Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Mathematics and Physics – serie

This book offers a plurality of perspectives on the historical origins of logicism and on contemporary developments of logicist insights in philosophy of mathematics. It uniquely provides up-to-date research and novel interpretations on a variety of intertwined themes and historical figures related to different versions of logicism.The essays, written by prominent scholars, are divided into three thematic sections. Part I focuses on major authors like Frege, Dedekind, and Russell, providing a historical and theoretical exploration of such figures in the philosophical and mathematical milieu in which logicist views were first expounded. Part II sheds new light on the interconnections between these founding figures and a number of influential other traditions, represented by authors like Hilbert, Husserl, and Peano, as well as on the reconsideration of logicism by Carnap and the logical empiricists. Finally, Part III assesses the legacy of such authors and of logicist themes for contemporary philosophy of mathematics, offering new perspectives on highly debated topics—neo-logicism and its extension to accounts of ordinal numbers and set-theory, the comparison between neo-Fregean and neo-Dedekindian varieties of logicism, and the relation between logicist foundational issues and empirical research on numerical cognition—which define the prospects of logicism in the years to come.This book offers a comprehensive account of the development of logicism and its contemporary relevance for the logico-philosophical foundations of mathematics. It will be of interest to graduate students and researchers working in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of logic, and the history of analytic philosophy.

This book seeks to work out which commitments are minimally sufficient to obtain an ontology of the natural world that matches all of today’s well-established physical theories. We propose an ontology of the natural world that is defined only by two axioms: (1) There are distance relations that individuate simple objects, namely matter points. (2) The matter points are permanent, with the distances between them changing. Everything else comes in as a means to represent the change in the distance relations in a manner that is both as simple and as informative as possible. The book works this minimalist ontology out in philosophical as well as mathematical terms and shows how one can understand classical mechanics, quantum field theory and relativistic physics on the basis of this ontology. Along the way, we seek to achieve four subsidiary aims: (a) to make a case for a holistic individuation of the basic objects (ontic structural realism); (b) to work out a new version of Humeanism, dubbed Super-Humeanism, that does without natural properties; (c) to set out an ontology of quantum physics that is an alternative to quantum state realism and that avoids any ontological dualism of particles and fields; (d) to vindicate a relationalist ontology based on point objects also in the domain of relativistic physics.

This book is meant as a part of the larger contemporary philosophical project of naturalizing logico-mathematical knowledge, and addresses the key question that motivates most of the work in this field: What is philosophically relevant about the nature of logico-mathematical knowledge in recent research in psychology and cognitive science? The question about this distinctive kind of knowledge is rooted in Plato’s dialogues, and virtually all major philosophers have expressed interest in it. The essays in this collection tackle this important philosophical query from the perspective of the modern sciences of cognition, namely cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge contributes to consolidating a new, emerging direction in the philosophy of mathematics, which, while keeping the traditional concerns of this sub-discipline in sight, aims to engage with them in a scientifically-informed manner. A subsequent aim is to signal the philosophers’ willingness to enter into a fruitful dialogue with the community of cognitive scientists and psychologists by examining their methods and interpretive strategies.

The nature of reality has been a long-debated issue among scientists and philosophers. In 1930, Rabindranath Tagore and Albert Einstein had a long conversation on the nature of reality. This conversation has been widely quoted and discussed by scientists, philosophers and scholars from the literary world. The important question that Tagore and Einstein discussed was whether the world is a unity dependent on humanity, or the world is a reality independent on the human factor. Einstein took the stand adopted by Western philosophers and mathematicians, namely that reality is something independent of the mind and the human factor. Tagore, on the other hand, adopted the opposite view. Nevertheless, both Einstein and Tagore claimed to be realists despite the fundamental differences between their conceptions of reality. Where does the difference lie? Can it be harmonized at some deeper level? Can Wittgenstein, for example, be a bridge between the two views? This collection of essays explores these two fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of reality from the perspectives of theories of space-time, quantum theory, general philosophy of science, cognitive science and mathematics.

