Practical Philosophy - Böcker

This book presents an answer to the question of why modern legal institutions and the idea of citizenship are important for leading a free life. The majority of views in political and legal philosophy regard the law merely as a useful instrument, employed to render our lives more secure and to enable us to engage in cooperate activities more efficiently. The view developed here defends a non-instrumentalist alternative of why the law matters. It identifies the law as a constitutive feature of our identities as citizens of modern states. The constitutivist argument rests on the (Kantian) assumption that a person’s practical identity (its normative self-conception as an agent) is the result of its actions. The law co-constitutes these identities because it maintains the external conditions that are necessary for the actions performed under its authority. Modern legal institutions provide these external prerequisites for achieving a high degree of individual self-constitution and freedom. Only public principles can establish our status as individuals who pursue their life plans and actions as a matter of right and not because others contingently happen to let us do so. The book thereby provides resources for a reply to anarchist challenges to the necessity of legal ordering.

Employing computer simulations for the study of the evolution of altruism has been popular since Axelrod's book „The Evolution of Cooperation“. But have the myriads of simulation studies that followed in Axelrod's footsteps really increased our knowledge about the evolution of altruism or cooperation? This book examines in detail the working mechanisms of simulation based evolutionary explanations of altruism. It shows that the „theoretical insights“ that can be derived from simulation studies are often quite arbitrary and of little use for the empirical research. In the final chapter of the book, therefore, a set of epistemological requirements for computer simulations is proposed and recommendations for the proper research design of simulation studies are made.

At the centre of the metaethical debate that took off from G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) was his critique of ethical naturalism. While Moore's own arguments against ethical naturalism find little acceptance these days, an alternative ground for thinking that ethical properties and facts could not be natural has gained prominence: No natural account can be given of normativity. This collection contains original essays from both sides of the debate. Representing a wide range of metaethical views, the authors develop diverse accounts of normativity and discuss what it means for a concept to be natural. Contributions are by Norbert Anwander, David Copp, Neil Roughley, Peter Schaber, Thomas Schmidt, Tatjana Tarkian, and Theo van Willigenburg.

Eric Voegelin is famous as a philosopher of history and a as one of the most eminent political scientists of the 20th century. His most fundamental work on political theory, the "New Science of Politics, is nowadays considered a classic in ist field. While the "New Science" has always been a very controversial book, ist critics have hardly ever taken the pain to pinpoint the weaknesses they condemmed Voegelins book for. There is, however, one exception: Only shortly after the appearance of Voegelins "New Science" in 1954, Hans Kelsen has written a most detailed reply to this book of his former student. This reply, which was known to Voegelin and is mentioned in his autobiography, is now being published by the ontos verlag. Being a distinguished philosopher himself of an erudition and breadth of knowledge that matches that of Eric Voegelin, Hans Kelsen is able to support the critical stance he takes on Voegelin "New Science" by clear and well founded argument. This critical reply to Voegelins "New Science" is not only an important contribution to the dispute about the foundations of political order in modern society, but will also prove valuable to readers generally interested in Voegelins life and work.

Humanitarian Interventions - that sounds nice; much nicer than wars, battles and use of military force. Foremost, the phrase makes you think of the delivery of sanitary goods, medication, of soup-kitchens. Here we are not supposed to think of interventions of this kind; we have to have humanitarian interventions in mind which are humanitarian intervention-wars. (I) At exactly what point is the use of military force a humanitarian intervention? What is the humanitarian aspect of those interventions? Their occasion? Their motive? Their alleged as well as their actual consequences? (II) At exactly what point are humanitarian intervention-wars morally justifiable? Are they justifiable even if they are wars of aggression breaching international law? And finally: (III) Was the war which was presented to us as the paradigmatic example of a humanitarian-intervention-war, that is: the war in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 (with over 37,000 bombing missions), really justifiable as a humanitarian intervention? Many of us wanted to believe so at the time. Does our ex ante judgement hold today in an ex post reflection? And which lessons for the future should we learn from the success or failure of this humanitarian war? These are the questions proposed in this book; therefore, it is concerned with problems of semantics (part I), problems of moral assessment (part II) and with the moral, legal and political conclusions we draw from our experiences with the war in Kosovo, our primary example of a humanitarian intervention (part III). International experts in the areas of philosophy, international law, sociology and peace studies debated these questions vigorously for several days. This is the resulting volume.

