With close connections to the idea of epistemic relativism, and with specific applications to various areas of contemporary epistemology (such as the debate over epistemic norms of action and assertion, epistemic peers' disagreement, self-knowledge and the status of philosophical disputes about ontology) this fascinating new volume is essential reading for scholars, researchers and advanced students in the discipline.

This book examines epistemic pluralism, a brand new area of research in epistemology with dramatic implications for the discipline. Challenging traditional assumptions about the nature of justification, an expert team of contributors explores pluralism about justification, with compelling first-order results – including analysis of the various requisites one might want to impose on the notion of justification (and therefore of knowledge) and why. It is shown why a long-lasting dispute within epistemology about the nature of justification has reached a stalemate and how embracing a different overarching outlook might lead to progress and aid better appreciation of the relationship between the various epistemic projects scholars have been pursuing. With close connections to the idea of epistemic relativism, and with specific applications to various areas of contemporary epistemology (such as the debate over epistemic norms of action and assertion, epistemic peers' disagreement, self-knowledge and the status of philosophical disputes about ontology) this fascinating new volume is essential reading for scholars, researchers and advanced students in the discipline.

Epistemic realists think that epistemic facts (such as the fact that you ought to believe what your evidence supports) exist independently of human judgements and practices, and that they have authority over our judgements and practices.