This book addresses the logical aspects of the foundations of scientific theories. Even though the relevance of formal methods in the study of scientific theories is now widely recognized and regaining prominence, the issues covered here are still not generally discussed in philosophy of science. The authors focus mainly on the role played by the underlying formal apparatuses employed in the construction of the models of scientific theories, relating the discussion with the so-called semantic approach to scientific theories. The book describes the role played by this metamathematical framework in three main aspects: considerations of formal languages employed to axiomatize scientific theories, the role of the axiomatic method itself, and the way set-theoretical structures, which play the role of the models of theories, are developed. The authors also discuss the differences and philosophical relevance of the two basic ways of aximoatizing a scientific theory, namely Patrick Suppes’ set theoretical predicates and the "da Costa and Chuaqui" approach. This book engages with important discussions of the nature of scientific theories and will be a useful resource for researchers and upper-level students working in philosophy of science.

This volume assembles cutting-edge scholarship on scientific understanding, scientific representation, and their delicate interplay. Featuring several articles in an engaging ‘critical conversation’ format, the volume integrates discussions about understanding and representation with perennial issues in the philosophy of science, including the nature of scientific knowledge, idealizations, scientific realism, scientific inference, and scientific progress.In the philosophy of science, questions of scientific understanding and scientific representation have only recently been put in dialogue with each other. The chapters advance these discussions from a variety of fresh perspectives. They range from case studies in physics, chemistry, and neuroscience to the representational challenges of machine learning models; from special forms of representation such as maps and topological models to the relation between understanding and explanation; and from the role of idealized representations to the role of representation and understanding in scientific progress.Scientific Understanding and Representation will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of mathematics, and epistemology.

This volume assembles cutting-edge scholarship on scientific understanding, scientific representation, and their delicate interplay. Featuring several articles in an engaging ‘critical conversation’ format, the volume integrates discussions about understanding and representation with perennial issues in the philosophy of science, including the nature of scientific knowledge, idealizations, scientific realism, scientific inference, and scientific progress.In the philosophy of science, questions of scientific understanding and scientific representation have only recently been put in dialogue with each other. The chapters advance these discussions from a variety of fresh perspectives. They range from case studies in physics, chemistry, and neuroscience to the representational challenges of machine learning models; from special forms of representation such as maps and topological models to the relation between understanding and explanation; and from the role of idealized representations to the role of representation and understanding in scientific progress.Scientific Understanding and Representation will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of mathematics, and epistemology.

This book provides an up-to-date overview of the foundations of spacetime physics. It features original essays written by world-class experts in the physics and philosophy of spacetime.The foundational questions regarding the origin and nature of spacetime are branching into new and exciting directions. These questions are not restricted to the quantum gravity program but also arise in the context of a well-established theory like general relativity. Against the background of these quick and diverse developments, this volume features a broad range of perspectives on spacetime. Part I focuses on the nature of spacetime in non-quantum theories, such as Newtonian mechanics and relativity. Part II explores some intriguing conceptual implications of developing a quantum theory of spacetime. The Foundations of Spacetime Physics is an essential resource for scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and scientific metaphysics.

This book provides an up-to-date overview of the foundations of spacetime physics. It features original essays written by world-class experts in the physics and philosophy of spacetime.The foundational questions regarding the origin and nature of spacetime are branching into new and exciting directions. These questions are not restricted to the quantum gravity program but also arise in the context of a well-established theory like general relativity. Against the background of these quick and diverse developments, this volume features a broad range of perspectives on spacetime. Part I focuses on the nature of spacetime in non-quantum theories, such as Newtonian mechanics and relativity. Part II explores some intriguing conceptual implications of developing a quantum theory of spacetime. The Foundations of Spacetime Physics is an essential resource for scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and scientific metaphysics.

This book offers a plurality of perspectives on the historical origins of logicism and on contemporary developments of logicist insights in philosophy of mathematics. It uniquely provides up-to-date research and novel interpretations on a variety of intertwined themes and historical figures related to different versions of logicism.The essays, written by prominent scholars, are divided into three thematic sections. Part I focuses on major authors like Frege, Dedekind, and Russell, providing a historical and theoretical exploration of such figures in the philosophical and mathematical milieu in which logicist views were first expounded. Part II sheds new light on the interconnections between these founding figures and a number of influential other traditions, represented by authors like Hilbert, Husserl, and Peano, as well as on the reconsideration of logicism by Carnap and the logical empiricists. Finally, Part III assesses the legacy of such authors and of logicist themes for contemporary philosophy of mathematics, offering new perspectives on highly debated topics—neo-logicism and its extension to accounts of ordinal numbers and set-theory, the comparison between neo-Fregean and neo-Dedekindian varieties of logicism, and the relation between logicist foundational issues and empirical research on numerical cognition—which define the prospects of logicism in the years to come.This book offers a comprehensive account of the development of logicism and its contemporary relevance for the logico-philosophical foundations of mathematics. It will be of interest to graduate students and researchers working in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of logic, and the history of analytic philosophy.