For many years value theory has figured high on the agenda of my interests, a fact attested by Introduction to Value Theory published by Prentice Hall in 1969. This interest has continued in recent years inter alia, finding earlier expressions in the articles constituting chapters 2-4 of the present book. (See the footnotes for publication details.) The remaining six chapters are new, and combine to form overall a synoptic overview of fundamental issues in the theory of value. 1. BY THE STANDARDS OF THEIR DAY 2. ON THE IMPORT AND RATIONALE OF VALUE ATTRIBUTION 3. NOMIC HIERACHIES AND PROBLEMS OF RELATIVISM 4. IS REASONING ABOUT VALUES VICIOUSLY CIRCULAR? 5. RATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE EVOLUTIONARY IMPETUS 6. EVALUATION AND THE FALLACY OF RESPECT NEGLECT 7. CREDIT FOR MAKING A DISCOVERY 8. OPTIMALISM AND THE RATIONALITY OF THE REAL (ON THE PROSPECT OF AXIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION) 9. THE REVOLT AGAINST ABSOLUTES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

What is desert? The aim of this book is to give an analysis of this notion. Starting from Feinberg's seminal paper, the argument goes on to Chisholm, 18th-century British Rationalism, and Kant, who developed the concept of propriety that is the foundation of the concept of desert and the key to understanding it. Beyond the analysis, the concept of desert is applied to two problems of moral philosophy, punishment and moral residue, that can be solved only by means of this notion. Desert is an indispensable moral concept we do well to understand clearly and to incorporate into our moral practice.

In our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one’s bus seat to the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand, too, that we may be praised or blamed for actions performed on the basis of these evaluations. The goal of this study is to illustrate the foundations that allow for these kinds of judgments.

The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and ‘applied’ ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.

Much of the recent literature on political perfectionism has focused on dealing with objections to this view. This book adopts a different approach: It attempts to highlight the intuitive appeal of liberal perfectionism by presenting a positive prima facie argument in its favour. The book starts by clarifying the relation between political perfectionism — a conception of politics — and prudential perfectionism and ethical perfectionism — a conception of the good life, and a type of ethical theory. It is crucial to start by selecting a plausible form of ethical perfectionism, as it makes an important difference to the plausibility of the political conception based upon it. Once appropriate distinctions are drawn and a plausible form of liberal perfectionism is endorsed, many of the standard objections to perfectionism are shown to fail to reach their target. Different arguments in favour of liberal perfectionism are then proposed and critically examined, but the resilience of some pragmatic arguments against liberal perfectionism is conceded. The book ends by showing that perfectionism can be surprisingly relevant for discussions of social justice and proceeds to draw a sketch of the perfectionist implications for questions of distributive justice.

Unless considered on a practical level, where a precise distribution of social goods is chosen, John Rawls’s and Gerald Cohen’s approaches to social justice cannot be complementary. Their disagreement about justice and its principles calls for a choice, which opts either for the Rawlsian theory or for the Cohenian one. What is the more plausible approach to social justice? This work compares both approaches and aims to defend Cohen’s position in the light of two considerations. It answers the philosophical question about the analysis of the idea of justice, which puts the virtue of justice in its philosophical context. It, however, presents a method everyone can apply in order to arrive at the fundamental principles of justice by employing the power of reason. An analysis of the concept of justice based on the power of reason should seek to uncover the ultimate nature of justice, which is independent of facts and of other virtues. Once exposed, the understanding of justice arrived at should inform social institutions and determine people’s daily decisions. A just society is therefore a society where just persons and just institutions exhibit the virtue of justice.

The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and ‘applied’ ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.

How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory – metaethical conativism – and defend it against some historically influential objections.