The nature of space and time is one of the most fascinating and fundamental philosophical issues which presently engages at the deepest level with physics. During the last thirty years this notion has been object of an intense critical review in the light of new scientific theories which try to combine the principles of both general relativity and quantum theory—called theories of quantum gravity. This book considers the way string theory shapes its own account of spacetime disappearance from the fundamental level.

This volume brings together philosophers and physicists to explore the parallels between Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism, and the phenomenological tradition. It is the first book exclusively devoted to phenomenology and quantum mechanics.By emphasizing the role of the subject’s experiences and expectations, and by explicitly rejecting the idea that the notion of physical reality could ever be reduced to a purely third-person perspective, QBism exhibits several interesting parallels with phenomenology. The central message of QBism is that quantum probabilities must be interpreted as the experiencing agent’s personal Bayesian degrees of belief – degrees of belief for the consequences of their actions on a quantum system. The chapters in this volume elaborate on whether and specify how phenomenology could serve as the philosophical foundation of QBism. This objective is pursued from the perspective of QBists engaging with phenomenology as well as the perspective of phenomenologists engaging with QBism. These approaches enable us to realize a better understanding of quantum mechanics and the world we live in, achieve a better understanding of QBsim, and introduce the phenomenological foundations of quantum mechanics.Phenomenology and QBism is an essential resource for researchers and graduate students working in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, quantum mechanics, and phenomenology.

This volume brings together philosophers and physicists to explore the parallels between Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism, and the phenomenological tradition. It is the first book exclusively devoted to phenomenology and quantum mechanics.By emphasizing the role of the subject’s experiences and expectations, and by explicitly rejecting the idea that the notion of physical reality could ever be reduced to a purely third-person perspective, QBism exhibits several interesting parallels with phenomenology. The central message of QBism is that quantum probabilities must be interpreted as the experiencing agent’s personal Bayesian degrees of belief – degrees of belief for the consequences of their actions on a quantum system. The chapters in this volume elaborate on whether and specify how phenomenology could serve as the philosophical foundation of QBism. This objective is pursued from the perspective of QBists engaging with phenomenology as well as the perspective of phenomenologists engaging with QBism. These approaches enable us to realize a better understanding of quantum mechanics and the world we live in, achieve a better understanding of QBsim, and introduce the phenomenological foundations of quantum mechanics.Phenomenology and QBism is an essential resource for researchers and graduate students working in the philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, quantum mechanics, and phenomenology.

This book argues that our current best theories of fundamental physics are best interpreted as positing spacetime as non-fundamental. It is written in accessible language and largely avoids mathematical technicalities by instead focusing on the key metaphysical and foundational lessons for the fundamentality of spacetime.According to orthodoxy, spacetime and spatiotemporal properties are regarded as fundamental structures of our world. Spacetime fundamentalism, however, faces challenges from speculative theories of quantum gravity – roughly speaking, the project of applying the lessons of quantum mechanics to gravitation and spacetime. This book demonstrates that the non-fundamentality of spacetime does not rely on speculative physics alone. Rather, one can give an interpretation of general relativity that supports some form of spacetime non-fundamentalism. The author makes the case for spacetime non-fundamentalism in three steps. First, he confronts the standard geometrical interpretation of general relativity with Brown and Pooley’s dynamical approach to relativity theory. Second, he considers an alternative derivation of the Einstein field equations, namely the classical spin-2 approach, and argues that it paves the way for a refined dynamical approach to general relativity. Finally, he argues that particle physics can serve as a continuity condition for the metaphysics of spacetime.The Non-Fundamentality of Spacetime will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and metaphysics.

This book argues that our current best theories of fundamental physics are best interpreted as positing spacetime as non-fundamental. It is written in accessible language and largely avoids mathematical technicalities by instead focusing on the key metaphysical and foundational lessons for the fundamentality of spacetime.According to orthodoxy, spacetime and spatiotemporal properties are regarded as fundamental structures of our world. Spacetime fundamentalism, however, faces challenges from speculative theories of quantum gravity – roughly speaking, the project of applying the lessons of quantum mechanics to gravitation and spacetime. This book demonstrates that the non-fundamentality of spacetime does not rely on speculative physics alone. Rather, one can give an interpretation of general relativity that supports some form of spacetime non-fundamentalism. The author makes the case for spacetime non-fundamentalism in three steps. First, he confronts the standard geometrical interpretation of general relativity with Brown and Pooley’s dynamical approach to relativity theory. Second, he considers an alternative derivation of the Einstein field equations, namely the classical spin-2 approach, and argues that it paves the way for a refined dynamical approach to general relativity. Finally, he argues that particle physics can serve as a continuity condition for the metaphysics of spacetime.The Non-Fundamentality of Spacetime will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, and metaphysics.

Events between which we have no epistemic reason to discriminate have equal epistemic probabilities. Bertrand’s chord paradox, however, appears to show this to be false, and thereby poses a general threat to probabilities for continuum sized state spaces. Articulating the nature of such spaces involves some deep mathematics and that is perhaps why the recent literature on Bertrand’s Paradox has been almost entirely from mathematicians and physicists, who have often deployed elegant mathematics of considerable sophistication. At the same time, the philosophy of probability has been left out. In particular, left out entirely are the philosophical ground of the principle of indifference, the nature of the principle itself, the stringent constraint this places on the mathematical representation of the principle needed for its application to continuum sized event spaces, and what these entail for rigour in developing the paradox itself. This book puts the philosophy and its entailments back in and in so doing casts a new light on the paradox, giving original analyses of the paradox, its possible solutions, the source of the paradox, the philosophical errors we make in attempting to solve it and what the paradox proves for the philosophy of probability. The book finishes with the author’s proposed solution—a solution in the spirit of Bertrand’s, indeed—in which an epistemic principle more general than the principle of indifference offers a principled restriction of the domain of the principle of indifference.Bertrand's Paradox and the Principle of Indifference will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in the philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, philosophy of science, probability theory and mathematical physics.

Events between which we have no epistemic reason to discriminate have equal epistemic probabilities. Bertrand’s chord paradox, however, appears to show this to be false, and thereby poses a general threat to probabilities for continuum sized state spaces. Articulating the nature of such spaces involves some deep mathematics and that is perhaps why the recent literature on Bertrand’s Paradox has been almost entirely from mathematicians and physicists, who have often deployed elegant mathematics of considerable sophistication. At the same time, the philosophy of probability has been left out. In particular, left out entirely are the philosophical ground of the principle of indifference, the nature of the principle itself, the stringent constraint this places on the mathematical representation of the principle needed for its application to continuum sized event spaces, and what these entail for rigour in developing the paradox itself. This book puts the philosophy and its entailments back in and in so doing casts a new light on the paradox, giving original analyses of the paradox, its possible solutions, the source of the paradox, the philosophical errors we make in attempting to solve it and what the paradox proves for the philosophy of probability. The book finishes with the author’s proposed solution—a solution in the spirit of Bertrand’s, indeed—in which an epistemic principle more general than the principle of indifference offers a principled restriction of the domain of the principle of indifference.Bertrand's Paradox and the Principle of Indifference will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in the philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, philosophy of science, probability theory and mathematical physics.

This volume argues that concepts from the theory of computation—including information theory, formal languages, and discrete structures—might provide novel paths towards a solution to the problem of quantum gravity. By combining elements of physics with computer science and mathematics, the volume proposes to transform the foundations of spacetime physics and bring it into the digital age.In recent years, it has become increasingly apparent a new theoretical framework will be needed to solve the problem of quantum gravity. This kind of framework—sometimes referred to as “pregeometry” or even “prephysics”—goes beyond conventional mathematical conceptions of space, time, and matter, seeking their building blocks in more fundamental elements. The essays in this volume explore this approach from a variety of perspectives, including physics-based, mathematical, computational, and philosophical. The new formal frameworks needed to discuss such approaches have their roots in homotopy type theory, formal language theory, and higher category theory; the computational perspective is informed by connections between pregeometric structures and formal proofs and programs. The new philosophical fulcrum supporting these new avenues is inspired by constructivism and meta-structures. By probing at a level of structure beneath the ordinary structures used in general relativity and quantum mechanics, this volume seeks to find new ways of showing how these higher-order structures can be constructed from the deeper elements. Quantum Gravity and Computation is an essential resource for scholars and graduate students interested in the philosophy of physics, quantum mechanics, and computational science.