A Pragmatic Approach to Agency in Group Activity builds towards an action theory that explains how new forms agency develop in group activity. The approach starts from practical insights about group activity and develops a new understanding of agency from there.This study shows how practical interactions and structures in group activity disrupt individual agency. It is concluded that important features of agency can be realized on a group level. Different types of group activities are analyzed in order to better understand these mechanisms and, consequently, revisit our understanding of agency. It is argued that „intentionality,“ the key concept in individual action theory, merely serves as a pseudo-explanatory connection between specific features of agency and their realization in humans. This is contrasted with empirical research showing that how humans act is far from the idealized concept of intentionality. Consequently, intentionality as a key explanatory concept is rejected and replaced by a diverse set of features of agency for a similarly diverse set of kinds of agency. In this view, groups display new forms agency beyond individual agency without making the groups agents themselves. Such is the nature of group agency.

Should emotions play a role in our decisions, even if they are "just feelings" and not necessarily "imbued with reason" or cognitively penetrated? The author shows that such basic feelings as aversion and attraction can be important normative guides by disrupting engrained habits and beliefs, enabling us to reconsider our ways, which is important due to the ever-changing nature of ethical demands on us. Therefore, these feelings should guide our decisions, even if they are not cognitive. This book fi lls a gap in the philosophy of emotions, ethics, and virtue epistemology.

What is moral progress? Are we striving for moral progress when we seek to ‘make the world a better place’? What connects the different ways in which moral agents, their actions, and the world can become morally better? This book proposes an explication of the abstract concept of moral progress and explores its relation to our moral lives. Integrating the perspectives of rival normative theories, it draws a clear distinction between ethical and moral progress and makes the case that moral progress can neither happen merely in theory, nor come about by a fluke. Still, the ideal of moral progress as a deliberate improvement in practices with a positive impact on the world is but one of several types of moral progress, relating in different ways to the theoretical and practical capacities of moral agents. No elevated level of sophistication in these capacities is required for moral progress to be possible, and the abstract idea of moral progress need not be on moral agents’ minds in the pursuit of the morally better. However, a desire for impactful moral progress, far from being a moral fetish, marks a particularly valuable moral outlook.

How can criminal punishment be morally justified? Zisman addresses this classical question in legal philosophy. He provides two maybe surprising answers to the question. First, as for a methodological claim, it argues that this question cannot be answered by philosophers and legal scholars alone. Rather, we need to take into account research from social psychology, economy, anthropology, and so on in order to properly analyze the arguments in defense of criminal punishment. Second, the book argues that when such research is properly accounted for, none of the current attempts to justify criminal punishment succeed. But that does not imply that the state should do nothing about criminal wrongdoing. Rather, the arguments that were supposed to justify criminal punishment actually speak in favor of an alternative approach to criminal law: restitution to the victim and restorative justice. That is to say, the state should coerce offenders to provide restitution for the harm inflicted on victims, and whenever possible restorative approaches should be taken to address criminal wrongdoing.

What is moral progress? Are we striving for moral progress when we seek to ‘make the world a better place’? What connects the different ways in which moral agents, their actions, and the world can become morally better? This book proposes an explication of the abstract concept of moral progress and explores its relation to our moral lives. Integrating the perspectives of rival normative theories, it draws a clear distinction between ethical and moral progress and makes the case that moral progress can neither happen merely in theory, nor come about by a fluke. Still, the ideal of moral progress as a deliberate improvement in practices with a positive impact on the world is but one of several types of moral progress, relating in different ways to the theoretical and practical capacities of moral agents. No elevated level of sophistication in these capacities is required for moral progress to be possible, and the abstract idea of moral progress need not be on moral agents’ minds in the pursuit of the morally better. However, a desire for impactful moral progress, far from being a moral fetish, marks a particularly valuable moral outlook.

Should emotions play a role in our decisions, even if they are "just feelings" and not necessarily "imbued with reason" or cognitively penetrated? The author shows that such basic feelings as aversion and attraction can be important normative guides by disrupting engrained habits and beliefs, enabling us to reconsider our ways, which is important due to the ever-changing nature of ethical demands on us. Therefore, these feelings should guide our decisions, even if they are not cognitive. This book fi lls a gap in the philosophy of emotions, ethics, and virtue epistemology.