Mathematics presents a fundamental puzzle: we possess extraordinary confidence in mathematical knowledge while struggling to explain how such knowledge is possible, especially in light of traditional realist conceptions of mathematics. This book solves this puzzle by resolving the tension between mathematical knowledge and mathematical realism through the development of an innovative accommodationist theory of reference in mathematics.The book provides an account of mathematical reference utilizing detailed case studies of mathematical induction, aspects of computability theory, and compactness phenomena in mathematics and logic. It answers two of the most significant and persistent open questions in the philosophy of mathematics: the Benacerraf-Field Challenge, which defies us to explain the reliability of mathematicians' mathematical beliefs, and the question of mathematical realism. By adapting Richard Boyd's influential theory of scientific reference to mathematics, the book shows how mathematical terms successfully refer through accommodation between mathematical practices and stable features of mathematical phenomena, while preserving traditional views of mathematical knowledge as both a priori and foundationalist.Accommodationism in Mathematics will appeal to researchers and graduate students working in philosophy and foundations of mathematics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and epistemology, as well as foundationally-minded mathematicians.

This book is meant as a part of the larger contemporary philosophical project of naturalizing logico-mathematical knowledge, and addresses the key question that motivates most of the work in this field: What is philosophically relevant about the nature of logico-mathematical knowledge in recent research in psychology and cognitive science? The question about this distinctive kind of knowledge is rooted in Plato’s dialogues, and virtually all major philosophers have expressed interest in it. The essays in this collection tackle this important philosophical query from the perspective of the modern sciences of cognition, namely cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge contributes to consolidating a new, emerging direction in the philosophy of mathematics, which, while keeping the traditional concerns of this sub-discipline in sight, aims to engage with them in a scientifically-informed manner. A subsequent aim is to signal the philosophers’ willingness to enter into a fruitful dialogue with the community of cognitive scientists and psychologists by examining their methods and interpretive strategies.

This book seeks to work out which commitments are minimally sufficient to obtain an ontology of the natural world that matches all of today’s well-established physical theories. We propose an ontology of the natural world that is defined only by two axioms: (1) There are distance relations that individuate simple objects, namely matter points. (2) The matter points are permanent, with the distances between them changing. Everything else comes in as a means to represent the change in the distance relations in a manner that is both as simple and as informative as possible. The book works this minimalist ontology out in philosophical as well as mathematical terms and shows how one can understand classical mechanics, quantum field theory and relativistic physics on the basis of this ontology. Along the way, we seek to achieve four subsidiary aims: (a) to make a case for a holistic individuation of the basic objects (ontic structural realism); (b) to work out a new version of Humeanism, dubbed Super-Humeanism, that does without natural properties; (c) to set out an ontology of quantum physics that is an alternative to quantum state realism and that avoids any ontological dualism of particles and fields; (d) to vindicate a relationalist ontology based on point objects also in the domain of relativistic physics.

This book addresses the logical aspects of the foundations of scientific theories. Even though the relevance of formal methods in the study of scientific theories is now widely recognized and regaining prominence, the issues covered here are still not generally discussed in philosophy of science. The authors focus mainly on the role played by the underlying formal apparatuses employed in the construction of the models of scientific theories, relating the discussion with the so-called semantic approach to scientific theories. The book describes the role played by this metamathematical framework in three main aspects: considerations of formal languages employed to axiomatize scientific theories, the role of the axiomatic method itself, and the way set-theoretical structures, which play the role of the models of theories, are developed. The authors also discuss the differences and philosophical relevance of the two basic ways of aximoatizing a scientific theory, namely Patrick Suppes’ set theoretical predicates and the "da Costa and Chuaqui" approach. This book engages with important discussions of the nature of scientific theories and will be a useful resource for researchers and upper-level students working in philosophy of science.

The nature of reality has been a long-debated issue among scientists and philosophers. In 1930, Rabindranath Tagore and Albert Einstein had a long conversation on the nature of reality. This conversation has been widely quoted and discussed by scientists, philosophers and scholars from the literary world. The important question that Tagore and Einstein discussed was whether the world is a unity dependent on humanity, or the world is a reality independent on the human factor. Einstein took the stand adopted by Western philosophers and mathematicians, namely that reality is something independent of the mind and the human factor. Tagore, on the other hand, adopted the opposite view. Nevertheless, both Einstein and Tagore claimed to be realists despite the fundamental differences between their conceptions of reality. Where does the difference lie? Can it be harmonized at some deeper level? Can Wittgenstein, for example, be a bridge between the two views? This collection of essays explores these two fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of reality from the perspectives of theories of space-time, quantum theory, general philosophy of science, cognitive science and mathematics.